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CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
EXERCISED THROUGH RESTRAINT OF THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
In the year 1967, the Congress of the United States exerted its
influence on foreign policy be exercising restraint of the United States
Military Assistance Program.
The argument of this thesis is that the executive branch invited
legislative oversight and, ultimately, restraint of the Military Assis-
tance Program by following a policy of deliberate obfus cation of some
of the workings of the program and by disregarding the interests of the
Congress. Further, that the executive branch made the Military Assis-
tance Program vulnerable to congressional criticism by so extending
its size that much of the program no longer corresponded to its original
supporting rationale.
The factors which led to the imposition of restraint on the Mili-
tary Assistance Program by the 90th Congress were the following:
- The executive branch, in the interest of iniproving the balance
of payments, had encouraged an aggressive arms sales program. The
civilian head of the sales program was given coequal status with the

Director of Military Assistance (although arms sales were supposed
to be integrated with and subordinated to overall rrdiitary assistance)
and was provided with potent instruments to facilitate sales. These
were: a Department of Defense guarantee authority on credit sales;
a revolving fund (which was not really subject to congressional scru-
tiny); and the lending facilities of the Export - Iniport Bank (which, when
used without full disclosure being made to the Bank, were known as
'Country - X loans "). By 1967, the value of arms sales had grown to
four times the value of grants made under the Military Assistance
Program and nearly 26% of the Export - Iraport Bank' s lending authority
was committed to credit arms sales. The executive branch did not
advise the appropriate committees of the Congress as to the mechanics
of this sales program or as to the Bank's involvement. When the
intricacies of the prograin were finally made known to the Congress
(by a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) there
was considerable indignation and the executive branch lost the sympathy
ofmany members of the Congress who had routinely supported the
Military Assistance Program.
- The executive branch, by allowing v/ide latitude for arms sales,
invited criticism of its decision-making apparatus. The Congress
uncovered evidence v/hich conflicted with the administration's claims
that all sales were considered in a coordinated manner and by the
highest officials of the executive branch. The administration was
never able to convince the Congress that at least some sales had not

been made by "middle level" officials and made without appropriate
interdepartmental coordination. In particular, the Congress was
displeased to find that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had
never been truly integrated into the decision-making process.
- The executive branch, pursuant to a philosophy which saw the
United States as a "world policeman," had incorporated 58 countries
within the Military Assistance Program. Whereas the original
rationale for providing military assistance had been the support of
free nations against communist military aggression (and, also as
quid pro quo for base rights required by the planned response to
such aggression), that rationale had, by 1967, been extended and
modified to include "internal security," "influence, " and in the
case of certain Middle Eastern countries, "balancing." In fact,
the rationale for providing military assistance had been stretched
to allow for support of any nation not an avowed enemy of the United
States. This inflation of the program made it vulnerable to congres-
sional criticism by those concerned with the program's contribution
to regional conflicts, arms races, dictatorships, and politically
unreliable allies. Military assistance -- and particularly its arms
sales coinponent -- was seen in competition with econoinic assistance
(and, on occasion, at cross-purposes with economic assistance); its
growth and wide application were criticized as a manifestation of the
military-industrial complex, and profits earned through the sales
program were characterized as " blood money. "

- The executive branch badly underestimated the determination
of the Congress to assert its influence on foreign policy, to curtail
federal spending, and to exercise greater legislative oversight and
control of the Military Assistance Program. Administration attempts
to reassure the Congress as to the propriety of its military assistance
expenditures and its arms sales decision-making apparatus were tardy,
uncoordinated, and, in some cases, inept.
- Finally, the rising costs of the war in Vietnam and the pressures
for increased domestic expenditures competed with the budget require-
ments of the military and economic assistance prograras and caused
further erosion of congressional sympathy for those programs.
The following restraints were imposed upon the Military
Assistance Program by the 90th Congress:
- The military assistance budget was reduced to $400 inillion
(the administration had requested $596 inillion).
- Ceilings v/ere set on military assistance expenditures to
Latin America and Africa ($75 million and $40 million respectively).
- The Department of Defense guarantee authority was terminated.
(This was restored, however, under tight congressional control, by
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. )
- The Department of Defense revolving fund was abolished.
(Funds used to facilitate credit arras sales were henceforth appro-
priated under the Foreign Military Sales Act and were, therefore,
subject to congressional authority. )

- Periodic reports were levied on the executiv^e branch to insure
that the Congress would be informed of military assistance and arms
sales developments in a timely manner.
- The Export - Inaport Bank was prohibited from using its facilities
for the financing of credit arras sales to less developed countries.
- The executive branch was prohibited from dispensing "sophisti-
cated weapons" to "underdeveloped countries." (This was one of the so-
called Conte-Long amendments -- it included certa-in exceptions and
provided for further exceptions in cases wherein tke President decided
that an exception was "vital to the national security of the United
States." )
- The executive branch was required to monitor the defense
expenditures of "underdeveloped countries" for "sophisticated weapons"
purchased fronn sources other than the United States and to withhold
like amounts of economic assistance. (This was the second of the
Conte-Long amendments -- again, certain countries were excepted
from the required penalties and the President was empowered to make
additional exceptions in cases "vital to the national security of the
United States." )
- The executive branch was required to monitor " unnecessary
military expenditures" on the part of recipients of United States
economic assistance in order to detect any "diversion of resources,"
and further required to withhold all economic assistance wherever
such "diversion " was judged to exist until it was terminated.

Although Secretary of Defense McNamara had predicted that the
results of this restraint would be " disastrous, " the Military Assistance
Program continued to function. The small appropriation for fiscal
year 1968 was augmented with funds previously appropriated but not
yet expended (this source was known as the "pipeline" ). The head
of the arms sales program was subordinated to the Director of Military
Assistance and the sales procedure was moderated under the control
of the Foreign Military Sales Act. Interdepartmental coordination
and even some coordination with the Congress became part of the
administrative response to the Conte-Long and Symington amendments.
There can be no question that the Congress, in exercising these
restraints of the Military Assistance Program, influenced United States
foreign policy. Executive branch hegemony of foreign policy was
circumscribed by this legislative control of one of its principal policy
making implements. The Congress, by acting as it did, may well
have averted undesirable United States commitments and responsibilities
abroad. Certainly, real limitations were placed on the making of
commitments and the incurring of responsibilities and United States
involvement as a "world policeman" Vv'as at least somewhat curtailed.
The undesirable aspects of some of the legislation, however,
Ipegs comment and analysis. The language of the Conte-Long and
Symington amendments was vague in the extreme. "Sophisticated
weapons," "underdeveloped countries," and " unneces sary military
expenditures" are all relative terms and they are not subject to easy

definition. Consistent and intelligent administration of these amend-
ments is an extremely difficult process. Moreover, the intent of the
amendments unmasks an arrogance of power that is both unseemly
and dangerous. The required monitoring process demands intelligence
collection of a wide order and risks foreign indignation. Further, and
much more serious, the impact of passage of such public legislation
must be regarded as blackmail by the recipients of United States
economic assistance. It is, to a degree, an intrusion on their sover-
eignty and an interference in their affairs. The ex;a.ctment of either
the Conte-Long or the Symington penalties can have no other effect
than to cause alienation and resentment -- the opposites of the attitudes
which the foreign assistance program endeavors to produce. Unfortunate-
ly, data which might prove these conclusions is classified and the State
Department has denied its release.
In summary, then, the influence which the Congress exerted on
foreign policy through restraint of the Military Assistance Program
was of mixed value. The curbs placed upon the arms sales program
were probably timely and beneficial. The Conte-Long and Symington
provisions, however, if interpreted strictly, could affect United States
foreign policy in dangerous and counterproductive ways. On balance,
it would seem that the Congress, in its rush to make its influence felt,
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PREFACE-
While studying at the Fletcher School of Lav/ and Diplomacy
during the years 1964 to 1966, I had the benefit of participating in
many discussions with Dr. Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic
History, on the subject of the relative influence of the branches of
the United States Government on foreign policy. It was Dr. Bartlett's
purpose, I believe, to make his students aware of the duties and respon-
sibilities of the Executive cuid of the Congress in regard to the exercise
of influence and also aware of the dangers inherent in any abuse of
that influence.
Later, during the period 1967 to 1969, I had the opportunity to
observe from close range one of the periodic efforts of the Congress
to assert its influence on foreign policy. As Strategic Plans Officer
for Allied Forces on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, I was
engaged in the development of allied forces whose strengths and
capabilities were designed to supplement United States forces within
a global structure of collective security. The primary implement
of that development was the Military Assistance Program. In 1967,
a somewhat disjointed -- but nevertheless effective -- congressional
campaign succeeded in severely restraining that program. . It has been
my intention, in writing this thesis, to return to that time and, hopefully
iii

divorced from the parochial fervor which I felt then,, make an objec-
tive analysis of congressional - executive interactions which produced
the restraint.
I have been encouraged in my research and A;vriting by my thesis
advisor, Dr. Geoffrey T. H. Kemp, Professor of International Affairs,
and a specialist in defense planning and military assistance. Whatever
academic value this thesis might claim is certainly a reflection of
Professor Kemp's acute perception, his attention to detail, and his
thorough knowledge of the subject matter.
For their cooperation with my research I am indebted to Dr.
Seth Tillman, Consultant for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
Dr. William B. Bader, formally a member of the staff of that commit-
tee and now with the Ford Foundation in Paris; Mr. Edward M. Feather-
stone, of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales, Departraent of
State; The Honorable Silvio O. Conte, Congressman from Massachusetts,
and The Honorable William B. Widnail, Congressma-n from New Jersey.
I am also indebted to the many other officials of both the executive and
legislative branches who allowed me to examine their files and who
guided me in nay search for materials. Mrs. Nan. A. Johnson, the
Librarian of the Edwin Ginn Library, and her competent staff were
particularly helpful. I am grateful to Mrs. Barbara Schwartz of
Medford for her patient labor in typing the manuscript and I am especial-
ly appreciative of the generous forbearance of my five children, without




I CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. ... 1
Introduction and Statement of the Thesis 1
The Nature of Congressional Influence 5
The Military Assistance Program 8
Background and Supporting Rationale 8
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 14
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 17
Military Assistance Sales and the Decision
Making Apparatus 20
The Senior Interdepartmental Group 32
^_^
The Role of the Congress in Legislative Oversight
of Military Assistance 38
The Changing Function of the Congress 38
The Power of Standing Committees 44
Congressional Oversight of the Military Assis-
tance Program 48
Summary 64
n THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM IS CHALLENGED .... 66
m RESTRAINT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- INITIAL HEARINGS. .91
Hearings Before the Disarmament Subcommittee 91
Hearings Before the Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Subcommittee 120
IV RESTRAINT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE --HEARINGS ON
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967 170
Hearings Before the House Committee on Appropriations . . 174
Testimony of Mr. Linder 175
Testimony of the Secretary of Defense 180
Testimony of Mr. Kuss and Vice Admiral Heinz 202

VI
Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs . . 248
Testimony of the Secretary of Defense 250
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations 264
Testimony of the Secretary of State 265
Coverage by the Press 279
Testimony of the Secretary of Defense 288
V RESTRAINT ON-THE EXPORT - IMPORT BANK 3 03
Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency 306
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency 345
VI THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINT TAKES FORM 365
Passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 366
The Form of Restraint in the Authorization Act 390
Passage of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies . .
Appropriations Act of 1968 399
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations 401
Passage of the Export - Import Bank Extension Act
of 1968 428
Vn EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO RESTRAINT OF THE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 438
Executive Response to Fiscal Restraint 439
Executive Response to Operational Restraint 444
Executive Response to Administrative Restraint 458
Summary of Response 461
VIU ANALYSIS OF RESTRAINT OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM 467
Summation of Congressional-Executive Interactions .... 467
Evidence in Support of the Thesis 478






A. Percent of Foreign Assistance Program 1950 - 1967
Represented by Military Assistance 499
B. Function and Duties of a MAAG in a Country
Receiving Military Grant Assista_nce 500
C. U.S. Arms Sales, Grants -- 1952-69 501
D. Military Assistance Program Deliveries/Expenditures, and
Deliveries of Foreign Military Sales, By Fiscal Years . . . 502
E. Committees of the Congress and Biographical Notes 506
F. The Leaders in Arms Sales Overseas 512
G. Foreign Military Sales Program By Weapons Systems; Fiscal
Years 1962 - 1966 and Outstanding Comrn-itments 513
H. Dr. William B. Bader letters, dated November 2, 1971 and
January 27, 1972 (with questions asked by the author). . . . 514
I. Correspondence Between Senator Albert Gore and Various
Departments and Agencies of the United States
Government 522
J. Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton's "rebuttal"
letter to Senator Gore 527
K. Memorandum of Senator Morse to the Gore Sobcommittee . . . 530
L. Organization of International Logistics Negotiations, OASD/ISA. 531
M. Export - Import Bank (history and functions) 532





O. Explanation of Amendments Proposed By the Executive
Branch to Part II (MAP) of the FAA of 19fel 535
P. Military Assistance Summary Status of Funds, 1950-1967 . . . 537
Q. Mr. Edward M. Featherstone letter, dated March 7, 197Z . . 538
R. Congressman Silvio O. Conte letter, dated April 27, 1972. . . 539

CHAPTER I
CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE THESIS
Periodically the Congress of the United States is given to
testing its influence on foreign policy. On occasion, this testing has
provided spectacular struggles with the executive branch --as when
the Senate thwarted President Wilson from enlisting the United States
in the League of Nations. More frequently, however, congressional
efforts to share in the conduct and control of Araerican foreign policy
take the form of congressional - executive interactions which are less
than spectacular for being only partially visible to the general public.
The complexities inherent in most modern foreign policy issues and
the adversary relationship which the United States has shared since
World War II with the Soviet Union have sometimes led the executive
practitioners of foreign policy to obscure intentionally their plans
and programs, not only from the public, but from the Congress as well.
Tests of congressional influence in cases where the nature or extent
of executive activities have not been completely disclosed most often
involve interactions spread over long time periods and too intricate
to lend themselves to wide public interest. Such tests, however, are

precisely the instruments which best define the limits of executive
power in the foreign policy arena. Only when the Congress has over-
come its own institutional inertia to probe deeply into an issue, and
then has gone on to overcome the institutional resistance of the execu-
tive branch to find its information, is the President truly reminded
that his hegemony over foreign policy is subject to challenge by a
constitutional partner. When the Congress finds cause to assert its
own views on some facet of foreign policy through legislation the
President and his executive bureaucracy are informed as to how and
where their prerogatives are circumscribed. The prudent bureaucrat
will, therefore, benefit from a close examination of the circumstances
and the outconae of each test of congressional influence.
In the year 1967, the Congress challenged the purpose and con-
duct of the United States Military Assistance Program. This program,
together with a comprehensive program of economic assistance,
composes American foreign assistance --a nearly worldwide manifes-
tation of United States foreign policy. Out of the challenge to military
assistance grew an inaportant test of congressional influence, a test
which involved numerous interactions, and one which, in the end,helped
to define both the limits of executive power in making foreign policy
and the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the Congress itself.
This thesis will undertake a critical exann.ination of the circumstances
and the outcome of this recent example of congressional influence on
foreign policy as it came to be exercised through restraint of the

United States Military Assistance Program.
The argument of this thesis is two-fold: first, that the executive
branch, partly through deliberate obfuscation of certain aspects of the
administration of military assistance, and partly through almost
cavalier disregard of congressional interests and opinions, invited a
test of influence which could only end in legislative restraint; and,
second, that the Military Assistance Program had, by 1967, been so
expanded by the executive branch that it no longer rested stably on
the structural rationale which originally supported it.
In order to demonstrate this thesis it is necessary to look
beyond published descriptions of the Military Assistctnce Program as
it existed prior to and during 1967, It is also necessary to look
beyond what may be considered as strictly the legistative histories of
the laws which were passed by the 90th Congress in restraint of mili-
tary assistance. The subsequent pages of this thesis reflect an examin-
ation into the Military Assistance Program as it was administrated
ajid conceptualized by its overseers in the executive branch and as it
was perceived and criticized -- and ultimately restrained -- by mem-
bers of the Congress. Only by reviewing in detail the congressional -
executive dialogue on military assistance as it developed through 1967
is it possible to determine with any accuracy either bureaucratic
motivations in the prosecution of such a progrann (as an organ of
foreign policy) or the real intentions of the Congress in choosing this
issue for a test of influence. Throughout this thesis executive

officials and legislators speak their views of the Military Assistance
Program, its goals, its faults, and its probable effects on both donor
and recipient nations. Evidence of obfuscation or misapplication of
the program on the one hand, or of its justification or propriety on the
other, is presented insofar as possible from the direct testimony of
those responsible for the Military Assistance Program. While the
hearings which were held incident to the passage of restraining legis-
lation serve as the source of the greater part of this congressional -
executive dialogue, material drawn from congressional publications
other than hearings, personal interviews, correspondence, and the
press completes the dialogue and assists in keeping the issue of control
of military assistance in perspective.
Three benefits accrue to utilization of this methodology in demon-
strating the thesis: first, a certain continuity is permitted in address-
ing an exposition of the Military Assistance Program which was spread
over a long time period; second, the fabric of questions and answers
which comprise most of the dialogue clarifies in relief many of the
intricacies inherent in the program; and, third, the reader is afforded
the opportunity to draw his conclusions from the evidence in step with
the author.
Effort has been made to provide all the material obtainable which
is pertinent to this test of congressional influence on foreign policy
without any bias either in selection or manner of presentation.

The Nature of Congressional Influence
Students of American foreign policy have long realized that, at
least since the beginning of this century, the Congress of the United
States has generally deferred to the executive branch the function of
innovation and has seemingly contented itself with legitimizing the
decisions of the President and of his bureaucrary. There have been,
of course, a few substantive exceptions to this apparent waiver of
initiative -- the laws regulating immigration probably being the most
notable. This is not to say that the Congress has, through the years,
become disinterested in American foreign policy; on the contrary,
there is ample evidence which indicates a growing willingness of the
members of the Congress to question the decisions of the executive
branch and to better inform themselves about international issues.
This attitude, however, is one of reaction to programs already in
progress -- seldom does it trigger new enterprise in the field of
foreign relations. ^
1/ The reader is referred to James H. Robinson, Congress and
Foreign Policy - Making, (Honaewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc.
,
1962) for an excellent analysis of legislative initiative. In Mr. Robin-
son's view, the most important example of congressional initiative
in modern foreign policy was the Monroney Resolution of 1958, which
led to the creation of the International Development Association. The
author points out that, although more foreign policy proposals actually
originate in the Congress than in the executive branch, the executive
proposals are far more substantive and always receive the most




If the Congress has allowed the executive to take the lead in
devising the essential manner and direction of foreign policy, it has
in no way abdicated its function of exerting influence on either manner
or direction. This it is empowered to do through certain prerogatives
given it by the Constitution -- the Senate having the province of
"advice and consent" over treaties and presidential appointments, and
the House of Representatives that of budget appropriations. These
and other prerogatives (more institutional than constitutional) permit
the Congress to examine and evaluate proposed cind ongoing endeavors
in foreign policy undertaken by the executive brauich. The procedure
of examination and evaluation, coupled with the cardinal power of
legislative approval or disapproval, constitutes congressional influence.
Some understanding of this influence, its changing nature and its
methods of application, is essential for both aspiring and practicing
makers of foreign policy.
By way of providing a contribution to such understanding, this
thesis investigates congressional influence on foreign policy as it was
applied on an individual occasion through restraint on the Military
Assistance Program -- one of the naost ambitious and expensive
ventures in international affairs ever entertained by the United States
Government. Particular focus is directed upon congressional -
executive interaction incident to the passage of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967 and related legislation. A review of this interaction will
serve to illustrate the most significant facets of congressional influence

-- among which are: the manner in which the Congress arrives at
the conceptualization of an issue; the procedure of program examina-
tion as it is manifested in congressional hearing;®; the tendency to
fragment issues according to personal philosophies (which makes
comprehensive influence difficult to achieve); aiid the harnessing of
congressional energies in the interest of passing legislation.
This review of the efforts of the Congress to project its collect-
ive will on United States foreign policy by legislating restrictive
changes to the Military Assistance Program proceeds in the following
order:
a. The Military Assistance Program (its background, support-
ing rationale, ajid development to 1967) is juxtaposed with the disquiet
it caused among certain members of the Congress and with the challenge
which was raised to it in early 1967.
b. Pertinent testimony from the several committee hearings
held on the subject of the Military Assistance Program (as a part of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967) and closely related subjects is
set out, together with accompanying explanation and analysis, in an
effort to represent the positions and opinions of the time as accurately
as possible,
c. The enactment of legislation restraining the Military Assis-
tance Program, in accordance with various congressional tastes, is
recounted and followed by analysis of the administrative techniques
employed by the executive branch in its response to the legislation.

d. Finally, this particular example of a congressional sortie
against a relatively well-entrenched executive program is critiqued
in terms of necessity, efficienty, and its likely impact on United
States foreign policy.
THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Background and Supporting Rationale
It is probably fair to identify the first step toward the Military
Assistance Program which was formerly established in 1961 with the
$400 million which President Harry S. Truman asked the Congress to
provide for the defense of Greece and Turkey on March 12, 1947.
The vast amounts of military assistance delivered to American allies
during World War II under the "Lend - Lease" Program had been
manufactured, shipped, and consumed in the interest of disposing of
the Axis Powers. It was in response to a new threat from a different
quarter that the United States embraced the Truman Doctrine (". . .
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
2
attempted subjugation by armed rainorities or by outside pressures. " )
and, after a two year pause, recommenced sending military equip-
ment abroad. Disillusioned with the post-war conduct of the Soviet
Union and concerned with the existence of the newly won world order,
2/ U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st session.
Vol. 9"3, pt. 2, (March 12, 1947), p. 1981.

the Congress strongly endorsed this opening campaign in \ hat Waiter
Lippman called "the Cold War. "^ In contrast to the ambivalent and
rather haphazard nature of the initial steps taken by the United States
against the Axis, the Truman Doctrine, with its conconaitant provision
of military equipment, seemed a positive and laudable move. In the
opinion of The New York Times, "the epoch of isolation and occasion-
al intervention is ended; it is being replaced by an epoch of American
4
responsibility. "
This first military assistance effort in aid of an anti- communist
rationale, whether epochal or not, netted some success. The Soviet
Union ceased making territorial demands on Turkey and, in October,
1949, the civil war in Greece ended with the defeat of the last commu-
nist guerrillas. By that time, however, Soviet attention had shifted
to another focal point in Europe. The Berlin blockade (April, 1948 -
May, 1949) and Soviet objections to the creation of a new German
state (the Federal Republic) prompted the negotiation of the North
Atlantic Treaty (signed April 4, 1949). In committing itself to its
first formal military alliance with any part of Europe since 1778, the
United States opted for collective security with the intimation that
whatever responsibility prevailed was to be shared among the twelve
3/ Walter Lippman, The Cold War: A Study In United States
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947).
4/ The New York Times, March 12, 1947,
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signatories. 5 The other members of the alliance, however, lacked
the means to share in arming for a viable defense against Soviet
aggression. Realizing this, they formally requested military assis-
tance from the United States. Treated with some urgency -- perhaps
due to the revelation, on September 23, 1949, that the Soviet Union
had detonated a nuclear device -- this request was answered by the
United States Government with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
(signed by President Truman on October 6, 1949), and, subsequently,
(on January 27, 1950) with bilateral agreements which arranged for
the transfer of United States military equipment to the European mem-
bers of NATO.
In proposing the Mutual Defense Assistance Act to the Congress,
the President had asked that the members authorize "military aid to
free nations to enable them to protect themselves against the threat
of aggression. "° A total of $1.4 billion was requested to establish
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. It would be the function of
this program to administer three kinds of grant military assistance:
1. Machinery and materials to permit Europe to increase its
5/ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United
States were the original members of the alliance. Greece and Turkey
joined in February, 1952 and West Germany was formally admitted to
membership in May, 1955.
bj President Harry S. Truman, Message to the Congress, July
25, 1949, quoted in U. S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance
Facts (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).
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own production of military items without seriously interfering with
economic recovery;
2. direct transfer of military equipment; and,
3. expert help in the production and use of military equipment
and training of personnel.
The term "grant" meant, of course, "free" as far as the
recipient countries v/ere concerned. The Congress authorized and
appropriated nearly all of the funds requested ($1, 314 million) and by
April 1, 1950, the first aircraft and weapons were arriving in Europe.
Military assistance which had been flowing to Greece and Turkey under
separate legislation was incorporated into the Mutual Defense Assistance
Progrann.
Another separate program of military assistance was also in-
corporated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. There had been
one exception to the termination of military equipment transfers under
the World War II "Lend - Lease" Program -- Nationalist China had
continued to receive nnilitary assistance due to the exigencies of its
internal struggle with the communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Between
August 1945 and December 1946, the Nationalists received over a
billion dollars of "lend - lease" military equipment.^ Following
Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Formosa (Taiwan) in December 1949, and
7/ For infornraation on United States military assistance to
Nationalist China during the period 1945 - 1948, see U.S. Department
of State
,
United States Relations with China (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949).
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in view of the "thirty- year treaty of friendship" which the Chinese
Communist Government concluded with the Soviet Union (February,
1950), it was considered appropriate that Nationalist China should be
added to the list of countries which were to receive free military
assistajice according to the new legislation. Thus, the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program was stretched for the first time to respond to a
threat other than that envisioned in its initial rationale.
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 19 50, the
"epoch of American responsibility" was discovered to contain another
dimension -- the "free peoples" of the Truman Doctrine not only
lived in Europe, it seemed, but elsewhere as well. George F. Kennan,
as head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department in 1947,
had advocated a policy of containment vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
He had characterized his proposed policy as being a "long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tenden-
cies. " This containment, he warned, would have to be implemented
"at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,
corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. " Nearly
a year after Mr. Kennan' s idea had been aired -- and as a tactic to
prepare the way for the North Atlantic Treaty -- the Senate was asked
to approve a resolution authored by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
(R - Mich. ) which reconnmended the negotiation of "regional and other
8/ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct, " _/un-
signecFarticie? Foreign Affairs, Volume XXV, July 1947, pp. 575-576,
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collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense.
""
The Senate did so with only four dissenting votes. By the time of the
Chinese Communist linkage with the Soviet Union, both the philosophical
and, to some extent, the political framework for a whole system of
containment alliances already existed. The Korean War and the
Chinese Communist intervention (on November 26, 1950) opened up a
whole new family of client states for the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program.
There was, during this early post World War II period, one other
rationale (besides the aid to "free peoples" of the Truman Doctrine
and the containment of connmunism philosophy which nourished NATO
and other, later alliances) that brought about incorporation of states
into a single comprehensive United States military assistance plan.
Since the Philippines had been taken from Spain and formally annexed
(in 1899), the United States had maintained bases in the archipelago
by way of providing a serious presence in the Far East. Having had
to "re-earn" those bases during World War II, and desiring to retain
no less of a presence in the western Pacific after the war, it became
necessary, with Philippine independence, to purchase rights for the
continued use of the bases. This quid pro quo was arranged in the
passage of the Philippines Military Assistance Act of 1946 and in a
1947 "base rights" treaty which secured for the United States
9/ U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd session.
Vol. 9~4, pt. 6, (June 11, 1948), p. 7791.

14
99-year leases for fifteen army bases and naval operating areas.
As the primary rationale of containment of the Soviet Union and
the Chinese Communists spawned clients for United States military
assistance whose potential contribution to hostilities would be fighting
men, this secondary rationale of free military assistance in return
for base rights would generate its own small clientele.
Whereas, despite its substantial initial budget ($1, 314 million),
the new Mutual Defense Assistance Program amounted in 1950 to only
26. 1 percent of total American foreign assistance, the Korean War and
the rapid pace of European rearmament raised it to 69. 8 percent in
1951 (with two giant appropriations totaling $5, 222. 5 million).
With every prospect for future military assistance budgets being even
greater, the administrative machinery responsible for the program
required imnaediate overhaul.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951
Until 1951, the various efforts at military assistance -- and,
indeed, all those of foreign assistance -- had been administered with
little or no coordination by separate government agencies. Suddenly
10/ Examples of countries invited to enlist in NATO because of
the base locations which they could contribute are Portugal (the Azores
Islands) and Iceland (where the United States had enjoyed base rights
in one form or another since 1941),
11 / U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts




confronted with all the budgetary trappings of a major program, the
Truman administration requested of the Congress and received the
authority to establish an overseer within the Executive Office of the
President. This official, the Director of Mutual Security, would
supervise all military, economic, ajid technical assistance provided
by the United States to other countries. Under a newly designed
Mutual Security Program lines of coordination were drawn between the
Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical
Cooperation Administration of the Department of State. The military
assistance budget administered by this Mutual Security Program in
fiscal year 1952 was $5, 744 million -- the peak amount ever appro-
priated for this purpose. The planning and disbursement functions
for this portion of United States foreign assistance (now 78. 9 percent
of the whole) fell to the Mutual Security Agency of the State Departnaent
and caused this office to dominate the other executive staffs associated
with foreign assistance. Still another hugh budget ($4, 219. 8 million)
in the next fiscal year led to the reorganization of the Mutual Security
Agency; renamed the Foreign Operations Administration, its director
was given the responsibility for continuous supervision and the general
direction and coordination of ail foreign assistance programs, including
military assistance.
The Mutual Security Act of 1954 redistributed foreign assistance
administrative authority once again, lodging the responsibility for
military assistance within the Department of Defense and that for
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economic assistance within a newly created International Cooperation
Administration --a semi -autonomous agency of the State Department.
This arrangement functioned satisfactorily until 1961 J the Director
of Military Assistance within the Department of Defense administering
to a growing number of recipient countries (from a gradually diminish-
ing series of annual appropriations), while the Director of the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration provided development loans and
grants to a likewise growing number of recipients. By fiscal year
1961, the Eisenhower administration, through its ever- expanding
system of alliances and mutual defense treaties (aimed at contain-
ing communism) had added over a dozen countries to those originally
marked for post World War II military assistance. The list included
(besides the NATO members, Nationalist China, and the Philippines):
Spain cind Ethiopia (new "base rights" countries); Thailand, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Pakistan (members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organ-
ization, or its separate protocol); Japan and South Korea (both of
which were considered vulnerable to aggression in light of the Korean
War experience); and Iran and Iraq (members of the original Baghdad
Pact). In addition, military assistance had been dispatched to Jordan
and Lebanon under the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) and to Nicaragua
and Honduras during the civil war in Guatemala (1954). Of all the
Latin American republics, twelve were receiving small grants of
military equipment the purpose of which was to aid them in insuring
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internal securityl^ __ and eight (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay) either had received surplus United
States naval vessels or would receive them shortly. Even one Eastern
European country, Yugoslavia, had been incorporated into the Mutual
Security Program. ^~'
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
It should not be inferred that, despite the impressive amounts
appropriated for military assistance during the years immediately
following passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the United
States was financing the entire cost of arming the non- communist
world. In 1950, the NATO countries had defense expenditures of
$6. 5 billion. In 1953 their expenditures had risen to $12. 8 billion,
and in 1956 the European members of the alliances were spending
$13. 1 billion for their own defense. •'•'* Thanks to the Marshall PlcUi,
12/ Although military assistance had actually been provided in
the interest of maintaining "internal security" in the Philippines
(against theHukbalahap) and in Ethiopia (against dissident tribes), this
rationale did not take its place alongside "containraent of communism"
and "base rights" as a formal purpose for military assistance until
Cuba developed into a spearhead for communist insurgency in Latin
America in the early 1960's
13 / Ultimately the recipient of $693, 9 million in military assis-
tance, Yugoslavia apparently felt itself sufficiently strong and indepen-
dent of Soviet influence in 19 54 to conclude a twenty-year alliance (the
Balkan Pact) with Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO.
14/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act of 1957 , Hearings
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 5th Congress, 1st session,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 140.

18
the economics of at least some of the recipients of military assistance
had recovered sufficiently to enable them to share in the expense of
containing communism. With the success of the European Economic
Community, after 1959 the major allies of the United States in NATO
were able to reduce rapidly their requirements for grant military
equipment.
In view of this factor and because of the number and geographical
dispersion of the countries included in the Mutual Security Program,
it was considered necessary in 1961 to revise once again the adminis-
trative structure of military and econonaic assistance.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 replaced the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 (which had been amended each year) and provided a compre-
hensive arrangement of the military and economic assistance efforts
which had been developed under previous legislation and in response
to evolving strategic and diplomatic philosophies. The new foreign
assistance law empowered the President to establish the Agency for
International Development within the Department of State, the function
of which was the planning and supervision of all United States economic
development assistance efforts in underdeveloped countries. The
Secretary of State was given not only the responsibility for the plans
and activities of this new agency (whose charter was limited to econ-
omic affairs), but also for the administration of military assistance
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as weii.^^ This Department of State hegemony over both types of
foreign assistance reflected the steadily shrinking military assistance
portion of the total foreign assistance package (slightly over 40 percent
in 1961), but, more importantly, it also indicated a mutual desire of
both the executive branch and the Congress to provide for the integra-
tion of the two kinds of assistance in the interest of a single coherent
foreign policy.
The Secretary of Defense, under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, was given the responsibility for: the determination of military
requirements (of the recipient countries); the procurement of military
equipment; the supervision of the use of that equipment by recipient
countries; the supervision of the training of foreign military person-
nel; the movement and delivery of military equipment; and, "within
the Department of Defense, the perfornnance of any other functions
with respect to the furnishing of military assistcUice. "^° In view of
the scope of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, it is
apparent that the realization of truly integrated economic and military
15/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (U.S. Public Law No.
87-195
, 75 Stat 424), Section 622, directed that ". . . the Secretary of
State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of the ^/economic and military/ assistance programs author-
ized by this act, including, but not limited to, whether there shall be
a Military Assistance Program for a country, and the value thereof,
to the end that such programs are effectively integrated and the foreign
policy of the United States is best served thereby. " italics supplied_^/
16/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 623.
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assistance would depend as much as his efforts as upon those of the
Secretary of State. Should the two assistance programs be found to be
operating in conflict with each other in some country or region it
would be likely that not only the Secretary of State would be at
fault. The lavs/ had provided that official with the senior respon-
sibility -- it would be incumbent upon him to so circumscribe the
activities of his colleague in the Defense Department as to make his
authority felt. If the integration of both facets of foreign assistance
was to succeed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
would have to impress upon their subordinates the importance of
interdepartmental coordination -- especially in the decision making
process.
Military Assistance Sales and the Decision Making Apparatus
Borne along by the momentum of its expenditures (nearly $30
billion between 1950 - 1962) and nurtured by a sizable bureaucracy
(over 15, 000 military and civilians, U. S. and foreign nationals, of
17
which nearly 10, 000 were assigned overseas), the business of dis-
pensing free military equipment proceeded through 1961 and 1962
without causing stress on interdepartmental relations and without
bringing into question the adequacy of whatever decision making
17/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act of 1957, p. 515;
see AppendixBfor the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory
Groups assigned to countries which receive equipment (or training)
under the Military Assistance Program.
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apparatus existed. With virtually all the likely candidates for
alliances and mutual defense treaties already subscribed, the en-
rollment feature of the Secretary of State's assigned responsibility
went unused. ^° Because it was the Secretary of Defense who deter-
mined requirements for military assistance, the other feature of
the Secretary of State's responsibility -- determination of the value
of each country's alloted military assistance -- also received little
attention.
In 1962, however, it suddenly became obvious that the Depart-
ment of Defense had not only been giving away military equipment
through grants, but it had also been selling military equipment to
those countries which could afford to make the purchases. Over the
previous ten years these arms sales had amounted to an aggragate of
20 percent of all military assistance --a significant amount, but
still representing only a sideline. ^^ There was though, a discernable
trend in the relationship between grants and sales. As the cost of
modern weapons and weapons systems rose, and as the ability of
America's industrialized allies to pay such costs also grew, the
United States Government sensed an opportunity to shift more of the
18/ In Africa, and particularly in the Congo (which experienced
both sonae communist influence and a crisis in internal security) the
United States initially elected to provide assistance through the medium
of the United Nations rather than through bilateral defense agreements.
19/ A table comparing the values of grants and sales from 1952
to 1969 is at Appendix C .
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expense of collective security to those allies and, at the same time,
to improve its own balctnce-of-payments situation.
For the first time, in 1962, the value of military equipment sold
($1,485 million) exceeded that which was given free ($1,314). Military
assistajice grants were clearly following a downward trend while sales
were steadily growing -- curves showing these two progressions
crossed that year and the evidence indicated that within several years
the Military Assistance Program (as it was called after 1961) miight
simply become a sales agency for military equipment manufactured
in the United States.
In an effort to secure congressional recognition (and, perhaps,
legitinoization) of this change in the character of military assistance,
the executive branch requested that the following subparagraph be
included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as it was amended for
1963:
The President shall regularly reduce and, with such
deliberate speed as orderly procedure and other relevant
considerations, including prior commitments, will permit,
shall terminate ail further grants of military equipment
and supplies to any country having sufficient wealth to
enable it, in the judgement of the President, to maintain
and equip its own nailitary forces as adequate strength,
without undue burden to its economy. 20
20/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 505 (c). This
subparagraph was added to the act by Section 201 (A) of the amending
legislation of 1963 (The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963).
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Even as this explicit encouragement towards increased arms
sales was being written into the law governing foreign assistance, the
Department of Defense was adjusting its military assistance organ-
ization to facilitate greater emphasis on sales. The Office of Inter-
national Logistics Negotiations was established under the direction
of Mr. Henry J. Kuss, a career civil servant with extensive experi-
21
ence in weapons procurement and distribution. As part of the Inter-
national Security Affairs Division of the staff of the Secretary of
Defense, this office exercised sales control across the spectrum of
weapons produced within the United States. Within each of the Armed
Services parallel sales offices were established -- their provinces
being those weapons which their service had sponsored through initial
development and production (for example: Army - HAWK missile;
Air Force - F-5 jet fighter; Navy - P-3 maritime patrol aircraft). ^^
Acting both independently and in concert these several sales offices
accelerated the shift in the composition of military assistance from
21/ The organization and functions of this office will be shown
in detail in later chapters.
22/ Military Assistance and sales were administered within the
Armed Services by the following offices: Army - International Logis-
tics Directorate, under the supervision of a major general with a staff
of 21; Navy - International Logistics Division, under the supervision of
a captain with. a staff of 14; and Air Force - Directorate of Military
Assistance and Sales, under the supervision of a brigadier general with
a staff of 18. (These numbers of personnel reflect the peak sales
period, 1967 - 1969, -- there were probably fewer personnel assigned
to these offices in 1962 and 1963. )
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grants to sales. By 1966, grants amounted to only one -third of sales
and by 1967, only one-quarter.
If the grant military assistance program had been relatively
free of rough interfaces with the economic assistance program and
with United States foreign policy as a whole, the suddenly burgeoning
sales program might not be as free. The Secretary of State had had
little cause to exert his lawful authority over the conduct of the
Military Assistance Program so long as its implementation simply
meant the delivering of free military equipment to recipients which
he had already selected via the institution of treaties and agreements.
Receipt of such equipment could hardly interfere with the economic
development of the countries involved and, hopefully, would assist
that development through making both internal and external national
environments more secure. ^^ The sale of arms, on the other hand,
implied an expense on the part of the recipient and the concept of
opportunity cost. -- alternatives forfeited -- had to be considered.
Scarce resources spent for jet aircraft could not be spent for schools,
hospitals or other building blocks of development. The sales of arms
also implied a profit making business and might reawake the image
(from the inter-war years) of "merchants of death. " Decisions on
arms sales clearly had to be weighed by an executive apparatus
23/ There was, of course, always the risk of arming countries
which were, within their own regional area, potential enennies -- and
thus, providing the wherewithal for regional conflicts (for example,
Greece and Turkey, El Saividor and Honduras, India and Pakistan).
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appropriate to the task -- giving free rein to an energetic sales pro-
gram would be shirking the responsibilities inherent in the military
assistajice legislation.
It should be made clear that arms sales decisions are really
tsyofold -- exactly what arms should be sold, and who should be allowed
to buy them. If the promotion of a beneficial balance-of-payments
is the only consideration, then sales emphasis should be on the
most expensive items of military equipment, such as high performance
supersonic jet aircraft and elaborate electronics systems. If, however,
the optimum force coinposition of the purchasing country is considered
a more important goal, then emphasis should be placed on encouraging
sales of the kinds of equipment that contribute to that composition.
For example, if military assistance -- either grant or sales -- is
justified to a certain Latin American country in the interest of internal
security (against, perhaps, some communist inspired insurgency), the
optimum force composition for that country should include light recon-
naissajice aircraft, helicopters of several type s, and communications
equipment. Supersonic fighters, tanks, and submarines simply would
not correspond to the supporting rationale for military assistance. If
that assistance consisted of grants -- the country lacking (in the lan-
guage of the Foreign Assistance Act) "sufficient wealth ... to main-
tain and equip its own nailitary forces" -- then in all likelihood, the
sraall aircraft, helicopters, etc. would be programed, delivered and
eraployed with no controversy. Hovv'ever, should the same country
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qualify as having "sufficient wealth, " to substitute sales for grants,
the new ingredient of buyer's choice is introduced and the administra-
tors of the Military Assistance Program must deal with a country which
might choose to achieve "internal security" with supersonic fighters,
tanks, and submarines. Of course, in this case, the buyer's choice is
influenced by goals other than internal security (prestige, fear of an
aggressive neighbor, dreams of territorial expansion, or simply a
hunger for greater military sophistication).
Administrative response to sales requests for military equipment
which have no relation to supporting rationale may range from outright
refusal, through corapromise (agreement to sell some token fighters,
tanks, etc. in return for at least some of the desirable purchases of
real counter-insurgency equipment), to coraplete acquiescence. Pur-
suing either extreme invites estrangement from the allied country on
the one hand or the prostitution of military assistance on the other.
The degree of success enjoyed along the middle road of compromise
depends directly upon the amount of influence which the United States
can exert on the will of the buying country. The influence, in turn,
depends upon many factors -- not the least of which is the relationship
between that country's military leaders and the representatives of the
Military Assistance Program (Military Assistance Advisory Groups)
assigned locally to carry out the legal responsibilities of the Secretary




If decisions about the kinds of arms which should be sold pose
a variety of difficulties, so too do decisions about which countries
should be allowed to buy arms. Whether or not a country is to be
included in the Military Assistance Program is, according to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, clearly up to the Secretary of State.
Whether or not a country, once included in the Military Assistance
Program, should receive military equipment in grajat form, or, if of
"sufficient wealth, " should be asked to purchase its military equip-
ment, is a decision which the Foreign Assistance Act entrusted to
the President of the United States. Evidence of the making of the
first decision is usually clear and obvious -- the Secretary of State
negotiates treaties and agreements for mutual defense assistance.
Evidence of the making of decisions as to which countries should be
24/ In regard to the selection of arnns to be sold, the International
Logistics Negotiations office (ILN) within the staff of the Secretary of
Defense has always had sonaewhat wider latitude than its sales counter-
parts in the Armed Services. The latter are normally required to
adhere to the recommendations for foreign force compositions agreed
to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their annual Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan, Volume III (Free World Forces). The ILN, however, being
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, but not to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, is free of this particular constraint. Another constraint, of which
even ILN is not entirely free, is that of classification. Each of the
Armed Services is responsible for approving the release of any weapon
the development of which it has sponsored. It is conceivable that the
Secretary of Defense might exert pressure on the services to expedite
release of certain weapons to facilitate good balance -of-payments
sales negotiated by ILN. New and sophisticated weapons are susceptible
to inclusion in large military sales packages as "sweeteners" -- the
temptation to so include such weapons in the interest of making sales
is naturally inherent in any energetic arms sales program.
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grant recipients and which countries sales recipients is less clear --
and evidence of the making of decisions about sales to countries not
in the Military Assistance Program or not allied in any way with the
Uixited States is less clear still.
By 1966, the United States was providing gra-nt military assis-
tance to 58 countries; of these, 45 countries were also purchasing mili-
tary equipment frona the United States. ^^ The monetary values of those
concurrent transactions under the Military Assistance Program varied
widely -- the underdeveloped "containment" countries having the high-
est grant/sales ratios: Turkey - $100. 5 million/$0. 5 million; Greece -
$78. 7 million/ $0. 6 million; and Nationalist China - $76. 5 million/ $1.3
million. The industrialized allies which still required grant military
assistance reversed the grant/ sales proportion: Italy -$3,2 million/
$57. 2 million; Japan -$1.2 million/ $18.8 million; and the Netherlands -
less than $50, 000/$15. 8 million. In the low value range of grant/sales
ratios were countries whose identification with the supporting rationale
of the Military Assistance Program was, at best, only tenuous: Austria
less than $50, 000/$4. 1 million; Mexico - $0. 2 million/$0. 6 million; and
Malaysia - $0. 2 million/$0. 1 million.
Of the 13 countries which were receiving only grant military
assistance in 1966, the two most vulnerable underdeveloped "contain-
25/ U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign
Military Sales Facts
,
March 1971, (Washington: U. S. Government




ment" countries received large amounts of military equipment;
Korea - $153. 1 million, and Vietnana - $169-9 million. The other
11 recipients of free military equipment included: Uruguay - $2. 5
million; Guinea - $0. 7 million; Mali - $0. 5 million; and, with less
than $0. 5 million each, Afghanistan, Nepal, Senegal, Sudan, Costa
Rica, Pajiama, Syria, and Upper Volta. From this list it is obvious
that the "American responsibility" for "free people" which had
forste red military assistance under the Trumaja Doctrine had come
to be broadly interpreted.
Among the 13 countries which were receiving only sales of
military equipment in 1966, the most industrialized NATO allies
absorbed the greater share: West Germany - $373. 8 million; Britain -
$66. 2 million; France - $45. 8 million; and Canada - $37. 7 million.
The lesser industrialized allies of the ANZUS alliance followed:
Australia - $66. 2 million, and New Zealand - $9. 1 million. Of the
remaining "sales only" countries, Switzerland purchased $7. 9
million; South Africa - $1.9 million; Sweden -$0.8 million, Yugoslavia
$0.4 million, Luxembourg - $0. 3 naillion and the United Arab Republic -
less than $50, 000. Israel purchased an undisclosed amount of military
equipment.
Within all three categories -- "grant only, " "sales only, " and
"grant and sales" -- were countries of widely different affiliation with
the United States, with each other, and with the various rationales
which had generated the Military Assistance Prograin, One would be
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hard pressed to make a case that Mexico, Upper Volta, or, for that
matter, the United Arab Republic were contributors to the containment
of communism or that they were iikeiy providers of strategic bases --
nor were any of them suffering fronn serious crises in internal security.
The justification, it seems, for the United States having extended
military assistance to these and ma-ny other countries of the "third
world" was probably competitive influence. The experience with
Yugoslavia (see foornote 13) may have indicated to strategic planners
in the Departments of State and Defense that military assistance could
be a useful ingredient in any scheme for winning away potential friends
or allies of the communist enemy. In countries wherein social,
economic or political factors caused pressure towards friendship with
the communist powers - or even, simply, neutrality in the "cold war" --
American military (and economic) assistance might provide enough
influence to bring about a change in direction. If, then, influence was
still another supporting rationale for military assistance, it had not,
by 1966, really been publicaliy identified.
Given the long list of countries which had been included in the
Military Assistance Program and the various rationales, stated and
unstated, for their inclusion, one might well have inquired as to the
decision making process which had yielded such results. Beyond the
obvious question of who, exactly, was making the decisions (presumably
the President and the Secretary of State had not abandoned their respon-
sibilities under the Foreign Assistance Act) laid the many considerations
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which begged to be taken into account throughout the process. For
example; was it sensible (or legitimate) to incorporate so many
countries, helter skelter, within a program whose original rubric
might not be stretched far enough to encompass them; were the variety
of country programs really integratable as parts of a whole and
coherent foreign policy; was the United States without responsibility
for the use of weapons which it had provided in conflicts which it had
not foreseen or sanctioned; was the capacity of the United States for
providing military assistance limitless; were the profits drawn from
the mushrooraing arms sales program immune from moral criticism --
particularly when the buyer had made purchases at the expense of
economic and social requirements? If these and other considerations
had, in fact, entered into military assistance decision making prior
to 1966 it does not appear that they were reviewed in any formal way.
Military assistance straddles the line between defense planning and
foreign policy; its purpose and execution satisfy demands and expec-
tations in both areas. It was not unreasonable then to have looked to
both the Department of Defense and the Department of State for joint
parenthood of military assistance decisions. Until 1966, however,
there was little evidence of the kind of institutional interdepartmental




The Senior Interdepartmental Group
Although there had not yet been much criticism vis-a-vis the
foreign policy (and military assistance) decision making process, the
primary decision makers themselves apparently came to the conclusion,
early in 1966, that the instruments of foreign policy -- such as arms
sales -- were fast growing beyond the capability of any informal system
(or non- system) of coordination to control adequately. Executive
response to this problem was the following presidential announcement
of March 4, 1966.
The President today discussed with his Cabinet and
other high officials a new procedure, which he has ap-
proved, for the purpose of modernizing and streamlining
the executive branch of Government in the conduct of
foreign affairs.
In order to assist him in discharging his respon-
sibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the President
has directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to
assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by
law for the overall direction, coordination, and super-
vision of inter departnaentai activities of the United
States Government overseas ... . Up to now, the
Secretary of State, assisted by the regional Assistant
Secretaries has performed a coordinating function in
interdepartmental matters abroad. Now he has received
formal and specific directive authority from the President.
While the term "interdepartmental matter" has not been
specifically defined, in the present context it covers
those activities abroad involving more than a single
department or agency, or which is of such a nature as
to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas pro-
gram in a country or region. /jThe Military Assistance
Program was, then, to be subjected to this new procedure_^/
To assist the Secretary of State in this new role,
there will be a permament interdepartmental committee,
called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), with
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the Under Secretary of State as its "Executive Chairman. "
The latter term is used to describe a chairman who has
the authority and responsibility to decide all matters
coming before his committee, subject to the right of
einy member to appeal from his decision to higher authority.
This is cui important provision which makes the difference
between the normal conamittee and an incisive, decision
making body.
_/ Italics supplied_^/ '^^
Henceforth, if it had not previously been the case, the Department
of State (in the person of the Under Secretary) would have clear respon-
sibility for insuring that foreign policy decisions in matters such as
the conduct and control of the Military Assistance Program (which
was now under the jurisdiction of the SIG) would rec-eive proper review
by all the departments and agencies concerned. For the first time,
apparatus was created which would implement the directive of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 -- "to the end that ^the economic and
military assistance/ programs are effectively integrated and the
foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby. "^^ The
composition of the SIG was to be as follows:
The other regular members of the Senior Inter-
departmental Group are: the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Administrator of AID /the Agency for
International Development/, the Director of CIA
/the Central Intelligence AgencyV, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of USIA
Z6J "Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Interdepart-
mental Matter s, " reproduced in U. S. Congress, Joint Committee Print,
Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes, (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 432-435.
27/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 622.
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/the United States Information Agency/, and
the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. The Chairman will invite represen-
tatives of other departments and agencies when
they have an interest in the matters under consider-
ation. ^®
It is of interest to note that, although the Defense Department
was represented on this high decision making board (second only to
the Cabinet in executive rank) by both the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the officer analogous to
the Administrator of AID (the Director of Military Assistance) was not
included. If this was a serious flaw in the organization of the SIG it
would not be discovered for over a year -- and then not by the executive
branch, but by the Congress.
There was another government official who was overlooked for
membership in the SIG -- the Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. ^9 if the Military Assistance Program met the
definition of an "interdepartmental matter" and thus, came under
28/ "Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Interdepart-
mental Matters, " p. 432,
29/ The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was
established in September 1961, in response to President Kennedy's inter-
est in reducing the threat of nuclear war and his concern over the develop-
ment of the independent French nuclear deterrent, the latest Soviet test
series (September - November 1961, with 50 explosions, one of which was
58 megatons), and the suspension of the Geneva test-ban talks. The pri-
mary function of this agency was to prepare the U. S. position at the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva which began in
March 1962. Despite its preoccupation with nuclear arms control,
ACDA is chartered to exert efforts towards the control of internation-
al traffic in conventional arms.
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the jurisdiction of the SIG -- and if, by 1966, the Military Assistance
Program was distributing, through both grants and saies, $1,470 million
worth of arms and military equipment to 58 countries -- then surely
permament membership on the SIG was justified for the official
"responsible for the conduct, support, and coordination of research
on
for arms control and disarmament policy formulation. " ^ The Director
of ACDA, however, was not included in the top policy making apparatus.
Surely, there was provision for his attendance on an invitational basis --
just as the Director of Military Assistance could conceivably have been
invited to meetings wherein he might have had "an interest in the matters
under consideration. " Again, it would be the Congress which would
discover (after a year of SIG operation) that the occasion of such
invitations was extremely rare.
The presidential announcement explained the purpose for establish-
ing the SIG.
The Senior Interdepartmental Group will function
as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas
interdepartmental matters which are referred to it by
the Secretary of State or by an Assistant Secretary of
State, or raised by the action of an individual member.
Any department or agency not a nnember may also raise
matters for action by the Group, ^/italics supplied. / 3 1
30 / The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act of 1961,
22 U.S. Code 2551
, 75 Stat. 631.
31 / "Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Inter-
departmental Matters, " p. 432.
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Any student of government with even a passing awareness of the
likely interaction between the favorite preoccupations of the ordained
members of the SIG would not be very optimistic about matters dear to
nonmembers ever competing successfully for attention. The difficulty
of overcoming institutional inertia (such as by raising a matter out
of a nonmember agency or department and placing it in competition for
SIG consideration) can never be underestimated in any large bureau-
cracy. As if to reassure those not chosen for membership, the
announcement concluded,
In establishing the Senior Group ... it created a
regular meeting place for the key officials involved
in overseas activities and assures decisive action by
giving unusual authority to the "Executive Chairman. "
These meetings also assure the departments and agencies
primarily involved in overseas affairs a forum in which
all views can be expressed in advance of decisions. The
departments and agencies with occasional interest will
be invited to attend these meetings when there are matters
affecting them on the agenda, or they may propose naatters
for the agenda. In any case, their representative will
have the same rights as the regular members when their
business is being considered. -^^
The overseas business of the United States Government being vast,
and occasions at which ail the important members of the SIG could be
gotten together for meetings necessarily infrequent and of short duration,
additional decision making apparatus was established at a lower stratum.
32/ "Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Inter-
departmental Matters, " P. 433.
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Beneath the Secretary of State and the Senior Inter-
departmental Group, the regional Assistant Secretaries
of State will occupy important focal positions in the
channel of responsibility for overall direction, coor-
dination and supervision of interdepartmental matters in
the regions of their responsibility. The Assistant
Secretaries will serve as Executive Chairmen of Inter-
departmental Regional Groups (IRG), analogous in naember-
ship ajid responsibilities to the Senior Interdepartmental
Group. They will work closely with U. S. Ambassadors
and the country tearas abroad and will assure the adequacy
in their regions of U. S. policy, plans, programs, resources,
and preformance. It is at this level that the volume of
work will be done, leaving for the Senior Interdepartmental
Group only the major problems. As in the case of the Senior
Group, the new arrangements are for the purpose of expedit-
ing decision and action, /italics supplied_^/ 33
Under the new procedure, it would seem then that many problems
not considered to be "major" would be decided by Assistant Secretaries
of State (as Executive Chairmen on the IRG's -- with the advice of their
counterparts in rank from the Defense Department, the JCS, AID, CIA,
USIA, and the White House Staff). Exactly what would constitute a
"major" problem was never defined. It was possible therefore, for
decisions as to the addition or subtraction of countries under the
Military Assistance Program to be made at the Assistant Secretary of
State level. It was possible that decisions concerning which countries
would receive grant military assistance and which countries would
receive sales (and which would receive a combination of grant and sales)
would be made at the same level. It was even possible that a decision
33/ "Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Inter-
departmental Matters, " p. 433. .
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could be made to sell arms to a country without the Director of the
Arms Control amd Disarmament Agency being consulted, without the
Administrator for AID and the Director of Military Assistance inte-
grating the decision within their separate programs on a face to face
basis, and without the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (much less their superiors, the Secretaries themselves)
ever meeting to formally consider the problein. or review the decision.
The new arrangements could certainly "expedite" decision asid action --
but would the SIG and the IRG's so police their activities that decisions
made and actions taken would reflect the serious deliberations of those
members of the executive branch charged by the Congress with the
responsibility for them? The Congress itself would be the judge.
Subsequent chapters of this thesis will show that the Congress,
in 1967, repeatedly questioned officials of the administration as to the
arms sales decision making procedure. The testimony of these officials
make it clear that the SIG was, in fact, contributing very little in the
way of executive deliberation or supervision -- the actual decision
making apparatus still seemed as ill-defined as it did prior to the
presidential announcement which established the SIG.
THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS IN LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The Changing Function of the Congress
A House Report of ten years ago rather wanly pointed out that,
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... it is eminently clear that the role of the Congress
in determining national policy, defense wor otherwise, has
deteriorated over the years. More and more the role of
Congress has come to be that of a sometimes querulous but
essentially kindly uncle who complains while furiously
puffing on his pipe but who finally, as everyone expects,
gives in and hands over the allowance, grants permission,
or raises his hand in blessing, and then returns to the
rocking chair for another year of somnolence broken only
by an occasional anxious glance down the avenue cuid a
muttered doubt as to whether he had done the right thing. 34
This self-depreciating critique was probably accurate --at least
in the sense that the Congress has over time deferred more and more to
the executive for the initiation of policy; this being particularly true in
regard to foreign policy. If the Congress, however, has paid less
attention to the initiation of legislation, it has sharpened its focus naany
times over in the business of administering legislation. The acts of
handing over allowances, granting permission, and bestowing blessings
are the functions of administration.
Perhaps the most important function available to the Congress in
the administration of the law is the power of investigation. The
34/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, House Report No.
1406
,
87th Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), p. 7; quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, "Congress-
ional Responses to the Twentieth Century, " The Congress andAmerica's
Future
,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, Inc. , 1965), p. 24.
35/ There are, of course, several other functions in this regard
-- impeachment being the most drastic. Congress more routinely
exercises control over executive implementation of the lav/ through
audit (performed by the Government Accounting Office, established in
1921, which is independent of the executive and responsive to the Con-
gress), and through the legislative veto. The latter being a procedure
which began in about 1932, whereby specified executive decisions are
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Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 enjoined the Congress to
exercise continuous watchfulness over the way in which the executive
branch implemented legislation. The LaFollette - Monroney Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress published a report in 1946
on which the Reorganization Act was based. The report noted that.
"While the Constitution directed the separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches,
it did not intend them to go separate ways and in
opposite directions. Each year the gulf between Capitol
Hill and the departments widens. And without effective
legislative oversight of the activities of the vast
executive branch, the line of democracy wears thin.
Only one man out of 3, 000, 000 Federal employees is
elected by and is directly responsible to the people. -^^
By way of narrowing the gulf between the Congress and the
executive departments, this report recommended that.
. . . the standing committees of both houses be
directed and enapowered to carry on continuing re-
view ajid oversight of legislation and agencies
within their jurisdiction; that the subpoena be
given them; and that the practice of creating
required to be submitted to the Congress or its committees for a wait-
ing period before going into effect. During the waiting period, usually
60 days, the decision may be disapproved in one of several ways by the
Congress. The reader is referred to Joseph P. Harris, Congressional
Control of Adnninistration
,
(Washington; The Brookings Institution,
1964) for an excellent treatment of these congressional functions.
36/ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Report on the Organization
of Congress, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946),




special investigating committees be abandoned.
The Legislative Reorganization Act did not abandon special inves-
tigating committees (the House of Representatives struck that provision
from the act), but it did provide the means for continual review and
oversight by the standing committees which had been recommended.
The right of the Congress to conduct investigations in regard to the
expenditure of public funds had been established in 1792, when the
House of Representatives adopted a resolution to establish a special
committee to investigate the defeat of General St. Clair's expedition
against some Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory. Between that
time cind the passage of the Reorganization Act the investigative power
of the Congress had been used rather sparingly (the investigation into
the conduct of the Civil War, the investigations into the scandals of
the Harding administration, and the Nye Committee investigation into
the munitions industry being perhaps the three most prominent incid-
ences). After 1946, however, the powers provided to the standing
committees of the Congress encouraged those committees to conduct
frequent investigations. ^^ As examples of this increased use of the
37 / U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Report on the Organization
of Congress, p. 249.
38/ These powers were: authority to supoena witnesses, authority
to require the production of papers, and the authority to spend $10, 000
per committee each Congress on investigations. All standing committees
of the Senate were granted these powers, but only four of the House
Committees received them -- Appropriations, Government Operations,
Un-American Activities, and Rules.
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investigative function: from 1789 to 1925 there were 285 investigations;
in 1950 through 1951, one Congress alone (the 82nd) voted 236. In 1940
39
the Senate spent $170,267 for investigations -- in 1952 it spent $1,639,040.
As the Congress became used to the process of investigation it
seems fair to say that the difference between the role of a Senator or
Representative as an "investigator" and the traditional role of simple
legislator gradually grew clouded and, on occasion, might have dis-
appeared altogether. A presumption of administrative (or legal) fault
is inore often than not associated with the raison d'etre of congressional
investigations -- hence, the investigators normally assume detective
attitudes. The routine passage of legislation, on the other hand, has,
since the beginning of the Republic always been preceded by institution-
alized dialogues in search of information -- these dialogues are known
as "hearings" and their public record provides the legislative history
of the bills passed by the Congress (together, of course, with the record
of debates incident to the passage of the bills). Although congressional
hearings, at which testimony is taken by appropriate committees from
members of the executive branch and other qualified witnesses, have
39/ Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, pp. 264
265. Figures for the investigative expenditures of the 86th Congress
indicate that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spent $705,000
from 1959 to 1961, ranking it fourth below the Judiciary, Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, and Government Operations Coinmittees.

43
been characterized as "psuedo-adversary proceedings, "^^ their
purpose is not to root for evidence of fault. Rather, hearings normally
fulfilled the requirement of congressional committees for detailed
information on executive proposals and afforded both the Congress
and the executive bt-anch a formal opportunity to engage in philosophical
discussion reiacive to those proposals.
Members of the Congress who have, over and over again, partici-
pated in investigations and who have both developed expertise in interro-
gation and won public acclaim through their performances might under-
standably be unwilling to put aside that expertise or to forfeit more
acclaim when their business is to conduct hearings. There are numer-
ous exanaples of hearings held in recent years which have truly amounted
to investigations. Excepting that executive witnesses appear voluntarily,
rather than on supoena, and that pertinent papers (proposals in support
of legislation, etc. ) are willingly provided, rather than produced on
demand, the remaining trappings of an investigation are frequently in
evidence at hearings. The example most germane to our subject were
the hearings which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted
on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. The facts that these hearings
40/ Richard F. Fenno, Jr. , The Power of the Purse --Appropriations
Politics in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 3Z8.
Professor Fenno points out that congressional committee members some-
times adopt the role of "prosecutors" in eliciting testimony from executive
witnesses in order to insure that the public record of the hearings will
provide sufficient justification for granting the funds or authority request-
ed by the executive departments. Sometimes, too, they will play the role
of "devil's advocate" in order to draw out the most telling arguments (or
to probe weak points) for future use in floor debates.
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were televised nationwide -- at the insistence of the committee chairman,
Senator J. W. Fulbright (D - Ark. ) -- were attended at all times by the
majority of the committee, were monitored closely by counsels in
committee employ, and served as a forum for the insinuation of execu-
tive fault (in this case, for the Vietnam war), all gave the distinct
impression that a congressional investigation was in progress. '^1 As
times goes on, it may happen that hearings will become even more
synonymous with investigations until the simple inquiry for information
and philosophy will become completely subsumed within the more aggres-
sive and suspicious instrumentality of investigation. It is interesting
that this increasing emphasis on legislative oversight (with a potential,
through investigative powers, for much greater emphasis in the future)
has so neatly coincided with the increasing dominance of the executive
branch in the initiation of legislation -- cinalysis of these parallel
developments is, unfortunately, beyond the subject of this thesis.
The Power of Standing Committees
In addition to providing the Congress with a greater bias toward
investigations, the Legislative Reorganization Act also concentrated
greater power in the hands of the chairmen of the standing committees.
41/ For details of circumstances accompanying these hearings
see: The New York Times
,
April 18, 19, 20, 21, 1966 and May 11,
and 12, 1966. For the text of the hearings see: U.S. Congress, Senate,
Foreign Assistance, 1966. Hearings Before the Comnmittee on Foreign




Where there had been 81 such committees, the act reduced the number
to 35, thus subordinating more members of the Congress to the chair-
men of those committees elected to remain. Committee chairmen are
elected by either the whole Senate or the whole House of Representa-
tives and are normally the member of the majority party with the
longest continuous service on their respective committee. Once elected,
the chairmen have the power to call the meetings of their committees,
over which they preside, cind to fix the agendas (in so doing, they decide
which bills will be considered and which ignored). Moreover, the chair-
men create subcommittees and appoint their members. It is within the
chairmens' prerogatives to participate in the work of the subcommittees
which they have established. No activity of a standing committee, such
as the selection of witnesses or the request for special information
from the executive branch, may be accomplished without the approval
of the committee chairman. It would be difficult to imagine, for instance,
a subcommittee chairman failing to coordinate the scheduling of hearings
for his group with the chairman of the whole committee -- or for such a
subordinate to initiate press releases without first obtaining clearance
fronn the chairman who is expected to be the spokesman for the special
province of the whole committee. One student of the Congress has
noted that,
42/ For an excellent description of the role and role behavior of
the chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations see: Fenno,
The Power of the Purse, pp. 136-160.
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The Committee Chairman possess the greatest capacity
for rewarding conformity or punishing deviation on the
part of other Committee members. Most tangibly, he
controls the size, nunaber, jurisdiction, and member-
ship of subcommittees. Newcomers, whose future hangs
in the balance on their subcommittee assignment, feel
the weight of these sanctions most heavily. But many
an experienced member covets a more favorable sub-
committee berth or, indeed, a subcommittee chair-
manship. In less tangible ways, too, the good will
or good offices of the Committee Chairman are valuable
assets for any member to whom they are extended.
This consolidation of power in the hands of the relatively few
committee chairmen probably accounts for the legislative success of
those bills which bear the chairmens' blessings. A study of the legis-
lative activity of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has indicated
that not only has that committee held a growing monopoly on the intro-
duction of foreign affairs proposals which originated in the Senate (70
out of IZO in the 81st Congress, 106 out of 167 in the 85th Congress),
but that of the bills which have been reported by the Foreign Relations
Committee the vast majority have been those which were introduced by
its own members (166 out of 219, during the 10- year sample, 1949 to
1958).^^ Further
Once the ^enate Foreign RelationsTCommittee
reports a bill or resolution, the chances are
higher than 9 out of 10 that the Senate will pass
it. During the years 1949 - 1958, the Senate up-
43 / Fenno, The Power of the Purse
, p. 228.
44/ Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making, p. 16,

47
held the Committee's position on 201 of these 219
bills which reached the floor. Although the Com-
mittee's recommendations were amended in about
20 percent of the cases, the overwhelming practice
was to pass its bills without a roll-call vote. Roll-
calls were taken on only 17 bills, only one of which
was defeated, and that one was reported adversely
by the Committee.
Despite the fact that the legislative purview of the House Commit-
tee on Appropriations is considerably different than that of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, the success of bills recommended by
the former seems to have been comparable with that of the latter.
Another study has shown that during the period frorn 1947 to 1962, out
of 575 Appropriations Committee decisions on budget recommendations,
the whole House of Representatives voted to accept 89.9 percent.'*"
The study states that.
Committee success can be explained by a number of
factors whose weight may differ depending on the situa-
tion. In the first place, the Committee can manipulate
the floor contest to its advantage by controlling the flow
of its bills to the floor, by restricting the spread of
information, by mininnizing the influence of party
leaders, and by dominating floor participation. In the
second place, the Committee operates under favorable
conditions in the Committee of the Whole House. The
rules making provision for a quorum and those specifying
45 / Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making, p. 16. There
are, unfortunately, no studies which provide comparable data for the
years immediately preceding 1966; however, this data serves to illustrate
the point about committee power and only evidence of a major shift in
trend would be relevant to consideration of the material in the subse-
quent chapters of this thesis.
46/ Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 450.
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amending and voting procedures bestow advantages
on the Coramittee. The Committee also benefits
from the inability and the unwillingness of House
members to devote their scarce resources of time,
energy, and legislative credit to a consistent or
concentrated, or conflict-producing consideration
of appropriations legislation. '^^
Legislative oversight of the Military Assistance Program would
be a duty of both of these committees and also of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs ctnd the Senate Committee on Appropriations. (It
would also, to some extent, become the duty of the Senate and House
Committees on Banking and Currency. ) It may be helpful, therefore,
in subsequent chapters of this thesis to recall both the degree of
success which the committees had traditionally enjoyed in having their
recommendations approved ctnd also the privileged and powerful position
4ft
of the chairmen.
Congressional Oversight of the Military Assistance Program
Utilization of the hearings incident to review of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1966 by Senator Fuibright to air his displeasure with
American involvement in Vietnam served to focus more than usual
attention on the Military Assistance Program (which was a portion of
47/ Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 500.
48/ Lists of the members of the several committees and sub-
committees which became involved in legislative oversight of the Mili-
tary Assistance Program and biographical notes on naembers of the
Congress who most affected that oversight are at Appendix E .
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the Foreign Assistance Act). The Congress had, of course, been aware
of the existence and the progress of the Military Assistance Program
since its inception. Through the reviews associated with the annual
authorization and appropriation for the program the members of the
Congress had been apprised of each aspect of the program's develop-
ment. Whether or not that apprisai was adequate to suggest ail the
ramifications of the program as its arms sales function grew was
another matter.
One member of the Congress, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D-
Minn. ), was alarmed at those ramifications which he discerned and,
in an article published in July 1966, provided what might be considered
a keynote for the congressional criticism which was to follow. '*9 The
Senator noted the change in the composition of military assistance from
grants to arms sales suid the predominent position of the United States
in the world arms market. He pointed out that beyond the principal
purpose of military assistance (being "to strengthen recipient countries
against communist aggression and subversion") certain new pressures
had combined to increase the arms supply. In the Senator's view, these
included: the desire of newly independent countries for prestige; United
States and Soviet competition for influence "in areas adjacent to the
sphere of influence of the other power;" and the United States balance
49/ Eugene J. McCarthy, "The U.S. : Supplier of Weapons to
the World, " Saturday Review, July 9, 1966.
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of payments deficit. The active participation by the United States
Government in a policy of expanding military assistance had, Senator
McCarthy wrote, the undesirable effect of fueling regional wars. Citing
the India- Pakistan war (of 1965) as a "prime example, " he quoted the
following testimony by John Kenneth Galbraith before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
The arms we supplied . . . caused the war be-
t-ween India and Pakistan ... If we had not supplied
arms, Pakistan would not have sought a military
solution J_to the Kashmir dispute^/. ^^
Another example was the Middle East where, according to
Senator McCarthy,
The United States appears to be abandoning its
traditional policy of non-involvement in the Middle
East arms competitions in favor of trying to naaintain
an arms "balance" in the interest of political and
52
military stability.
A second undesirable effect of the Military Assistance Program,
in Senator McCarthy's opinion, was that when it was applied to Latin
America it resulted in
. . . strengthening military elements in countries
that are, to a greater or lesser extent, trying to
move away from a tradition of donainent influence of
50 / Saturday Review
,







the military on political affairs, and endeavoring
to develop democratic societies dedicated to free-
COdom and social progress. -'-'
Finally, the Senator pointed out that Defense Department emphasis
on a large arms sales program seemed to be in contradiction with the
State Department's avowed interest in arms control. A possible means
of eliminating all of these undesirable effects. Senator McCarthy suggest-
ed, would be for The United States to seek a mutual disengagement from
arms competitions with the Soviet Union and to "use its influence to
persuade other major suppliers to agree to some forna of conventional
arms moratorium. "-^
Senator McCarthy's article provided evidence that some congres-
sional dissatisfaction existed in regard to the new form and directions of
the Military Assistance Program and served to attract at least a little
more attention to the problems inherent in arms sales.
By the end of 1966 (a year in which the arnas sales program had
grossed $1, 798 million --or nearly three times the amount of grant
assistance distributed), the sales program had grown large enough to
attract attention to itself. Two magazine articles in quick succession
publicized this relatively new manifestation of military assistance.
The first article, which appeared in Business Week, began by noting that,





Enticing a foreign government to forgo the manufacture
of its own weapons and buy from a foreign supplier is no
easy task. The buying government must be willing to sac-
rifice a certain amount of national prestige, to stand up
to the outcries of its own manufacturers, laborers, and
opposition politicians, and to accept the military dependence
on the selling nation that a weapons purchase necessarily
entails.
Even so, the United States has managed to become the
dominant weapons seller of the free world. However re-
luctajit nations may be to turn from their own producers,
the cost of keeping up in the arms race has soared so high
with the advent of atomic power, missilry, jet aircraft,
and electronics that most nations simply find it too expen-
sive to maintain a full-fledged defense industry.
"Buy American" is becoming an increasingly prevalent
slogan in the world arms market. ^-^
The article went on to list the sixteen leading United States manu-
facturers of arms for export, -'^ noted that foreign countries had bought
"about $7 billion worth of purchases in the past five years, " with an
additional $3. 5 billion due from outstanding commitments, ajid
commented that from those sales, the "U.S. industry will reap a
profit of well over $1 billion. "^^
The Pentagon was quoted as expecting "orders to remain at a
high level for at least another decade, averaging about $1. 5 billion a
year. " Further, "developing nations which now get arms grants will
be switching to a purchase basis. "^^ Mr. Henry Kuss and his Inter-
55/ "Aiming at the Arms Market Overseas," BusinessWeek, December
3, 196^
56 / This list is at Appendix F .




national Logistics Negotiations office were identified as playing,
... a key role in all arms deals, whether they are
made on a government-to-government basis or involve a
direct agreement between a foreign government and U. S.
manufacturer,
They/Mr. Kuss and his aide^/ also help arrange
financing where needed -- through private banking, the
Export-Import Bank, or a special military assistance
program credit account. About $3 billion in credit
has been provided for the $10. 5 billion in sales and
commitments achieved thus far. ^9
The article reviewed some of the domestic and foreign criticism
of the arnas sales program and connmented briefly on program control
by the government. In regard to developing nations.
. . . the U. S. has a declared policy of discouraging
them from building elaborate military machines at the
expense of economic development. What weapons have
been made available have been mostly grants of dis-
carded U. S. equipment.
Some backfire
The current situation in Latin America illustrates
how this policy can sometimes go awry. The U.S. last
year agreed with Argentina that it needed to modernize
its air force and with Brazil that it needed to replace
old tanks.
Argentina was sold 25 Douglas A-4B fighter -bombers
(it wanted 50) and Brazil 55 M-41 tanks. Now, as a result,
a potential arms race is threatening in Latin America.
^Italics suppiied_^/ Other Latin nations want more modern
equipnnent and are piqued because the U. S. is refusing
to sell arms to them. "^




In the context of the arms sales controversy which was to follow,
this article represented the first public description of the sales
program that was at all comprehensive. Whether or not the few
criticisms which it included were overdrawn would be debated in the
congressional hearings which would be held the following year (1967).
The article was important in that it underscored the growth of the
United States Government's arms sales business. There were a few
factors which it noted but did not underscore -- the most important
being the participation of the Export - Import Bank in the financing of
arms sales. This utilization of the Bank's facilities could well have
been in conflict with that institution's supposedly benign character.
The significance of the Bank's alliance with the arms sales portion of
the Military Assistance Program would not yet receive appropriate
emphasis (two months later it would come to light in another publication
--a staff study written, by a consultant for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee).
The other article which drew attention to the arms sales program
appeared in Armed Forces Management in January 1967. Entitled
"Can the U. S. Maintain the Momentum of Its Military Export Sales? "
this story posted the value of arms sales and commitments for the
period 1962 to 1966 at $11, 102. 9 million, or 45 percent of the cost of
maintaining United States forces overseas (excluding Southeast Asia).
The difficulties of continuing the program at a high sales volume were
noted but not overstressed due to the efforts of Mr. Henry Kuss and his
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staff in the Department of Defense.
. . . Kass is seeking to broaden and diversify the number
of firms doing business in the military export field. Cur-
rently, twenty companies dominate the field. In a survey
of seventeen of these firms, Kuss found some 40, 000 sub-
contractors that could be selling their products overseas.
. . . He sees a particularly rich market for second and
third tier subcontractors. Rather than just 20 companies
domirtating the market, Kuss "would be happy to settle
for 100 companies" out of the 40, 000 or so which could
participate . " ^
In more sympathetic terms than the previous article, this arms
sales story explained that arms sales to Latin America were only
"a miniscule amount of the total. "
The entire continent accounts for 1%, or $162. 7
million, of the sales total. . . . The nacent super-
sonic arms race is not worth the trouble it causes.
Defense officials feel. The U. S. in effect has
embargoed the selling of jet aircraft to countries
in this area by limiting deliveries to the post- 1969
period. Hopefully, before that time, the countries
involved will have worked out an agreement to halt
an arms race that robs these countries of needed
economic development resources.
. . .
More eloquent than words, however, is Kuss's
disestablishment of the Latin American Directorate
in his office. Although it shows on the organization
chart ... it is not an active eienaent and handles
6?only existing sales arrangements.
61/ "Cctn the U. S. Maintain the Momentum of Its Military Export
Sales, " Armed Forces Managemient, January, 1967. A list of the
weapons systems which constituted the volume of arms sales is at
Appendix Q . Arms sales according to geographic region are also




The article concluded with a brief reference to Mr. Kuss'
success in obtaining credit to facilitate arms sales (but did not mention
the Export - Import Bank), a list of his other achievements ( such as
replacing grants with sales and arranging for cooperative production
of some weapons systems with certain allies), and some optimistic
notes on future sales of sophisticated aircraft, tanks, and missiles.
Although the article was consistent in its approval of the conduct and
development of the arms sales program (for example, its handling of the
problem of arms sales to Latin America), it did open an avenue of
criticism along which the arms sales program would be increasingly-
vulnerable -- the amalgamation of a widening section of American
industry with the interests and purposes of the American military
establishment. The term which was then coining into use to describe
this coalition was "military - industrial complex" and it would come
to be used with sinister implications.
On the occasion of his leaving office in January 1961. President
Eisenhower had called attention to the coalition with the following warning:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment
and a large arms industry is new in the American experience,
The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual
-- is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of
the federal government. We recognize the imperative need
for this development. Yet we must not fail to connprehend
its grave implications. Ourtoil, resources, and liveli-
hood are ail involved; so is the very structure of our
society.
In the councils of government we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought
or unsought by the nniiitary industrial complex. The
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potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. "-^
The complex whose existence troubled President Eisenhower was,
of course, a real entity. The way in which the United States Government
had perceived the threat from the Soviet Union (and later Communist
China) necessitated the maintenance of large standing forces and the
development of one sophisticated weapons system after another --in
effect, a scheme of perpetual mobilization. The magnitude and the
nature of that threat were such as to demand defense expenditures of
comparable magnitude. The management of these expenditures neces-
sarily brought about an interplay between the military officials whose
duty it was to devise the nnost effective weapons systems and the civilian
industrialists whose duty was to return the greatest profits to their
corporate shareholders. The motives of the officials and industrialists,
it has been argued, became clouded over time by the migration of many
of the military officials into industry upon their retirement from the
service -- and by the counter -migration of many of the industrialists
into appointed positions within the government. Whether or not real
conflicts of interest have acted on the one hajid to benefit the procure-
ment of favorite (but expensive and possibly wasteful) weapons for the
63/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Speech, " January 17,
1961, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Establishment:
Vested Interests and the Public Interest, " The Military-Industrial
Complex and U. S. Foreign Policy, edited by Omer L>. Carey (Washington
State University Press, 1969), p. 9.

58
Armed Services, or, on the other hand, have acte»d to produce highly-
profitable (but possibly unneeded) weapons by induistry is a question
that has been debated with varying intensity over the last decade.
Mr. Kuss, through his zeal to secure increased growth for his arms
sales program, was interjecting the program (and the rest of the Mili-
tary Assistajace Program) squarely into that debaJte.
Antagonists of the military-industrial complex would see the
hoped-for expansion from 20 contractors m.anufacturing military
exports to perhaps 100 "second and third tier subcontractors" as clear
evidence of the complex at work. The demand whiich would create this
expansion would be inspired by an agency of the s,ame government which
seemed constantly to demand more military produiction for American
forces. Moreover, this particular government-icispired impetus in
arms production would be colored by the fact of uJitimate delivery to
foreign hands - constituting perhaps an invitation for the reemergence
of the "merchants of death. "
The Congress had had some experience witla those grim phantoms
in the past. One of the relatively infrequent cong^res sional investigations
64/ For a critical analysis of the causes amd effects of the military-
industlTai complex, see: Sidney Lens, The Military- Industrial Complex
(Philadelphia: Piigram Press and the National Calthoiic Reporter, 1970).
Mr. Lens characterizes the union of military government officials with
industrialists as a "confluence of interests" -- w,Mch also includes:
a civilian-militarist faction in the Congress; cerHain liaison organiza-
tions between industry and the military; the Deparitment of Defense sub-
sidized "think-tanks;" private research organizaJfcions; labor leadership;
and much of the academic community, pp. 39-40.
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in the time before the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was the
Nye Committee inquiry into United States munitions manufacturers. This
inquiry was conducted at the high point of American post World War I
idealism and isolationism. A letter written in 1923 by President Harding
to the Secretaries of War and Navy had established United States policy
vis-a-vis arms sales (in the absence of any legislative control of arms
exports).
I hope it will be the policy of the War (and Navy)
Department not only to make no sales of war equipment
to any foreign power, but that you will go further and
make certain that public sales to our own citizens will
be attended by proper guarantees that sucli supplies are
not to be transferred to any foreign power. I would
gladly waive aside any financial advantage that might
attend such sales to make sure that none of our surplus
equipment is employed in encouraging warfare any place
in the world. "^
Following this presidential statement no legislative action
seenned necessary until 1928 when the private sale and exportation
of newly manufactured military equipment (not government owned
surplus) to Asia and Latin America prompted a series of proposals
by Congress, the sense of which was to "prohibit the exportation of
arn:is, munitions, or innplements of war to any nation which is engaged
m war with another. "°° Still, no legislation was forthconriing until
65/ The New York Times, April 25, 1923.
66/ House Joint Resolution No. 183 (70th Cozigress),. text in the U. S.
,
Congressional Record
, 70th Congress, 1st session. Vol. 69, pt. 2, (Janu-
ary 25, 1928), p. 3269. For an excellent discussion of the various resolu-
tions offered during this period in the interest of controlling arms sales.
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public opinion was sufficiently stirred by the long and costly Chaco War
between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932 to 1935). Finally, on May 28, 1934,
the President signed a resolution passed in both houses of the Congress
which prohibited the sales of arms and munitions of war to the belliger-
ents. This was "the first instance in which the United States attempted
to throw its weight on the side of 'starving' a foreign war by restricting
the supplies of war materials to the two belligerents. "
Concurrently with the development of the Chaco embargo, a move
was underway in the Senate to find ways in which to inhibit arms and
munitions manufacturers from exerting pressure towards United States
involvement in war. One of the leaders of this move was Senator
Gerald P. Nye (R - N. D. ), whose particular energies were directed
at depriving the producers of arms of any profit they might receive
incident to supplying the weapons for war. Senator Nye was attempting
in early 1934 to adapt income tax legislation to his purpose. As a naeans
of diverting the Senator from altering the tax structure President
Roosevelt supported his appointment to head a special Senate Committee
which would investigate "the activities of individuals, firms, associ-
ations, and of corporations and all other agencies in the United States
engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, import or export of arms.
see: Elton Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941).
67/ Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports, p. 192.
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munitions, or other implements of war. "
The Nye Committee began its public hearings on September 4, 1934,
and its hearings have been described as forming
... a sensational cind sordid story of intrigue, of
gratuities in the form of large "commissions" to obtain
foreign business, of incredible claims put forward by
lobbyists and other agents of their influence with those
in high places in certain governments, and of equally
incredible gullibility on the part of their employers.
. . . The testimony established the fact that armament
firms in different countries were linked together in
various ways, including agreements for the exchange
of patents and the allocation of business; that a few
AnaericBJi army and naval officers had acted virtually
as commercial agents for private munitions concerns;
that the War and Navy Departments, as a measure of
"preparedness, " had sought to encourage the munitions
business in the United States, and to this end had
aided private firms in their sales of war naaterials
to foreign governments. ^9
Providing an indictment of the "military-industrial complex" of its
time, the report of the Nye Committee showed the practices of the
War and Navy Departments vis-a-vis the munitions industry and the
export of arms to be somehow immoral --if not illegal. The inter-
national linkage of arms manufacturers, the role of army and naval
officers involved in arms sales "as commercial agents, " and the
68 / The New York Times , April 13, 1934.
69/ Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World
Affairs (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), p. 264. For the text
of the investigation see: U.S. Congress, Senate, Munitions Industry,
Report No. 944, Parts 1 - 17, by the Special Committee on Investigation




encouragement of private firms to enter the arms export business
all seemed to be dark and illicit activities -- and, given the idealistic
spirit (as exemplified by the Harding letter) of the period, they may
have been so. Certainly, the impact of the Nye investigation was
sufficient to ensure the passage of a joint resolution known as the
First Neutrality Act (August 31, 1935). "^^
Now, in Jcuiuary 1967, the revelations of the activities of Mr.
Henry Kuss might stir either soine latent isolationist idealism or some
latent adversion to the "merchants of death, " or both. Congressional
response to the discoveries of the Nye Committee vjbls a campaign to
control the export of arms. This campaign was successful until its
purpose was overtaken by World War II. Since then, the Congress had
moved away somewhat from exerting its influence through controls
(such as the First Neutrality Act) and towards meeting its responsibilities
for the conduct of the government through legislativ^^e oversight. One
writer has made the following distinction between "• control" and
"oversight. "
"Control" in the narrow sense refers to legislative
decisions or activities prior to the relevant administrative
70/ This resolution was, of course, helped to success by the
popular spirit of revisionism which had sought to discredit all but the
profit motive for United States participation in World War I. In this
regard, see: "Arms and the Men, " Fortune, March 1934, and
Helmuth C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death:
A Study of the International Armaments Industry (New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company, 1934).
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action. Thus it includes legislative determinations
about departmental policies and activities, examination
of proposed executive actions in view of a possible
legislative veto, and the issuance of authoritative
instructions to guide executive officers in the per-
formance of assigned functions. Such controls are
expressed in provisions of statutes or appropriation
acts, in committee reports, and in various informal
ways. "Oversight, " strictly speaking, refers to re-
view after the fact. It includes inquiries about policies
that are or have been in effect, investigations of past
administrative actions, and the calling of executive
71
officers to account for their financial transactions.
Because the arms sales program was apparently being conducted
within the bounds of existing legislation, whatever the congressional
reaction to the evidence of the program's growth, at least the initial
manifestation of disquiet would be likely to occur as a case for greater
oversight. There was not yet, however, the same kind of charged atmos-
phere which had triggered the establishment of the Nye Committee.
Enough information about the conduct and effects of the arms sales
portion of the Military Assistance Program had come to light to cause
some dissatisfaction within the Congress. The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, in its report on the draft Foreign Assistance Act of
1966, had voiced the hope that, "the U. S. balance of payments is not in
such a perilous condition that it has to be salvaged by taking blood money
from poorer countries. " Articles had appeared -- such as the one by
71/ Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p. 9.
72/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Report
of the Connmittee on Foreign Relations, No. 1358, 89th Congress, 2nd
session (Washington: U.S. Government Office, 1966), p. 3.
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Senator McCarthy and the one in Business Week -- which suggested
strongly that the arms sales program was fueling arms races in Latin
America and elsewhere. Still, there was not enough evidence of im-
propriety to arouse sufficient congressional pressure to exert real over-
sight -- or if there was enough evidence, thus far it had simply not been
put in appropriate context.
SUMMARY
The Military Assistance Program had its birth in the Troma-n
Doctrine and grew to maturity through the Cold War. The system of
alliances which the United States established in the name of collective
security required vast amounts of weapons in order to become and remain
viable. Allied countries at first depended upon the delivery of free, or
grant military assistance. Later, when their economies had prospered
sufficiently, they were encouraged to purchase the arms they needed,
either for cash or credit. In order to facilitate increased arms sales
for balance -of-payments and other reasons the Department of Defense
established a sales staff. Within a few years sales became the dominant
feature of the Military Assistance Program. Given the highly political
nature of arms sales, more attention came to be focused on the decision
making machinery. Legislative control of decision making v/as vague
or non-existent and administrative regulations governing decision making
did not really come into being until the Senior Interdepartmental Group
was established in 1966. Certain organizational flaws in the SIG made
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possible the making of decisions affecting some of the 58 countries
receiving military assistance at levels below the highest cabinet officials.
These flaws also made possible the failure of proper coordination between
the Military Assistance Program and the economic assistance program.
The function of the Congress had changed through the years from
one of initiation of foreign policy to one of legitimization of policy initiated
by the executive branch. Meanwhile, the role of committees and commit-
tee chairmen had been strengthened by the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946. Committees became more prone to investigation and even simple
hearings began to seem like investigations. Thus, the Congress moved
more in the direction of legislative oversight of executive conduct and
away from outright control of future executive plans and programs.
By 1966, the arms sales progrann had grown big enough to attract
wide attention. There was evidence that some dissatisfaction existed
in the Congress with the nature and scope of that program, however,
until January 1967, no action had been taken by the Congress to exer-
cise either control or oversight of the Military Assistance Program.
Some precedent existed in the experience of the Nye Committee which
had investigated the munitions industry from 1934 to 1936. The
First Neutrality Act had been one outcome of that investigation.
The question then, at the beginning of 1967, was in what manner
should the Congress proceed -- if indeed it had cause to proceed --




THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM IS CHALLENGED
Despite all the evidence of growing dissatisfaction with both the
conduct and effects of the Military Assistajice Program, no one had
yet phrased either coherent criticLsin or serious challenge. If
congressional interests in exerting influence on the form and direction
of military aid were ever to be written into legislation someone would
have to provide a suitable guidon around which others could rally.
Sonneone would have to analyze the various components of the program,
identify its faults, and point out the way for constructive action.
Once given such an analysis, the multiple but uncoordinated forces
within the Congress would be capable of devising restraining or cor-
rective legislation -- hopefully, it would also be intelligent and appro-
priate legislation.
Although it might have been expected that the effective challenge,
when it came, would be authored by a member of the Congress, it was
not. The Military Assistance Program had existed for years, and,
each year, had been reviewed and approved by the Senate and the
House of Representatives alike; yet, no member of either body took




initial assault, and most of the campaign that would follow was the
work of a young intellectual whose experience on Capitol Hill amount-
ed to no more than a few months on the staff of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations.
Dr. Williann Banks Bader had arrived at his position as consul-
tant on the committee staff by way of Princeton, where he had received
his Ph. D. ; the United States Navy, in which he had been an air intel-
ligence officer; and the Department of State, where he had served in
the Bureau of European Affairs. When he took up his work on the
Foreign Relations Committee, in June 1966, Dr. Bader evidenced
interest in three areas within the general field of disarmament --a
field on which the committee planned to focus some attention in 1967.
He informed Mr. Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Committee, that,
in his view, the issues of anti-ballistic missiles, chemical-bacterio-
logical warfare, cuid arms sales would be of primary importance.
Given approval to proceed along all three lines, Dr. Bader began
research which would be used in the preparation of future committee
hearings.
1
On his own initiative, and without the assistance of any other
member of the committee staff, the thirty-four year old consultant
1/ William B. Bader letter, dated January 27, 1972 (at Appen-
dix H ), p. 1. Dr. Bader's work on anti-ballistic missiles and
chemical-bacteriological warfare proved nearly as fruitful as that on
arms sales. For insight into his contributions to Senate action in
those two areas see The New York Times, March 22, 1969-
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investigated the intricate and often arcane arrangements through which
arms sales were negotiatied by the United States Government. It had
come to Dr. Bader's attention, during the course of a hearing on
nominations, that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency "had
no voice in the decisions on arms sales. " Perhaps considering this a
curious aberration in whatever system of arms sales decision making
that existed. Dr. Bader elected to promote his research on the sub-
ject into a thorough study. 2
Published on January 25, 1967, as a "staff study" entitled
Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, the consultant's work seeniedmore
a brief research paper than a potent indictment of the administration's
handling of arms sales. Succinct and academic in tone, the thirteen
page study was introduced by the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator J. W. Fuibright (D - Ark. ) with the following
preface:
This study is the result of the belief of the Committee
on Foreign Relations that the problems and responsibilities
the United States has acquired with its ever increasing
arms exports are of prime concern to the Congress. The
complex nature of these arms sales, as well as their
implications for national and foreign policy encourages
the belief that this study can serve a useful purpose.
It should be einphasized that this study does not
necessarily reflect the views of the committee or any
2/ William B. Bader letter, dated November 2nd, 1971 (at




J. W. Fulbright, Chairman
/Italics supplied. /
Despite Senator Fulbright' s disclaimer, and despite the fact
that "the study was given normal distribution with no special effort
to bring it to the attention of the rest of the Congress or the press, "
Dr. Bader's paper did come to serve a useful purpose --it became
the schema with which Congress would trace the convolutions of the
arms sales portion of the Military Assistance Program."^ More im-
portantly, the study would provide the Congress with an index of the
probable dauigers ajad excesses inherent in the arms sales business
ajid would serve to place in perspective most of the collective uneasi-
ness about that business.
As illustrations of avowed United States policy vis-a-vis arms
sales, Dr. Bader chose quotations from the published words of Presi-
dent Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara. In January 1966,
the President had decried the expenditure of resources devoted to
arms races. "These resources, " he pointed out, "might be better
spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick and teaching the unedu-
cated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of super-
3/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, Staff
Study Prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th
Congress, 1st session, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), p. iii.
4/ Bader letter, dated November 2nd, 1971, p. 1.
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sonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a
university. " In September 1965, the Secretary of Defense had ex-
plained his department's attitude towards "those underdeveloped
nations which have not yet met the minimum needs of their people for
social and economic progress but who nonetheless are inclined to
divert an unreasonable share of their scarce human and material
resources to defense."" In the case of such nations. Secretary
McNamara had said,
. . . our first objective is to use the influence
that we gain through the military assistance programs
and occasionally through the military export sales
programs to work with them to reduce the share of
their resources devoted to defense and to increase
the portion of their human and material capital that
is allocated to economic and social programs. '
Now, Dr. Bader contrasted the administration's policy, as stated,
with the facts of the enormous growth in sales of arms by the United
States and the quickening pursuit of "illusory prestige" by the develop-
ing nations. As examples of that pursuit, he cited recent sales of
F-4 fighters (America's "most sophisticated operational supersonic
aircraft" ) to Iran; sales of F-5's ("among the United States most modern
5/ President Lyndon B. Johnson "Message to Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Conference," January 1966, quoted in Arms Sales and
Foreign Policy, p. 1.
6/ Robert S. McNamara, news conference, September 16, 1965,





fighter-interceptors") to Morocco; sales of F-104's (another fighter
aircraft) to Jordan; and sales of A-4B's ("tactical attack aircraft")
to Argentina. ° Noting the shift in composition of American military-
assistance from grants to sales. Dr. Bader suggested that there was a
direct relationship between that change in emphasis and the "growing
problem of arms competition in the underdeveloped world and the
Q
diversion of scarce resources. "' Moreover,
. . .the developing nature of the arms competition
seems to defy the best intentions of Mr. McNamara's
reasonable explanation of how the United States con-
ducts its armis sales. The question that must be ad-
dressed is whether the governmental machinery designed
for the management of our military sales program is
adequate to the task of bringing the U. S. actions in
line with Secretary McNamara's intentions.
There is evidence to suggest that it is not. .
_/ltalics supplied^ A
This, then, was Dr. Bader 's challenge to the administration. It
was not his thesis that the government's policy, as it had been des-
cribed, was improper. Rather, it was the "governmental machinery"
which was tasked with the implementation of that policy that he chose
to call into question. Was the machinery 'adequate" or not? In
making the answer to this question the target of his exposition of arms
8/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy , p. 1,





sales, the young consultant had discovered the most vulnerable salient
of the Military Assistance Program. It would become the job of the
Congress to test those officials responsible for the operation of that
machinery, to call each one to account for his stewardship, and to
judge whether they had fulfilled their functions in such a way as to
bring "U. S. actions in line with Secretary McNamara's intentions. "
Through the exercise of its investigative authority -- the process of
hearings -- the Congress could ascertain the sincerity of the adminis-
tration, the competence of its officials, atnd the degree to which arms
sales had become an instrument of foreign policy. In so doing, the
Senate and the House of Representatives might find within themselves
the coherence necessary- for the development of legislation that would
satisfy their multifold discontents.
Making the point that "the Defense Department's approach to the
arms sales field has been dynamic and aggressive, " Dr. Bader intro-
duced the person of Henry J. Kuss and explained the function of the
International Logistic Negotiations office of which Mr. Kuss was the
chief. ^^ That official was described as having made a number of
appeals to the American armament industry to go 'international, ' and
as having chided those who were reluctant to do so in the following
terms:





This tendency of American companies to refrain
from entering into the international arms market
is a serious one and affects our entire international
posture in a military, economic, ajid political way.
From the military point of view we stand to lose
all the major international relationships paid for
with grant aid money unless we can establish pro-
fessional military relationships through the sales
media. ^^
Mr. Kuss was also quoted as having said.
. . .the highly competitive approach that has
been taken here in the United States, particularly
as a result of Secretary McNamara's cost reduction
programs, places U.S. industries in fit condition
for competition throughout the world. .JjsAr. Kuss
estimated that over the next 10 years U.S. allie_s/
inay purchase a mininaum of $10 to $15 billion of
their _/military equipment/ requirements from the
United States by sheer virtue of the fact that most
of these items will be a minimum of 30% to 40%
cheaper and will be highly competitive from a
technical point of view . . . ^^
Having looked into the matter. Dr. Bader noted that there were.
... a number of ways be which arms can be sold
abroad: private firms selling to a foreign govern-
ment, private firms selling through an agency of
the U. S. Government, and government to government
sales. There are other possibilities as well, such
as a U. S. manufacturer licensing a foreign firm to
produce his products. 1"*
12/ Henry J. Kuss, speech before the American Ordnance
Association, October 20, 1966, quoted in Arms Sales and Foreign
Policy, p. 4.
13/ Henry J. Kuss remarks before the National Security Indus-
trial Association, October 8, 1965, quoted in Arms Sales and Foreign
Policy, p. 4.
14/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, p. 3.
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Given the emphasis which Mr. Kuss had placed on competition
and the multiple ways in which arms could be sold. Dr. Bader obser-
ved that it was "difficult to know the extent of just how much equipment
is being purchased. "15 ^s examples of arms sales which underwent
various permutations in buyers and sellers, he called to mind
. . .the F-86's Venezuela recently bought from West
Germany /which/ were manufactured in Italy under a
U.S. licensing arrangement /and other/ F-86's /_which_/
West Germany 'sold' to Iran but which mysteriously
seenn to actually belong to Pakistan (despite U. S,
efforts to halt the flow of arms into Pakistanj
/and which/ were manufactured in Canada. ^^
Turning to the recipients of American arms. Dr. Bader distin-
guished between those sales to developed countries and those to under-
developed countries. "During the period fiscal years 1962 - 1966, "
he had found, "$9. 85 billion of $11. 1 billion in orders and conamit-
ments, went to developed countries in Europe and Asia. This is 88
percent of the total . . . "^^ However, he wished to stress that.
The fact that sales to underdeveloped countries
amount to only 12 percent of the total military sales




, p. 3. It is doubtful that, when he included this infor-
mation about the F-86's "mysteriously" belonging to Pakistan, Dr. Bader
could foresee the attention this would attract in the Congress. It proved
to be the kind of transaction which most fired congressional criticisms





handled by the Department of Defense is importajit for
a number of reasons. These figures on sales to under-
developed countries lead to a conclusion that the U. S.
motives in arranging such sales simply cannot be rooted
in balance of payments considerations. If the United
States were to lose its entire arms market to the under-
developed world the impact on our overall baiance-of-
payments accounts would be small. Therefore, our
justification for such sales must be based on the other
considerations, such as influencing the development of
the local military elites or helping a country resist
the threat of external aggressions. Preventing the
influx of military equipment of other nations, a sort
of preemptive selling, has also been a strong U. S.
motive in the underdeveloped areas of the world.
/Jtalics supplied_^/18
His analysis of the government's motives for selling arms to
certain underdeveloped countries was, of course, quite correct; the
administration had already enunciated its intentions of influencing
development and supporting resistance to aggression (see previously
quoted statement of Secretary McNamara). Dr. Bader, however, in
coining the expression "preemptive selling, " and in joining that
motive with the others, had given the critics of the Military Assistance
Program a perjorative catchword and had flagged a practice which
would seem to many to be less than respectable.
Dr. Bader, in the next section of his study, reported on another
practice of even more precarious respectability -- the financing of
"country - X" loans. Noting that "sales to the underdeveloped regions
of the world have been mainly credit financed, " and that it was "the





International Logistics Negotiations Office, not AID /Agency for Inter-
national Development/ or the Export-Import Bank, /whichy has acquired
the responsibility of negotiating the terms of the credit extended
for nnilitary purposes, " the consultant described the sources of
that credit. ^^ These, he said, were "the Eximbank ^one of the
several abbreviations used for "Export - Import Bank of Washington ;j7
private banking facilities, and a military assistance account available
for the use of the Defense Department under the authority of section
508 of the Foreign Assistance Act. "''^ According to Dr. Bader,
The Eximbank role is one of providing a service
function for the Department of Defense and bringing
to military sales on credit the advantages of the
Bank's experience in the international credit field.
. . . Eximbank makes direct loans for military equipment
only to industrial nations such as Great Britain,
Australia, etc. In addition, Exinabank naakes so-called
"country - X loans." Such loans are the result of
Eximbank establishing what amounts to an accounts
receivable fund for the use of the Department of
Defense in arranging loans to underdeveloped countries.
The Eximbank does not know or want to know where
this money goes. The Department of Defense guaran-
tees these funds through the military assistance
account ... . The bank therefore avoids the problem
of directly financing military sales to underdeveloped
countries, /italics supplied_^/ 21
As to the military assistance credit account. Dr. Bader felt
that it was,
19/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy,
p. 5.
—





. . . the most useful instrument at the disposal of
the International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) office
for use in providing credit for arms sales to areas
where commercial anddirect Eximport credits are
unavailable
.
The idea that the Department of Defense should
have funds available to arrange credit terms for arms
sales was initiated with the Mutual Security Act of
1957 when a fund of $15 million was authorized for
this purpose. This account officially became a
"revolving account" to finance additional sales when
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (sec. 508) author-
ized that repayments from such sales to 'be available
until expended solely for the purpose of furnishing
military assistance on cash or credit terms. ' Con-
sequently, this fund through yearly appropriations
ranging from $21 to $83 million, has grown to over
$300 million.
An important amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act came in 1964 when the Defense Department asked
for, and received from the Congress, the authority to
allow the Department of Defense to guarantee 100 per-
cent of the credit extended by U. S. banks for arms
sales while only obligating 2 5 percent of the amount
from the military assistance credit account as a
reserve to back up the guarantees in the event of
default. In other words, the $300 miiiion in the ever-
increasing 'revolving account' now allows the Depart-
ment of Defense to put the fuii guarantee of the U. S,
Government behind over a billion dollars in military
credits, /italics supplied. /22
Although, as Dr. Bader pointed out, this revolving account had
been authorized by the Congress, and its uses were, therefore,
legitimate, the significance of the account being used in combination
with country - X loans financed by the Export-Import Bank had probably
never been fully grasped by the Congress. Was the legislature aware




that it had empowered one agency of the executive branch to undertake,
at its own discretion, potentially over a billion dollars worth of credit
arms sales to underdeveloped countries -- aided and abetted by another
executive agency which neither knew nor cared to know to which coun-
tries the arms were going? The hearings that would take place through-
out the year 1967, in several committees and subcommittees of the
Congress would show that, until Dr. Bader brought their attention to
it, this important facet of the Military Assistance Program had gone
almost completely unnoticed by the members of the Congress. The
questions as to whether or not this interesting mechanism should re-
main in the hands of the administration and whether or not the adminis-
tration had been altogether candid in the manipulation of its authority
would be among the most controversial raised that year.
Having, thus far, acquainted his readers with the dimensions
cind workings of the government 's arms sales program, Dr. Bader
returned to the central issue of his study -- was the governmental
machinery adequate to the task of reconciling the enormous capacity
for making arms sales with the well-intentioned policy advocated by
the leaders of the government?
The magnitude and complexity of the arms sales pro-
gram would seem to demand a well-developed system of
interagency supervision and complete statistics on what
is being sold to whom under what terms. In large meas-
ure because of the phenomenal growth of the arms sale
programs, neither the administrative resources of the
•executive nor the legislative attention of the Congress





have brought in their wake. ^-'
Dr. Bader outlined the existing machinery as he had found it:
Under the provisions of the post-world war II legis-
lation concernded with the regulation of arms sales (the
Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual
Security Act of 1954, as amended) the Department of
State and the Treasury Department share the responsibility
for establishing policy and enforcing regulations with
regard to the sale of arms. As for the obvious connection
between arms sales and arms control, the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was given the
responsibility by Public Law 87-297 in 1961 to:
. . . serve as the principal adviser to the Sec-
retary of State and the President on arms con-
trol and disarmament matters. In carrying out
his duties under this act the Director shall,
under the direction of the Secretary of State,
have primary responsibility within the Govern-
ment for arms control auid disarmament matters.
In order to insure that arms exports procedures are
consistent with the security of the United States and
U.S. foreign policy, the Secretary of State under the
statutory authority of the 1954 Mutual Security Act,
established an Office of Munitions Control to control
the export licenses of items on the U. S. munitions
list. That is, items the United States considers
"arms, ammunition, and implements of war. "^'*
•'In theory, " Dr. Bader admitted, "the interdepartmental
machinery seems adequate to the task of coordinating a national
policy of arms sales which would take into full account the military,
political, economic, and arms control implications of our expanding







sales program. "25 However, he had discovered that.
In practice, the mechanism appears unequal to the
task. First of all, the Office of Munitions Control
which should serve as a general clearinghouse for all
arms sales, does not have the responsibility for handl-
ing, or even cataloging, government-to-government mil-
itary sales -- thus it has no influence over the greatest
exporter of all, the Department of Defense. Moreover,
since 1962 the Office of Munitions Control has not issued
a report on just what commercial military items were ex-
ported. . . . there is no way, short of a special request,
for Congress or the Secretary of State to know just what
is being exported to where by commercial firms.
Since the Defense Department submits no composite
reports to the Congress on what it sells abroad or even
how the military assistance credit account is used, legis-
lative oversight in the arms sales field is haphazard and
generally ineffectual, /italics supplied^/ 2
6
Having exposed these institutional administrative deficiencies.
Dr. Bader then phrased his essential criticism of the arms sales
program.
How and by whom the major decisions on arms sales
are made is something of a mystery. There is reported
to be a State- Defense Coordinating Committee for arms
sales policy consisting of members of Treasury, the
State Department, the Defense Department, and pre sum-
ably the Arms Control Agency and AID. Whether the full
Committee actually meets is uncertain. One thing is
clear, however, . . . the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, despite its charter, does not sit at the high
table when decisions on the sale of arms are made.
Another open question is whether the Agency for
International Development or the Bureau of the Budget






actually participate in the process of making a decision
to sell, for example, A-4B's to Argentina or have only
the option of attempting to overturn a promise of arms
sales already made to another country, /italics supplied^/
Given the sv/ift growth of the arms sales program, its capacity
for still further growth, and the apparent paucity of real coordination
and control of the program, Dr. Bader suggested three "major and
intertwined policy concerns" which he felt must shortly be addressed:
First, what is the effect of U. S. current military
export policy on our European alliance relationships;
second, what is the effect of these arms exports on
the external indebtedness and general financial cir-
cumstances of the underdeveloped countries; and third,
what are the prospects for arms control in the develop-
ing regions of the world given the present pace and
pattern of the international traffic in arms?
About the first concern, it was Dr. Bader' s opinion that,
. . . while the financial success of the U. S, military
sales is beyond dispute, there is ample reason for con-
cern as to the side effects of the vigorous sales cam-
paigns. American sales efforts have become a source of
great irritation in Europe, particularly in West Germany
and Great Britain, and nnay also be a major cause of the
increasing interest of Europeans in competing for arms
markets in developing regions of the world, ^/italics suppliedT/'^"
Dr. Bader substantiated this "European irritation" with quota-
tions drawn from the British press and from a speech before Parliament






by Mr. Denis Healey, the British Government's counterpart to Secret-
ary of Defense McNamara. Mr. Healey had promised that his govern-
ment would "take what practical steps we can to ensure that his coun-
try does not fail to secure its rightful share of this valuable commer-
cial _/arms sales7 market. "29
In Dr. Bader's view, however, despite the intention of any
European government, realistic competition with the United States
within the European market was impossible because.
A combination of technological skills, a high rate of
government investment in defense industries, flexible
credit arrangements, and the vigorous salesmanship of
ILiN_/Mr. Kuss' officeT have virtually put the rest of the
Western World out of the sophisticated arms export market.
The defense common nnarket is little more than an arena for
arms competition between resentful pygmies and an affable
giant. ^0
The dajciger in such a "pygmies - giant" relationship, Dr. Bader
deduced, would necessarily be increased European arms sales to the
"third world" because "Europeans must feel that in Latin America,
the Middle East, and, in time, Africa, they can corapete on equal
terms. "-^ ^
29/ Dennis Healey, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (January
25, 1966), quoted in Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, p. 9.





In regard to the second policy concern, the consultant noted that,
according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, the external debts of the most underdeveloped nations had
"increased at a considerably higher percentage rate than exports of
goods and services, gross national product, or savings. "^2 Further,
a check of Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
estimates indicated to him that "two thirds of Latin America's
foreign exchange deficit is caused by external debt service payments. "^-'
It would seem legitimate, therefore, to devote attention to the effect of
U.S. arms exports on the external debts of at least the underdeveloped
recipients. Dr. Bader's research prompted him to make the following
cogent observation:
Credits for military purchases are usually hard
loans with high interest rates and a short repayment
period. Development loans are norinally just the
opposite. Unless ail credits to a particular country
-- both development and military sales -- are subject
to a comprehensive review how can we know enough about
the total economic circumstances of a country to make
the right decisions? At the moment there seenns to be
very little coordination between the right hand of
military export credit policy and the left hand of
development loans, /italics suppiied_^/^'*
During the hearings that would follow the publication of this study








several of the highest ranking administration officials would dispute
the apparent lack of coordination between the hands of the executive
branch.that Dr. Bader detected. Were credit arms sales in fact
synchronized with economic assistance loans -- or, for that matter,
even with military assistance grants? Did the Director of Military
Assistance carefully match the sales and grants of his Military Assis-
tance Program with the development assistance provided by the
Administrator of the Agency for International Development? Both
military and economic assistance were provided under the same piece
of legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act -- shouldn't it be expected that
the two types of assistance would be efficiently integrated? The adminis-
tration would have ample opportunity during the hearings to make its
case and to prove that the desired coordination really existed.
The third of Dr. Bader's "major and intertwined policy con-
cerns, " the prospects for arms control, raised for him the "question
of the compatibility of our present arnns sales policies with the United
States' expressed desire to control arms races in the developing
regions of the world. "^5
"The Congress," according to Dr. Bader, "has fully supported
the efforts of the executive agencies to administer military assistance
and sales with the goal of arms control in mind at ail tinnes. " /italics
supplied^ 36 in order to demonstrate that such was the intent of the





Congress, he quoted from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966,
Programs for the sale or exchange of defense articles
shall be administered so as to encourage regional arms
control and disarmament agreements and so as to discourage
arms races, ^'
Was the Congress directing the executive branch to proceed
along two mutually exclusive lines -- somehow to balance arms sales
with arms control? Dr. Bader took the position that it was not -- not,
at least, if the administration was willing to include negative alternatives
in its arms sales program. In the interest of arms control the United
States Government could say "no^' to requests far arms as well as it
could say "yes. " Aside from security and balance-of-payments reasons,
what other argument seemed routinely to bias the administration toward
"yes" rather than "no?" Dr. Bader thought he had the answer.
It is a commonplace to hear discussions on whether
the United States should or should not sell military
equipment to this or that country end with ". . . but
if we don't sell it to them the Russians (or the British,
or the French, etc. ) will. " Fully aware of this flaw in
the U.S. armor, many countries have exploited it in order
to acquire equipment we don't really want to sell them.
Consequently, the United States often ends up selling,
say, the Iranians supersonic F-4 aircraft for defense
primarily because the Shah says he will go to the Russians
if we don't give him the equipment he wants. When this
sort of compelling argument is added to the glint of a
balance-of-payments success, a raomentum is created which
tends to divorce the process from its appropriate overall
37 / Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Public Law 89 - 583, 80
Stat. 795, quoted in Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, p. 11,
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foreign policy context, /italics supplied^/ -^^
If the United States wanted to demonstrate sincerity about arms
control -- and if the administration wished to adhere to the intent of
the Congress -- then, Dr. Bader suggested.
It seems imperative that at some point the United
States take the risk that great powers must take and
simply say, "No -- go to the Russians or the British
if you must. "... Surely such a policy of denial will
have its dangers: but an effort must be made to slow
the seemingly relentless pace of arms competition
throughout the underdeveloped world. ^9
The study had, thus far, examined more comprehensively than
BJiy other effort the arms sales program administered by the United
States Government. Dr. Bader' s research had focused light on arms
sales of questionable legitimacy (such as the F-86's allegedly provided
to Pakistan), the problem of "preemptive selling, " the participation
of the Export-Import Bank in the financing of arms sales, country -
X iocuis to underdeveloped nations, the military assistance credit
account (and its use in combination with country - X loans), the
"mysterious" process of arms sales decision nnaking, and, finally,
three "major policy concerns" -- the effects of arms sales on
European allies, the effects of arms sales on the external debts of
underdeveloped countries, and the effects of arms sales on progress






toward arms control. In one brief piece of v/ork Dr. Bader had
brought together ail the essential ingredients of a very complex issue
and had provided the Congress with a blueprint for possible recon-
struction of a controversial program.
It was the general conclusion of Dr. Bader' s study that.
. . . it is incumbent on the United States to re-
appraise the adequacy of the present machinery of
policy control and legislative oversight governing
the sale of arms. On the basis of the available
evidence, there is sufficient justification for
tentatively concluding that the adjustments in
policy and administrative procedure necessited
by the change in the composition of military aid
/from grants to sales/ have been marred by a lack
of information, by weaknesses in interdepartmental
coordination at the highest levels, and, finally,
by a lack of serious attention to the problem of
reconciling an active arms control policy with an
arms sales program /italics suppiied_^/ "^^^
No matter how "tentative" his conclusions. Dr. Bader had
accused the administration of failure to provide information, of
coordination weaknesses at "the highest levels, " and of a "lack of
serious attention" given an important responsibility. If he had
accused the administration of negligence, incompetence, or duplicity
it would hardly have been a stronger arraignment. The reaction of
the executive branch would await the hearings for which Dr. Bader'
s
study had been undertaken.




Based upon the evidence which he had found and upon the goals
which both the administration and the Congress had officially embraced,
Dr. Bader completed his work with the following recommendations:
(1) In order to provide an adequate informational base
upon which to judge the scope of U.S. arms exports, the
Munitions Control Office should be directed to compile
on a quarterly basis a complete list of all arms exports
both commercial and governmental. This report -- with
a classified annex if required -- should be submitted at
least to the Secretary of State and the Congress.
(2) The Department of Defense should be required to give
a full account of the annual use of public funds in the
military assistance credit account.
(3) The role of the Export-Import Bank in the financing
of military exports should be carefully exainined by the
Congress.
(4) Congress should consider making all military export
credits and guarantees the subject of a simultaneous re-
view with development loans. Both involve a charge on
the resources of the recipient country and both involve
the use of U.S. public funds.
(5) Congress should examine the decision making process
of the military sales program to determine whether the
Arms Control Agency and Agency for International Develop-
ment are meeting their responsibilities as defined by law.
(6) The United States should take the initiative in
orgcuxizing regional conventional weapons "free zones";
zones that would be free of sophisticated offensive and
defensive weapons -- missiles, jet aircraft other than
subsonic fighters, tanks, etc. Latin America, and perhaps
north and sub-Saharan Africa, offer possibilities for such
zones. 41




The question must certainly be raised as to what impact Dr. Bader
anticipated his study might have. If it had been processed only as a
briefing paper and retained within the files of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee its impact might have been unremarkable. It was,
however, published and, as a Senate document (albeit a document
bearing a disclaimer of responsibility) carried with it a certain respect-
ability and insurance of at least some distribution. Dr. Bader, himself,
has remarked that the study was "a sleeper. No one involved had any
idea that the study would draw so much attention and cause so much
controversy. It was probably one of those cases where the staff study
acted as the last drop of acid before the litmus turned. "
Whether or not the litmus had been turning, the study proved to
be a vital ingredient in congressional efforts, throughout 1967, to
establish effective legislative oversight vis-a-vis the Military Assis-
tance Program.
Even as a published document, however, it would be necessary
for the study to receive some guided exposure in order for it to develop
its full potential as a challenge to the administration. This exposure
came, initially, from two sources. The first was Senator Eugene J.
McCarthy (D - Minn.). On January 30, 1967 -- five days after the
publication of the staff study -- Senator McCarthy, a nnember of the
Foreign Relations Committee, voiced his alarm in The New York Times
42/ Bader letter, dated November 2nd 1971, p. 1.
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concerning the study's findings. Specifically, the newspaper article
(under a picture of the Senator) scored the Defense Department's
Program of arms sales abroad and cited the study as evidence that the
program was "contravening the foreign policy objective of disarma-
ment. " Further, the article indicated that the study characterized
the arms sales program as "aggressive, " and -warned that it may
have gained uncontrollable naomentum. ^ Senator McCarthy wanted it
known that he was in complete support of the staff study.
The second source of exposure for the study came from the
author, himself. Dr. Bader had been assigned as consultant for two
of the subcominittees of the Foreign Relations Committee -- the Sub-
conunittee on Disarmament, whose chairman was Senator Albert Gore
(D - Tenn. ), and the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, whose chairman was Senator Stuart Symington (D - Mo. ).
As the hearings conducted by these subcommittees progressed through
the spring and early sumncier of 1967 Dr. Bader would have ample
opportunity to inject his own views, as expressed in his study, into
the dialogue between the administration and the Congress.
43/ The New York Times, January 30, 1967.

CHAPTER III
RESTRAINT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE
INITIAL HEARINGS
HEARINGS BEFORE THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Less than two weeks after Dr. Bader' s study. Arms Sales and
Foreign Policy, had been published and circulated, the Subcommittee
on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began
seven days of hearings on the general subject of United States arma-
ment and disarmamemt problems. These hearings were held in
executive session, however, it was the strong feeling of the sub-
committee chairman. Senator Albert Gore ( D - Tenn. ) , that the
public interest -would be served by publishing the testimony taken
after the various executive agencies concerned had had an opportunity
to make selective deletions in the interest of national security. This
declassification was accomplished and the text of the hearings was made
available to the public on May 2, 1967.
The first day of these hearings, February 3, 1967, was used by
the subcommittee to examine the problena of strategic defense and the




second day of the hearings (February 7, 1967), the subcommittee
invited Mr. John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (and Mr. Henry Kuss's immediate
superior in the Department of Defense) to present a statement on the
subject of arms sales. Mr. McNaughton's appearance was the first of
any official of the administration before a congressional hearing on
this subject in 1967; it came two days before the President was to
submit to the Congress his message on foreign aid -- a preamble to the
draft Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, which would be sent to the
Congress later that month.
Mr. McNaughton began his testimony with a simple statement
likening the sales of military equipment by the United States to the
provision of grant military assistance which had long been sanctioned
by the Congress. He pointed out that the aggregate mix of grants and
sales of military equipment had remained about the same -- averaging
approximately $3 billion each year -- during the period 1961 through
1/ Present to hear Mr. McNaughton's testiraony were, among
others, Senators Stuart Symington (D - Mo. ) and Eugene J. McCarthy
(D - Minn. ). Senator Symington was a member of the Disarmament
Subcommittee and also the chairman of the Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator McCarthy, although a member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, was not a member of either of the two subcommittees. He
had, it seems, read Dr. Bader's staff study and wanted to participate
in questioning the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Dr. Bader was
also present in his role as consultant to the subcommittee.
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1966. Econoinic advances among United States military allies had
allowed those allies to gradually assume the cost of the military
equipment required for their defense; thus, the US Military Assistance
Program had been gradually shifting away from grants and towards
sales. Mr. McNaughton testifies that, since this shift had tegun, sales
of military equipment to developing countries had amounted only "to
about 10 percent of the total, " with the rennainder going to NATO,
Australia, a_nd Japan. Sales requests from countries of the Middle
East, Latin America, Africa, or other underdeveloped areas were only
made, according to the Defense official, "subject to the most intensive
4
review and debate within the U. S. Government." Further,
Every proposed sale is consonant with overall
policy established by the Department of State or
specifically subjected to a careful and thorough
review within the U.S. Government before negotiation
is initiated. This review involves not only the
Defense Department, but the State Department, AID,
and other relevant agencies. This review is con-
cerned with the military legitimacy of the require-
ments, the recipient's ability to pay, the potential
effect on peace or stability in the area, and on
other foreign policy considerations. These reviews
2/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and
Disarmament Problems, Hearings Before the Subconnmittee on Dis-
armament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st
session, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 66.





are conducted at very high levels of Government ajid
approval is not given until a positive determination
has been made that, balance of payments considera-
tions aside, it is in our best national interests. Secre^
tary McNamara personally reviews all important pro-
posed sales, and the decision frequently goes to the
President. /Italics supplied_^-'
Mr. McNaughton had, by the date of his testimony, apparently
seen Dr. Bader's study. He now included in his statement an almost
point-by-point rebuttal of these deficiencies of policy control which
had alarmed Dr. Bader. As indicators of the extent of the review
and control of U.S. military sales, Mr. McNaughton noted the following:
(a) The U.S. maintains control over the resale or
other trajisfer of all military material sold or granted
by the United States (this includes MAP equipment in
Germajiy to which we have sold our direct right of
repossession).
(b) The Export-Import Bank does not finance any
military sales without assurance from the Departments of
State and Defense that such sales are consistent
with our national objectives.
(c) The credit sales fund of the DOD /Department
of Defens^/ is used to finance sales to those countries
which can repay only over longer periods than the
5/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 68.
6/ The reversionary rights (rights to reclaim) to all inaterial
and services which the United States had provided to the Federal
Republic of Germany as grant aid military assistance during the
period 1954 to 1959 were sold to the FRG on May 25, 1962, for
$75 million. The complete list of this material and these
services bears the name of Mr. Frank Nash, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISA) at the beginning of that period, and is
often referred to, therefore, as the "Nash List. "
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Export-Import Bank terms will allow. The Department
of the Treasury together with the AID /Agency for Inter-
national DevelopmenT/ and DOD are primarily responsible
for determining the terms under which sales are made.
(d) DOD has accounted to the Congress for the use of
the credit sales fund every year since its inception
in 1957.
(e) The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament
and his entire staff were briefed on the military sales
program and its underlying policies. All information
concerning the program is available to them.
Mr. McNaughton chose this opportunity to respond also to Dr.
Bader's charge of "preemptive selling," claiming that displacing
other arms suppliers in the international market was "necessary in
certain cases to safeguard U. S. security interests, " and that.
Our primary a-nswer to the suggestion that we are
seeking to preempt our European friends and allies in
various military markets is that we do not ask any
country to buy anything from us which it can buy
cheaper or better elsewhere.
Senator Eugene McCarthy (D - Minn. ), a member of the
Committee on Foreign Relations but not of the Disarmament Sub-
committee, was present at this hearing as an interested observer. He
too, it seems, had read Dr. Bader's study and was disturbed by it.
Following Mr. McNaughton' s statement, Senator McCarthy challenged
the very neat picture of absolute policy control which the Assistant
7/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-






SENATOR McCarthy, what I am concerned about is the
manipulations in the Defense Department. We sit
around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and
all this /arms salej7 is going on. . . . The whole
thing becomes a military determination of foreign
policy, and we JThe Congres_s^/ catch on as the train
goes by and say, "OK, let us get up there and try to
put the brakes on. " I do not know where the policy
is naade for this kind of thing.
MR. McNAUGHTON. I can tell you
SENATOR McCarthy. Well, you read the report of our
staffraan /"Dr. BaderZ who said he cannot find out. ^
Now that the staff study had been mentioned directly in the
hearings, Mr. McNaughton decided to attack it head-on.
MR. McNAUGHTON. I will do my best to provide any
information you want. The second point Senator
McCarthy raised _/the question of where arms sales
policy was made_/ was a very important point, and I
was very disappointed with the staff study that came
out in this regard, Mr. Chairman.
The decisions with respect to sales are decisions
carefully made in the executive branch and are not
made in the Air Force or in the Defense Department.
They are made in the U. S. Government. Secretary
Vance sits as a Defense Department representative
on the senior interdepartmental group, SIG, and
certain decisions go to that group, where they are
carefully addressed by the State Department, Defense
Department, AID, and some other agencies that are
interested.
9/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Arnriament and Dis-




SENATOR SYMINGTON. You understand that was a
staff study, not a committee report.
MR. McNAUGHTON. But Senator McCarthy referred
to it, ajid there have been a number of press
releases based on it, and an editorial in a news-
paper said the accusations were unanswered.
/This is probably a reference to the New York
Times article of January 3Q, 1967^/ There
was no attempt to get answers from us before
this was published, but these decisions are
carefully reviewed, and sometimes all of the
interests are very difficult, . . . But the
State Department is intimately involved in
each of these decisions, /italics supplied^/
SENATOR GORE. How about the Disarmament Agency ?
_/ltalics supplied^
MR. McNAUGHTON. The Disarmament Agency has not
been intimately involved in the past, /italics supplied^
Senator Symington was, apparently, somewhat surprised at Mr.
McNaughton's clainn that there had been no attempt to get answers from
the Defense Department before IDr. Bader's study was published. He
wanted to pursue the matter.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Was the staff study shown
to you before it was published and issued?
10/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, pp. 73-74. Senator Gore, in an effort to
ascertain the extent of interagency coordination in the supervision of
arms sales, addressed letters of inquiry to the Administrator for
AID, the Director of the Arnns Control and Disarmament Agency,
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Secretary of the
Treasury. The responses of these officials are at Appendix I
and are recommended to the reader for insight into the real degree
of coordination (or lack of it) involved in four cases of jet fighter
sales to developing countries.
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MR. McNAUGHTON. I never saw it, Senator.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Was it sent over?
MR. McNAUGHTON. It was --
I
MR. MARCY. ^Mr. Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff for the
Comraittee on Foreign Relations and Mr. Bader's
superior^/ Dr. Bader discussed the matter with
Mr. Kuss for about two hours.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Who is Mr. Kuss ? /palics supplied.7
MR. McNAUGHTON. Mr. Kuss is my deputy in charge
of noiiitary sales. He was not shown a draft.
MR. MARCY. We did not show him a draft. We
talked to him about it for two hours.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Why didn't you show it
to them?
MR. MARCY. The staff of the committee does
not feel it is necessary to show drafts to the
executive branch.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Don't you think you ought
to let them see the draft so as to check possible
mistakes ? /italics supplied^
MR. MARCY. It just seems to me it is an improper
thing for the staff to do. The people in the executive
branch don't show the conamittee staff reports they
do before they send them to Congress. This was
discussed at considerable length by Mr. Bader with
Mr. Kuss. It was discussed with people in the
Department of State and with people in the Dis-
armament Agency, /italics supplied._/
MR. BADER. Senator, may I say that any point
of fact that was questionable was checked out with
Defense or State sources.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Let me ask Mr. McNaughton
,
were all the facts in it correct? /italics supplied. /
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MR, McNAUGHTON. The answer is "No. " Facts are
interpreted by assertion of judgements, /italics supplied. /
SENATOR SYMINGTON. That is what I thought you
were saying and would say! /italics supplied. / ^^
I
It is noteworthy that Senator Symington, at this date, could not
identify Mr, Henry Kuss, the United States chief arms salesman; this
bespeaks a considerable lack of familiarity with the military assistance
and arnns sales program. It would be the task of Dr. Bader and others
to "educate" the Senator during the weeks and months to come.
Failure to show a draft of the staff study to the principals involved
may well have been more than the calculated lack of administrative
courtesy suggested by the Chief of Staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Mr. Marcy. The staff study, as has been indicated by
its sole author, was meant to yield maximum impact. Had the
appropriate officials of the administration been given the opportunity
to change its tone, to scrub its prejudicial complexion, it is likely
to have emerged with its impact much reduced.
Before concluding the hearing for that day, the subcommittee
chairman. Senator Gore, felt it proper to allow the administration to
respond further to the questions raised by the study.
SENATOR GORE. Obviously this is a study of very
keen interest to the committee. I think there is
11/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, pp. 79-80.
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a good deal of public interest in it and surely a
good deal of public policy involved in it. ...
Dr. Marcy has nnade a suggestion that you be
invited to submit to the conimittee a factual
rebuttal, your comment on the staff report.
MR. VANCE. 7Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary
of Defense and Mr. McNaughton's superior^/ We would
be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman. We will be delighted
to do so. 1^
Three weeks later, on March 2, 1967, Mr. McNaughton returned
to the subcommittee hearings bearing a lengthy letter of rebuttal.
This letter examined every assertion made by Dr. Bader in his study
and made the following counterassertions:
1. The shift away from grant aid military equipment towards
arnas sales was "attributable almost entirely to natural economic
developments" and was "consistent with urgings by the Congress. "
2. "The process of policy review always allows for the
presentation of views by State, Defense, Treasury, and AID" and the
military sales program was "an accurate reflection of considered
US policy. "
3. That, while it was "true that no single, connprehensive
report on military sales information (including munitions licenses) is
prepared within the Government, " the Department of Defense believed
12/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
arnn.ament Problems, p. 80.
13/ The full text of this letter is provided at Appendix J.
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that, nevertheless, "Congress am d the general public have been
extensively informed on the scope, results and future plans of the
military sales programs" through such means as the annual Depart-
ment of Defense Military Assistance Program presentation to the
Congress and annual testimony by administration officials on behalf
of that program as a part of the Foreign Assistance Act.
4. That, while, admittedly, the Department of Defense had
"worked with a number of defense industry groups to further U. S.
military sales" and that while such sales "contribute directly to our
balance -of-payments situation, " they were, in fact, made "within
the framework of the rather stringent sales criteria adopted by the
Secretary of Defense." According to Mr. McNaughton's letter.
(1) We will not sell military equipment to a
foreign country which we believe it cannot afford.
(2) We will not ask a foreign country to buy any-
thing which in its judgement, or in ours, is not
needed for its armed forces.
(3) We will not ask any foreign country to purchase
anything from the United States which it can buy
cheaper or better elsewhere.
Further, the United States "competitive advantage, especially with
respect to highly sophisticated items, " had enabled this country to
beconne "the lowest cost and most effective producer of military
equipment in the world. " While European allies purchased "23% of
their nailitary equipment requirements fronn the United States, "
(77% being supplied by their own industry) they were in doing so.
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saving money and other resources. In addition, sales of military
equipment were satisfying American economic goals in that they:
(1) provide 1. 2 million man- years of employment in the i
United States,
(2) result in nearly $1 billion of profits to United States
industry each year, and _/Italics supplied^
(3) [canxsedJ the backlog of orders for U.S. industry _/ito
grow7 by 500%, from approximately $900 million in 1961
to more than $5 billion in 1965.
5. The Export-Import Bank did not act autonomously in
financing arms sales; its policies and procedures having been established
at an interagency meeting "attended by the AID Administrator, the
Budget Bureau Director, and representatives of the State and Defense
Departments, and under the personal chairmanship of the Secretary of
the Treasury. " The military assistance credit fund was not solely at
the disposal of Mr. Kuss' International Logistics Negotiations Office
(as the staff study had seemed to imply), but, rather, was managed
"as a matter of interagency coordination, and disbursements from it
are specifically controlled by the AID Administrator acting under the
broad delegation of authority from the Secretary of State as set forth
in the Foreign Assistance Act. "
6. That, finally, in response to the study's allegations
concerning pre-emptive arms sales and intensification of the arms
race in underdeveloped areas, the United States was, on the one hand,
simply underselling European competitors due to its comparative




radical shift in the orientation of the recipient country through the
introduction of Soviet arms, training missions, aund other instruments
of influence. "^
Although most of the points made by the administration in this
letter already had been either noted emphatically or at least touched
upon in testimony before the Disarmament Subcommittee, the letter
itself, couched in terms of discernible indignation, came as some-
thing of a surprise. Dr. Bader, the author of the staff study,
recollects that "it was not anticipated that McNaughton would so
react. I did not think DOD would react at ail. " The Department
of Defense was obviously anxious to make its case. There is some
question, however, as to the effectiveness of this vehicle for doing
so in a timely -way. The staff study was, of course, unclassified,
and although, according to Dr. Bader, "it was given normal distribution
with no special effort to bring it to the attention of the rest of the
Congress or the press" nevertheless it did come quickly to the
attention of both the Congress and the press (recall Mr. McNaughton'
s
ire about "a number of press releases" and "an editorial").
The rebuttal letter was classified bat, again according to Dr. Bader,
14/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems
, pp. 122-125.
15/ William B. Bader, letter dated November 2nd, 1971, p. 1.





*.'was printed in the hearing /the Disarmament Subcommittee hearing/
and the hearing given the same distribution as the study. In fact, given
a wider dissemination because of the growing controversy around the
issue. "^' The text of the hearing, however, was not, in fact, released
to the public until May 2, 1967, two full months later. The adminis-
tration's case in the matter of arms sales would go largely unheard
for some tinae.
Worse still, the rebuttal letter contained a factual error which
would cause the administration some degree of trouble. In its justifi-
cation of arms sales as being responsive to American economic goals
the letter had stated that such sales yielded "nearly $1 billion of
profits to United States industry each year. " Senator Wayne Morse
(D - Ore. ), already an established firebrand in opposition to military
assistance, immediately seized upon this figure. Although he was not
a member of the Disarmament Subcommittee (he was, though, a
member of the Committee on Foreign Relations), Senator Morse
was present on March 2 and asked to have a memorandum entered
in the record of the hearings. The classified rebuttal letter was, he
felt, "another example of the executive branch classifying its embarrass-
18
ments. " Senator Morse contended that,
17/ William B. Bader, letter dated November 2nd, 1971, p. 1.
18/ Senator Wayne Morse, memorandum dated March 2, 1967,
published in U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problenris, p. 125. See at Appendix K*
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. . . the fact that military sales abroad provide
profits -- not contracts, but profits -- to
American business in the magnitude of $ 1 billion
a year is a statistic to make us wonder whether
profits in the arms traffic are not making us
a profiteer in blood money. ^"
This concern over "blood money" led him to conclude that,
The Department's response does not rebut the
essential points of the Committee study. The
alarms it raises call for a complete, public
re-thinking of our arms sales policy, /italics
supplied_^/^'J
Senator Gore, the subcommittee chairmcui, was also shocked at
the profit figure given by the Department of Defense; he inquired of
Mr. McNaughton about it.
SENATOR GORE. . . . statement in your letter that
these sales provide nearly $1 billion of profits
to the U.S. industry each year --
MR. McNAUGHTON. Did I say "each year, " Mr.
Chairman?
SENATOR GORE. Yes. You say "each year" on
page 5, first paragraph. In view of the policy
implications, the magnitude of this problem, and
the extremely limited role that the Congress plays
and the limited information it has had on this
subject, the committee may very well find itself.
favorable to Senator Morse's motion, Zjhat public
19/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-





hearings be held investigating the arms sales
progranv^/ What would be your view of a public
hearing on this subject?
MR. McNAUGHTON. First, I would like to say
that I want to double check this figure of
$1 billion each year. It is in my letter
this way. This does not sound correct.
_/ltaiics supplied^/
SENATOR GORE. This was given to us last time.
MR.. McNAUGHTON. I understand. I wrote this letter,
SENATOR GORE. What I am saying is that this part-
icular statement was given the committee before, as
I recall. ^^
MR. McNAUGHTON. I want to double check this
figure because our total sales program runs about
one and a half billion per year, and how it could be
a billion dollars in profits out of one and a half
billion dollars of business is a little difficult for
me to understand. I will double check that number. '^^
The number was shortly rechecked and was found to represent
sales profits over a five year period. Damage had, however, been
done by this piece of misinformation. Not only had an outraged
Senator Morse called for public hearings (thus stirring up considerable
21/ The statement that Senator Gore probably remembered --
incorrectly — ^jpas the concluding sentence of Mr. McNaughton's pre-
pared stateraent given to the subcommittee as part of his testimony on
February 7, 1967; to wit: "Our sales have created . . . over $1 billion
in profits to American industry over the last five years. " /italics
supplied."/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-







interest on the subject of arms sales), but Senator J. W. Fulbright
(D - Ark. ), Chairman of the Comnaittee on Foreign Relations and the
loudest critic of the administration's foreign policy, had become
aroused. He -was now, in fact, present at the hearing. Dr. Bader's
study and the erroneous profit figure delivered by Mr. McNaughton had
served to flag for Senator Fulbright a whole new arena for contest with
the administration -- an arena in which the administration was
beginning to appear to be vulnerable. The Senator had, apparently,
begun to do some research on his own.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. I have a copy of Armed
Forces magazine. It is primarily supported by ads
frora people who get big contracts from the Pentagon
so, in effect, it is practically a Pentagon magazine.
It states:
In five years the military export sales
program has emerged fronn an afterthought
to a major concern of the U. S. Government.
It goes on to say what a magnificent job Mr.
Kuss has done in increasing the sales. /Senator
Fulbright, at least, could identify Mr. Kuss^
Here again I think that these sales ought to be
carefully analyzed. I would like to know not
only -what the sales are, but the net income.
When I say net I mean deducting all kinds of
aid that we give to respective countries that
purport to buy our arms. I have a hunch that
in a great many of the countries all we are
doing is obtaining cash from the sales, giving
the ma.nufacturers their billion dollars of pro-
fit, while paying for a big part of it oat of
foreign aid. Public Law 480, or loans of some
other kind. /Italics supplied_^/'^'*
Z4/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 134.
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If full disclosare of the arms sales feature of the Military-
Assistance Program had really been made to the Congress, as Mr.
McNaughton had claimed, somehow Senator Fulbright had been over-
looked. At cuxy rate, the billion dollar profit figure certainly brought
it to his attention. In Senator Fulbright' s view, an active arms sales
progrann was far from beneficial for the economy; rather.
It does not really increase the peoples' earning
power. In fact it is just the opposite. It constitutes
a great drain on them, and I am more and more in-
clined to be dubious about maintaining the military aid
program because it is doing nothing but creating a far-
flung organization of petty armed states which are bound
to come to no good end. I do not think it is a very wise
policy. ^-^
If Mr. McNaughton thought that by correcting the figure which
he had given for profits derived from arms sales he could placate
Senator Fulbright, he failed to consider the Senator's well known
tenacity. The attack had only just begun.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. Let me talk about this policy
matter in public hearings. /Again referring to the
Armed Forces magazine:/ This is certainly a public
magazine. Here is the item, "Can the United States
Maintain the Momentum of Its Military Sales?" This
is a 10-page article; the subheading reads, "As the
number of major weapons systems to be sold overseas
decreases, how does International Logistics Nego-
tiator Henry Kuss plan to maintain his annual one
and a half billion dollar pace ? "
Z5/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 134.

109
The next item, an article in this magazine, is
entitled "How the Pentagon Organizes for World-
wide Arms Sales. "
All this gives the impression that we are going
all out to sell arms to any and everybody we possibly
can, and the implication fronn the editorial is that
this is the way we are going to offset our balance
of payments deficit. I cannot think of a more
disastrous way to do that because we are just piling
up trouble for the future. ^"
Other members of Congress might be favorable towards an arms
sales prograna (particularly if the arms were manufactured in their
states or districts), amd some might be ambivalent, but Senator
Fulbright -- whose power in the Congress was considerable -- was
putting himself on record as being adamantly opposed.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. The United States, which
professes to be a peaceful country and a stalwart
supporter of the U. N. now becomes the biggest arms
salesman the world has ever seen. It seems tome
that you might have some qualms about presenting this
terrible word "image" of the United States as a
country doing everything possible to induce poor
nations to buy arms because we want to balance our pay-
ments. ... It seems to me this is a disaster, /italics
supplied. / ~^
Mr. McNaughton had already shown that he was sensitive to
criticism about the arms sales program which was flourishing under
his supervision (although he must have suffered some embarrassment
26/ U. S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-





due to his temporary inability to say with certainty whether the program
was yielding its $1 billion profit over one year's time or five). Now
his sensitivity would lead him into a sharp verbal exchange with one
of the most powerful men in the entire legislative branch.
MR. McNAUGHTON. I would like to make the point:
first, that it is rare that anything the Defense Depart-
ment puts out, although sometimes sonaething like
this magazine article happens: it is rare that the
Defense Department contributes to the image you
discuss.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. There is a big picture of
Mr. Kuss. I am sure they must have consulted
him on thi s .
MR. McNAUGHTON. They interviewed him the
same way that your staff member _/_Dr. Bader_/
interviewed him in preparing your committee
staff study, ^/italics supplied^/
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. This is obviously based
upon support of your clients to whom you pay money.
Practically every advertiser in here _/_the Armed
Forces magazine / has huge contracts with you.
MR. McNAUGHTON. Most of the bad image is
created by such things as an article of this sort:
the committee staff study of the type that came
out from the staff of this committee, statements
by members of the Congress, or sometimes by
press reports of speeches by my deputy, Mr.
Kuss. Generally by the critics of the sales
program. ^°
At a moment when a certain amount of diplomacy might have
salvaged at least some of the reservoir of good will which existed in
28/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 137.

Ill
the Congress and the press for the Military Assistance Program, Mr.
McNaughton would not let go of his dudgeon and so, lashed out at both.
MR. McNAUGHTON. The image that is given, for
example, ail the way through the committee staff
report is one of our energetically seeking business.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. It is the same way right
here. JjX is unclear whether the Senator meant in
the magazine or in the subcommittee hearingT/
MR. McNAUGHTON. This is untrue, and I think
it should be fully understood that this is untrue.
The efforts that we put into this program by a
factor of five to one are efforts to avoid selling.
^/italics supplied^
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. I can guarantee that is
not true here, /italics suppliedTT
MR. McNAUGHTON. I can guarantee that it is
true in fact. It is my program, and this is where
most of our efforts go /deleted_/ trying to find ways
to keep a country from spending its resources
on things it should not spend them on. This is
not always the case, but in no case do we
practice the hard sell, and I think that should
be fully understood. ^Italics supplied^^/ ^°
There is evidence that the Defense official's argument was being
received, at least by some, with a certain amount of sarcasm.
MR. McNAUGHTON. But one point I think you should
understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may
be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off.
SENATOR GORE. Tinterjecting
-J7 In dictatorships ?
29/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, pp. 137-138.
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MR. McNAUGHTON. They are paying off in terms of
military, the size of the military establishment. There
is a human, psychological, political, internal problem
that these governments have to deal with, just as you
have to deal with who sits where around the table or
who is where in the Pentagon. These problems are
important to these people and, therefore, we move
slowly to contract their expenditures on sophisticated
types of equipment which, in our view, are un-
30necessary. "^^
Senator Fulbright had, by this time, become increasingly
anxious to air the administration's arnas sales program outside of
executive session. He continued to pursue the matter.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. Are you opposed to a
public hearing on this subject . . . ?
I think this is important not only from your
military point of view, but from the point of
view of foreign relations. I think in the long
run it matters what the world thinks. I do not
like for the world to think of us as being
interested only in waging war in southeast Asia
and arming everybody else in an effort to make money,
2Uid to line up everybody in a military confronta-
tion with your enemies of the moment. I do not
think it is a wise policy.
It seems to me a public hearing on this would
be justified so that the Senate as a whole and the
public share the responsibility with us. This
committee cannot stop you; I realize that. Cer-
tainly I cannot. Only public opinion and the
Congress as a whole can. They ought to at least
share the responsibility of knowing what is
going on. I would, therefore, think public
hearings are justified because this is a major
policy matter. _/jtaiics supplied^ 3i
30/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armanaent and Pis-





Dr. Bader's efforts had now borne real fruit. Thanks to some
imprudent braggadocio on the part of Mr. Kuss, some iiitimed pub-
licity, an error in the Defense Departinent' s rebuttal letter, and,
perhaps, Mr. McNaughton's responses to Senator Fulbright's baiting,
the administration's arms sales program had been pronounced "a
major policy matter. " The charge that the Department of Defense was
"a profiteer in blood money, " albeit it stemmed from reaction to
erroneous information, would follow the administration throughout the
year and would help to drain further whatever good opinion remained
in the Congress for the Military Assistance Program.
In response to Senator Fulbright's challenge to place the subject
of arms sales before the public, Mr. McNaughton's answer, although
completely proper, seemed weak and evasive.
MR. McNAUGHTON. On the question of public
hearings you, of course, should address this
question to the Secretaries involved, _/the
Secretaries of State and Defens^7but my own
view is that it would be very difficult to
answer the specific questions that come up
as to why sales in this case, why not in that
case. What were the other agreements that
the country made that made this a more
sensible deal than appears by just a transfer
of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly
be done in public session without gravely
injuring our relations with the countries
involved. ^^
32/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armannent and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 141.

114
Although most of this hearing on the subject of arms sales seems,
thus far, to have been primarily concerned with either the adminis-
tration's rebuttal to Dr. Bader's staff study or the increasing likely-
hood that public hearings would be called for, there were two substan-
tive issues raised which were shortly to capture the imagination of
arms sales critics -- the question of the resale of United States
military equipment, and the problem of so-called country - X loans.
The chairman of the subcommittee. Senator Gore, was curious about
both of these issues and twice exercised his prerogative as chairman
to interrupt the heated dialogue between Senator Fulbright and Mr.
McNaughton. First, he inquired about the resale of equipment.
SENATOR GORE. Do you have any indication as
to the amount of profit that the private concerns in
recipient countries are earning from the resale of
American armed /sic/ equipment?
MR. McNAUGHTON. Well, I do not know how, Mr.
Chairman, I do not know how private concerns in
these countries would be involved. It is conceivable
that the sales inight be made through private sources.
SENATOR GORE. There is a German concern -- I
am not sure how private it is -- named Merex, an
organization through which the sales of American
equipment are made to third countries. Would you
be able to supply the committee with information
about the amount of sales of this organization, to
whom, and at what price?
MR. McNAUGHTON. I will try to get that information,
Mr. Chairman, and, submit it to you. I will also




If, in fact, countries which had received United States military
equipment through either grant aid or arms sales were reselling that
equipment to other countries there might be at least three ramifica-
tions which could be considered unfortunate: (a) the United States
would be providing the wherewithal for such countries to implement
their own foreign policies, possibly running counter to that of the
United States; (b) such disposition of military equipment granted or
sold by the United States might be in violation of "end-use" agree-
ments which had always accompajiied grants and sales (which raises
the question of whether or not the administration might have been
ignoring resales -- or, worse, might have been ignorant of them
altogether), and, (c) recipient countries which had been provided
with military equipment by the United States at little cost (or no cost
at all) would stand to profit through such resales and, further, might
actually be in competition with American arms sales companies.
Mr. McNaughton provided the following information for the
record in response to Senator Gore's question.
Merex AG, a private firm was established in
Vevey, Switzerland, in 1963, and deals primarily
in industrial and military ordinance equipraent
sales to foreign governments. It is headed by
G. G. Mertins, who was formerly a Daimer - Benz
Near East sales representative. The company
operates in several European countries, and is
the West German agent for Interarmco Ltd. , whose
president is Samuel Cummings, an American.





Lacking any imnnediate response from Mr. McNaughton on the arms
resale problem. Senator Gore next brought up the subject of country - X
looins.
SENATOR GORE, Mr. Secretary, the staff study
stated that in addition to its role in making direct
loans to major industrial countries, the Export-
Import Bank makes so-called country - X loans.
Such Loans are the result of the Ex-Im Bank
establishing Twhat amounts to an account re-
ceivable fund for the use of the Department of
Defense. The study states, "The Ex-Im Bank
does not knov/ or want to know where this money
goes. " These funds are being utilized without
reference to Congress. This is a serious matter.
What, in fact, is the country - X account? Why
is such a device necessary? _/Ttalics supplied. /
MR. McNAUGHTON. It is simply a line of credit
which can be used by the State Department, AID,
DOD cooperating in making a decision as to a credit
sale of arms. That you can then go to Ex-Im and
say, "We need so much to cover deal so and so. "
SENATOR GORE. What does the aggregate of the
country - X account amount to?
MR. McNAUGHTON. The total financed so far
from fiscal year 1962 to 1969 runs approxinaately
$800 million. They have undertaken to finance,
including things not yet financed, they have under-
taken to finance a total of about $2. 6 billion.
SENATOR GORE. But nowhere in your referenc_e
to the various phases of the U.S. Government _/_in
making decisions about country - X loans/ have
33/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Probienns, p. 136.
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you referred to any part that the Congress plays
in allocating $800 million, and yet we theoretic-
ally have a representative democracy.
MR. McNAUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I hope I did
not give that impression, because each year when
we come in here to testify before the full committee
we present reclamation --
SENATOR GORE. You tell us about country - X accounts?
MR. McNAUGHTON. No. But we tell you where sales
are going to be made, and we tell you where the sales
by countries are going to be made so that you know
where the arms are going to go, and we tell you how
the financing is going to be handled. If this is not
conapiete, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to improve
the reporting system to you, and our planning,
/italics suppliedTZ
SENATOR GORE. Fine. ^^
Mr. McNaughton's explanation of country - X loans may have
been accepted as "fine" on this occasion, however, as members of
the Congress in this and other committees began to give the issue
serious consideration it would seem to them that the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, in making his response to Senator Gore, might
have been purposefully brief and even, perhaps, not completely candid.
Mr. McNaughton would, in fact, come to be hounded on this subject
literally until the day he died.
The subcommittee hearing had now nearly reached the time for
adjournment. Senator Joseph S. Clark (D - Penn. ), who had not
34/ U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, pp. 142-143.
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commented thus far, was disturbed about the policy control arrange'
ment for sales of military equipment. In his view.
SENATOR CLARK. It is a great dereliction of their
responsibilities on the part of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency that they have not taken the lead
in this, .... I read this reply of yours to our staff
study .... I am concerned that behind some very able
legal verbiage you come pretty close to admitting that
what the staff study says is right. In the second
place, I think this whole problem should not be with-
in the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. It
has been conducting this aggressive sales policy which
is building up military equipment to feed on animosities
centuries old, especially in the Middle East. I do not
think the policy on this raatter is correct. I think
ACDA ought to have a bigger say, and if they are not
asserting theraselves, they ought to. This trend has to
be stopped, ^/italics supplied^/ ^^
The Senator's anxiety about feeding animosities in the Middle
East would seem prophetic when, just three months later, another
Arab - Israeli war would erupt. As hearings on the military assis-
tance portion of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 progressed through
the year, it would become noteworthy that many other members of the
Congress shared Senator Clark's dismay in discovering that the
35 / U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, pp. 144-145.
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federal agency chartered for arms control was not, in fact, controlling
arms at all; its energies being expended elsewhere.
Before the hearing closed, Mr. McNaughton sought to reach some
polite accomnaodation with the subcommittee on the subject of arms sales,
MR. McNAUGHTON. I want the committee to under-
stand that I do not want this committee to feel towards
the sales program the way Senator Symin.gton said he
feels. ^/Apparently, that administration disclosure of
details of the program had been less than adequate^/
I want this comm.ittee to have the information; indeed,
I want to have it before them, and I want them to
understand what we think we are going to do in the
interests of the United States.
SENATOR GORE. Mr. Secretary, I do not think any-
one doubts the sincerity and earnestness of your desire
to communicate and fully inform this committee. I
think a gulf has developed because of possible break-
down in communication. Here is the chairman of the
Middle East Subcommittee /Senator Symington, chairmcin
of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee^/
who learned from the press about the development in Iran.
^/Presumably, a barter arrangement between Iran and the
Soviet Union whereby Iran would receive Soviet military
equipment in return for natural gas -- while Iran would
still be receiving military equipment from the United
States through grants and saies_^/
I do not like this country - X account, and these kinds
of devices which reaiiy go around any participation by
the Congress or any of its committees. Things grow like
Topsy, you know, and this program has grown without ade-
quate participation of the Congress. Both the executive
and the legislative branches need to work at proper
liaison in communication. /Ttalics supplied^/
36/ The letter written by the Director of the Arms Control and
Dis^irnnament Agency in response to Senator Gore's inquiry (at Appendix
I ) provides some indication of the interests that competed for that




MR. McNAUGHTON. I am prepared to cooperate fully. ^"^
HEARINGS BEFORE THE NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE
If Senator Symington had appeared unfamiliar with the arms sales
feature of the U. S. Military Assistance Program in early February, by
mid-March he had been made knowledgeable enough to want to conduct
his own hearings on the subject. On March 14, 1967, he began a series
of executive sessions, the purpose of which was to explore "not whether
the United States should or should not be selling this military equipment,
rather whether the governmental machinery is coordinated adequately;
and also whether the Congress is properly informed and consulted
2 O
before such decisions are made. "
Present at the first of these sessions were the following non-
members of Senator Symington's subcommittee: Senators Fulbright,
Gore, Clark, and McCarthy. Also present was the subcommittee consul-
tant, Dr. William B. Bader. Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton
was not asked to appear before this subconnmittee; it was his Deputy
37/ U. S. Congress, Senate, United States Armament and Dis-
armament Problems, p. 150.
38/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries
,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern
ajid South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th
Congress, 1st session, (Washington: US Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 1, Like the Disarmament Subcommittee hearings, testimony
received by Senator Symington's subcommittee was released to the public
only after the administration had had the opportunity to make selective
deletions in the interest of security: in this case, not until July 11, 1967.
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for International Logistics Negotiations, Mr. Henry J. Kuss, whose
testimony the senators wanted to hear.
At the time of this hearing, Mr. Kuss had accumulated 23 years
in the service of the Department of Defense. He had worked for seven
years within the United States Navy supply system ajid for ajiother
seven years in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller. In 1957 he became the head of a division within the
Department of Defense which planned military assistance and determined
the resources of foreign countries in meeting mutual military objectives
together with the United States. Following recommendations by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),
Mr. Kuss was, in 1962, asked to head a small organization within the
International Security Affairs branch of the Defense Department, the
mission of which was to develop forms of military assistance other
thcin grant aid. That organization became known as the Office of
International Logistics Negotiations. Mr. Kuss explained the title and
the function of his organization.
MR. KUSS. In the past 5 years we have developed
techniques of communicating with our allies to
assist in promoting their defensive strength con-
sistent with our political and economic objectives
without using grant aid. We and they call this
conamuni cation "negotiation. " Anybody who is
using his own money does not wish to call it
assistance; he calls it negotiation.
We have developed machinery for the management
of sales throughout the Government to assure that
the political, econonnic and military aspects are
considered extensively at the highest level.
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Through this communication, and following the
process of Government review, we have consumated
arrangements for orders and commitments totaling
over $11 billion in the last 5 years, 90 percent
of which is for seven largely industrialized count-
ries, a-nd the balance of 10 percent, while it covers
some 40 countries, is largely only to three countries. ^
The reliance which Senator Symington had in his young consultant.
Dr. Bader, is evidenced by the fact that it was the consultant, and not
a senator, who was appointed to handle the initial interrogation of Mr.
Kuss. The staff study had flagged the disposition and sales of several
types of jet aircraft to various countries. Mr. Bader' s line of question-
ing indicates that he wished official corroboration of those transactions
to appear in the record.
MR. BADER. What is our present position with respect
to the supply of military equipment to PakistaJi?
MR. KUSS. Ever since the -- immediately during the
war we ceased all supplying of equipment to both Pakistan
and India. Many months later we instituted a policy of
selling noniethal equipment to Pakistan and India.
MR, BADER, Would you define noniethal?
MR. KUSS. It is a very difficult thing to define, but
generally it has covered the kind of things that are
in the ground environment for aircraft, radar control
systems, radios, trucks: it does not include even
39/ U, S, Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries
, pp. 3-4. Mr. Kuss retired from government service
in 1969and now is president of Henry J. Kuss, Jr. Associates -- an
import-export firm located in Arlington, Virginia (which, as of this
writing, does not deal in military equipment).
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armored personnel carriers that have no weapons on
them. Actually, there has been no activity going
even though we have had that policy, there has
been no activity since we changed that policy.
MR. BADER. So we have a policy of total embargo on
what one could define as lethal military equipment
to Pakistan?
MR. KUSS, Yes, we do.
MR. BADER. During the Subcommittee on Disarmament
hearings, Mr. McNaughton was asked to submit a list
of military equipment of U. S. origin that the West
German Government has resold or given to a third
country. On that list was an itein of 90 F-86 air-
craft that the West German Government sold to Iran.
Is that correct?
MR. KUSS. To Iran?
MR. BADER, Yes. I understand that these aircraft
are actually in the possession of Pakistan- Would
you care to comment? /Italics supplied. / '^^
Dr. Bader was, of course, leading the witness toward the pre-
sumption that United States policy vis-a-vis Pakistan was being circum-
vented by a recipient of U.S. military assistance -- either with or
without the knowledge or approval of Washington. In order to make this
point clear for the subcommittee Dr. Bader inquired further of Mr.
Kuss before the latter could phrase his connment;
MR. BADER. While you are getting that -- let me
ask you another question. As I understand it, we
include in our military sales or grant agreement
40/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to I^ear East and South
Asian Countries, pp. 6-7.
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with West Germany a so-called end-use agreement.
Is that correct? That is, we have ^/deleted/ veto,
as Mr. McNaughton said, over the final disposition
of Americaji military equipment.
MR. KUSS. That is right.
MR. BADER. So in the case of these F-86 /Jlc? if they
are not in Iran --if they actually belong to
Pakistan -- then the West German Government
and perhaps the Iranian Government, if they were
the middlenrian in this case, have turned aside
what was American desire and policy with regard
to Pakistan. Would that be correct?
MR. KUSS. The aircraft which you mentioned were
produced in Canada under U. S. license, and pro-
At
vided by Cajiada to the Federal Republic of Germany. ^
If Mr. Kuss thought that by shifting the responsibility for this
transaction to Canada, as the original producer of the jet aircraft
in question, he could evade the issue, he was mistaken. His answer
raised a new issue -- one that Senator McCarthy was alarraed about.
SENATOR McCarthy, why was that done? Explain
that procedure to me. Why were they maxiufactured
in Canada? . . .1 just want to know what is the
game? Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under
our license? The Canadians don't have a serious
balance -of-payments problem with Germaiay. We do.
MR. KUSS, My answer to the first question, to
start with, first of all, the North American
Aircraft Corp. has the rights to license foreign
manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft in. this
case. They obtained that right through their
contractual arrangements with the Defense Department.
41/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to N"ear East and South
Asian Countries, p. 7.
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They then obtained the approval of the Office of
Munitions Control, /in the State Department/ who
would also check it out with Defense, to license
Cauiada. to produce not only for themselves but for
other countries as they were able to work out
mutually agreeable sales arrangements.
The U.S. Government, in reviewing that license,
approved it but insisted that the license itself
/deleted/. And, further, in that particular agree-
ment, that if the other country were to ever sell
it to any other country, they must also get the
approval in succession of the U. S, Government.
_/ltalics supplied^ 42
Since, as Mr. Kuss testified, F-86 aircrafr produced in Canada
were subject to virtually the same end- use agreement as like aircraft
produced in the United States, the point which he raised -- as to the
origin of the aircraft which had, it seems, ultimately gone to Pakistan
was hardly relevant. Senator Symington was anxious to determine if
the transaction -was accomplished with the knowledge of the United
States Government.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Did we know of the movement
by Iran of the F-86's from Iran to Pakistan?
MR. KUSS. No. As a deliberate plan of our own.
No, we did not know. . . . We expressed no objection
to a sale to Iran, not 'Pakistan.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. How many weeks was it,
roughly, or months, after they went into Pakistan
that we found out that they had gone to Pakistan?
MR. KUSS. It was some months, and after
42/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 8.
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consultation with Germany and Canada, both
countries protested, /presumably to Iran/.
Iran stated that the aircraft were in Pakistan
only for repair.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. How many went from Iran
to Pakistcin?'^^
Mr. Kuss could not answer the Senator's question, but he later
supplied the following information for the record.
All 90 of the aircraft involved in the trans-
action were delivered to Iran between March and
Noveraber . 1966 and then sent to Pakistan, allegedly
for repairs. Of these, 26 were returned briefly to
Iran in October 1966. We do not have precise infor-
mation as to where these planes maybe at a given
moment, in view of the pattern of their being moved
back and forth between the two countries.
If it ocurred to any of the Senators that the administration might
have simply acquiesced in an arrangement which provided Pakistan --
a SEATO ally -- with access to jet fighters despite a U.S. embargo oa
lethal military equipment, they did not choose to raise the issue; rather
they yielded to Dr. Bader. He wished to know more about the details
of the F-86 transaction.
MR, BADER. . . . according to information provided
by Mr. McNaughton, there is a private firm in West
Germany, by the name of Merex. The Merex Corp.
,
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according to our information, is the West German
agent for Interarmco.
Could you tell the subcommittee whether these
F-86's went from the West German Government to
Merex and then to Iran?
MR. KUSS. No, I really could not tell you that,
although it is likely because I know -- I deal
very closely with the Federal Republic of Germany,
and they follow a normal policy of using Merex as
their distributor, and not dealing directly them-
selves. '*^
Mr. Kuss later supplied for the record a statement confirming
that Merex, had, in fact, handled the sale of the F-86's to Ircin. The
consultant then wanted to know whether Merex had sold 200 to 400 tanks
to Iran, tanks which, according to Dr. Bader, might have finally gone
to Pakistan. Mr. Kuss flatly denied any knowledge of tanks going from
Iran to Pakistan. Dr. Bader next brought up the subject of a sale
of F—4 jet fighter-attack aircraft to Iran. Senator Symington was upset
about the lack of administration disclosure of this sale.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Now, when was the
Congress notified that F-4's were going to
be shipped to Iran?
MR. KUSS. I do not believe the Congress was
notified. Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke
on the subject, /before the Disarmament Sub-
committee/ .
45/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, pp. 10-11.
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SENATOR SYMINGTON. That was after it was in
the press?
MR. KUSS. Correct, sir.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. And we talked about
governmental machinery. Is it the policy of the
Defense Department to tell the press before it
tells the Congress about such sales?
MR. KUSS. As a matter of fact, I do not
believe we told the press.
SENATOR SYMINGTON, Do you not think, if you
make a sale of a sophisticated, modern airplane
to a foreign government, the Congress should be
informe d?
MR. KUSS. I think I can best answer that question
by saying it is not my function to determine that
answer, sir.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Well you could say this,
could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?
MR. KUSS. Yes, sir.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. And you do not know
anybody who did inform the Congress.
MR. KUSS. Yes, sir.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. And to the best of your
_
knowledge it would have remained a secret /deleted/
.
MR. KUSS. No, sir; it would have been perfectly
evident in this year's presentation of the congress-
ional program, because it has been occurring in the
last year, and in describing our congressional pro-
gram for this year we would have been describing
that which we have provided to Iran in the last year.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. And that means that the
planes would first be sold, then somewhere between




MR. KUSS. Yes, sir , /italics suppliedT?'^^
Having established that the administration was following a
disclosure policy which was, to say the least, tardy. Senator Symington
moved to another facet of the F-4 sale to Iraji with which he was upset.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. When did you fixid out for
the first time for a Western country, in a Western
alliance ACENTO/ , the Iranians were going to
purchase over $100 million of military equipment
from the Soviet Union? When were you informed
of that?
MR. KUSS. Early in 1966.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. So you knew that sale was
going to be made before you agreed to sell them
the F-4's. /italics supplied^/
MR. KUSS. Yes, sir. /italics suppliedT/ 48.
The justification given by the administration for application of
the Military Assistance Program to Iran had always been that Iran was
one of the "forward defense" countries; that is, like Greece and Turkey
in Europe and South Korea and Taiwan in Asia, Iran was on the frontier
facing the communist powers. Some or all of these countries would be
among the first in the free world to be attacked should either or both of
those powers commence active aggression. Other countries, such as
Gernaany, were, of course, also on the frontier but, being industrialized
47/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South





and relatively wealthy, their participation in the original grant aid
Military Assistance Program had been terminated some years pre-
viously. Although they were now the recipients of arms sales adminis-
tered as part of that program, sales did not require the same stringent
justification as did grants of military equipment and, so, terminology
such as "forward defense" was no longer applicable to them.
In the case of Iran, a total of $1.4 billion in grant military
equipment had been provided since World War 11 and now, in 1967,
sales of military equipment were beginning to mount up -- all justified
by the supposed antipathy of the Shah for the communist powers. It is
hardly surprising then, that Senator Symington was somewhat dismayed
to find that Ircin was about to receive military equipment from the Soviet
Union as well as from the United States. It seemed to be the kind of
situation that naight shake the faith of any observer in the administration's
conduct of foreign policy and control of the Military Assistance Program
-- particularly an observer who, despite his privileged position in the
Congress, felt that he had been forced to do his observing "through a
glass, darkly. "
Another Senator, one who had listened thus far in uncharacteristic
silence, now felt it appropriate to challenge Mr. Kuss on a more
personal basis.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. Mr. Kuss, you have no feeling
of responsibility, I assunne, for the political develop-
ments in Iran. All yea do is sell arms, is that right?
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I read a very interesting article about your activities
and you apparently are an effective arms salesman.
MR. KUSS. Well, we all learn in the United States
very early never to believe everything we read,
sir, and I tried to explain earlier --
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. I don't want you to repeat
anything you said.
MR. KUSS. Well, I think it would be important.
For inany years I was director of Military Assis-
tance Planning and also responsible for studying
the application of country resources, and the
application of policy which says that countries
who could afford to pay for their necessary re-
quirement for forces, /deleted/ should do so.
All my office does is try to carry out a pro-
gram of the United States that does the same thing,
the same objectives that we have before and do it
without grant aid.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. But who makes the decision
to sell arms? Who determines the country's capacity
to purchase arms without endangering their economy?
MR. KUSS. It is nay responsibility since the manage
-
)p you, as an official of the Defense Department?
/Italics supplied_r7
ment for funds must be put somewhere to see to it
that that is managed in a viable way. /italics
suppiied_r7 49
If Mr. Kuss was, indeed, responsible for arms sales decision
naaking. Senator Fulbright wanted to elicit from him the motive behind
the sale of the very sophisticated and very expensive F-4 jet fighter-
attack aircraft to Iraui. Retreating from his assertion of responsibility,
Mr. Kuss claimed that it had been the "political and economic machinery
49/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 17.
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which made the principal decision in the case of Iran. "
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. Of our Government or theirs?
MR. KUSS. Of our Government. '
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. By the Pentagon?
MR. KUSS. No, sir. Absolutely not.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. The highest level is the
Pentagon, isn't it? /itaiics supplied_^/
MR, KUSS. No it is not.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. You don't think so?
MR. KUSS. We are minions of the wheels, /italics suppliedfT
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. You don't believe General
Eisenhower knew what he was talking about when he
spoke of the dangers of the military and industrial
complex?
MR. KUSS. No, sir , /italics suppliedT/ ^^
The grim specter of the American military - industrial conaplex --
coordinating its operations in such a way as to concoct self-serving
rationale for allied defense requirements on the one hand, while
profiting hughly from supplying those requirements on the other --
had now been incarnated. In a season when it was quickly becoming
fashionable to ascribe every blemish of United States foreign and
domestic policy to the machinations of such a complex, it could easily
50/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 18.
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be accepted that here, in the Military Assistance Program, was one
more example of unfettered power run amok. All the testimony by
all the administration witnesses throughout the entire year of 1967
would, unfortunately, never really allay this suspicion.
Senator Symington, in closing the hearing that day, made a final
complaint.
As chairmsm of the subcommittee which embraces
this part of the world, it is a fact that I had no
knowledge of the sale of these planes
_Zj"-4' s to Iran/
or the purchase of the military equipment /by Iran /
from the Soviet Union until I read it in the news-
papers. So one wonders just what is the position,
let alone the prerogatives of the Congress when it
comes to this type and character of operation.
In order to inform himself and his colleagues more adequately on
this operation of arms sales. Senator Symington next called before his
subconamittee Mr. Samuel Cunnmings, the president of the International
Armament Corporation -- the "Interarmco" mentioned in previous
testimony. Mr. Cummings' appearance before the subcommittee
(which again included Senator Fulbright, as an observer) took place on
April 13, 1967. Although action had already begun in the House of
Representatives on the draft Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (with
hearings before the Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees),
as yet, no Senate conamittee had addressed proposed legislation on
51/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South




Had Hollywood's central casting been asked to provide "one arms
merchant -- 1960's style" for a motion picture role, they would
probably have closely approximated Mr. Samuel Cummings. Forty
years old at the time of this hearing, Mr. Cummings had been born in
Philadelphia, educated in the United States, and had served briefly in
the U.S. Army towards the end of World "War 11. Now, in 1967, Mr.
Cuinmings was a resident of Monaco and was the president and principal
stockholder of a corporation of some seventeen companies located
throughout most of the Western and nonaiigned world (he was also the
sole owner of two wholesale - retail firearms companies which operated
exclusively within the United States -- one of them on a mail-order
basis). Asked to describe the business of his corporation, he said.
We trade in all fields of armament, although
our specialty is light armament, let us say, weapons
up to ZO millimeter. In those, in that field, I can
52/ The Administrator of the Agency for International Develop-
ment had, according to established procedure, submitted the draft
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (which included, as Part II, the pro-
visions covering the U.S. Military Assistance Program) to both the
Senate and the House on February 23, 1967. Commencement of hearings
in the House of Representatives began in a timely way -- the Appropria-
tions Committee began on March 20, and the Foreign Affairs Committee
on April 4. Senate action, however, was not so timely. The Foreign
Relations Committee did not formally acknowledge the draft legislation
until May 25 (when it became S. 1872), and did not begin hearings until




say that we are, I believe, unquestionably the largest
traders in the world as we have very substantial depots
in the United States and the United Kingdom.
In heavy weapons, we deal primarily as brokers .
actin.g for selling governments, since no one really
handles heavy weapons as a principal, other than
goverrunents themselves, owing to the physical
impossibility in dealing with such material. '-*
Senator Symington was still interested in the F-86 jet fighters
which had somehow found their way to Pakistan despite an avowed U. S.
embargo on lethal weapons for that country. He asked Mr. Cummings
if he knew ctnything about that transaction.
MR. CUMMINGS. I knew about it.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. You had no connection with it?
MR. CUMMINGS. I had no connection with it, although
it was common knowledge in Europe at the time of that
transaction that the material was not for Iran, but
for Pakistan, /jtaiics supplied^/
SENATOR SYMINGTON. It was common knowledge?
MR. CUMMINGS. It was common knowledge.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. That is interesting.
MR. CUMMINGS. Those aircraft were flown by
Luftwaffe /German Air Force/ pilots in civilian
uniforms to Iran, to an airbase I really do not know
the name, it is somewhere in the eastern part of
Iran, and then, they were flown from there to
Pakistan. . . .
As far as Pakistan goes, as you know, immediately
after, and even during the Pakistan - Indian conflict,
53/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, pp. Z5-26.
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/the Kashmir War of 196_57 there was a United Nations
declaration that neither side should be supported, to
which everyone agreed.
Shortly after that conflict ended, the Pakistanis
sent an. Iranian mission to Europe headed by a high
ranking Iranian general by the name of Toufanian,
whose job was to purchase rather substantial quantities
of material for Pakistan of heavier type, most of which
had been lost in the fighting, tanks, tank parts, a lot
of artillery ammunition, and some naval equipment.
The Pakistanis chose Toufanian, or chose the Iranian
general, he was picked by the Shah, we were told, because
they thought, correctly at that time, that they would
have difficulty in buying, themselves, directly.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. The German Government
must have known what was going on if the pilots were
flying the planes.
MR. CUMMINGS. I would not speak for the German
Govermnent but my educated guess would, be that they did.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. So really it was a way of getting
around an agreement we made and announced to the
Arr.erican people about not selling arms to Pakistan or
India?
MR, CUMMINGS. You could say that. ^^
Discovering that Mr. Gumming s was a mine of information on
arms sales, Senator Symington pressed him for more details.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. If the Germans were operating
independently of what our stated position was with
respect to Pakistan and India, assuming that they were
. . . why would they do it /conclude the F-86 transaction/
through Merex instead of direct?
54/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
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MR. CUMMINGS. I think for two reasons: first, if
they did it through Merex, they could claim at least
ostensibly that they were only selling to Merex, and
Merex was only selling to Iran. Second, in order not
to incur the wrath of India, they would have had an
advantage in not dealing directly.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. But it would have become
known pretty quickly by India, would it not?
MR. CUMMINGS. In my view, yes because it is very
difficult to really conceal substantial arms move-
ments anywhere in the world. Senator. Small arms,
light weapons
,
yes but heavy material, virtually
impossible, /italics supplied/ 55
During the previous hearing of this subcommittee. Dr. Bader
had inquired of Mr. Kuss concerning tanks which might have followed
the same route -- Germany to Iran to Pakistan --as the F-86's.
Mr. Kuss had replied in the negative. Now X)r. Bader had information
about a sale of tanks by one Levy Auto Parts Company to the Iranian
Government. The signature on the sales contract, according to Dr.
Bader, being that of General Toufanian. Mr. Cummings was able to
provide additional information for the subcommittee.
MR. CUMMINGS. Levy Bros, are Canadian, as far
as I know, and they are based in Toronto with other
places in Canada. . . . They are one of the people
who are presently bidding in Pakistan to sell the
55/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 30. It is interesting that "unquestionably the largest
trader in the world" of small arms would volunteer this fact -- with
its possibly sinister implications.
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surplus German armored fighting vehicles to Pakistan,
either directly or through Toufanian.
At the present time, there exists a minimum of
three contracts between Toufanian and suppliers in
the West for the furnishing of these armored fighting
vehicles to Pakistan from Germany. I would say there
exists at least three contracts we know of, having
seen the actual documents in one place or another in
my normal travels. One is Levy Bros. , one is Merex,
and one is with or through a Pakistani whose name is
Hamid Khan.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. These are all three for
armored vehicles?
MR. CUMMINGS. These are all three for armored
vehicles. -'"
One might ask, why was Mr. Cummings, a prominent arms
merchajit, so cooperative and so candid with this subcommittee? Was
he not aware of the growing sensitivity of the Congress to arms sales
and to the uncontrolled spread of arms to developing countries? Was he
not concerned that an alarmed Congress might move to dry up his
sources of arms or somehow curtail his business activities? Apparently,
he was not. Once having described for the Senators the activities of the
German Merex company, the Canadian Levy Brothers, and other arms
merchants -- all "foreign" and all his competitors -- Mr. Cummings
revealed his real motive for providing testimony for the subcommittee.
MR. CUMMINGS. Our position /jrelative to the sale
of surplus German armored vehicles to Pakistan/
56/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
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in that is that we have directed last month a letter
to the Department of State asking them for a policy
which, if favorable, we believe we could move in
and take that business for a number of reasons. ....
/italics supplied_^/
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Do you expect to get a part
of that business?
MR. CUMMINGS, I have a meeting with Assistant
Secretary /of State for Politico-Military Affair_s/
Kitchen tomorrow, with many, many problems
,
because we have coordinations necessary all over
the world. One of them is, of course, this letter
and, of course, this pending Pakistan, so-called,
Iranian business. As a commercial organization
we naturally would like to secure that business.
Tltaiics suppliedW^
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Sure. ^"^
The president of Interarmco went on to explain some of the
operational difficulties in competing with foreign arms merchants
particularly in connection with the Department of State.
MR. CUMMINGS.
. . .
we always direct such a policy
Letter to the Department, and we do not move unless
we get an affirmative which, I might say, has lost
us untold amounts of business for usually the lack of
an ansv/er, rather than a negative answer.
You cannot imagine how difficult it is to get them
to give us any policy, even verbal. I can recognize
they may not want to write down a clearance, but
even a verbal policy is good enough for us. _/ltalics
supplied. / 58
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Having heard high administration officials testify repeatedly
as to the exhaustive policy control procedures connected with all
arms sales (with decisions made at the Secretarial --or even the
Presidential -- level), this evidence of offhand and haphazard super-
vision of the world's largest arms trading corporation must have come
as something of a shock to the Senators. There were further shocks
on the way. Returning to the subject of the rearming of Pakistan;
MR. CUMMINGS. It seems difficult for me to
believe that the very considerable transactions
which took place primarily last year between
Germany and Iran and Pakistan, by implication,
were totally ignored by the United States or
that the United States pressured the Germans
at all.
I had the innpression when that business was
going on or being primarily developed, which
was in the fall and winter of 1965-66, because
it was well-known on the continent, ... it
seemed to me that the United States was almost
indifferent to what happened to the material
because, for instance, there were thousands of
rounds of tank gun and artillery ammunition
which were shipped out of Germany and France
to Iran for Pakistan. jDeletedi^/ All of that
material was U. S. standard material or even U. S. -
produced material, and there was no licens-ing
problem experienced by Merex. /Deleted^ /Italics suppliedf/
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Where was it going ? /Italics supplied_r7
MR. CUMMINGS. That went to Pakistan also ,
/italics supplied_^/ ^
For a businessman whose livelihood seemed to depend upon arms
59/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 33.
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sales, Mr. Cummings apparently felt secure enough to display a wide
streak of cynicism when questioned about the motives of the United
States Government in encouraging certain arms sales. On the subject
of balancing the forces of potential belligerents, he felt particularly
cynical.
MR. CUMMINGS. I know of the theoretical desire
for the America_n Government to balance material.
In my personal opinion that is a total mirage
and illusion, and it can never be done as long
as there are two forces in the world who do not
have similar policies in every case, the United
States and the U. S. S. R. and the naere fact that
the United States tries, that will encourage the
U. S. S. R. to just put the thumb on the balance to
throw it out of kilter, which is what happens,
as you know, everywhere in the world. ...
SENATOR SYMINGTON. . . . what you are really
telling us is that, in our efforts to sell these
arms on a balancing basis, what we are really
doing is promoting the arms race with the
Ru s s ian s
.
MR. CUMMINGS. Yes, yes, I would say it is a
very fair estimate of the situation. But what
solution is there?
I SENATOR SYMINGTON. We are not looking at this
time for solutions. All we are looking for is truth.
Solutions can only come after the truth is known.
MR. CUMMINGS. Right. ^0
If the president of Interarmco had not made his motive for
testifying clear enough already, he underlined his displeasure with
60/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
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the bureaucracy (which he felt was unjustly hampering his business)
in stronger terms towards the end of his testimony.
MR. CUMMINGS. It drives my Scotch-Irish nature
crazy to see this trading going on through every
nogoodnik and his brother, which we would not be
able to do, and which we could do if we could get
an accord from our country. It is our ovm material.
. . . We can never receive permission to do anything
from the Department of Defense. We technically have
to go through the Departroent of State. That is the
Office Tthe Munitions Control Offi ce/ we must
report to.
However, our experience over many years has
been that -we just cannot get a policy out of the
Department of State while the rest of the world
is busy wheeling and dealing and operating ... .
with our Government, and I hate to admit it, it
is sometiraes pitiful."^
Despite his envy of his "nogoodnik" competitors, Mr. Cummings
did want to show the Senators that he was not hopelessly beyond redemp-
tion. Responding to a question from Senator Fulbright regarding the
arms sales dilemma, he philosophized,
It is almost like a perpetual motion machine,
we all agree that the arms race is disaster, and
we all agree that it could lead to an ultimate
conflict which would more or less destroy the
civilized world as we know it. The old problem
is, who is going to take the first move to pull
61/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South





Senator Fuibright replied by phrasing his own quandry, cuid
possibly that of many members of the Congress at that time;
It seems to me this country ought to be taking
some kind of meaningful step in this direction.
We are given a lot of propaganda up here that we
all do not believe, but we do not know quite how
to combat it. We are having hearings like this,
because we do not know what to do about it. °-^
One week later. On April 20, 1967, Senator Symington's sub-
committee met again -- this time to hear testimony from Mr.
Townsend W. Hoopes, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (and Mr. McNaughton's
immediate subordinate). The focus of questioning on this occasion
was United States military assistance to India and Pakistan.
Mr. Hoopes presented to the subcommittee an opening statement
which surveyed the history of application of the Military Assistance
Program to the subcontinent. Grant aid military equipment had been
provided to Pakistan after that nation was incorporated into the American
62/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 45. Questioned as to why Mr. Cummings had been
requested to testify and what his motives may have been, Mr, Bader has
stated, "Both Symington and I were intrigued by a number of articles on
Cummings and I lived in Alexandria (home of Interarmco). This is an
example --in all candor --of how decisions are often made about wit-
nesses. After listening to Cummings I can believe that he really enjoyed
the idea of testifying, and, more inn.portantiy, putting the " 'commander'





system of alliances (in this case, SEATO), in 1954. Grant aid military
equipment had been provided to India after the Communist Chinese
limited invasion along India's Himalayan frontier in 1962. Deliveries
to both countries were suspended in September 1965, implementing
an arms embargo during the Kashmir War. By that time, India had
received $83 million of United States military equipment and Pakistan
had received $730 million. The embargo was partially lifted in February
1966, when President Johnson permitted both countries to purchase for
cash or credit so-called nonlethal spare parts. Such purchases were
to be made subject to case-by-case review. Because Pakistan's
military equipment was almost totally of United States origin and
because that country's economic resources were smaller than those of
India, the embargo had much greater impact on Pakistan -- and Pakistan
was infinitely more dependent upon the United States as a source of
spare parts. In order to reduce this dependancy, Pakistan had turned
to Communist China as an alternative supplier of military equipnnent.
India had, of course, been receiving a steady supply of arms from the
Soviet Union, ajid, to a lesser extent, from the United Kingdom.
In April 1967, two weeks prior to Mr. Hoopes' appearance before
the subcommittee, the administration had made certain adjustments
in its policy towards both India and Pakistan. These adjustments
included:
a. Explicit termination of ail equipment assistance on a grant
basis to both countries; this had been suspended in 1965.
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b. Withdrawal of the military advisory groups from both countries;
some form of limited military representation to handle small scale
military equipment sales would be substituted.
c. Resumption of grant training programs for both Indian and
Pakistani officers in the United States.
d. Cash sales of spare parts for previously supplied lethal
equipment; such sales to be considered on a case -by-case basis.
Criteria established for determination of each case were; critical
need, contribution to reduced military expenditure or arms limitation,
and, contribution to a reasonable military stability within the sub-
continent.
Mr. Hoopes admitted in his opening statement that "probably no
fully satisfactory policy of arms supply toward the subcontinent exists
today, " how^ever, the United States Government had felt it necessary
to respond to the following factors:
a. Both India and Pakistan were determined to have modern arms
at levels "that relate to their sovereign judgement of need. ""-^
b. The Urdted States could not prevent either country from
acquiring the arms which they desired, nor impose any view as to the
proper levels or composition.
c. The Urdted States policy of total arms suspension was dissi-
pating American influence in the subcontinent and was encouraging the
introduction of counter- influence from the cornmunist powers.
These factors, according to Mr. Hoopes, were "de stabilizing and
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their cumulative effect could produce an uncontrolled arms race,"""
The new policy would, it was hoped, provide the United States with a
limited leverage with respect to inducing arms restraint.
If any of the Senators who heard this statement were impressed
by the irony of this policy vis-a-vis Pakistan, they didn't move to
insert it into the record of the hearings. It does seem, nonetheless
remarkable that the United States, which had initially supplied arms to
Pakistan at least ostensively for use against the communists now must
continue to supply arms to Pakistan (aiter that country had demonstrated
its real purpose for desiring arms -- to make war with India) in order
to restrain that country from accepting arms from Communist China.
As the spring of 1967 turned to summer, more and more members of
the Congress would come to feel that such a policy was completely
bankrupt and obviously counter-productive, especially when its effect
on India was contemplated. One Senator, John Sherman Cooper
(R - Ky. ), however, was prepared to draw at least one conclusion
from the administration's new policy.
SENATOR COOPER. Their fear of each other is much
greater than their fear of Russia or China or anybody
else. It is an obsession both in Pakistan and in India,
but I think we will be charged with -- I don't think this
applies to India at aii because they haven't got enough
of our equipment to make it reasonable to buy parts --
activating the Pakistani Army. /Italics supplied."?
66/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 51.

147
MR. HOOPES. I think it depends on how we apply our
policy. This is an entirely possible consequence.
On the other hand, if we are to head off a major
increase in Pakistani arms expenditures, which would
in turn cause India to run up further expenditures,
we have at least the possibility of persuading them
to act with restraint, and therefore gain a measure
of stability and arms restraint between the two
countries. That is the essential purpose of this
/deleted? effort. ^7
Senator McCarthy, who was present at this hearing questioned
Mr. Hoopes as to the size of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups
which were to be withdrawn from India and Pakistan and replaced with
smaller military representation. He received the reply that there
were 17 in Pakistan and 13 in India and he commented that it would
be difficult to get much smaller. Although the Senator did not press
the point, it was now becoming evident that most of the new policy,
while couched in terms indicating United States restraint in providing
military assistance to the subcontinent, was neither new nor really
indicative of restraint. "Explicit termination" of equipment provided
on a grant basis had little meaning since no such equipment had, in
fact, been provided since the Kashmir War. "Withdrawal of the
nailitary advisory groups" lost its impact when it was realized that any
substitution for those groups could hardly be smaller in size. Even the
"resumption of grant training programs" really was irrelevant since
officers who were already in school in September 1965 were allowed
67 / U.S. Congress, Senate, Arnas Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 57.
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to finish their courses -- any gap in this form of assistance, there-
fore had only been of short duration. The salient feature of the
new policy was, then, the decision to sell spare parts for previously
supplied lethal equipment. Since such equipment had gone predominantly
to Pakistan, the only serious effect of the new policy would be to
allow -Pakistan to rebuild their armed forces, which had been grievously
mauled by the Indians in 1965. Further, because sales of spare parts
could be made either for cash or credit, this rebuilding process could
be undertaken with the help of generous loans made through the Export-
Import Bank (under the country - X arrangements, if necessary) and
secured by the Department of Defense Military Assistance Credit
Account. It is not too difficult to imagine how Senators and others would
begin to question the legitimacy of this facet of the Military Assistance
Program
The one-sided nature of this new policy (bia.sed in favor of
Pakistan) interested Senator Symington.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. What has Pakistan asked
for under this new policy?
MR. HOOPES.
. . .
they have dispatched lists of
requests, We have not yet received them, nor,
of course, acted on them.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Has India asked for anything?
MR. HOOPES. Not to my knowledge, sir. 68
68/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 61.
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The Senator was also interested in the criteria which the
administration had cited for approval of sales under the new policy.
He quoted Secretary McNamara to the effect that, "We will not ask
a foreign country to buy anything which in its judgement or in ours is
not needed for its armed forces, "
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Do you believe that
Pakistan needs this equipment?
MR. HOOPES. I think the key point is, sir, that
Pakistan believes it needs to modernize its mili-
tary forces, or at least to reactivate those
pieces of equipment it now possesses. I think
that is the acid test. Pakistan cites a need.
They wish to buy American spares. /Deleted/
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Why? They are afraid
of "whom ?
MR. HOOPES. They are primarily afraid of India.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Is there any evidence the
State Department has or the Department of Defense,
that India is planning a further attack on Pakistan?
MR. HOOPES. I think the answer is clearly no, 69
The rationale for renewed military assistance (via spare parts
sales) to Pakistan could not be, then, a requirement for defense against
Indian aggression, since it was likely that none was forthcoming; nor
could it be a valid requirement for defense against Communist Chinese
aggression, since the Communist Chinese had, themselves, undertaken
69/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 62.
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to supply Pakistan with military equipment. There only remained the
goal of buying continued United States influence -- and, thereby, fore-
stalling further Chinese influence -- in PakistaJi. Whether such
influence could restrain Pakistan frona excessive military procure-
ment, from exacerbating the tensions with its neighbors, India, or
even from ultimately carrying out some form of aggression towards
India would be problematical.
By so extending the basis for the United States Military Assis-
tance Program, (to include the purchase of influence) the administration
had disfigured the essential rationale for the program and had, un-
wittingly it seems, seriously weakened its underpinnings. The Mili-
tary Assistance Program had been born out of fear of Soviet aggression
in Europe. The Congress had, for over twenty years, appropriated
literally billions of dollars to provide military equipment for those
countries which would assist the United States in combating that
menace. Throughout that period, the conmnunist military threat had
been more or less demonstrable (and had grown to include the Asian
theater) and there had been little objection to raising the funds required
to offset it. Extending the rationale for military assistance to include
quid pro quo payment for the use of foreign bases (overtly in the cases
of Spain, Libya, ajid Portugal and covertly elsewhere, as perhaps, in
Pakistan) had not been difficult to justify in terms of military necessity
and seemed businesslike enough to satisfy most members of the Congress.
Even stretching the rationale to cover military assistance to the countries
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of Latin America in the name of "internal security" had proven
acceptable (although less so). The Administration had only to point
to Cuba and Castro's threat to export communism. Now, however, it
would appear that the administration had finally so convoluted its
military assistance philosophy that it would ask the Congress to support
military equipment expenditures, through grants and sales, to countries
which were also receiving military equipment from the communist
powers. If the administration, in the conduct of its increasingly
sophisticated foreign policy, had forgotten that a very unsophisticated
anti- communism was the real keystone of congressional support
for the Military Assistance Program, it would be brought to their
attention, drannatically, in 1967.
Senator Symington found the new concept difficult to grasp and
wajited it stated explicitly.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Have we now put ourselves in
the position of being a cbsuppiier of military equipment
to a country receiving Communist military aid?
MR. HOOPES. In the case of India that is true, sir.
That has been true for some years.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Pakistan also?
MR. HOOPES. Yes.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. So in the case of Iran
,
Pakistan, and India, we ar e supplying arms, and




MR. HOOPES. Yes sir; that is true. /italics supplied^/
If this new aspect of military assistance policy upset Senator
Symington, he was equally upset (at least at this stage) by the fact
that the Congress had had to drag pertinent information out of the
administration. He chided Mr. Hoopes as he had other officials.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. . . . there has been practically
no knowledge about these programs. Our colleague,
Senator Gore, started hearings some weeks ago, on
the question of arms sales auid disarmament; then
we continued, with the approval of the chairman.
Senator Fulbright. . . . As chairman of the Mid East-
South Asian Subcommittee, and a member of the
Arnned Services Committee I am a little embarrassed
when I read in the newspapers that an airplane made
in my own State has been sold to Iran in quantity
when people from my State called up and asked if
it was true, I give them the truthful answer "I
don't know. " Then I check, and find it is true.
It seems in this case you are ail establishing high
standards for not letting the Congress know before
the press. ^1
A vote on the Senate floor interrupted the hearing and further
interrogation of Mr. Hoopes was postponed until April 25. At his
second appearance before the subcommittee Mr. Hoopes was treated
to some additional chiding.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Now we continue this balancing
act, balancing arms in theory between the various
70 / U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South





countries; example, Pakistan - India. Apparently
the idea is to keep things sort of on an even scale,
perhaps tilting a little bit toward those countries
who, at the time, we consider our friends. . . .
In any case, what worries me is the extent to
which this whole arms program has been under the rug,
so far as the Congress is concerned. I do not mean
to be redundant, but mentioned that the first knowl-
edge we had on the Foreign Relations Coranaittee or the
Armed Services Comraittee, of the sale of sophisticated
planes to Iran, was when we read about it in the press.
This, in effect, such sales, formulate foreign
policy. In such cases, if there is no "advice and con-
sent, " what is the use of having us here ? ... I
realize the position of the Congress is not respected
by some in the administration ... . Some agree, give
us a pleasant grin, and do as they please.
This is either going to stop or there is going to
be a lot more said about it. We want to know. When
you set foreign policy through the sale or grant of
arms, we believe the appropriate Senate committees
have the right to know the details before it is de-
tailed in the public press, and the reasons for each
major decision, /italics supplied. /
Mr. Hoopes did not challenge Senator Symington's thesis that
arms sales formulate foreign policy, nor did he challenge the Senator's
surmise that the administration might "tilt" the arras balance from
tiine to time in favor of countries which could be described as friends
of the United States. The Senator's apparent displeasure with the
administration's handling of the Military Assistance Program had
probably flashed a warning signal to the Defense Department official,
causing him to opt for silence. Nevertheless, the question of whether
or not the making of arms sales (or granting of arms, for that matter)
72/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 79.
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constituted the formulation of foreign policy was really the key to the
whole maze through which both the administration and the Congress
would flounder for the rest of that year and beyond.
Should the administration establish a piece of foreign policy,
together with the "advice and consent" of the Congress --as
Senator Symington had put it -- then the implementation of that
policy could seemingly be left in the hands of the executive brajich.
Suppose, however, that the process of implementation, itself, spawned
new foreign policy; would it not then be proper for the executive branch
to return, at each step, to the legislative branch for additional advice
cind consent? Surely, the legislative branch should at least be in-
formed of the birth of each new sub-piece of foreign policy. The
record indicates that this was Senator Symington's train of thought
vis-a-vis the Military Assistance Program. The Congress had
worked closely with the administration at the program's inception,
thus fulfilling its traditional share of the responsibility for United
States foreign policy. Since that time, however, the opinion of the
legislative branch had been less and less sought after by those whose
duty it was to implement the program. Experience (or his advisers)
seems to have taught Senator Symington that the dispensation of arms,
whether through grants or sales, brought about different results than
the dispensation of food or other types of aid. Food and development
funds and the like were usually consumed by the recipients at no
expense to their neighbors. Arms, on the other hand, could be said
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to bring with them not only the power to change the relationships
between recipients and their neighbors, but also the power to change
the nature of the recipients themselves. The bringing about of these
kinds of changes could be construed to be the making of foreign policy;
thus, each decision by the administration to grant, or to sell, or to
withhold arms would amount to creating new policy, separate and
distinct from the original policy in which the Congress had collaborated.
The granting of arms under the Military Assistance Program had been
taking place on such a scale and for so many years that congressional
scrutiny had become routine. The system was such that few grants,
if any, could escape the attention of interested members of the Congress,
The sale of arms, however, was different; it added a new and, as yet,
unscrutinized dimension to the program. In its conduct of arms sales
the administration had obviously not returned at each step for additional
advice and consent -- worse yet, it seems to have taken the Congress
completely by surprise.
If the administration disagreed with the thesis that arms sales
formulated foreign policy, Mr. Hoopes did not articulate that disagree-
ment; nor would the administration's position on that crucial point
find articulation in any of the testimony at any of the hearings which
were to take place that year.
Although he had been handled at least as roughly as any
administration official who had appeared before the Congress thus far
that year, Mr. Hoopes was not yet to be allowed to retreat across the
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Potomac. Before the day's hearing was adjourned. Dr. Bader was
given leave to question Mr. Hoopes on the subject of the resale of
United States military equipment by its original recipients. The
Defense Department official had earlier touched on. the potential
problem of excess and obsolescent equipment in th.e arsenals of
America's allies.
MR. HOOPES. We think that in the case not only
of Germany /deleted/ there will be large quantities
of American excess that those countries -will want to
try to move onto the market. We are trying to
achieve a comprehensive solution to this problem
which may involve at sonae time a request to the
Congress. I am speaking tentatively, but it seems
to those of us who have examined the question in
the Pentagon that, in order to prevent the large-
scale transfer of this kind of equipment, we may
have to provide some kind of inducement to these
countries -- _/_Deleted/
SENATOR SYMINGTON. What inducement could
we give JjieietedJ today?
MR. HOOPES. It would be, perhaps, some kind of
/deleted/ inducement to scrap the equipment when
it becomes excess to their needs, so that there
would be no incentive to sell it to Africa or
Latin America, for example.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. You mean the United States
would pay for scrapping equipment that otherwise
somebody would pay them for around the vfo rid? /italics supplied.^
MR. HOOPES. That is the essence of my suggestion,
sir, and I understand the implications. /italics supplied.
7"
SENATOR SYMINGTON. So do I. . . . I thijak_7deietej7
_/it/ would be awfully difficult for me to canvince
the people of Missouri, that after we had gaven and
lent /deleted/ more than any other country in the
world bar none, we would pay them not to sell
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equipment, /italics supplied_^/' -^
Now Dr. Bader wanted to begin to define the magnitude of this
resale problem -- perhaps in an effort to better grasp the level of
inducements which might becorae necessary in order to deter undesir-
able resales. He focused on some of the major items included in the
so-called Nash List (all material and services furnished to West
Germany between 1954 and 1959 -- the reversionary rights to which
were sold to the West German Government in 1962 for the estimated
scrap value of $75 million).
MR. BADER. . . . the last tinne we were here /the
hearing of April 2i}/ we talked about a contract
between the Levy Auto Parts Co. and the Iranian
Government for the sale of 60 M-47 tanks fully
tracked. A- 1 condition. These tank prices per
unit were $32, 000. . . .
There is no way of knowing where these tanks
came from. My guess would be that they are
tanks that are now in West Germany, and the
Levy Auto Parts Co. is acting as a broker. . . .
Have you been able to discover any additional
information about this contract as to where these
tanks are and whether they are a part of a sales
agreement between the Iranian Governraent and the
Levy Auto Parts Co. , Mr. Hoopes?
MR. HOOPES. I have not, Mr. Counsel, But I will
have it very shortly.
(The following information was subsequently sub-
mitted for the record:)
The original cost to the United States of 600
M-47 tanks provided to the FRG /Federal Republic
of Germany/ was approximately $201, 000 each.
73/ U. S, Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 78.
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including spares, or about $121 million total.
Since these tanks were provided as grant aid,
there was no sales price to Germany. However,
on the basis of the 7-1/2% of cost formula which
applied to the 1962 agreement for the sale of
reversionary rights, the FRG investment in those
tanks, at the time of the purchase of those rights,
would be about $9 million.
For further information on the Levy Auto Parts
contract see the following question.
Question. What information can Defense
provide on the Levy Auto Parts contracts with
Iran (on M-47 tanks and tank spares)?
Answer. /Deleted. /'
Aside from the revelation that West Germany had purchased 600
tanks, presumed to have been in excellent condition at the time, for
a scrap value of only $15, 000 each ($9 million divided by 600), this
portion of Mr. Hoopes' testimony is intriguing because of the answer
which the administration chose to delete prior to release of the record
to the public. Had there been no contract, or contracts, or had Dr.
Bader's probe otherwise missed the mark entirely, it would seem
logical that the Defense Department would have been eager to set the
record straight. Having already noted the recondite characteristics
surrounding West Germany's sale of those elusive F-86's, a reader
might be forgiven for drawing the conclusion that the administration had
deleted a response confirming Dr. Bader's guesswork. If the sub-
committee consultant had indeed guessed correctly, the Levy Auto Parts
Company, acting as broker, would obtain a profit of some $17, 000
74/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 81.
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($32, 000 minus $15, 000) on each tank for the West Germany Govern-
ment -- a margin that certainly afforded considerable temptation to
resell excess and obsolescent military equipment of United States
origin. Any monetary inducement that might come to be offered to
American allies in order to offset this temptation would bound to be
very expensive. By promising to answer Dr. Bader through the sub-
sequent submission of information, Mr. Hoopes was allowed to conclude
his testimony without being drawn into further discussion of this
potentially dangerous subject.
Nearly two months elapsed before the Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Subcommittee reconvened to hear its last witness, Mr.
Jeffrey C. Kitchen, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Politico- Military Affairs. By June 22, 1967, when Mr. Kitchen made
his appearance, the June 1967 Arab— Israeli War had begun and ended.
Whatever tilting the United States might have done while balancing arms
postures in the Middle East seemed to have been in favor of Israel.
The war had drawn nnuch attention to the issue of military assistance
and had made Senator Symington and many other members of the
Congress even more anxious to look deeper into the problem of
formulating foreign policy through the grants and sales of arms. '-'
75/ One member of the Congress who was particularly aroused
was Senator Frank Church (D. - Idaho), who delivered a long speech
on the floor of the Senate entitled, "Arsenal Diplomacy: The Failure
of a policy, " (see U S. , Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st
session, Vol. 113 pt. 3, (June 26, 1967), pp. 17305-17310.) which
cited the June War as an illustration of "the bitter friuts of our arms
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Mr. Kitchen was responsible for the Office of Munitions Control
within the Department of State and had been associated with that office
since 1963. It was this office which actually issued export licenses
for all arms sales of United States military equipment. In coordinating
these arms saJ.es, Mr. Kitchen dealt primarily with Mr. Kuss in the
Department of Defense; in matters of policy development (such as the
policy vis-a-vis India smd Pakistan, announced in April 1967), he dealt
with Mr. Hoopes.
Previous testimony, particularly that of Mr. Hoopes concerning
possible inducements to deter resales of military equipment of United
States origin, had shed considerable doubt on the efficacy of end-use
agreements. A serious example of such an agreement that seemed not
to have been observed was the resale of the F-86's, at least some of
which ultimately appeared in Pakistan. Senator Symington was still
alarmed about that transaction (and with the Middle East example fresh
in his mind, was probably more than ever interested in defusing arms
induced tensions in the subcontinent before they could erupt into
warfare); he queried Mr. Kitchen.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. . . . the subcommittee has been
told that there was no doubt within the intelligence
aid policies in the Middle East. " Senator Church decried, "Fueling
regional arms racer motivated more by ancient rivalries than by
any shared concern over the threat of Communist aggression" and




community that the F-86's in question were going to
Pakistan, and reports to this effect were circulated
before the aircraft left Germany. Did you see those
reports? /jDeleted/ Did you approve of their sales
to Pakistan?
MR. KITCHEN. I was involved in securing the
Bureau's approval of the sale. I concurred in the
sale --
SENATOR SYMINGTON. What Bureau?
MR. KITCHEN. The Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs foi the Departnnent of State/.
I think it filled a proper need at that time as
far as the Iranians were concerned. They had F-86
aircraft in their inventory: thus the sale was
complementary to an existing system.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Did you approve of them
going to Pakistan?
MR. KITCHEN. No, I felt that if they were going
to Pakistan they were going in contravention of U. S.
wishes at that time. The first reports we saw on
that, Senator, were that the aircraft had been sighted
in Pakistan, and the question of numbers -was never
clear, the question of markings on the aircraft was
never definitive. The aircraft observed in Pakistan
were subsequently observed back in Iran. It was not
a clear picture in the early phases.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Well, may I repeat, it was
clear to them /presumably, the "intelligence commu-
nity_^/ they were going to Pakistan. . . . when we found
out they had gone, did we make any protest to Iran, or
to Pakistan?
MR. KITCHEN. Well, as far as Iran is concerned,
the degree of protest was confined to inquires as to
whether when they gave the certification that the air-
craft were to be used in Iran, whether or not this
really constituted Iranian Government policy. There
was never, to my knowledge, an approach to the Shah. ,
At the tinae of the transaction, the Canadians were
the ones who decided that they could accept the Iranian
bona fide that there would not be a further retransfer
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of the aircraft, although they did consult with the U. S.
Government. We told thenn that they had to make a
decision with regard to whether or not this was a bona
fide Iranian undertaking or not, and the Canadian
Government subsequently did accept that. /Italics
supplied._7 ^"
It is fair to say that one portion of the Department of State's
responsibility in the conduct of foreign policy would be the mainten-
ance of a watch on the implementation of that policy. It would also
be fair to expect that, s-hould there be even a hint that the policy
was about to be subverted, the Department would exert powerful
efforts to prevent that subversion. In giving this account of his own
stewardship, Mr. Kitchen virtually admitted that the United States
(specifically, his department) had washed its hands of the F-86
decision in favor of Canada, and then, after United States foreign
policy had, apparently, been outflanked, had never insisted on re-
proving the head of the government which had, perhaps, misrepre-
sented its role in the transaction. If this was an example of the high
level decisionmaking process of which Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Kuss,
and others had spoken with esteem. Senator Symington's alarm may
well have been justified.
Senator Frank J. Lausche (D - Ohio) was curious about the
manner in which that process was organized.
76/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, pp. 85-86.
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SENATOR LAUSCHE. Are you the Chairman of the
State - Defense Coordinating Committee? TjThis
being the body wherein proposed arms sales were,
according to Mr. McNaughton's testimony, sub-
jected to a careful and thorough reviewr?
MR. KITCHEN. I am.
SENATOR LAUSCHE. How often do you meet?
MR. KITCHEN. We try to meet every Monday
afternoon. We meet no less than three times
a month.
SENATOR LAUSCHE. What agencies participate
on a regular basis?
MR. KITCHEN. Primarily State and Defense.
AID has been invited, ACDA /the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency/ now participates
regularly
.
Anyone Else ? /italics supplied.T
MR. WOLF. /Joseph Wolf, the Director of
Operations, Politico-Military Affairs Bureau,
Department of State_/ Treasury is invited on an
open basis and comes sometimes, /italics
supplied^ 77
Above the State- Defense Coordinating Committee in the decision
making hierachy was the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). This
body was a second- echelon Cabinet; it was chaired by the Under Sec-
retary of State and its regular members included the Deputy Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as
the number two men in the other executive departments and the heads
of agencies such as AID, USIA, ACDA, the CIA, and the Bureau of the
77/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, pp. 92-93.
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Budget. Meetings were normally attended byatleast one observer
from the White House Staff. Decisions which this group did not feel
competent to make were passed directly to the President. One of the
main functions of the SIG was to resolve disputes between the execu-
tive departments and agencies where they pertained to foreign policy
and overseas activities of the United States, short of warfare. The
Cabinet members themselves were kept advised of the SIG's workings
through their deputies and by means of decision nn.emoranda which were
circulated after each meeting. Mr. McNaughton had described this
body as being very active in the determination of arms sales policy;
now. Senator Symington wanted to know about that activity.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. On the record, has the
Senior Interdepartmental Group met recently on
military sales agreements?
MR. KITCHEN. No, sir; I do not believe it has.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. When was the last time
it did meet on military sales agreements? Would
you supply that for the record?
MR. KITCHEN. Yes.
(The following information was subsequently provided. )
The SIG met on February 14, 1967, to consider
arms control measures, including the question of
military sales, for India and Pakistan.
78/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 94. The letters received by Senator Gore from
the Administrator for AID and others (see Appendix I ) indicate that the




Senator Symington next inquired about Department of State plans
in the granting of country - X loans, Mr. Kitchen replied, "I am not
familiar with that designation. " " Dr. Bader was asked to describe
the mechanism by which the Export-Import Bank participated in the
financing of arms sales; frequently doing so with no knowledge of the
identity of the recipient countries. After some discussion, Mr. Kitchen
acknowledged that he could identify that procedure. Senator Symington
then placed in the record the names of the countries which his staff
had discovered to have been provided such country - X loans:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia,
Morocco, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela --a total loan extension
of $526 million at that time.
Mr. Kitchen had indicated that his primary point of contact in
the Department of Defense for arms sales transactions was Mr. Kuss.
Senator Symington was interested in their relationship.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Now, Mr. Henry Kuss,
what is his title?
MR. KITCHEN. He is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for -- what is his precise title ? _/ltalics suppliedTy
MR. WOL.F. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Security Affairs for International Logistics
Negotiations.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Mr. Kuss told this
committee, and I quote:
79/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 94.
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"From the military point of view, we stand to
lose ail of the major international relationships
paid for with grant aid money unless we can estab-
lish professional military relationships through
the sales media. "
Is that the policy of the State Department?
MR. KITCHEN. No; it is too blanket a state-
ment. I would say this, that where we did
provide large amounts of aid, generally that
was in accordance with policy which has
continued. It does not carry the implication
that we must necessarily continue sales or
that we are in any way bound to continue
thenn as far as the Department of State is
concerned. Where this is to the advantage
of the general relationship, then the State
Of)Department would be in favor. °^
Grajiting the gist of Mr. Kitchen's statement to be "sometimes,
yes -- sometimes, no, " it may have conne as some surprise to
Senator Symington and his colleagues that two administration officials
who professed to be in close touch in the arms sales decision making
process were really in disagreement over basic policy. Further, the
subcommittee could hardly have been impressed with Mr. Kitchen's
hesitation as to the membership of his State - Defense Coordinating
Committee, his lack of familiarity with the country - X loan program,
or his ignorance of Mr. Kuss' title. The infrequency of SIG meetings
on the subject of arms sales also said little for the administration's
high level supervision of what was fast becoming a very controversial
program.
80/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arnas Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 95.
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The full Committee on Foreign Relations had, on June 12,
commenced its hearings on the draft Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.
The nnatter of arms sales would be considered as an integral part of
the Military Assistajice Program which, in turn, was part of that
Act. Senator S5rmington*s subcommittee -- and Senator Gore's sub-
comnaittee on disarmament had, by now, at least familiarized all of
the committee menabers with every issue originally identified by Dr.
Bader in his Jaji.uary 1967, staff study. Moreover, the subcommittee
had, in a sense, scouted out the enemy; they had had an opportunity to
meet and to interrogate those administration officials who seemed to
have the most to do ^with anns sales and arms sales policy. True,
the most senior administration officials, the heads of departments,
had not been interrogated; this, however, would be the responsibility
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee when the members of the Cabinet would appear in
support of the foreign assistance legislation for that year.
Senator Symington, it seems, had simply grown more perplexed
as he had undergone his indoctrination into the ways of the arnns sales
business. Towards the conclusion of his subcommittee hearings, after
some discussion on the resale of the F-86's. he remarked in exasper-
ation to Mr. Kitchen,
We sell arms all over the free world in recog-
nition of what we consider the menace of communism.
. . . Novi/, if we are going to say that we are going
to control our arms sales in the free world, and
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the Soviets find out that we are not controlling
the sales of those arins whether it is the fault of
our allies or the fault of ourselves, they will
have all the bells to ring to say our word is not
to be relied on. . . . Tyou/ represent to the German
Government that we are not happy about the way
they have been hajadling this matter of arms sale
and resale; but the horse has gone, the barn door
was open, so our whole effort to control arnns
through agreements seems to be failing on its
face, all over the world. ^1
If it had been Dr. Bader's intention to bring; the whole issue of
the administration's conduct of the Military Assiststnce Program, and,
particularly the question of arms sales of U.S. military equipment to
the attention of the Congress, he had certainly succeeded. His staff
study, taken together with the hearings conducted by the Gore and
Symington subcommittees (for both of which he was the consultant),
assumes the aspects of a campaign. Before any hearings had been
held on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 itself (or the Export-Import
Bank Extension Act), and before the Cabinet memb>ers approached
Capitol Hill to defend their economic and military assistance programs.
Dr. Bader had established a definitive base from -which foreign assis-
tance could be attacked. Older and more experienced members of the
legislature had frequently failed in attempts to restrain the Military
Assistance Program or the foreign assistance effort as a whole for
the lack of just such a base. Asked about his reaction to the impact
81/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South
Asian Countries, p. 97.
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of his study. Dr. Bader modestly replied,
No-one involved had ajiy idea that the study
would draw so much attention and cause so much
controversy. It was probably one of those cases
where the staff study acted as the last drop of
acid before the litmus turned. °'^
82/ Bader letter, November 2nd, 1971, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
RESTRAINT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- HEARINGS ON
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967
Congressional action on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 was
generally in accordance with the established procedure for all legis-
lation which required both authorization and appropriation. Like all
la^jvs which entail the expenditure of United States funds, each year's
renewal of foreign assistance depends upon the passage of two separate
pieces of legislation -- one authorizing expenditure and another appro-
priating the precise amount of that expenditure. Hence, the draft
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, which was delivered to the Congress
by the Administrator for the Agency for International Development on
February 23, 1967, took the form of two separate legislative bills.
Because the United States Congress is bicameral, bills are
divided into two parts -- each part requiring hearings, a committee
report, cuid a floor vote in the Senate, while the other part requires
sinailar action in the House of Representatives. These parts normally
begin as identical twins, but they frequently emerge from the independ-
ent actions of the Senate and the House in very dissimilar form.




into law the differences must be reconciled away. This reconcilia-
tion process is accomplished by conference committees, which are
established ad hoc for this specific purpose and which are composed
of members of both houses of the congress. After these conference
committees have bargained, compromised, and massaged the different
bills into mutually acceptable legislation they are returned to their
respective congressional parents for final floor vote. This process
routinely takes a few months. In the case of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967, it took nearly a full year.
The House Committee on Appropriations initiated congressional
action on March 20, 1967, when it began hearings on the Foreign
Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1968 /_fiscal
yea.rj (HR 13893). Two weeks later, on April 4, the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs began its hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1967 Tthe authorization bilTZ (HR 7099). Action in the Senate did
not commence until June 12, when the Foreign Relations Committee
heard its first testimony on its version of the authorization bill
(S 1872). The Senate Committee on Appropriations did not hold
hearings on the appropriations act passed by the House (HR 13893)
until November 14, 1967. ^
1/ Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provided that the House
of Representatives alone would have the power to originate bills which
would raise and distribute revenue. The House has traditionally taken
this to include all appropriations bills; thus, the Foreign Assistance
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1968 was considered
first by the House (as House Rule 13893). After passage by the House,
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The Foreign Assistance Act, originally passed in 1961, and
renewed with amendnnents each year since then, is comprised of
three parts: Part I -- policy and authorization for economic assistance;
Part 11-- policy and authorization for military assistance; ajid Part
III -- general administrative provisions for the implementation of the
act. The Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations
Acts which are passed each year to allocate the revenue which supports
the Foreign Assistcuice Act are, likewise, divided along the lines
separating economic and military assistance. The hearings conducted
by the committees cognizatnt of these acts fall naturally into separate
areas of concentration -- time and interest being devoted to economic
or military assistance according to the predilictions of the committee
members and the relative degree of controversy associated with
either form of foreign aid. Although a case could be made that the
Congress, in 1967, sought to influence United States foreign policy
through exercising restraint on economic assistance programs, the
record of the hearings, the subsequent debates, auad the final measures
enacted into ia^v all argue strongly that it was the Military Assistance
Program which evoked the greater congressional agitation, and which,
in the end, afforded the Congress the most effective mechanism for
the exercise of influence.
the Senate held its hearings and offered its amendments -- this




This chapter will deal only with those portions of the pertinent
hearings which relate directly to the authorization and appropriation
of funds supporting military assistance. A student of congressional
action, vis-a-vis foreign aid, during 1967 will find certain parallels
between the legislative histories of economic assistance and military
assistance. Such parallels are beyond the scope of this thesis.
The congressional - executive dialogue which is presented in
this chapter -- like that of the preceding and subsequent chapters --
provides a special insight into the congressional effort to influence
United States foreign policy by means of increasing legislative over-
sight of an importauit executive program. The diverse motives and
concerns of the legislators who led this effort are shown clearly by
their choice of questions and their commentary. The attitudes and
political philosophies of the executive officials responsible for the
Military Assistance Program are evident from their responses. By
reviewing both the questions and the answers taken in testimony it
is possible to discern much about the actual conduct and purpose of
the Military Assistance Program that might escape a reading of any
program description.
Issues such as Export - Import Bank financing of country - X
loans> military assistance training, arms sales decisionmaking,
preemptive selling, or the greater role of the United States in providing
international security constituted the flesh which enveloped the skeletal
framework of program organization. Only the hearings provide a
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balanced exposure of these asid other pertinent issues as they were
addressed by the administrators and legislators who made them their
concern.
Relevant testimony, drawn from the hearings, will be presented
in the order which the hearings occured. All testimony, however,
from each set of committee hearings (such as that of the House
Committee on Appropriations) is presented in separate coherent
sections, thus providing the reader sufficient continuity to identify
important trends as they developed in the separate committees. The
reader's attention will be drawn to those instances where testimony
heard in one committee relates to that heard almost simultaneously
in another committee. Appropriate subheadings are used throughout
this chapter to identify and separate issues as they appear in the
testimony.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
The House Committee on Appropriations numbered fifty-one
congressmen, a group too unwieldy to conduct full committee hearings.
The work of examining the appropriation bill for foreign aid fell to one
of its subcommittees, that on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies,
Chairman of that subcommittee was Congressman Otto E. Passman
(D - La. ). It would be an understatement to say that Congressman
Passman was dissatisfied with the philosophy underlying foreign aid
and with the cost and administration of the program. He began his
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hearings on the appropriations bill for fiscal year 1968 by inserting
in the record a letter of his own, written the previous year, casti-
gating executive branch management of that program in the following
term s
:
Foreign aid has been so fragmentized and so enmeshed
into the Budget until it is difficult for members of Con-
gress to unscramble it. The Congress would do well
to again place this program under close scrutiny, permit
the proper Committees to bring it back under control,
cind allow the Executive what it needs, rather than what
it asks for, which is usually far in excess of actual needs
and encourages continued waste.
Congress is the first brajich of the Government. It
should stop yielding its prerogatives to inexperienced,
bureaucratic spenders who have limited knowledge as to
what the dissipation of our Nation's wealth is doing to
our economy, our monetary system, and our free
world markets. '^
Testimony of Mr. Linder
One of the "related agencies" whose budget was appropriated
together with economic and military assistance was the Export-Import
Bank. Mr. Harold F. Linder, the President and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of that bank, was the first witness called by
Congressman Passman to testify before his subcommittee. The
subject of the Export- Import Bank's participation in country - X loans
2/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, Hearings Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 90th Congress,
1st session, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 4.
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had, thus far in the year, been flagged only twice -- once in Dr.
William Bader's staff study and once in Assistant Secretary of
Defense McNaughton's testimony before Senator Gore's Disarmament
Subcommittee on March 2 (which had not been naade public when
Congressman Passman's subcommittee began hearings on March 20,
1967). Congressman Passman, however, led Mr. Linder into dis-
cussion of this issue almost immediately, in his testimony.
MR. PASSMAN. If I remember correctly, 3 years
ago the Congress authorized the Export-Import Bank
to m.ake loans to finance the sale of military equip-
ment; is that correct?
MR. LilNDER. I do not know that there was a
specific authorization by the Congress. /Italics
supplied^/
MR. PASSMAN. Let me put it this way: Export-
Import Bank financing of sales of military equip-
ment is a fairly recent practice, is it not?
MR. L.INDER. Yes Sir. The loans started in
fiscal year 1963, but none was made in 1965,
cLnd very, very little was authorized in 1964.
MR. PASSMAN. What prompted this decision,
Mr. Linder?
MR. LINDER. Sir, in the first place, the adminis-
tration as a whole -- and this includes Treasury,
State Department, Bureau of the Budget, and, of
course, the Defense Department -- felt that there
were a number of countries among those receiving
military equipment under grant arrangements that
could afford to pay for it. However, they could not
necessarily afford to pay cash, but were prepared
to undertake a valid debt obligation. The question
was, how could that be financed? . . .
We said to the administration, "Gentlemen,
these military sales are exports, and we are in

177
the export financing business. " Where the buyers
clearly have good credit and where we are reason-
ably convinced that the borrowing countries are
close to us and are good friends of ours, we will
be gla.<d to consider financing military export sales
on relatively short terms -- "not more than 7 years, "
using your definition. Occasionally, we may have
gone ap to about 10 years, but rarely, and frequently
we have authorized loans on 5-year terms.
Chairman Passman then requested that Mr. Linder provide a
table showing all the Export-Import Bank's loans for military equip-
ment purchases and was told by the bank president that such infor-
mation would kave to be "off the record. " This prompted the follow-
ing conversation and the first clear and public description of the
country - X loan mechanism by an official of the administration.
Country - X Loans
MR. PASSMAN Why should it be off the record?
If it is good and regular, and it is the American
people's business we are attending to, and if it is
not cia.ssified, then why should it not be on the
record? It is part of the Bank's operation.
MR. LINDER. Sir, I have at times taken the
liberty of classifying some things because I have
felt — and the Defense Department, I think joins
me in. feeling -- that certain of these transactions
should not be on the record. I am perfectly pre-
pared to tell you, when we have financed the sale
of military equipment to the United Kingdom, that
3/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 18-19. It is
interesting to note here Mr. Linder's disclaimer of "specific authoriza-
tion" for his financing of arms sales; he would, in subsequent testimony,
go to lengths to show that he had had, in fact, just such authorization.
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we have done it.
But in some cases I do not even know to which country
the export has gone because I am merely accepting a debt
instrument which is guaranteed by the Department of
Defense.
MR. PASSMAN. Could you tell us the number of countries
to which you have financed the sale of military equipment?
MR. LiINDER. I can tell you the number which I know.
MR, PASSMAN. Would not someone in you Bank have to
know?
MR. L.INDER. No, sir; we would not. ^alics supplied_^/
MR. PASSMAN. How would you ever get the money out
of the Treasury on that basis?
MR. LiINDER. I get this money not out of the Treasury,
but I get it out of the market.
MR. PASSMAN. Do I understand the committee is not
going to be able to ascertain the nunnber of countries
for which you are financing the sale of military equipment?
MR. LINDER. The committee can ascertain all of those
countries where we at Eximbank can identify the country.
But if the Defense Department came to us tomorrow morn-
ing and said, "Country - X is buying $5 million worth of
military equipnnent. We have a 5-year note from country
- X which we are prepared to guarantee to you. Country
- X has paid down 10 percent or 15 or ZO percent in cash.
It will repay the balance over a period of 5 years in equal
semiannual installments. Will you discount a note guaran-
teed by the Defense Departm.ent or buy an account receiv-
able Avhich the Defense Department has against country -
X's obligation which we tell you we hold and which we
guarantee you repayment on?" I would provide them with
the money. I do not know which country is denominated
"X. "
"^
4 / U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp. 18-19-
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The President of the Export-Import Bank had now confirmed the
assertions made by Dr. Bader in his study -- the Bank was financing
arms sales, to countries whose identities were unknown to the Bauik,
and was doing so, apparently, solely on the recommendation of the
Department of Defense, the agency which was prepared to guarantee
such financing against risk. Further, according to Mr. Linder, there
had never been specific authorization by the Congress for such activity
on the part of the Export-Import Bank. If Mr. McNaughton had purpose-
fully softpedaied his department's utilization of the Bank in his testi-
mony before Senator Gore's subcommittee (in executive session), the
facts of that utilization were now available to all the members of the
Congress and to the public as well.
Congressman Passman was somewhat alarmed to hear this
confirmation and he indicated his feelings concerning such participation
by the Bank.
We know there is a military assistance program in
over 50 nations of the world. We just do not want the
Export-Import Bank to get too far afield in financing
the sale of military equipment to various countries
for profit's sake because there are two profits in-
volved: one, to the manufacturer and one to the lending
agency, whether it is a private bank or the Export-
Import Bank. I do not think it is very conducive to
peace if we keep on advocating the sale of military
equipment by too many agencies of Government and
make it too easy for these countries to buy military
equipment.
5/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 23-24.
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Testimony of the Secretary of Defense
After several days of hearings pertinent to other related agencies.
Congressman Passman's subcommittee was prepared to listen to the
first Cabinet member to approach Capitol Hill in support of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967. On April 4, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara appeared to testify in behalf of the Military Assistance
Program (Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act).
In Secretary McNamara' s opening statement he stressed the
fact that the United States Military Assistance Program had shrunk
from $1.2 billion appropriated in fiscal year 1962 to $596 million
which he was now requesting be appropriated for fiscal year 1968.
This sharp reduction, he pointed out, amounted to more than a 50
percent cut in those country programs which renaained in the proposal
for 1968 and resulted, he said, from "a sustained and concerted
effort to streamline nailitary assistance and to sharpen the program's
focus on primary objectives. "°
Congressman Passman, however, wanted it made clear for the
record that the proposal for fiscal year 1968 did not include funding for
military assistance to Vietnam (which the administration had shifted to
the Defense budget the previous year -- with Congressional approval)
or for Laos or Thailand, or for expenses accrued to the maintenance of
6/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign As sis
-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 451.
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international military headquarters or to the United States' share of
NATO infrastructure costs, all of which the administration was re-
questing be shifted to the Defense budget -- and all of which had been
supported by the $1. 2 billion appropriated for fiscal 196Z. In addition,
the military assistance programs for India and Pakistan had both been
cancelled. Secretary McNamara had to admit that, should those factors
be considered, the country programs which remained sustained a net
reduction of only $95 million.
Secretary McNamara then went on to justify those shifts which
either had been made (Vietnam) or which he wanted to see made away
from the budget for military assistance (carried under Foreign Assis-
tance) and placed under the Defense budget. As he explained it;
Unanticipated increases in Lao and Thai requirements,
stemming from changes in the overall railitary situation
in Southeast Asia, have in the past had to be financed
by reducing grant programs to other importauit countries
of the free world. Such shifts in the allocation of
finite assets (most notably to meet rising Vietnam re-
quirements in 1965) have greatly complicated management
of the total program. They have also caused understand-
able concern on the part of the other MAP / Military
Assistance Program/ recipients whose programs were
adversely affected.
The proposed transfers will remedy this situation; at
the same time they will simplify the logistics management
in Southeast Asia. . . . the NATO Infrastructure program,
which provides for the construction and maintenance of
facilities needed by the United States and other NATO
forces in Europe J_asid_/ the International Military Head-
quarters program, which supports the integrated command
structures of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO. . . are not
military assistance. They represent the United States'
share of the total costs of two international endeavors;
they go to the support of United States forces and therefore
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are more appropriately financed by the regular
Defense budget. ^
There was one benefit of these shifts which the head of the
Defense Department did not mention. Both he and the Secretary of
State had been severely handled by critics of the Urdted States'
involvement in Southeast Asia when they had appeared before those
committees which had jurisdiction over the foreign assistance authori-
zation and appropriations acts of previous years. Removing military
assistance funding from the scrutiny of those committees and placing
it before the much less hostile audience of the Armed Services Com-
mittees (as part of the annual Defense Department budget) would
deprive the program's critics of their most incande scant issue.
Should this have been a motive, the additional transfer of the head-
quarters and infrastructure accounts might have been included as a
screen; there is, however, no evidence of this. Secretary McNamara's
arguments about unanticipated increases due to combat, logistics
complications, and the like were certainly legitimate. Dr. Seth
Tillman, consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
a colleague of Dr. William Bader, is under the opinion that the shifts
7/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, p. 452.
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were made because the administration "was afraid of Fulbright. "^
As the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 passed through the hands of
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee later in that year
it •would become obvious that such a "fear" -- if it existed -- would,
too, have been legitimate.
Of the $596 million which he was requesting for the Military-
Assistance Program, Secretary McNamara described the following
disbursements:
About three-quarters of the proposed total is allo-
cated to five nations adjacent to the U. S. S. R. and Red
China where military assistance contributes directly
to strengthening their ability to defend themselves
against the threat of aggression by Communist neighbors.
These countries are Greece, Turkey, Iran, Republic of
China and Korea. Their MAP- supported forces are vit-
ally important to our forward strategy for free world
common defense.
The remaining fourth of the program is divided be-
tween grant assistance for ail other recipient countries,
on the one hand, and funds required for credit assistance
and nonregional expenses, on the other. Less than one-
fifth of our anticipated total obligationai authority for
fiscal year 1968 is allocated to grant programs for
countries which are not directly exposed to the threat
of aggression by Communist neighbors. 9
8/ Quoted from a personal interview with Dr. Tillman in Wash-
ington, D. C. on November 16, 1971. There is certainly no que stion
that this portion of military assistance funding -- which supported the
war in Southeast Asia -- would be much less visible when included
with a total Defense Budget of $71 billion rather than the Foreign As sis
tance Budget of $3. 1 billion.
9/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp. 453-454.
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There were, according to Mr. McNamara, five basic criteria
which were applied to ail military assistance planning:
The first is that each program should relate very
directly to important U. S. security and foreign policy
interests, and should contribute to the optimum politico-
military approach to the threat faced by the recipient
country.
The second is that aid should be responsive to changes
in our interests and in the threat, external or internal.
The third is that precautions must be taken to reduce
the chances, however, remote, that assistance may be put
to unintended purposes, such as regional conflicts or the
support of undemocratic regimes.
The fourth is that grant aid should be terminated, and
essential military equipment provided thereafter on
a sales basis (with credits as necessary), when a
recipient country has developed the ability to bear its
own defense burden.
The fifth, but not least, is that -- at a time
when the conflict in Vietnam makes major claim on
our total national assets -- we must concentrate
resources and programs which are not merely
desirable, but indispensable. ^^
Military Assistance Training
-It would be the duty of the Congress to examine Secretary
McNamara and other administration officials as to how the details of
the Military Assistance Program were to be reconciled with those
five virtually unassailable criteria. One of the difficulties of recon-
ciliation was Congressman Passnn.an's notion that funds appropriated
for the training of friendly foreign military forces purchased increased
10/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 452-453.
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obligations for United States' involvement. He began the questioning
of Secretary McNamara by introducing this notion.
MR. PASSMAN. Last year the budget proposed a
grant aid program for 54 countries, of which 14
were programed for training only. What is the
number of countries receiving military equipment
from the fiscal 1967 appropriation?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Thirty-seven, I believe,
received equipment in the fiscal 1967 program com-
pared to 58 in 1962 and 35 in 1968. That is equip-
ment and services, excluding training.
MR. PASSMAN. Usually these countries move
from training only to equipment countries.
SECRETARY McNAl^lARA. On the contrary, sir.
That is not correct.
MR. PASSMAN. You say that is not correct. I
have a right to assume if you train people to use
military equipment, if they do not get equipment
from our country, they will get it from somewhere
else.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, you may
have the right to assume that the provision of train-
ing leads to a material program, but that is not
supported by the facts.
MR. PASSMAN. What do you train them for?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. That is not the
question at issue.
MR. PASSMAN. What do you train them for?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. That is not the question
at issue. You said the provision of training leads to
aid programs in material, and I simply say, as a
matter of fact, that it is not the case. The fact is
that the number of material programs has dropped
dramatically from 1962 to 1968. It was 58 in 1962
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and it is 35 in 1968 _/fiscal year 1968? . 1
1
Although it may be improper to describe Robert S. McNamara
as having been hostile or even impolite during his several appearances
before congressional committees, it was obvious that he frequently
testified in a manner characterized by impatience auid seeming dis-
dain, tending often to lecture his questioners. He assumed that
manner now with Congressman Passman.
MR. PASSMAN. Mr. Secretary, I respect your
position, but what do you train them for? Why are
they trained in the use of military equipment?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. We are training them to
provide internal security in their respective countries,
That is the primary function of the training for the
countries receiving training-only programs. It is
those to which you are alluding.
MR. PASSMAN. In the event, after they have been
trained, it is necessary for them to have military
equipment for internal security purposes, is it
provided?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. In these training- only
countries, no. ^Italics supplied^^/
MR. PASSMAN. Then what would be the use of
training thera if they are not going to have military
equipment to use internally?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. It is a non sequitur to
suggest that because we train them, we must also
provide the equipment. . . . The point I want to make
is that it is not correct to say that because we have
11/ U.S. Congress, House of Representative s , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 464.
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training- only prograras, they are leading into larger
military aid programs, including material. That is
not a fact. It is not a fact supported by history, and it
is not a basis for appraising our potential military
aid prograxns.
MR. PASSMAN. I was in South Vietnam when we
started a small military aid program. It was mainly
to train those people for internal security purposes ;
is that correct? /Italics supplied^ ... I am going
back to 1957.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I am not familiar with
the details of the program at that time.
MR, PASSMAN. Let me say for the record, and it
is in the record of prior years, that we were furnish-
ing military advisers primarily for training these
people for internal security. It would appear to me
that in many countries where we could have trouble,
that these people now are wanting more ajid more
military equipment.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Let me simply say this, sir.
The record is very clear on this point. I examined it
during the past week to make certain I was correct. We
have added one country to the material program since
1962, and that is the Congo. During that same period,
we have discontinued material and services programs
for about Z3 countries. So I do not see any basis for
concluding that training programs, as we are adminis-
tering them, lead to expansion of training-only programs
into material aid programs. They do not.
If it was Congressman Passman's intention to mount an attack
upon the Military Assistance Program based on the position that
inocuous appearing training-only missions ended in full-scale material
commitments, he could elicit no support from Secretary McNamara.
12/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 464-465.
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Even citing the "horrible example" of the Vietnam experience failed
to win a satisfying response from the head of the Defense Department.
The Congressman's argument, however, was not without merit and he
would return to it again and again throughout the hearings.
Military Assistance to North Africa
Certain aspects of the proposed military assistance budget were
confusing to the subcommittee chairman; one of these was arms trans-
fers to Morocco cuid Tunisia. According to his testimony. Secretary
McNamara was recommending such transfers in order to "introduce
stability into the area. "^^
MR. PASSMAN. Mr. Secretary, how can our Govern-
ment justify a military program for Tunisia, based on
Soviet assistance to Algeria when Algeria is getting
economic assistance frora the United States _/_unde
r
Part I, Economic Assistance, of the same Foreign
Assistance Act -- italics supplied^/ ?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. You mean based on mili-
tary aid to Algeria while Algeria is also receiving
economic aid from the United States.
MR. PASSMAN. Yes.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I chink it is just a matter
of practical international relationships -- . We can
advance the interests of Tunisia and Morocco, and
in a very real sense of Algeria, by reducing the
military vacuum. That is what, at least to a very
slight degree, we seek to do with these very small
military programs.
13/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance cind Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 466.
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MR. PASSMAN. How can we justify economic
assistance to Algeria?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. If you do not provide
economic assistance to Algeria, you have an economic
vacuum
,
sir. There is going to be -- . This is a
question of our own self-interest. We are trying to
dampen down the fires that erupt into international
incidents, that increase the risk of military conflict
this country may be engaged in. That is the entire
purpose of our military aid prog ranm, and it is an
important purpose of our economic aid program. We
think that economic aid to Algeria and military aid to
these other two nations, small as the amounts of
military assistance are
. . . are well justified in
relation to this objective, /italics supplied^/ ^"^
Given Congressman Passman's age, his long tenure in the
Congress, and a personal philosophy that embraced the Baptist faith,
the Masons, and the American Legion, it should have come as no
surprise that he would not be moved to approve Goverrmaent spending
abroad based upon sophisticated arguments about military and
economic vacuums. Secretary McNamara's reasoning was lost on
him and he was not ashamed to say so.
I do not comprehend, and I do not have all
the answers, but it is a new concept, nevertheless,
to try to keep America secure by dissipating our
wealth. When I try to reconcile this with my under-
standing of how we became great, free, strong, and
wealthy quickly, and then look at the 98 nations we
will be disbursing military and economic assistance
funds to this year, and when I think practically every
time the President goes out of the country he must be
14/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 466-467.
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cloaked with the authority to make commitments,
or if some potentate comes to this country usually
he is looking for an aid commitment, it just naay
be that the times have gone off and left me. I do
not know. To me it does not add up. 15
A menaber of the subcommittee. Congressman Clarence D.
Long (D - Md. ), was also confused by the administration's penchant
for treating foreign economic and military vacuums with American
aid. He asked Secretary McNamara to clarify this policy.
MR. LONG. It does seem to me that the chairman has
a point, and I am not sure I understand your answer to
it. Tensions exist between two countries which we have
chosen to alleviate by spending money on both sides.
Why can't we solve the problem by not spending money
on both sides? What is our reason for supposing that
we have achieved a better result by spending money on
both sides than we would have by cutting down on both
sides ?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Dr. Long, we start with
nations that were not born yesterday which bring into
their relationship -- very serious economic problems.
We Ceinnot change that situation. That economic chaos
is going to break out or erupt into civil disturbances
that will eventually cross borders and which therefore
become a danger to us. . . .we believe that as a Nation
we, the United States, are better off for having given
economic aid to Algeria, thereby advancing its growth,
while making very small grants of military assistance
to Tunisia and Morocco.
MR. LONG. If we are not giving them enough money to
do much harm with, then we are surely not giving them
much to do much good with either. And since we don't
see our way clear to solve the situation, why don't
15/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 467.
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we stay out until we can see where it leads to?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I don't think it is correct
to say that, because the amounts are small, they don't
play a significant role in preventing conflict between
small nations. They do. . . . We have seen illustration
aiter illustration of this. The Congo is one, Jordan is
ajiother. Ethiopia is a third, and I think these two
countries /Morocco and Tunisia/ are fourth and fifth
examples. . . . But I think your question is a good and basic
one. My answer is a clear and simple one. We should
never provide military aid when we can avoid doing so
without unreasonable risk.
Now, I think all of us must recognize that if North
Africa became inflamed, trouble would spread to the
Middle East very quickly. So we must try to preserve
peace in North Africa and the Middle East. This is
what our very small military aid program to both of
those areas is designed to do. ^"
In the view, then, of the Secretary of Defense -- and presumably
of the administration -- the filling of econoinic and military vacuums
could be justified in the interest of preventing war not only in those
areas of primary United States' strategic concern but also in areas
where war might lead to conflict in adjacent areas wherein the United
States had important interests. This might be described as a kind of
"domino theory" -- not really too different frora the politico-military
philosophy which led the same administration into ever deeper involve-
ment in Southeast Asia.
Throughout their testimony on military assistance and arms
sales decisions thus far in 1967, each adnriinistration official had
16/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp. 467-468.
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stressed the high level at which such decisions were ultimately made.
It had been stated by some and intimated by others (and would be re-
iterated still further as time went on) that economic and military
assistance decisions were largely under the personal cognizance of
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and that such
decisions comprised a coherent and comprehensive whole program.
Congressmaji John J. McFall (D - Cal. ) now suddenly opened the door
to skepticism, on this point.
MR. McFALL. Will you discuss the Algeria, Tunisia
Morocco triangle with reference to your previous ex-
planations that you have given? What is the situation
in those countries?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. In the case of Algeria,
Tunisia, and Morocco, I haven't been participating
in the Algerian negotiations because these are non-
military, and only peripherally in the Tunisian and
Moroccan negotiations. /Italics supplie d. /17
Military Assistance Training
The subcommittee chairman however, was not interested in
pressing Secretary McNamara on the subject of decision making; he
was more concerned with proving his argument that training conducted
under the Military Assistance Program eventually led to the provision
of military equipment.
17/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 470-471.
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MR. PASSMAN. Mr. Secretary, you know I am in
politics. The testimony at the beginning of today's
hearings could make me look stupid, when I indicated
that when you start a training program in a nation, it
could lead into a military equipment program. It is
all right for me to insert in the record, is it not, the
number of nations in which we started with a training
program that eventually turned into a military equip-
ment program?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Chairinan, obviously
you should introduce into the record whatever you
choose.
MR. PASSMAN. No, not what I choose, I just want
the facts.
SECRETARY McNAMARA, Introduce the facts you
choose; but I hope that in the course of introducing
them, you will emphasize that, from 1962 to date,
only one country has been added to those for which
we have material programs -- the Congo. So, at
least during this period of time, training prograins
have not evolved into material programs.
MR. PASSMAN. I was not limiting my comment to
1 or 2 years. I am speaking of the tirae since we
started the Military Assistance Program and nations
who -went from training- only to military equipment
programs. Your own people inserted this chart in
the record last year. It indicated that up until last
year there were seven countries that had moved out
of the training-only category to an equipnaent category.
/The chart indicated those countries were: Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvidor,
Panama, and Paragua y. /
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I ask your permission. .. to
introduce the figures covering the movement of countries
from training- only prograras into material prograras in
the years that this administration has been responsible
for, fiscal 1962 through fiscal 1968. May I have that
permission?
MR. PASSMAN. There is nothing wrong with that.

194
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Thank you, sir. /The
following information was inserted: Since FY 62
there have been no countries, for which grant aid
was initiated as training- only, which moved into
a material program category_^/
MR. PASSMAN. We are not working under just one
administration. Sometimes these administrations do
not last as long as they would like to last. I am talking
about the length of time you have had a Military Assis-
tance Program. I repeat: From little acorns big trees
1 8grow. ^°
While the subcommittee chairman had been dueling with the head
of the Department of Defense, one of his colleagues had been waiting
patiently for an opportunity to phrase his own questions. CongressmcUi
Silvio O. Conte (R - Mass. ), a relatively junior member of the Con-
gress (having first been elected in 1958) had apparently been doing
his homework on foreign aid in general auad on the Military Assistance
Program in particular. Now that Congressman Passman had finally
driven home his homily about acorns, Mr. Conte took his turn at
examining the Secretary of Defense.
The questioning of Secretary McNamara had, to this point, been
undertaken haphazardly and had provided the subcommittee with little
more than verbal fencing between the Secretary and the chairman.
Congressman Passman. Mr. Conte, however, intended to put the time
to better use. His first few questions concerned Southeast Asia --
the progress of the war, the likelihood of Chinese intervention, and the
18/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 483-485.

195
probable long-range military assistance requirements for South
Vietnam, Laos, asid Thailand. In contrast to those questions put
forward by his fellow committee members. Congressman Conte's
were thoughtful, direct, and well-phrased; they appeared to conceal
no traps and they were not argumentative in nature. Secretary
McNamara, in response, reassumed his role of crisp, efficient
super-executive. The following questions and answers are examples
of their furtlier dialogue and illustrate the administration's position
on. various iraporta-nt facets of the Military Assistance Program.
Military Assistance Precautions
MR. CONTE. you state one of the basic criteria being
applied to military assistance is the taking of pre-
cautions to reduce the chances that assistance may be
put to unintended purposes such as regional conflicts
or the support of undemocratic regimes. Could you
elaborate on how these precautions have been taken?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. United States actions in South
Asia are representative of measures we have taken to
prevent the unintended utilization of military equipment.
In 1965, all military shipments to India and Pakistan
were halted, thereby minimizing the possibility of
U.S. arms being used to continue hostilities on the
subcontinent. ^^
When developing nations in the Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa desire military equipment, it is
19/ Three weeks earlier, during the Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Subcommittee hearing of March 14, 1967, Senator
Symington and Dr. Bader had surfaced the issue of F-86 jet fighters
having found their way to Pakistan "despite" U.S. precautions. If
Secretary McNannara felt at all vulnerable on this score he chose not
to make this subcommittee aware of it.
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our policy to avoid the provision of material which
could contribute to conflicts or arins races and en-
courage only essentially defensive hardware. For
example, in the Middle East we have resisted arms
requests because we suspected that the items might be
put to unintended purposes such as regional conflict or
the support of undemocratic regimes. To date we have
denied the efforts of Latin American countries to ob-
tain supersonic aircraft and we have encouraged other
free world nations to do likewise. Similarly, our pro-
grams in Africa are minimal and confined to internal
security and civic action programs.
Finally, foreign military personnel receiving U. S.
training are exposed to the democratic philosophy
as to the proper role of the military vis-a-vis its
civilian leadership.
MR. CONTE. Greece and Turkey are two of the five
countries to receive 75 percent of the proposed mil-
itary aid. In light of the conflicts which have in
the past arisen over Cyprus, what steps have been
taken to minimize our winding up in the same situa-
tion here that we found in the India- Pakistan con-
flict of our weapons fighting our weapons? ^^
SECRETARY McNAMARA. We have refrained from
intervening directly in the Cyprus dispute for the last
3 years, believing that the solution to the problem
must be found by the parties concerned. We normally
work through the U. N. to dampen tensions. Both
countries are aware of the threat of the loss of MAP
^/Military Assistance Program/ if MAP supplied equip-
ment is converted to purposes other than those for
which it was furnished.
20/ Congressman Conte seems to have had a flair for pre-
science. Within the month the new Greek junta would break off talks
with Turkey and by November Greek forces equipped with U. S. weapons
would be preparing to fight Turkish forces likewise equipped over
the Cyprus issue. Only very direct diplomatic intervention by the
United States would prevent another regional conflict.
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Military Assistance to Latin America
MR. CONTE. As you are well aware Mr. Secretary, I
have been very unhappy with our program of providing
military aid to Latin America on an individual country
rather than on a regional program basis. My views
have not changed on this subject and I would like to know
if any steps have been taken to develop means to provide
regional assistance to Latin America and Africa as well,
as opposed to this highly dangerous independent assis-
tance ?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. WHle the executive branch
is mindfui of the intent of the Congress to provide mili-
tary assistance to Latin America on a regional program
basis, as expressed in section 511 (b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act, there are certain obstacles to the effec-
tive implementation of this intent. The major thrust of
military assistance to Latin America is internal security,
which is most effectively dealt with internally by each
country. Moreover, countries resist efforts for others
to become involved in their internal security problems
and prograxns. Therefore, it is difficult to attempt to
channel military assistance for internal security purposes
on a regional program basis. . . . military assistance
has been provided to some extent for regional or sub-
regional programs such as: assistance to the Central
American Defense Council; support for an expanded
program of combined military exercises, regional
seminars, and conferences with the purpose of achieving
greater multilateral planning for, and operation of,
Latin American military forces; and, support of Latin
American units appropriate for GAS /Organization of
American State^/ on U.N. peacekeeping assignments,
communications networks, and logistical support forces.
In Africa, our material assistance is selective,
limited to only certain countries whose security re-
quireraents are not being m.et adequately by other means
and where the U. S. security interests are involved, A
regional approach, such as through the OAU /Organization
for African Unity/, would pose serious practical problems




Controlled Sales of Military Equipment
MR. CONTE. In your statement you emphasize your view
that the controlled sale of appropriate types of military
equipment to allied and friendly nations is in the national
interest. Senator McCarthy of Minnesota in an article
in the Saturday Review of July 9, 1966, quotes the follow-
ing from a Defense Department pamphlet entitled "Infor-
mation and Guidance on Military Assistance. ":
The Department of Defense has embarked on an
intensified military assistance program. . . .
Achievement of . . . objectives calls for a very
substauitial increase over past sales. Success
in this endeavor will be dependent in large measure
upon effective sales promotion.
Would you care to conament on this in terms of your
reference to the importance of controlled sales of
appropriate military equipment?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. In reply, I beUeve the
following points are pertinent:
1. Three basic standards govern the conduct of our
foreign military sales program:
(a) We will not sell equipment to a foreign country
which we believe it cannot afford.
(b) We will never ask a potential foreign customer
to buy anything not truly needed by its own forces.
(c) We will not ask any foreign country to purchase




Every proposed sale is consonant with overall policy
established by the Department of State or specifically
subjected to a careful and thorough review within the U. S.
Government before negotiation is initiated.
. . . These
reviews are conducted at very high levels of Government
3. The mix of U. S. military grant aid and credit sales
has changed in recent years, but the aggregate grant-sales
program today is about the same as it has been for the past
5 years -- approximately $3 billion. . . .
4. Almost 90 percent of U. S. cash aund credit military
sales has been to NATO, Australia, and Japan; military
sales to underdeveloped countries have amounted to only
about 10 percent of the total. . . .
5. Extensions of credit by the United States are
carefully controlled. The Eximbank does not finance
any military sales without assurance from the
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Departments of State and Defense that such sales
are consistent with our national objectives. , . .
6. Our sales have created about 1.4 million
manyears of employ-ment in the United States atnd
over $1 billion in profits to Axnericctn industry-
over the last five years. ...
In summary, although we sell arms abroad, we do
so in a very responsible manner and, in this foreign
military sales program, I believe that we have estab-
lished all the necessary policy and administrative
safeguards to insure that this will continue to be
true in the future, j/ltalics supplied_^/^l
From the length of Secretary McNamara's answer to the last
question it seems apparent that the query on arms sales had touched
a nerve. The head of the Defense Department reiterated the entire
litany already recited by his subordinates, Mr. McNaughton and Mr.
Kuss, incident to their appearances before Senator Gore's and Senator
Symington's subcommittees. (Secretary McNamara, however, correct-
ly indicated the $1 billion in profits to have accrued over a five year
period. ) While the testimony given by his subordinates occurred in
executive sessions and would not be made public for another month,
Secretary McNamara's statements were made in open session and
provided a sooner rebuttal to the points raised originally by Dr. Bader
in his staff study. By conforming precisely to the language used by
his assistants in defending the military sales program, Secretary
McNamara committed the administration, at the Cabinet level, to
certain assertions which had already been brought into question by
21/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentative s, Foreign Assis-
tance atnd Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp. 495-499.
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the Gore and Symington subcommittees and which would continue to
suffer from close scrutiny throughout the year. Had the Defense
Secretary been able to foresee the damage which a loss of credibility
would ultimately bring to this, and other, programs, he might well
have taken this occasion to temper his position on the goals and
practices of the Military Assistance Program. What would soon come
to be known as "the mood of Congress" vis-a-vis arms transfers by
the United States must not yet have been clearly obvious to Secretary
McNamara -- this might be inferred from his response to Congress-
man Conte's final question.
"Preemptive Selling"
MR. CONTE. Mr. Secretary, we have had a tremen-
dous growth in the sale of weapons and other military
equipment from an average I believe of $300 million
in the fifties to a range today near $2 billion a year.
Furthermore, Mr. Kuss of your staff predicts nauch
greater increases of sales in the future. How can we
continue to take these steps and at the same time hope
to achieve a workable arms control program for this
country and the world? If you follow the theory of
"preemptive selling" so that you sell to countries
because otherwise they will buy from other countries,
how can we ever establish a solid foundation for
achieving arms controls?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. With respect to the first
part of your question, our total sales exports have
increased tremendously but our total exports in-
cluding aid have remained about the same. Mr.
Kuss has always indicated that in the 10- year
period, 1952-1961, we exported about $22 billion
in military hardware of which $17 billion was paid
for by the American taxpayer. He forecasts a
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complete reverse in the situation with the cash
sales increasing to about $15 to $17 billion and
the exports paid for by our taxpayer decreasing
to about $5 billion. . . .
With respect to the second question, we talk
of preemptive selling only where failure to sell
would cause a radical increase in direct or in-
direct Sino-Soviet influence. In applying such
preemptive policies, for example in the Middle
East, we encourage purchases of arms from other
Western countries before considering our own
sources. We do not follow preemptive selling
policies as a commercial practice. _/ltalics
supplied^/ '^^
Two months later, the Middle East would erupt into a short but
vicious conflict in which elements of both sides would employ quantities
of United States military equipment that would draw nearly as much
attention as that supplied by any other nation. Not only would it seem,
then, to Mr. Conte and others, that the Secretary of Defense had
evaded the issue of arms sales being counterproductive to arms control,
but it would appear that he had overstated the administration's policy
of deferring arms sales in favor of "other Western countries. "
Whether or not the United States was engaged in preemptive selling
would be determined by each member of the Congress as evidence of
American competition in the sale of arms was brought to light
throughout the year.
22/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 499-500.
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Testimony of Mr. Kuss and Vice Admiral Heinz
Having heard from the head of the Department of Defense, the
subcommittee now turned to the two officials who personally oversaw
the duel components of the Military Assistance Program -- Vice
Admiral L. C. Heinz, the Director of Military Assistance and Mr.
Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internation-
al Logistics Negotiations.^^ Both of these gentlenaen worked directly
under Mr. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs -- who, in turn, worked directly under the
Secretary of Defense, Although Vice Admiral Heinz was responsible
for the entire Military Assistance Program, which included both grant
aid and sales of military equipment, the ever-growing volume of
sales had led to the elevation of Mr. Kuss to a co-equal status. The
latter was theoretically constrained from making sales which were
out of the context of the overall plan for military assistance as
designed by the former (in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Services, and the regional Unified Commands). In practice,
military assistance plans were normally sufficiently flexible to allow
Mr. Kuss and his staff of salesmen wide enough latitude to pursue
23/ The Office of the Director of Military Assistance is one of
those within the staff of the Secretary of Defense which is occupied by
a general or flag officer drawn from the Armed Services. The posi-
tion rotates between the Services and there is no special significance





whatever customers they desired.
On the day following Secretary McNaraara's testimony, April 5,
1967, Vice Admiral Heinz appeared before the subcommittee and
provided a detailed analysis of the proposed program for fiscal year
1968. The Admiral explained that his office meant to abide by all of
the caveats ^which the Congress legislated previously in regard to the
Military Assistance Program. These included restricting the program
to only forty countries, limiting total grants and sales to Latin America
to $85 million and to Africa, $25 million. He provided the subcommit-
tee with a regional breakdown of proposed new disbursements together
with the folio-wing statennent:
Our proposals with respect to the use of fiscal
year 1968 funds are, as Secretary McNamara told
you, fully consistent with the carefully established
criteria he discussed; and the entire program is
designed to generate maximum security benefits for
the United States at minimal cost to the American
taxpayer. Accordingly, the portion of total assets
we propose to allocate to each region, and to non-
regional undertakings and credit assistance, reflects
very clearly the degree and nature of our national
defense and foreign policy interests with respect to
each --as follows:
24/ As has been noted in Chapter I, Mr. Kuss' counterparts
in each of the Armed Services were constrained to follow the force
structures recommended annually by the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan, Volume III, in carrying our their sales programs.

204
(Dollar amounts in millions)





Near East and South Asia 234.0 34
Europe 5.9 1
Africa 31.2 4
Latin America 45. 5 7
Credit Assistance 60. 9
Nonregional 30.0 4
25
The Director of Military Assistance went on to show that 93
percent of the funds proposed for the Far East and Near East and
South Asia regions would be distributed to the five "forward defense"
countries; the Republic of China and Korea (in the Far East) and
Greece, Turkey and Iran (included -vvithin the Near East and South
Asia, region). The $60 million for credit assistance would, of course,
be administered by Mr. Kuss in the financing of arms sales, and, of
the $30 million requested for nonregional use, $21.4 million would be
used to defray the administrative costs of the Military Assistance
Program worldwide.
Mr. Kuss then identified himself to the subcommittee and ex-
plained the role of his International Logistics Negotiations office in
helping to fulfill the goals of the program, helping "to generate maxi-
mum security benefits for the United States at minimal cost to the
American taxpayer." His statement afforded the Congressmen some
25/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 519.
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excellent information concerning the nature of the Defense Depart-
ment's function in the promotion of arms sales -- particularly in
regard to finsaicing.
Financing of Military Sales
The basic source of financing these sales is always
the resources available to the country whether the sale
is a cash or deferred payment sale. Of the total $11
billion in sales over the last 5 years, approximately
$2.4 billion were country financed purchases directly
from U. S. commercial sources, approximately $5. 7
billion cash purchases from the U. S. Department of
Defense, approximately $2 billion will be financed
directly by private U. S. banks or with the Export-
Import Bajik (in other words, without any Defense
Department involvement) and the balance of about $1
billion financed or guaranteed by the Department of
Defense.
Another way of looking at financing sources is to
compare the orders implemented during the 5-year
period, fiscal years 1962-66 (aside from commit-
ments which will be implemented in future years)
against the budgetary expenditures of the principal
countries buying in the United States, . . . Overall,
the free w^orld countries are estimated to have spent
about $38. 4 billion and implemented orders of about
$8.3 billion from the United States during the last
5 years or a little over 21 percent of their total
procurement budgets.
You can see that the United States is not gener-
ally supplying all of the requirements but supplies
selected items which would normally cost anywhere
from 100 to 200 percent more if each country chose
to develop and produce the material independently. ^6
In regard to the division of financing responsibilities between
26/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 529-530.
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the Department of Defense and the Export-Import Bank, Mr. Kuss
made these t'wo points:
1. In 1963 an Executive Branch decision, taken in
consultation with Defense, AID, State, and the Ex-
imbank under the leadership of the Treasury Depart-
ment, determined that credit requirements of the
industralized countries of Europe and the Far East
would be handled, as necessary, by the Eximbank or
private banks without any Department of Defense
guarantee or extension of credit. Thus, since 1963
the Eximbank has been the principal source of finan-
cing for countries like the United Kingdom, Australia,
ajid New Zealajtid.
2. This same 1963 decision forraed the basis for the
DOD assuming the responsibility for the greater risk
loans in the other parts of the world. Under its
authorities the DOD may do one of the following
three things:
(a) Extend credit directly and maintain the notes
in its own portfolio.
(b) Guarantee repayments to exporters, insurance
companies, financial institutions, or others who would
finance or extend credit to foreign governments for
the purchase of military material, of course, that
which was consistent with our objectives, or,
(c) Negotiate credit sales and sell notes or other
evidences of indebtedness to private or Government
banking facilities with a guarantee of repayment.
_/ltalics supplied^ 2
7
Country - X loans, flagged by Dr. Bader in his staff study, were
transacted according to the last of these methods by which the Depart-
ment of Defense could arrange financing for arms sales -- the Depart-
ment negotiating the sales, selling the notes to the Export-Import Bank,
27/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 530-531.
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and guarantying repayment with its own credit sales fund as collateral.
When Congressman Passman had earlier inquired of Mr. Linder, the
president of the Export-Import Bank, as to the authorization for such
transactions, he responded that he knew of no specific authorization
by the Congress. Now, Mr. Kuss attributed the procedure to an
"Executive Branch decision" made in 1963. Several administration
spokesmen would, later in the year, testify that not only was there
"congressional authorization" for country - X loans but that Congress
had been informed of the implementation of that procedure from the
very outset.
The Department of Defense credit sales fund, which was some-
times alternately called the "revolving fund, " was, according to
Mr. Kuss, handled in the following manner.
Operations for each year are financed from repay-
ments received during the year and from new obliga-
tional authority as required. For example, in the
fiscal year 1968 fund request before you the $120,6
million estimated requirement will be met from repay-
ments of $55 million; $5. 6 million in reduction of
outstanding guarantee reserves due to repayments /the
Department was securing loans from the Export-Import
Bank with reserves equal to 25 percent of the total
loans outstanding --as the loans were repaid, the
reserves were reclaimed/, and $60 million of requested
new obligational authority /the "credit assistance"
noted by Vice Admiral HeinzT.
We estimate that the total amount of the program
to be financed with this $120. 6 million will be about
$300 million, but this total will be finally dependent
on terms negotiated, bank rates, and bank willingness
to purchase evidence of indebtedness with or without
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DOD guarajitees and reserves 28
The subcommittee chairman, Congressman Passman, had
restrained himself quietly throughout the prepared statements of
Vice Admiral Heinz and Mr. Kuss. Now that they had finished, he
exposed them to his own personal discomfit with their whole program.
We have had a government, as we know it, for 178
years -- I think the Constitution and Bill of Rights
came into being 178 years ago. From that date through
December 31, 1966, our Federal Government collected
in taxes $1, 608, 390 million. However, for every dollar
collected in revenue during the entire 178 years, our
Government created an obligation of $1. 82. Most of
this tremendous obligation has been created in the
past 30 years.
On December 31, 1966, our borrowed money Federal
public debt amounted to $330 billion. Federal Stat-
utory obligations, calling for the payout of money in
subsequent years for services previously rendered,
amounted to $800 billion. The two together make it a
real public debt, or obligation, for services previously
rendered -- not to be rendered -- of $1, 130 billion.
These obligations amount to $5, 794 for every living
American.
. . .
With that fact in mind, we just hope that you gentle-
men who are requesting this money, sorae where along
the way, can find the tiine and the place to reduce the
amount that you have requested. It is not very popular
with the executive departmen^^ and with many members
of Congress to nnake budget reductions, but I think that
time is fast approaching when we will have to make
reductions and balance this budget. If we do not, our
successors will. ^9
28/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-





Thus began four grueling days of hearings (xA.prii 5, 6, 7, and 11)
during which Vice Admiral Heinz and Mr. Kuss -were treated to vin-
tage congressional interrogation -- philosophical admonitions, sarcas-
tic tirades, and veiled accusations, all seasoned. Avith homespun
allegory, tested the administration officials in tkeir defense of the
Military Assistance Program. The following exa.!mples illustrate the
areas of greatest congressional concern as well as some of the temper
of the lengthy dialogue.
Export-Import Bajik Financing of Military Sales
MR. PASSMAN. Mr. Secretary /KusT/, a moment ago
we were discussing military sales financed by the Export-
Import Bank. So as to get away from this facet of the
military assistance program and move into the main
program, that is, the grant aid progranx under Admiral
Heinz, we can state in an abbreviated form for the record
that as of this date the Export-Import Ba-Tik has financed
sales of military equipment to only four nations.
MR. KUSS. No, sir.
MR. PASSMAN. How many nations?
MR. KUSS. Four nations in addition thafc are not
included in that first list that you received.
MR. PASSMAN. Then what is the total mumber of
nations with which the Export-Import Ba£a.k has financed
sales of military equipment since they started the pro-
gram in 1965?
MR. KUSS. I will give you a figure for vwhat we plan to
the beginning of fiscal 1968, or do you want it through
1968?
MR. PASSMAN. I want to know the numfeer of nations --
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MR. KUSS. Or through today?
MR. PASSMAN. Through fiscal year 1967. In fiscal
year 1968 we raay amend the law and not permit you to
do it. This question deals with what has happened and
not what may happen. Indicate the names of the nations,
/italics supplie d."/
MR. KUSS. The names of the nations are classified.
MR. PASSMAN. You can put them in the record. If
they have to be classified they can be taken out. . . .
What is the total?
MR. KUSS. Fifteen. /Italics suppliedT? 30
It is obvious from the record that Mr. Kuss and the subcommittee
chairman communicated poorly. After some farther questions Congress-
maji Passman expressed his opinion of this use of the Export-Import
Bank.
MR. PASSMAN. Of course, Mr. Secretary, themain
reason we wanted you before the committee was to clear
up the system used by the Export-Import Bank to finance
the sales of military equipment. The Export-Import
Bank, since its inception, has been finajicing the sales
of only nonmilitary exports.
It has been a very fine institution and has had a lot of
support froin this committee. As one individual, I regret
very much to see the Export-Import Bank get into the
financing of the sales of nn.ilitary equipment. The way I
see it, the purchase of military equipnaent is not con-
tributing to the developraent of the underdeveloped
countries, and such a high percentage of the income of
these underdeveloped countries is being diverted to this
operation -- in just three years I believe, you said $600
million -- which represents a fairly substantial portion
30/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 544.
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of th.e total amoant of sales financed by the Export-
Import Bank, does it not?
MR. KUSS. I am not aware of their total budget. •
MR. PASSMAN. Do you have any projections as to
how much military sales that you would expect Export-
Import Bank to finance for you?
MR. KUSS. Yes. I have potential of $256 million. ^^
The no-w uncovered extent of the credit arms sales program
prompted Congressman Passnian to initiate the following. exchange.
MR. PASSMAN. I am afraid there is too much emphasis
on the sale of or the giving of military equipment. That
is bound to keep people's mind on wars rather than on
building the common interests of peaceful pursuits. I
for one am greatly worried about it because we have
about 74 nations, if we add the _/NATO/ infrastructure
countries to the three categories we mentioned /^rant
aid, direct credit sales, and credit sales guaranteed
by the DOD/, and that is about 65 percent of the total
number of nations.
MR. KUSS. I would like to assure you, Mr. Chairman,
as I am sure the Secretary did yesterday, that we have
this concern of yours uppermost in our mind as well,
and that in those countries, for example, who are
transiting from economic aid, as Iran, which was cut
off in 1962 from budgetary assistance but still is
receiving some military aid, we are extremely careful
about how we go about our military program in that
country.
And invariably one of our most difficult diplomatic
tasks is coming to a level of a program which is far
under what the country itself desires. Invariably
through a systenn of analysis not only by the military
in the country, but by the central bankers in the
31/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 547-548.
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country with our embassy, our military command, the
State Department, Defense Department, and Treasury
Department, an analysis is made of what the current
revenues are available for the economic programs first,
and military programs are entered into only to the extent
that it appears there are revenues available for that. . . .
I just want to be on the record, Mr. Chairman, that
your concern is our concern and a greatt deal has been
done to take care of it.
MR. PASSMAN. I do appreciate your statement, Mr.
Secretary. I respect all witnesses appearing before
this committee. Without exception, I ha.ve never met
one that was not dedicated. You raust believe in these
programs or I do not think you would associate yourself
with them. But inasmuch as this is still America and we
have a right to think and speak, I say that history, when
it is written, is going to make all of us look stupid. We
are attempting to work out the problems of all other
peoples on the face of the earth, and it does not appear
to me that we are capable of arranging our own business
financially.
We are using up our resources very rapidly and our
resources are the wealth of our country. It is a new con-
cept -- giving away our wealth by startiiag a military assis-
tance program in half of the nations of the world is entirely
a new concept and only history will teli -whether or not we
affected it.
Arms Sales and the Economy
The question of whether arms sales were being promoted by the
so-called military-industrial complex in the United States was touched
on briefly.
MR. PASSMAN. It would appear to rae that we are not
very careful /in making arms sales decision_s_/ inasmuch
as we have made the manufacture and sale of military
32/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentatives. Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968. pp. 550-551.
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equipment an essential part of our economy today and it
is- getting to be a big thing. ...
MR. KUSS. ... in fact military sales do not make up a
large part of our economy. They are important to us
politically, militarily. They do not amount to nnore than
about 6 percent of our defense production industry. Many
of our defense companies could care less whether they
ever made a military export sale or not. -'•'
Military Assistance Training
Turning to Vice Admiral Heinz, the subcommittee chairman
reopened the issue of whether training-only programs eventually led
to raaterial programs of military assistance.
MR. PASSMAN. This is somewhat controversial and I
find that some witnesses are very quick and sensitive
when you ask this question /Secretary McNamara was
the only witness so askec[/: Since the inception of the
military assistance program, how many countries in
the program started with a training program only, that
subsequently started getting material?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. I recognize that we gave you a list
of this last year.
MR. PASSMAN. That is right, That covered only
one period.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. There were seven countries.
33/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 555. Mr. Kuss
nnay have been understating the economic innpact of arnns sales some-
what here. Even in. the United States, any business that has earned
$1 billion in profits for it's first five years of operation -- although
it may not be "essential" --is certainly a "big thing. "
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MR. PASSMAN. Seven, that is correct. . . . What is
the purpose of training personnel to use military
equipment?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. The purpose of training person-
nel to use equipment is, of course, so that they may
make better use of the equipment they have.
MR. PASSMAN. And if that wears out it would follow
that they would have to procure other equipment to
replace it; is that right?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. When equipment wears out, you
may or may not replace that equipment, depending
upon whether your forces are increasing, are reniain-
ing static, or are decreasing. It is to be expected
that everyone replaces equipment when it wears out,
as you do your car and as I do my car.
MR. PASSMAN. If it were conclusive that they would
never have any use for equipment, then it would be
useless to train them to use it; would it not?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. That is correct.
MR. PASSMAN. That is a good answer and I am grate
ful. It is perfectly obvious, we both knew that, but I
never have been able to get it in the record before. 3"*
Satisfied that he had made his point, Congressman Passman
changed his tack.
Military Assistance Related to Coups
MR. PASSMAN. Admiral, does the fiscal 1968 budget
contain any funds for a program of military assistance
to any country that experienced an illegal seizure of
control of the government since you appeared before the
committee last year?
34/ U.S. Congress, House of Representative s , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 558-559.
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ADMIRAL HEINZ, . . . There is no indication that
military assistance encourages coups.
MR. PASSMAN. Coups are sometimes accomplished
with arms?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. Sometimes they are accomplished
•without arms.
MR. PASSMAN. We both know that, but I said some-
times they are accomplished with arms.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Sonaetimes they are accomplished
with arms.
MR. PASSlvIAN. That is right. . . . One country changed
governments four tinnes, I have heard people testify for
one government. That government would be overthrown
and the satme people would testify for the new government.
. . . People have a difficult job explaining some of these
things and I would not want to press the point and ask you
to go into too much in detail other than to give us a list
of all the nations at this point in the record.
(The information follows:)
Successful Military Coups, April 1966 - April 1967
Five military coups have been successfully executed
since April 1966: in Argentina (June 1966), Nigeria (July
1966), Burundi (November 1966), Togo (January 1967),
and Sierra Leone (March 1967). Of these countries,
three received no U. S. military assistance and Nigeria
received only MAP training; Argentina alone received
both military grant and sales assistance. U.S. naiiitary
assistance to Argentina, suspended for four months
after the coup, has been resumed and is included in the
FY 1968 program. Zitalics supplied^/ ^-'
35/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp"! 559-560.
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Justification of Military Assistance Items
The subcommittee chairman was alarmed at several of the line
item expenditures in the previous military assistance budgets -- one
of these was for locomotives for Thailand.
MR. PASSMAN. Admiral, to be perfectly honest with
you, I think that we will agree that the executive branch
runs this Government just about the way they want to,
and they stretch these laws until it is almost out of the
bounds of reason. It is pretty hard to justify the purchase
of 10 locomotives for Thailand by the military assistance
appropriation when we know that primarily they are used
in the general economy of Thailand. The percentage of
military equipment they would raove at that time /1963/
was a very small percentage of the total tonnages moved.
Would that be a fair statement?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. I would say at that time, yes, very
small.
MR. PASSMAN. And I will tell you, they go pretty far
afield and I think you would worry as much as we do,
if we don't assume our responsibility for running this
Government. -^"
36/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives
, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 19 68, p. 578. It may
have occurred to sorae of the subcommittee members that these
locomotives, funded under MAP and delivered four years previously,
might have indicated then, by their significant addition to the logistics
infrastructure in Thailand a U. S. intention towards large scale
military involvement in that country. No one, however, raised this
point. -- neither was it even flagged in hearings conducted by other
committees. The commitment conscious Senate Foreign Relations




The Function of Mr. Kuss
Congressman Conte, who was certainly prepared to assume his
share of the responsibility for running the Government, now began
to-take his turn at questioning the witnesses. As he had done with
Secretary McNamara, Mr. Conte normally framed his inquiries
in such a way that they were requests for information rather than
polemic traps, however, there were some exceptions.
MR. CONTE. Could you_/Mr. Kus_s7 give us a brief
rundown of the operation of your office including a
breakdown of the responsibilities of your four sales
teams and the methods they use to carry out their
assignments ?
MR. KUSS. Yes, sir. . . .
MR. CONTE. I do not want to be rude and I do not
want to interrupt you, but do you go around with a
briefcase and portfolios and try to sell military
supplies atnd weapons like an automobile salesman?
MR. KUSS. My office never has yet, principally because
we have been kept so busy with people coming to us that
there is absolutely no need for us to operate as a sales-
man. It is not only that there is no need, but it is not
our business to do so. Our business is to try to respond
to requirements such as Prime Minister Wilson's re-
quest to the President. "Will you help us out on three
aircraft that we do not want to develop ourselves?"
For agreement between the Minister of Defense of
Germany and the Minister of Defense of the United States,
there are no bag- carrying salesmen in this office.
My job, I'm afraid, is to act like a bureaucrat and to
coordinate with five other regions in international security
affairs for Europe, for the Far East, amd so forth, to meet
every Monday afternoon with the State Department and
review what is going on, every Thursday afternoon with
the Treasury Department to review the financial ends
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of the business, weekly with the armed services,
monthly with the Joint Chiefs, and to see to it that
all of this machinery ends up with a product. Some'
times it is difficult to end up with a product after
ail that machinery -- but that is my job. We are
not bag carriers, /italics supplied^/ ^^
It is difficult to recognize in this principal architect of a very
healthy arms sales program and dignified "bureaucrat" whose days
were spent arrzinging agreements between Ministers of Defense, the
same Mr. Kuss who, in a different mood, described himself and his
associates to Senator Fulbright as "minions in the wheels. " It seems
that, while he might be a minion, he was not a bag carrier. As was
noted in Chapter I, however, there was certainly a great deal of bag
carrying going on in 1967, as well as in previous years.
Military Assistance to Latin Ainerica
During cux earlier session of the Congress, in September 1965,
Mr. Conte had made a speech on the floor of the House on the subjects
of foreign aid and military assistance. One of his concerns then was
Latin Anaerica; in regard to which he said.
I am not convinced that, in every instance, the
funds, which have been programed for military assistance
for Latin American countries, have been applied toward
their intended purpose. These funds could, however,
well be an enabling factor for any Latin American
37/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, p. 587. The break-
down of Mr. Kuss staff, requested by the subcommittee, is provided
for reference at Appendix L .
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country's buildup of military capabilities for external
aggression. These funds may well have been applied in
many of the coups that have taken place in Latin America.
Mr. Conte was still very much concerned with the application of
military assistance to Latin America and he approached that subject
again in questioning Mr. Kuss.
MR. CONTE. The following statement is made in the
justification book /assumed to be the DOD publication
Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts/:
"We shall continue to discourage sales of military
equipment to countries which may seek to acquire it
primarily for prestige purposes just as we recognize
the danger of sales which contribute to the develop-
ment of arms races among neighboring countries or
divert limited country resources from more urgently
needed economic and social development. "
Would you expand on this statement, including an
explanation of how this policy is carried out and perhaps
a few examples of what you have done in this field?
MR. KUSS.
. . .
let me at this point just give you a slight
example. We do not believe, and have not believed for a
long time, that the economies and that the military estab-
lishments of Latin America require a million, a million
and a half or a two million dollar supersonic fighter.
MR. CONTE. Amen.
MR. KUSS. We have been working diligently to negotiate,
to talk these people diplomatically into forestalling all
internal actions that would aim toward that direction.
. . . The problem has occurred in some countries where they
have said, "All right, we will give up two squadrons and
consolidate into one squadron in order to bear the expense
38/ U, S. , Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st session
(September 8, 1965), p. 23158.
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of the new aircraft. We are not growing, " they say,
"we are contracting. "
So we deliberately say, "All right, but we still think
it is a misuse of expenditures, " and our next step is to
try to find something else that will temper the problem.
In Chile they acquired used overhauled Hawker -Hunters.
. . . When it broke in the newspaper it sounded like there
was a big arnms prograna. If you had known what it looked
like from where we started, you would have an example of
what we have done to keep this depressed.
MR. CONTE. It is discouraging to see that they are able
to get around us. We can turn them down and they go to
some of our allies that we are helping out. I think the
chairman really hit on this where we are giving grajit aid
to some of these countries and then they turn around and
use their own resources to buy this military equipment.
Chile purchased $13 million -- you mentioned Chile --
worth of high performance Hawker-Hunter jets from the
British. This is a lot of naoney for a country that is
wobbly on its feet right now and could use every plugged
nickel it could get to develop itself.
It should be plowing that naoney into education and doing
away with some of the misery and sickness and hunger that
they are faced with down there. ... $13 inillion is a lot
of money. I don't care what it's for; it's a lot of money,
even if they are buying kites with it. ... You have to agree
with me that to a country that is struggling like Chile,
$13 million is a lot of money.
MR. KUSS. I do not know where they got the $13 naillion,
to tell you the truth,
MR. CONTE. We are giving thena grant aid. That is the
whole point. Then they divert that grant aid for these
Hawkers. -^"
This, then, was Congressman Conte's view of the Military Assis
tance prograna as it was applied to Latin American countries -- they
were diverting grant aid, they were getting around us, they were
39/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencie s Appropriations for 1968, pp. 592-593.
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going to our allies when we turned them down. It is frequently
difficult to pinpoint the genesis of legislation -- amendments and
even laws find their origins in cloakroom conversations, unpublished
debates in closed committee sessions, private staff memoranda,
andliinchtime banter. Mr. Conte, however, in this dialogue with
Mr. Kuss, has provided an inclusive glimpse of his philosophy-
vis-a-vis the application of military assistance to the underdeveloped
countries; particularly to those of Latin America. By the end of the
year he would seize a chance to codify that philosophy in the form of
legislative restraint on the Military Assistance Prograna. This
exchange with Mr. Kuss illustrates the Conte diagnosis of one of
the ills of the program -- the legislation that followed would represent
his idea of cui appropriate cure.
Review of Arms Sales
Although Dr. Bader tells us that there was, at that time, "re-
markably little communication between the relevant staffs, " it is
evident that his staff study had reached the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations and Related Agencies --at least Mr. Conte was cognizant
of it. He now gave Mr. Kuss an opportunity to respond to part of
that study.
40/ William. B. Bader letter dated Novem.ber 2nd, 1971, p. 2.
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MR. CONTE. I am sure you are familiar with the recent
study of arms sales and foreign policy prepared for the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 90th Congress,
first session. The following statement is made in the
study;
On the question of the arms sales and U. S. relations
with European allies the central fact is that while the
financial success of U.S. military sales is beyond dis-
pute, there is ample reason for concern as to the side
effects of the vigorous sales campaign. American sales
efforts have been a source of great irritation in Europe,
particularly in West Germany and Great Britain. It may
also be a major cause of increasing interest of Europeans
in competing for arms markets in developing regions of
the world.
The report also states that in practice it does not
believe we presently have an operation adequate in inter-
departmental coordination a-nd supervision of a national
policy of arms sales taking into full account the military,
political, economic, and arms control implications of our
expanding sales program. Could you comment on both of
these positions?
MR. KUSS. Let me speak first to the serious question which
both we and the Disarmament Committee under Senator Gore
have been studying, and that is the adequacy of the machin-
ery to review arms sales. We have reported to that commit-
tee all of the extensive machinery that exists today. We have
noted to that committee what our standards are in selling
equipment. ... In coordination with all government agencies,
we reported to that committee that every proposed sale is
consonant with overall policy established by the Department
of State or specifically subjected to a careful and thorough
review within the U. S. Government before negotiation is
initiated. . . . These reviews are conducted at very high levels
of government. Secretary McNamara, himself, personally
has reviewed almost all of the important sales. "^^
It is noteworthy that this initial portion of Mr. Kuss' response is
an exact repetition of Assistauit Secretary McNaughton's opening
41/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 595-596.
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statement before the Gore subcommittee on February 7, 1967. (Mr.
Kuss is not quoted here in full in order to avoid redundancy -- Mr,
McNaughton's statement is quoted at length in Chapter HI. ) The
difficulty of coordinating the individual testimonies of administration
witnesses (so as to provide a united and coherent front before the
Congress) would plague the executive branch throughout the year,
but Mr. Kuss would do his best not to contribute to that difficulty --
he would use the "golden words" (in the Pentagon vernacular) of his
superiors whenever he could. Having reaffirmed his department's
position on policy review, Mr. Kuss continued.
With respect to the first part of your statement, this
is not an element that the committee /the Gore sub-
committee/has gone into at all. You will recall this
was a staff study. You will recall that principal sub-
stajatiation of that statement was taken from European
newspapers, and not really from statements of respon-
sible officials of those governments. ... I can only say
don't listen to the losers in the newspapers. The fact is
that those countries spend 75 percent or more of their
total hard'ware budgets in their own countries, not in the
United States, So we are not taking all of their program
away either, /italics supplied._/ ^^
"Preemptive Selling"
Apparently, much of Dr. Bader's staff study had impressed
Congressman Conte. The charge of preemptive selling particularly
42/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 596.
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interested him --he had asked Secretary McNamara about it and now
he wanted Mr. Kuss' point of view.
MR. CONTE. . . . could you tell us whether, in your
Opinion, the concept of preemptive selling of military
arms is compatible with being able to achieve a
successful arms control program?
MR. KUSS. ... with respect to preemptive selling, I
think it is best to just state what Assistant Secretary
John McNaughton stated to the Gore committee on dis-
armament in this matter. He said those of us who are
concerned with guiding and directing U. S. foreign policy
must, with respect to arms competition, draw a sharp
distinction between other free world competitors and
those from major Communist countries.
In the case of Israel, which he had mentioned also,
our action was prompted by a heavy iiifusion of Communist
equipment to neighboring states. Our primary answer to
the suggestion that we are seeking to preempt our Euro-
pean friends and allies in various military markets is
that we do not ask any country to buy anything from us
which it can buy cheaper or better elsewhere. We believe
that preemption is necessary only where it is for the
purpose of preventing a radical shift in Communist influ-
ence. We do not use preenaptive methods for the other
countries of the world. '^^
Conventional Weapons "Free Zones"
Another point raised in Dr. Bader's study prompted Congressman
Conte's next question.
MR. CONTE. What is your opinion of the recommendation
in the early staff study prepared for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the United States should take
43/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, p. 597.
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the initiative in organizing regional conventional weapons
"free zones" or zones that would be free of sophisticated
offensive and defensive weapons? The report cited sub-
Saharian Africa and Latin America as possible places for
such, zones. !
MR. KUSS. The United States has attempted this many-
time s
.
MR. CONTE. We may have attempted it, but we haven't
gotten very far.
MR. KUSS. It is a big difference to attempt and to
achieve.
MR^ CONTE. Ccui you name one free zone in sub-Saharian
Africa or Latin America?
MR. KUSS. No, I can't. ^'^
Congressman Conte may well have drawn the conclusion from
this conversation that the executive branch was either insincere about
its desire to see such "free zones" become a reality or else, was hope-
lessly ineffective in bringing such zones about -- he may also have
concluded that the Congress must take a hand if the underdeveloped
nations were to be spared the burden of further arms acquisitions.
Arms Sales Clearances
Mr. Kuss had testified that neither he nor any of his associates
were bag carrying arms inerchants. Congressman Conte had let the
point pass unchallenged, however, the subcommittee chairman wanted
44/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 597-598.
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to know if other salesmen might be on the move -- under the auspices
of Mr. Kuss and his office.
MR. PASSMAN. Do you permit factory representatives
of small arms and major arms manufacturers to go abroad
to contact foreign nationals and so on, and speak to the
merits of their products?
MR. KUSS. If they have a munitions control clearance
from the Department of State, yes.
MR. PASSMAN. I would assume they ^would have to have
that, but they are permitted to go abroad and sell their
hardware ?
MR. KUSS. Yes.
MR. PASSMAN. Does that create a demand within itself?
MR. KUSS. Well, for example, we don't permit them --
one of the reasons many of them are complaining is that
we don't permit them to go to Latin America.
MR. PASSMAN. I didn't say permit them to go to Latin
America. I asked a general question, if there is a policy
to give clearance to let them go abroad and demonstrate
and discuss the merits of their hardware ?
MR. KUSS. If we didn't want to sell the thing on the first
place, we wouldn't give them the clearamce, Mr. Chairman.
MR. PASSMAN. That is an evasive ans-wer. . . . Do you have
ciny cases Vv^here you have given clearance for them to go
abroad?
MR. KUSS. U.S. representatives have been given clearance.
That is what one of the primary functions of munitions
control is, to give that clearance.
MR. PASSMAN. I am trying to find out whether there has
been any clearance given to factory representatives to
go abroad to contact prospective purchasers of our hard-




MR. KUSS. Every day. Thousands. /Ttaiics supplied^/
Congressman Passman and Mr. Kuss were still communicating
with difficulty, but, through persistence , the congressman was getting
the answers that he wanted. With thousands of arms salesmen "on the
street" it was obvious why Mr. Kuss didn't have to resort to carrying
a bag. The fact that these salesmen where formally authorized by
the Government of the United States to pursue such sales must cer-
tainly have enhanced their stature among their competitors. The
subcommittee chairman next asked whether or not such extensive
salesmanship created a demand for military equipment.
MR. KUSS. It created a demand only if we approved it
for countries in which there was a demaxid in the first
place.
MR. PASSMAN. The deraand may be there and you dis-
approve it, but that within itself, would it create a demand
on the part of the foreign government to buy it?
MR. KUSS. No, sir. /Italics supplied^
MR. PASSMAN. That would be the most unusual thing I
ever heard of then. If you show something to an individ-
ual that he actually likes and wants, the very fact that it
might be disapproved doesn't stop the demand or desire.
_/ltalics supplied^/ "^^
Mr. Kuss had asked the subcommittee to believe that the United
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States would disapprove a sale of arms, the display of which had been
undertaken with the authorization of the Munitions Control Board of
the Departnnent of State. It is the salesman's function to tantalize
prospective buyers with the obvious goal of making sales. If the
administration was, indeed, loosing "thousands" of salesmen on an
"every day" basis, cind then disapproving the demands which these
merchants stirred up, it was following a procedure both foolish and
cruel. Mr. Kuss and his superiors had frequently made the claim
that the administration had, in the past, disapproved from three to
five times as many requests for arms sales as they had approved.
If the procedure now described by Mr. Kuss was, in fact, in effect,
it is hardly surprising that the claimed record of disapprovals had
reached such proportions.
It must have occurred to Mr. Kuss that he had been pressed into
making a statement which might well be exploited to the administra-
tion's disadvantage. Within a few minutes he asked the chairman's
permission to correct the record. Congressman Passman replied,
MR. PASSMAN. Positively. If I reach the point where
I could not be fair with any witness or member, I would
quit. What was it?
MR. KUSS. You asked me the number of munitions control






MR. PASSMAN. You want to change it to "many?"
MR. KUSS. I called the "horse's mouth" so to speak, the
Department of State Office of Munitions Control, and they
average in their statistics, up to about 100 per day.
^/Italics supplied^/ ^^
While it was probably apparent to the subcommittee that the
figure of "thousands" first given by Mr. Kuss was likely a gross
exaggeration induced by their chairman's persistent questioning, the
firm figure of 100 per day must have had real impact. A solid admis-
sion by the executive branch that it was authorizing something over
30,000 arms sales efforts each year could only beg some alarnning
conclusions. The potential demaxids for weapons which might be
generated through these efforts could be enormous. If the demands
responded in proportion to such an apparently intense sales program
how could any governmental machinery hope to conduct really effective
reviews, to coordinate, to supervise, or to execute any sort of mean-
ingful policy control? It may well have seemed to the subcommittee
members that any administration plan for arms sales decision making
would be ambitious indeed if it were not to be overwhelmed by the
fruits of the labors of the arms merchants.
Congressman Passman was moved at this point to deliver a little
homily on the subject of salesmanship. He had operated three small
companies, he said, smd had employed 57 salesmen. "It was not
47/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
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unusual, " according to the congressman, "for one of my men to go
into some food store, maybea small store, where the man had given
no idea whatsoever about buying new refrigeration equipment. Invari-
ably before ray man left there ... he had not only sold this man equip-
ment that he had given no thought to buying that morning, but he had
oversold the man. "^^ There was an analogy with the sale of nailitary
equipment.
MR. PASSMAN. When you get these people to thinking
of and talking about military hardware in all probability
they start thinking about what you say may happen and
they might find many uses. It is perfectly obvious that
the sale of military hardware, that is the manufacture
and sale of military hardware, has been built into our
economy, almost as firmly as the manufacture of refriger-
ators, washing machines, and television. Those people
are in business primarily to get a return on their invest-
ment so they can pay a dividend to their stockholders and
make a profit.
If you have a hundred men that are licensed to go out
per day into foreign countries and offer their goods and
services you have people thinking about that. A good
salesman would always think in terms of selling the maxi-
mum, not the minimum; so upon that basis certainly the
Defense Department would not have to send out salesmen.
The manufacturer will do that, because he wants to make
a profit. . . .
What would happen if you kept these salesmen home,
these people to whom you give permission to go out and
sell their military hardware? Why don't you keep them
home instead of letting them out and getting these
foreign procurement officials' minds on the military
hardware? You know it is only natural that they are
going to recommend the largest figure. What would be
the answer if you were to wait until these people came
48/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis.
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to you or the Defense Department for consideration of their
requirements? Do you think you could possibly slow this
down and get people's minds on something else, other than
on wars? I do not think we will ever get this world out
of a state of turmoil as long as this Nation, my Nation,
our Nation, and other industralized nations, are making
ajid selling military hardware as a part of their economy. . . .
MR. KUSS. . . . let me say that if your salesmen had gone into
that store /the small food store of the homily/ and found we
also had an ambassador there and we also had an attache and
we also had a MAAG /_Military Assistance Advisory Group^/
chief, and we also had a political attache with whom your
salesman had to check in while they were dealing with that
country, they would be considerably slowed down, particu-
larly if they had to check what they were about to say to the
country or to the customer, particularly if they had to come
under very direct and observant control.
MR. PASSMAN. Do you send the ambassador out with these
salesmen when they call on the prospective buyer?
MR. KUSS. We ask all of these salesmen -- first of all,
these hundred a day do not all involve people going abroad,
these are approvals of export sales, commercial export
sales. Some of them will never involve a person going
abroad. It may involve a man sending ixi a requisition
to United Aircraft for a spare part. So only some of this
might involve going abroad. But those that do go abroad --
and it is a very small portion of our total sales that result
from this, believe me -- most of it results from ambassador-
ial. Secretary of Defense, Government actions, ^/italics
supplied. /49
After having first told the subcommittee that clearances granted
to factory representatives to go abroad to contact prospective pur-
chasers of military equipment numbered "thousands" per day -- and
then amending that to "about 100 per day" -- Mr. Kuss' explanation
49/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
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about spare parts requisitions was, unfortunately, somewhat belated.
Moreover, he had now identified the ambassadors as bag carriers.
In fairness to Mr. Kuss, it should be recalled that 90 percent of the
arms sales which had been concluded were made to industralized
countries cuid many were of such magnitude that they could hardly
have escaped the attention of the American ambassadors, the attaches,
amd all the rest of American officials in- country. Whether these
sales were inade subject to the approval or recommendation of these
officials, or whether the officials themselves were actively involved
as sales representatives was, unfortunately, left unclear by Mr. Kuss
-- the subcommittee members were to draw their own conclusions
from his testimony. In point of fact, the United States Government
had established a Defense Attache's Office in each of these countries
wherein the United States had arms sales interests and wherein there
were not already Military Assistance Advisory Groups (or Military
Groups, in the cases of Latin American countries). Either the DAO
or the MAAG served as the point of contact for all arms sales trans-
actions. In each case, the anabassador exercised personal jurisdic-
tion over the activities of the DAO or MAAG within the country to
which he was the United States representative. The extent to which
the ambassadors becarae involved in arms sales varied from country to
country and from sale to sale; ranging from intimately in the case of
F-lll's to Britain or Australia, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft to the
Netherlands, or armored cars to Bolivia to very slightly or not at all
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in the case of avionics to Japan or vehicular spares to Norway. By
oversimplifying the established sales procedures Mr. Kuss probably
unduly confused the subcommittee members amd, thereby, did the
Military Assistance Program serious disservice. The image of
hundreds of arms merchants, supported by an auxiliary of ambas-
sadors, overselling United States military equipment to clients --
frequently like the small food store owner, gullible and broke --
would stick from then on.
Congressmaji Passman's Concerns
MR. PASSMAN. You people are involved in the sale of
military hardware, directly or indirectly, and it will
go on as long as you have a U. S. military aid program
going in 60 nations. Just so long we are going to
stay in a state of turmoil in my opinion, I am going
to say for the record that time and time again we have
had witnesses before this committee saying, yes, they
should not get this, but it is a political decision and
if we are going to get along we are going to have to
yield to them and furnish certain types of military
equipment. . . . But the aid bill grows every year. It
had been so fragmentized that the confusers are now
confusing themselves. I will tell you it takes a lot
of research to put all these pieces together. Now you
are fragmentizing military assistance and I have to work
overtime to pick up these programs for Thailand, Laos,
Infrastructure, and International Military Headquarters
to try and get a grand total so we will have something
to compare this year's cost against last year's cost.
MR. KUSS. I remember your complaints in 1955.
MR. PASSMAN. They are not my complaints. It is Mr.
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auid Mrs. America's complaints. _/ltaiics supplied._/ 50
Throughout their encounter, Mr. Kuss cuid Congressman
Passman had responded to each other as adversaries. Mr, Kuss had
described some of his own testimony as flippant --it was obvious that
he regarded the subcommittee chairman as more of a nuisance than
a threat. Like his superior. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Kuss had
not yet sensed "the mood of the Congress, " As he finished his testi-
mony. Congressman Passman let him glimpse this mood.
MR. PASSMAN. I think you are a great adininistrator,
and a great American, but I am going to make your job
as hard as I can for you. You don't mind that, do you?
/Italics supplied.-/
MR. KUSS. _/Still flippant? I think it helps. I think
it helps. There is nothing like competition
^Italics supplied^/ 51
To a professional salesman such as Mr. Kuss, making his job
harder simply meant increasing the competition, a threat which he
could understand within his own frame of reference. Congress, how-
ever, did not deal within that frame of reference -- Congress dealt in
fiats. Congressman Passman and his colleagues had the power to
emasculate Mr. Kuss' program, if not Mr. Kuss himself. They
would do so by the end of the year.
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Functional Control of Military Assistance
The attention of the subcommittee now turned exclusively to Vice
Admiral Heinz. Mr. Conte inquired of the Admiral as to the functional
control of his program.
MR. CONTE. Would you describe the evaluation pro-
cedures that exist for determining whether the goals
and objectives of our individual military assistance
program'^ are being met and also for determining that
the appropriations are being put to use in the manner
intended?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. The mechanics of the evaluation nor-
naally are tied to the annual MAP planning and program-
ming procedures, although special appraisals are fre-
quently required by those conducting day-to-day affairs.
This continuing evaluation also provides the basis for
program adjustments as required when goals and objec-
tives chcunge or are modified.
In the normal planning cycle, U.S. objectives, policy
guidance, and dollar guidelines are first provided the
Unified Commands ADommander in Chief Europe, Comman-
der in Chief Pacific, Commander in Chief Middle East,
Africa, and South Asia, and Comma-nder in Chief South-
ern Command (Latin America)/ and the Country Teams.
The country MAAG's then prepare various papers for in^
closure in a formal military assistance plan. These papers,
which are coordinated with the respective U. S. diplomatic
missions, include the following subjects relative to an
evaluation of past performance and accomplishments:
(a) Plan objectives and the contribution of military
assistance to the acconnplishment of U.S. objectives.
(b) A discussion of wherein various objectives
have been met.
(c) A discussion of local efforts to meet their own
military requirements.
The country plans are then forwarded to the Unified
Command, where they are considered from the regional
point of view. Next they are sent to Washington and reviewed
by DOD, State, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget prior to




The foregoing outlines the normal procedures relative
to evaluating the goals and objectives of individual pro-
grams. While these procedures also bear on the problem
of appropriations "being put to use in the manner intended, "
there are other more specific actions which apply to the
latter problem. These are:
(a) DOD internal audits: On a regular schedule auditors
from the military departments check specific country pro-
grams or functions. These audits are developed, plajined,
and sometimes performed by the MAP Audit Division, OSD
_/Office of the Secretary of Defense_/ Comptroller.
(b) Inspector General, foreign assistance inspections:
The Inspector General, foreign assistance, operating
out of the Department of State, includes military
assistance matters in his comprehensive audits and
inspections of foreign assistance programs.
(c) GAO /Government Accounting Officey compre-
hensive audits: These comprehensive audits specific-
ally review the results of a program in the light of
legislation and the intended purpose of the program.
In all three of these cases, the audit or inspection
reports require investigation and comment by the pertin-
ent activities and, if valid discrepancies have been
uncovered, then corrective action in instituted. ^2
Justification of Military Assistance Items
From Admiral Heinz' long and authoritative response, one would
gather that the problem of accountability throughout the administration
of the Military Assistajice Program was completely in hand. Doubtless,
the Director of Military Assistance was ajixious for the congressmen to
understand that this was the case.
While it is obviously one thing to appear before the Congress and
pontificate to the effect that one's program is managed with great care
52/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
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and at the highest levels of the government, it is quite another thing
to be forced to defend and to justify each of the thousands of line
items which comprise the program. Admiral Heinz had gone to lengths
to impress upon the subcommittee that the Military Assistance Prograin
was guarded to insure that appropriations were "being put to use in
the manner intended. " Chairman Passman and his colleagues could
not resist testing the Admiral. When is became apparent that they had
uncovered an area wherein management techniques seemed to have
slackened and where legitimacy of expense seemed open to question
they made the most of the situation.
MR. PASSMAN. Do you have in your 1968 program 25
sedans for Iran?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. There are 25 contained in the fiscal
year 1968 program.
MR. PASSMAN. What is a sedan used for in the way of
military purposes?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. The major use in Itsjd. is for the
Iranian gendarmerie.
MR. PASSMAN. You are charging these vehicles to the
Iran program?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Yes, sir.
MR. PASSMAN. Are they all Cadillacs?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. We do not buy any Cadillacs. These
are small sedans.
MR. PASSMAN. If we can, let's put in the record at
this point the make of the 44 automobiles /provided to
Iran under MAP for the previous year^ If there are
any Lincoln Continentals let them be included.
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ADMIRAL. HEINZ. There are no Lincoln Continentals.
^/italics suppliedr?
MR. PASSMAN. What are the names? ... Do you not know
the names of the automobiles you get for Iraji?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I tell the Army I need to requisition
sa ma-ny vehicles of a certain type. The procurement
authorities then put out a bid for the contract. It may
be won by American Motors or Ford or Chevrolet.
MR. PASSMAN. How do you know there are no Cadillacs
if you do not know the names? . . . Will you please furnish
for the record the make of these sedans?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I will do that.
(The information follows:)
The last sedans delivered under MAP for Iran were
Plymouth, light sedans, at a procurement cost of $1432
each.
MR. PASSMAN. Admiral, do you not think that Iran with
its oil revenue exceeding $500 million annually, could
pay for these sedans?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. They could pay for them.
MR. PASSMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. ^^
The chairman of the subcommittee may have satisfied himself
that some point had been made concerning possible waste of grant aid
appropriations, but this line of questioning aroused Congressman Conte,
who, it seems, had noticed that Admiral Heinz might be vulnerable
about item justification.
MR. CONTE. In regard to these automobiles, how many
automobiles have we given to the Iranian Government?
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ADMIRAL HEINZ. Are you talking about all vehicles?
MR. CONTE. All right, let's discuss the question
of all vehicles. Give us a breakdown. I thought
they were just sedans. But it seems there are
more than sedans.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I will have to supply that for the
record, since I do not have the total cost for vehicles
broken out.
(The information follows:)
Under the grant aid Military Assistance Program,
the total cost for the 20, 888 vehicles, all types,
deUvered to Iran as of 30 June 1966 is $78, 051, 000.
MR. CONTE. These are all trucks given to the Iranians?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Deliveries under the grant-aid program.
MR. PASSMAN. /Interjecting/ Did we have our factory
representatives in Iran working these things out for them
-- helping them establish a need and the quantity?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. This is done by the MAAG.
MR. PASSMAN. This is a beautiful picture. It looks
as if somebody got a lot of business. -''*
Having found the witness to be cooperative despite the direction
of the questioning, Mr. Conte pressed on with reference to other line
items -- among them, shotguns.
MR. CONTE. I notice that during that period of time.
Admiral, /assumed to be 1954-196_77, we have given
them 24 shotguns. This year, Mr. Chairman, we have
two shotguns in the program. Is that for some general
54/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis
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out there going on a safari?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. No, sir.
MR. CONTE. Why two shotguns?
I
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. These are for riot control purposes.
If you will recaii, we support the gendarmerie which
has internal security as its mission. Some of them
are equipped with shotguns. These are all short-
barreled riot guns.
MR. CONTE. Admiral, I can visualize that and understand
it, but what are two shotguns going to do to put down a riot?
It looks like some person wants a shotgun. What are those
guns?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I do not have the gage.
MR. CONTE. Let's get it for the record. I want
the trade name and the caiiiber.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. If we could find it.
MR. CONTE. Why can't we find it? We are paying
for it. ... This is utterly fantastic. They must
have some clay pigeons down there and are doing a
tittle practicing. . . . We delivered 16, 000 rounds
of ammunition for those shotguns, and they are
asking for 5, 000 shotgun shells in this budget.
That is 21,000 rounds of shotgun shells for 20
shotguns ./3ic. there were 257. That covers a lot
of ciay pigeons. Their shoulders must be black
and blue.
MR. PASSMAN, /lnterjecting_/ We will admit diversion
is one of the healthiest things in the world. So we won't
become bored, let's sidetrack a bit: What is some of
the game they have out there? They have quail and dove,
do they not?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I do not admit that there was any
diversion /Italics supplied/.
MR. PASSMAN. I didn't ask you to admit it. I asked
you, or do any of your supporting witnesses know, what

241
kind of game they have? Is it quail or partridges?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I do not know, nor do I admit that
any of this was used for that.
MR. CONTE. They are not shooting each other. I
haven't heard of any riots out there where they would
be using shotguns. What else do you use them for?
ADMIRAL. HEINZ. It is also used for training. I have
used a shotgun and our people use shotguns for target
practice.
MR. CONTE. Tell me how you use it in training: with
Clay pigeons?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Yes, clay pigeons.
MR.. PASSMAN. That is good enough.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. This is not diversion, I say this is
training, /italics supplied_^/
MR. CONTE. They must have a nice little gun club
out there.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. They may have, but none of this goes
to gun clubs.
MR. PASSMAN. You would not mind our checking?
_/ltalics suppiiedrT
ADMIRAL HEINZ. No.
MR. PASSMAN. If we find out there is good hunting
out there --
ADMIRAL HEINZ, If they go hunting they buy their own
eimmunition for that.
MR. PASSMAN. You do not know if they had any other
shotguns?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I presume they had other shotguns. . .
Any force of this size, particularly the gendarmery,




MR. PASSMAN. There would not be any objection to the
MAAG officers using these shotguns if they wanted to,
would there ?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Yes, there would be. These are for the
Iranian forces.
MR. PASSMAN. How much money are you requesting
for these two guns this year, Admiral?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. I will not be able to give you this
information until they are delivered.
MR. PASSMAN. But you should know how much funds
you are requesting for these two shotguns.
MR. RIEGLE. /Congressman Donald W. Riegle (R -
Mich. )/ Have you found out if there are any duck calls or
decoys or anything like that in here, too?
MR. PASSMAN. Not yet . /Italics suppliedT/ . . .
MR. CONTE. You will have to agree with me. Admiral,
that a shotgun is a good weapon to use in riot control in
any country in the world.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Yes.
MR. CONTE. How does it happen you have only two
shotguns in your entire military equipment program
last year, and those two were for Iran? Why didn't
these other countries who have problems even greater
thcin those in Iran, ask for shotguns and get them?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. We support the Iranian Gendarmerie,
it is one of the few internal security forces that MAP
does support. We have had advisers to the gendarnaery
since 1947. I can determine the basis for programing
these particular shotguns. I will find out.
MR. RIEGLE. The thing that is amazing to me is this:
let's say there are other shotguns in their arsenal that
they have gotten somewhere else. They have purchased
them; someone has given them to Iran; or they have been
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there for years or what have you. If that is the case,
I can't see what possible good our two would be. It
is such a ridiculously small number.
MR, PASSMAN. Let the record show that the two guns
allocated to Iran for fiscal year 1967 were 12 gage,
a very- popular hunting gun.
ADMIRAL HEINZ. They were not provided for hunting,
but for riot control. /Italics supplied^/
MR. PASSMAN. Let the record show the admiral is
assuming they are not used for hunting, but he has
that right, /italics supplied^/
(The following information was subsequently provided:)
The United States has provided 24 twelve gauge riot
control shotguns to Iran under the Military Assistance
Program. Two more riot control guns have been proposed
for inclusion in the FY 1968 program. These 26 will be
the only riot control shotguns in the inventory of the
Imperial Iranian armed forces and the Imperial Iranian
Gendarmerie. Iran has not purchased shotguns from other
sources . MAP- supplied ammunition has been used only in
MAP-provided weapons, and has been provided for training
and necessary stockage. Necessary quantities of ammuni-
tion have been provided over the past 13 years for riot
control training. Training procedures for riot control
personnel require the expenditure of ammunition for train-
ing purposes for each guard annually.
The shotguns we have provided under the Iran military
assistance program have been Riot Type, 12-Gauge, 20-
inch Barrel, Stevens and Winchester models, /italics
supplied^ ^~'
It would not be fair to assume that the congressmen hoped to dis-
credit a budget request of $596 million on the strength of two shotguns,
or some sedans -- rather, it is likely that they simply wanted to signal
55/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
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the administration that they would no longer accept the Military Assis-
tance Program at its face value, that they were aware that it contained
imperfections, and that, if they chose, they could exploit those imper-
fections to the embarrassment of the executive branch.
Military Assistance to North Africa
There were two points which Chairman Passman wished to
explore with Vice Admiral Heinz before he would allow the Director
of Military Assistance to withdraw. The first was the dilemma of
economic and military assistance to North African countries -- the
same problem which Secretary McNamara had explained away in terms
of filling vacuums.
MR. PASSMAN. If you ever get to where you understand
this puzzle, muddle, or mulligan stew, you let me in on
it so I will understand it also. We are giving military
assistance to Morocco and Tunisia -- and we have given
Algeria since the inception of the program, $179,400,000, .
We have an economic aid prograna going on now in Algeria.
It is pretty hard to reconcile where and why you are pouring
in this amount of naoney to various countries, . . . They buy
military equipment from Russia but we have an economic
aid program for Algeria, do we not?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. We do. A very minor self-help
program.
MRS. HANSEN. /Congresswoman Julia B. Hansen (D -
Wash. )/. If Algeria were to take the money with which
she is buying military equipment from Soviet Russia and
put it into her economy, she would not have to have so
much aid?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. On the face of it, that is correct,
however, there may be other considerations.
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MRS. HANSEN. Why on earth don't we say that?
ADMIRAL, HEINZ. Since I am not responsible for the
economic assistance program, I can't discuss those
considerations, /italics supplie d. /
I
MR. PASSMAN. It is just as confusing as it can be.
Sound logic and common sense cannot explain this pro-
gram. It must take something else. I do not know
what it is, but you are fattening them up with econ-
omic assistance which releases their foreign exchange
to parchase arms from Russia to fight other nations,
that "we are giving military equipment to. It is as
confu-sing as mischief. I believe we need to have the
AID and military people together in this room to try
to explain this program.
I am airaid that there is a wall down the middle
of the street and neither you nor AID can see through
it. /Italics supplied^/ ^t)
High level coordination had been repeatedly stressed by officials
of the administration as a pillar of the Military Assistance Program.
Decisions, such as certain of those on arms sales, were supposed to
have been readied only after cautious review by the Senior Interdepart-
mental Group (A^-hich was chaired by the Under Secretary of State), by
Cabinet members, or even by the President. Now, the Director of
Military Assistance found himself unable to discuss the considerations
underlying an econoraic assistance program which obviously seemed to
be functioning at cross-purpose with his own. Was it possible that the
Director of Military Assistance and the Administrator of the Agency for
International Development (the two of whom were responsible for
56/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
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managing their respective portions of foreign assistance) did not con-
sult with each other on country programs. This would have been the
proper time to make a strong case that they did, in fact, consult and
that the North African dilemma, despite appearances, could really by
resolved along logical lines. Vice Admiral Heinz either could not,
or would not make such a case --he made no response to Congress-
man Passmaji's analogy about a wall obscuring the goals of one agency
from another. If the admiral remained silent simply because he felt
some jurisdictional inhibition about discussing another agency's pro-
gram, then events would show that he had done a disservice to both
programs. The Passman subcommittee would leave the hearing certain
that, at least in North Africa, the two arms of foreign assistance were
wasting effort struggling with each other.
Military Assistance Training
The last point which Congressman Passman wished to make
concerned the exposure of representatives of underdeveloped countries
to modern military equipment.
MR, PASSMAN. I notice you are budgeting . . . for the
orientation and training for distinguished personnel
in the military forces of the emerging African nations.
. . . These would be the top echelon military people ?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. Yes, sir.
MR. PASSMAN. That is what I thought. I want to repeat
some rural logic. When you talk about going fishing,
you want to go fishing. When you talk about going hunting.
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you want to go hunting. When you start taiking about a
vacation, you start planning a trip. I think you ought
to spend this money for something else. Remember:
From iittie acorns big trees grow. . . . Aren't you
frightened to start this new program of bringing
these people from Africa to the United States and
exposing them to ail the modern weapons around our
military bases in this country? Do you not think
they will go back with their appetite all whetted up
for these sophisticated weapons?
ADMIRAL HEINZ. No, sir; I do not.
MR. PASSMAN. If you actually feel that way, God
bless you. It is as sure to lead us into trouble as
can be. I say, leave them home. 57
With this advice. Congressman Passman completed the substan-
tive portion of his subcommittee's hearings on the proposed budget
for military assistance --it would be seven months before his report
would be brought before the Congress. The amendments recommended
by that report would indicate the impressions made upon the subcom-
mittee members by the Secretary of Defense ajid his subordinates, Mr.
Kuss and Vice Admiral Heinz, in their defense of the Military Assis-
tance Program. Where they had failed to appreciate the seriousness
of congressional interest; where they had misread the mood of their
congressional audience; where they had stated their case ineffectually,
or not at all, they w^ouid discover that they had lost the cause of a
strong Military Assistance Program and had possibly forfeited some
executive hegemony in the making of foreign policy.
57/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance ajid Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, pp. 726-729-
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HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
On the same day, April 4, 1967, that Secretary McNamara
appeared before Congressman Passman's subcommittee, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs began its review of the draft Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967. The bill under consideration (H. R. 7099)
would provide authorization for the annual amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan (D - Penn. ) approached the annual
addressal of foreign economic and military assistance in much less
combative fashion thaji did Congressmaji Passman. If, in fact, the
mood of the Congress was darkening in regard to the administration's
conduct of foreign policy, much change would be hardly perceptible
in the reception accorded witnesses by Chairman Morgan and his
committee members.
The review of proposed amendments to the Military Assistance
Program was, each year, accomplished by the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee with a certain degree of pomp and circumstance. The Secretary of
Defense, Robert S. McNamara, when he made his appearance to testify,
was accompanied by the Chairmaji of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Earle G. Wheeler, U. S. Army, and these gentlemen were more enter-
tained than interrogated. ^° Vice Admiral L. C. Heinz, the Director
58/ Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler appeared on two
separate occasions before this committee during the course of its hearings
in order to provide ail of its members an opportunity to pose questions.
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of Military Assistance, appeared on five separate occasions -- and
he was not once harassed about shotguns or sedans. Each of the
Unified Commanders appeared, flown in from their own particular
fiefs to testify on the merits of the Military Assistance Program.
Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific; General
T. J. Conway, Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, South Asia;
General R. W. Porter, Jr. , Commander in Chief, Southern Command
^/Latin America^/; amd, finally, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe and Commander in Chief, European
Commajid, each testified for a full day on the application of the program
to their respective areas of responsibility. If the hearings conducted
by the Foreign Affairs Committee lacked poiimic heat, they were
sufficiently star-studded to raake up the loss.
It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Henry Kass nor his immediate
superior Mr. McNaughton were asked to testify^. If any of the commit-
tee members were aware of Dr. Kader's staff study or were seriously
concerned with the problem of arms sales, the record of hearings
shows no evidence of such interest -- no witness was bedeviled on
this issue. It is curious that the staff study which, according to Dr.
Bader, "was given no special distribution, " made no discernible
impact on any of the 36 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee --
the House counterparts of the Foreign Relations Committee members
-- whereas Congressman Conte, member of the relatively remote
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the
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House Committee on Appropriations, was already, on this date, fuiiy
armed with the document. Queried as to whether Mr. Conte, whose
euatipathy towards the conduct of the Military Assistance Program was
generally known, was deliberately fuzed. Dr. Bader replied that
"there was remarkably little communication between the relevant
staffs" and that he, Bader, "was not aware of the Conte-Long
amendment" (which was later devised to restrain the Military Assis-
tance Program). "
Testimony of the Secretary of Defense
Secretary McNamara began his testimony before the Foreign
Affairs Committee on April 11, 1967, with essentially the same pre-
pared statement which he had presented to the Passman subcommittee.
Chairman Morgan had only one problem with the entire program as the
Secretary of Defense proposed it - - he was concerned about the recom-
mended transfers from the military assistance budget to the defense
budget (Laos, Thailand, NATO Infrastructure, and International
Military Headquarters).
CHAIRMAN MORGAN. I have heard through the executive
grapevine that there is going to be an attempt to switch
all military assistance to the Department of Defense budget.
You have already made substantial progress in this direc-
tion.
Have you any comment, Mr. Secretary? Will we
come here some morning and find that all nailitary
59/ Bader letter dated November Znd, 1971, pp. 1-2.
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assistance has become part of the DOD budget?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I know of no
such plan. As you know better then I, this is nothing
that the administration could do uniiateraiiy. This is
a matter for the Congress to decide --to decide it both
in its assignment to committees of responsibilities for
reviewing the program asid to decide it in the form of
the legislation in which it provides funds for the program.
In ajiy case, I know of no plan on the pa.rt of the
administration; and I v^ould not recommertd any such
action to transfer what is properly military assistance
from a separate budget into the regular defense budget. .
CHAIRMAN MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, tlaere is a
further rumor from the executive that youi are tired
of appearing before so many committees Here on
Capitol Hill and that if you could get all the MAP
funds in the defense budget you would have to appear
only before the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees. Is there any truth in that?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I don't believe there is
ciny truth in that. In the first place, as I say, we
have no intention of recommending that the Military
Assistance Program be transferred into tiie regular
defense budget. Secondly, even if it were, my
appearances before committees would not be reduced
for t"wo reasons: one, the defense commictees would
certainly want to spend as much time on tfce subject
as your committees do; and two, the Foreign Affairs
and Foreign Relations Committees will continue to
have an interest in defense regardless of -avhere the
budget is lodged. I am sure you would wa.nt me to
appear before you, and I would be delighted to do so.
_/ltaiics supplied^ ^^
Whether or not, for one reason or another-, the Secretary of
Defense might have been interested in a wholesale shift of military
60/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
I
tance Act of 1967, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
90th Congress, 1st session, (Washington: US Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 122-123.
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assistance to the defense budget, the two reasons he cited as evidence
that no such shift was planned were not really sound. With a defense
budget of approximately $71 billion to consider it was highly unlikely
that the "defense committees" (House and Senate Armed Services
and the appropriate subcommittees of the House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees) would be willing or able to spend the sajne
ajnount of time on a military assistance budget of $596 million as did
the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees (or Congress-
man Passman's appropriations subcommittee). Secondly, as Secretary
McNamara must certainly have known, it is one thing to "have an
interest in defense" and it is quite another to have committee respon-
sibility for a bill. The initiative in questioning witnesses, in making
amendments, and in bringing a bill to the floor of the Congress for a
vote resides with the cognizant committee. A committee that relin-
quishes jurisdiction loses some of its power and becomes a "looker-
on. " The difficulty of affecting a piece of legislation outside of normal
committee prerogatives would be demonstrated later in the year by
Congressman Conte.
Reduction in Military Assistance
Contrasted with the questions put to Secretary McNamara and his
subordinates by the Passman subcommittee (and those raised by the Gore
and Symington subcommittees) there were few inquiries by members of
the Foreign Affairs Committee which could be described as hostile or
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even unsympathetic. An example of one of the more difficult questions
phrased by these apparently friendly congressmen is the following:
MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. /Congressman Peter H. B.
Frelinghuysen, (R - N. J. )/ . . . you created an indelible
impression on me a couple of years ago when you came
here ajid argued for a minimum of a billion dollars in
nnilitary aid. You said that you would have been asking
for more except for the fact that Congress had made it
crystal clear they were not going to give more. You
added insult to injury at that time by saying that the
billion dollars that had been made available the previous
year v/as not enough to protect the national security. I
think you used the words "jeopardized national security. "
Now you seem to be taking pride in the fact that there
is a reduction of over 50 percent in the amount of military
aid which you are now requesting as compared to the
amount available only 6 years ago. ... It is an about
face >A/hich astonishes me, to tell you the truth.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, it is
a great temptation to rise to that bait. I think I will
not. Other than to say --
MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. I believe it is safer to yield
to temptation in a case like this, Mr. Secretary.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. (Continuing) Other than
to say that at the same time when we were arguing very
vehemently 3 or 4 years ago -- I think it was fiscal
1963 -- that the military assistance program had been
seriously and adversely affected by the cuts of the
Congress, I was telling you then . . . that I felt we
could reduce the military aid program to about a
bilUon dollars by 1968 or 1969. I felt that way
then; and, in effect, we have done so if you exclude
the combat impact on Vietnam. But I repeat today
what I said 3 or 4 years ago, that we were very
seriously and adversely affected by the cuts at that
time, but I won't resurrect the past to reargue it
today. ^^
61/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis
tance "Act of 1967, p. 134.
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It had, of course, been common knowledge for some time that
Secretary McNamara had, after considerable struggle, finally succeed-
ed in iraposing his will on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In matters such
as the military assistance budget the advice and recommendations of
the Service Chiefs and of the Unified Commanders in the field was
routinely subordinated to that of the Secretary's staff for Systems
Analysis and International Security Affairs. Mr. Frelinghuysen now
took advantage of the simultaneous appearance of both the Secretary
and General Wheeler to probe slightly into their relationship.
MR. FRELINGHUYSEN General Wheeler has
surprised me for being as mild as milk in accepting
amd going along with this figure /the $596 nniliion pro-
posed for MAP/ which he describes simply as an
absolute minimum and a bare minimunn., adding that
a reduction below the current levels would not be
justified.
General Wheeler, you referred in your statement
/given immediately after Secretary McNamara' s and
echoing the Secretary's statement/ ... to the fact that
the impact of continuing hostilities in Vietnam affects
the probable availability of military assistance funds.
Is this the reason why more funds were not requested?
I would think the amounts involved would be relatively
small and that if they were of sufficient importance you
should not assume in the executive branch that Congress
wouldn't respond to additional requests.
In other words, the pressure of Vietnam on the budget
is of course inescapable, but that still doesn't avoid
the necessity for you worrying about such matters as
obsolescence of forces to which v/e have contributed sub-
stantially in the past, and their continuing importance
to our own security, does it? "^
62/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentatives, Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967, p. 134.
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If Secretary McNamara had risen to Mr. Frelinghuysen's bait
only with reluctance, it was now for General Wheeler to follow suit -
and he chose to respond in soldierly fashion.
GENERAL WHEELER. In dealing with the Military Assis-
tance Program, Mr. Frelinghuysen, we do so in conjunction
with the other elements of the Government. I pointed out
on page 1 of my statement that the program has been dras-
tically cut in recent years, and this reduction is a matter
of serious concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On. the final page, as you say, I was quite mild in say-
ing this v/as the bare minimum of military aid that was re-
quired to further our national interest and the security of
the free world. I think that is a true statement. I could
use more colorful adjectives, I assure you. This matter
has been discussed at gre at length within the Department
of Defense, It has been discussed with the Department
of State
.
Th e se were the de cisions that were made. I
believe it is a true statenaent I have expressed here,
_/ltaIics supplied._/o3
Despite his careful choice of words, some hint of the General's
dissatisfaction with the budget request which had emerged from the
Department of Defenses' s decision making apparatus came through.
Nowhere else in all the testimony relevant to the Military Assistance
Program in 1967 was there a glimpse of the dichotomy which existed
between the military and civilian views within the Department of Defense
of just how much military assistance was enough. The recommendations
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff make annually to the Secretary of Defense
in this regard are never made public. It is for the Secretary to
63/ U» S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967, pp. 134-135.
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compromise between their military advice and the political liabilities
of large budget reqaests. It is also for the Secretary to anticipate the
response of the Congress and to mobilize the appropriate elements of
the executive branch accordingly. Where that anticipation is faulty, or
the mobilization ineffective or belated, it is the Secretary who is
derelict. Whether or not the Service Chiefs enjoy their insulation
from these responsibilities is irrelevant -- it is a fringe benefit of
civilian control.
Alternatives to Military Assistance
Congressman Armistead I. Selden (D - Ala. ), while not critical
of the Military Assistance Program, himself, was aware that other
nnembers of the Congress were and he was curious about alternatives.
MR. SELDEN. Mr. Secretary, if the views of those
who oppose this legislation were to prevail, and this
program were to be eliminated, would it then be neces-
sary to add additional funds to the military ^defense/
budget, and if so, how much?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I think that would be one
alternative we should consider. In certain areas of the
world, it would be one we could undertake. In other cases,
I think it would be impossible by any reasonable amount
of expenditure to so strengthen our forces as to offset the
failure to support other forces in the free world through
the military aid program.
The result would be that we would either be forced to
change our political commitments, or suffer substantial
military risk because we were facing the potential threat
of aggression and fulfillnnent of commitments without
adequate means to meet them.
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MR. SEL.DEN. Would you also say, however, that the
costwouidbe considerably more ?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Yes. Very, very roughly it
costs 5 to 10 times as much to support an American soldier
as it does a soldier of one of the free world nations in the
Middle East, Asia, or the Far East.
MR. SELDEN. Then you would not consider a vote to
eliminate this program an economy vote?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Quite the contrary. Even
in the cases where we could substitute U.S. forces for
foreign forces, the cost would far exceed the small
amount we are asking for in this prograxn. "
Arms sales Decision Making
Practically all of the questions asked of Secretary McNamara and
General Wheeler were in the same vein as Congressman Selden's --
none really critical, some, in fact almost patronizing, and most
phrased in such a way that the witnesses could insert in their responses
as much official rationale in support of their program as they desired.
The following is an example of the general tone of the hearing, ctnd,
aptly enough, touches on the controversial issue of arms sales.
MR. O'HARA /Congressman O'Hara (D - 111.]? You state
on page 23 of your presentation that our military sales are
made either by the policy established by the State Depart-
ment or after careful and thorough review within the U. S.
Government, which you say is conducted at very high levels
of government. What do you mean by that?
64/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967, p. 136.
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SECRETARY McNAMARA. Quite frankly, the Secretary
of State and I personally review the major military sales
even though they appear to conform to policy, and any
sales that api>€ar not to conform to policy. We review
thena all. /italics supplied^
MR. O'HARA. Briefly, couldn't we say that when the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State get to-
gether and come to an understanding that is the final
deteinnination ?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Yes; contrary to what one
sometimes reads in the press, these military sales are
not carried out without consultation with the State Depart-
ment; and they are not carried out without the consideration
of all the interests of the Government. They are not de-
signed therefore, to advance some parochial interest of the
Defense Department or some limited interest of a defense
contractor. ^Italics supplied^/
MR, O'HARA. Mr. Secretary, I think that is a good
thing for us to know. You are known as an intelligent,
hard-driving ctnd dedicated Cabinet member. The
Secretary of State is known as an intelligent, hard-
driving, dedicated public official, a member of the
Cabinet. Neither of you is a "yes" man and you and
Secretary Rusk do not always view things in the same
way. Then you talk it out and reach a decision, I would
say the decision is apt to be a wise decision and good
for our country. Thank you.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Thank you indeed, sir.^^
If any of the committee members were aware of the correspon-
dence which Senator Gore had received from the various heads of
agencies (found at Appendix I ) indicating that, in the case of some
65/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967
, pp. 139-140. Contrast this with Congressman
Passman's handling of the Secretary of Defense.
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important sales, neither the Senior Interdepartmental Group nor even
the State Defense Coordinating Committee had participated in decision
naaking (rendering it at least open to question whether the Secretaries
of State and Defense had participated), none rose to challenge Secretary
McNamara's claim that he had reviewed all "major military sales. "
In any case, the definition of what might constitute a "major" sale
could have been a factor in this policy of personal review.
Parochial Interests in Arms Sales
It may be of interest to discuss here what might constitute a
"parochial interest of the Defense Department. " The unit cost of
large cuid expensive engines of war such as supersonic fighters or
dual-capable (fighter-bomber) high performance aircraft, or warships,
or modern tanks has significant impact on the numbers which can be
purchased with any reasonable defense budget. It was manifestly to
the advantage of the Armed Services and, therefore, to the Defense
Department, to reduce this unit cost wherever possible. The economy
of scale of production would dictate that as production lines lengthened,
unit cost would be reduced. If American allies could be induced to
purchase certain numbers of certain weapons those production lines
would be lengthened sufficiently to allow the American Armed Services
to buy the same weapons at less cost. The highly controversial sale of
the F-111 "ail purpose" jet aircraft to Britain and Australia during
this period provides an excellent example of this particular mechanism
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at work. At least in this case, there was ample evidence of personal
66
review by both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
While it was unlikely that the shrinking military assistance
budget for grant aid could contribute much to furthering this kind of
parochial interest (particularly since most of it would be spent simply
for the operating costs of the large foreign forces which it supported),
the Foreign Military Sales Program was focused largely on customer
investment in new equipment. As that program expanded (and grant
aid correspondingly contracted), more and more opportunities would
arise to sponsor sales which would have the effect of reducing Defense
Department purchasing costs. This mechanism was made particularly
attractive by the lenient policies governing sales financing -- employing
the mechanism would be a temptation increasingly difficult to resist.
Congressinan Gross' Budget Concerns
The closest that Secretary McNamara would come to a confronta-
tion with any member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was the
following exchange with Congressman H. R. Gross (R - Iowa).
MR. GROSS. Nowhere in your statement did I notice any
recognition of the fact that this Government is borrowing
66/ In 1966, the U.S. promised to "offset" the $1 billion cost of
50 F-TTl's which Britain agreed to buy through the purchase of $725
million of British "defense articles. " This "offset" was raised to
$825 million in January 1968, when Britain threatened to cancel the
order -- indicating U.S. Defense Department interest in stimulating
a longer production line. See: The New York Times , February 20,
23, 1966, and January 2, 17, 1968.
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billions of dollars, that the budget is not in balance
and we are borrowing billions of dollars to support the
war in Vietnam as well as foreign aid. You are concerned,
are you not, by the financial situation of this Government,
the existing debt and the piling up of this debt day by day
ajid hour by hour?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Gross, I did point out
that the Military Assistance Program is 50 percent less
than it was 6 years ago. I think that expresses rny desire
to eliminate prograins that don't advance our national
interest.
MR. GROSS. I am talking about the tota.1.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I am aware of that, I am point-
ing out that you approach the total through individual actions.
I think my actions will indicate that I am as concerned, or
more concerned than anybody in this room, with avoiding
wasteful expenditures hr the Federal Government.
Having said that, I think I have a difference of opinion
with you as to the ability of our Nation to finance national
needs. The fact that the defense budget, large as it is for
fiscal 1968 ... is still only 9 percent of our gross national
product, which is essentially at the sanae level /proportion/
as it was in 1961. ...
MR. GROSS. I hope the day will come, Mr. Secretary,
when you deal in a net national income rather than a
gross national product. I doubt the Ford Motor Co. oper-
ates on a gross national product basis, . . .
SECRETARY McNAMARA. . . . There is no question but that
our Nation is affluent. It is prosperous. It is a disgrace
that we sit here in this Nation's Capitol 2 miles away from
children who don't have books because ovxr Congress won't
appropriate funds. That is my belief as Secretary of Defense,
-- and there isn't -- may I finish, I allo-wed you to finish --
may I finish --
MR. GROSS. Go right ahead.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I don't know anything more this
Congress can do to strengthen our Nation., to advance our
national security, than to take the money out of the defense
budget and spend it in meeting the ills of our Nation, if you
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won't appropriate more. I think you can appropriate more,
/Italics supplied^
MR. GROSS. That is the trouble, Mr. Secretary, I have
had poorly instructed high school students say to me that
is doesn't make any difference how much debt we have be-
cause we owe it to ourselves. I am surprised that a Secret-
ary of Defense would come before this committee and say
approximately the ssume thing. I am very much surprised
to hear you say it. Suppose you tell me how you propose
to retire the $336 billion worth of debt we have today?
Is it inconsequential?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Mr. Gross, I don't propose
to retire it.
MR. GROSS. I am sure you don't.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I don't believe that the Congress
proposes to retire it. I hope the Congress has advanced
beyond the stage where it believes it is necessary to
retire it. ^^ /italics supplied^
There were occasions, apparently, when the Secretary of Defense
would "rise to the bait, " Although Secretary McNamara seemed to
have chosen to defend the much larger defense budget, rather than to
limit his remarks to the military assistance budget at hand, this
example illustrates both his socio-economic philosophy and his temper.
He might have been better advised to have selected another forum for
his slur on the Congress and his impromptu lecture on econonnics.
It is parenthetically noteworthy that, unlike their Senate colleagues,
members of the House of Representatives could serve only on one
67/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign As sis-




coininittee at a time. An adversary, therefore, had only to be en-
countered once each year. Should Congressman Passman or Congress-
man Conte have been on the Foreign Affairs Connmittee, Congressman
Gross would have had sufficient allies to seriously harass the Secretary
of Defense. As it was, the flurry raised by the latter was short-lived
and Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler were allowed to with-
draw after answering several polite questions about technical aspects
of the action in Vietnam and the posture of NATO.
Neither the Director of Military Assistance, Vice Admiral Heinz,
nor ciny of the Unified Commanders, whose appearances followed that
of the Secretary, were subjected to any serious criticisra or strenuous
questioning. Each, in turn, presented an overview of his functional
concerns in administering his own portion of the Military Assistance
Program. None of their statements conflicted with the positions taken
by their higher civilian authority and the members of the Foreign
Affairs Committee made no attempt to probe for differences in view
point between the senior military officers and the civilian authorities
whom they served.
All in all, the hearings conducted by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee were the most cordial and least provoking of any on the
subject of the Military Assistance program that w^ould take place through-
out the year.
If any of the nnembers of that committee were aware of the
challenges to the program that had been raised by Dr. Bader they
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chose not to echo them. In contrast with his counterpart in the
Senate (Senator Fulbright), Chairman Morgan was not at odds with the
administration's policy in Vietnam and, therefore, limited his ques-
tions on that subject to simple requests for information; his committee
members, seemingly of the same mind, followed suit. Only Congress-
man Gross, whose primary concerns were the budget and the national
debt, made cuiy effort to cross swords with the Secretary of Defense
and, apparently, he was neither tenacious enough (as was Congress-
meUi Passman) or well enough informed (as was Congressman Conte)
to make that official uncomfortable.
The testimony of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, before this
committee, in support of the economic assistance portion of the
Foreign Assistance Act was even less eventful. His appearance .
occurred on May 4, 1967, a month before theArab-Israeii hostilities
which would re-double interest in the Military Assistance Program
and focus attention on the State Department's relationship with the
program.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
The chairman of the Senate Coinmittee on Foreign Relations,
Senator J. W. Fulbright, (D- Ark.), waited until his colleagues, Senator
Gore and Senator Symington, had essentially completed their subcom-
mittee hearings (the latter stili lacked the testimony of one witness,
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Mr. Kitchen of the State Department) before scheduling hearings
before the full Foreign Relations Committee on the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967. I
Chairman Fulbright's concern with administration policies vis-
a-vis Vietncum had been demonstrated the previous year through wide
press and television coverage of exhaustive public hearings. He had,
at that time, utilized congressional review of foreign assistance as a
vehicle for his interrogation of administration officials about the war.
Now his schedule was interrupted by the June Arab - Israeli War and he
was not able to begin until June 12, 1967. Even so, the senior officials
of the State and Defense Departments were unable to attend and the
committee had to content itself with witnesses whose interests were
really only peripheral to the major issues inherent in the proposed
legislation (i.e.
,
the Friends Committee on National Legislation,
UNICEF, the National Farmers Union, and the National Council of
Churches).
Testimony of the Secretary of State
It was not until July 14, 1967 that the first administration witness.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was available to meet with the committee.
The committee members, however, had not been idle during the several
weeks they had had to wait for the executive branch to tidy up the Middle
East in the war's aftermath. Chairman Fulbright and his associates had
been at work on the draft Foreign Assistance Act despite the absence of
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important witnesses and he alerted Secretary Rask accordingly.
THE CHAIRMAN. We are somewhat behind last year's
schedule in the consideration of the foreign aid bill
because of the difficulties encountered in obtaining
testimony from the executive branch witnesses.
The committee has proceeded v/ith the making of
tentative decisions on some aspects of the bill. These
decisions, as I said, are tentative and subject to
review in light of the testimony which v/e receive
today. ^/Italics supplied^ 08
Secretary Rusk and the other senior officials of the administration
would be ignorant for some time as to the decisions already made by the
committee; just how "tentative" they were or how "subject to review"
would not be disclosed for several months. The Secretary of State (and,
others, including the Secretary of Defense) would certainly have been
dismayed had they known that their testimony before this key commit-
tee would have no positive impact -- nor would it change decisions
already made during the spring by Senator Fulbright and his committee
naembers.
Perhaps unaware that he was facing legislators whose minds were
already focused on drastic cuts in his foreign assistance program.
Secretary Rusk delivered his seventh formal presentation on that sub-
ject in much the same way that a tour conductor might point out sights
seen for the hundredth tinae. His support for the military assistance
68/ U. So Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress,




portion of the foreign aid bill was typical of the almost passionless
tone of his whole presentation.
For two decades now we have supported the ability
of free nations adjacent to the Soviet Union or Connma-
nist China to defend against external military threats.
This free \vorid strength has been indispensable in
keeping the peace. Over three-quarters of this year's
program is needed to continue our investment in this
proven form of insurance. . . .
The second major foreign policy function of the
program is to help selected developing nations protect
themselves against internal violence, and thereby
provide the stability that is essential to development. . . .
Our programs for our own western hemisphere, as it
continues its struggle against Castro-exported insurgency
and terrorism, and as it seeks to move more quickly
toward human progress, reflect our efforts to meet
these pressures throughout the world.
Through these programs we support not only free-
dom and progress but also try to foster political
stability within the various regions of the world. This
program is tailored to help discourage arms races
and to try to stabilize regional arnas balances, and to
keep the military expenditures of ourselves and of our
friends to the minimum necessary. . . .
Quite frankly, we have been disappointed that more
progress has not been made in this direction. We are
intensely interested, at this moment, in the arms race
in the Middle East. President Johnson has pressed
very hard both publicly and privately for understandings
among arms suppliers and arms recipients for prudence
in the levels of arms which have created so much tension
in that area. We shall continue to work on this, both
in the United Nations and in our bilateral contacts with
the governments concerned. /Italics supplied. / "°
This statement, it must be recalled, was given to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on July 14, 1967. The Arab - Israeli




war had erupted nearly six weeks before and the unsuccessful Arab
clients of the Soviet Union were desperately seeking to re-equip their.
armed forces. It would prove an ironic commentary on the adminis-
tration's "intense interest" in arms control that the United States
would, by default of the other Western countries, shortly become the
principal supplier of weapons to Israel, and, therefore, a principal
contributor to the Middle East arms race. By flagging the adminis-
tration's thus far inconsequential diplomatic efforts -- "in the
United Nations" aind in "bilateral contacts with the governments
concerned" -- the Secretary was simply providing the committee
with an indictment of his own stewardship.
Responsibility of the Congress
Senator McCarthy was the first member of the committee to
question Secretary Rusk. The Senator was concerned about the
problem of shared responsibilities within the government.
SENATOR McCarthy. I think it important that we find
out what the Departnaent' s /the State Department/ position
is as to what voice the Congress ought to have in deciding
what countries you ought to give aid to. We ought to find
out if you have any other idea as to how we might exercise
some influence on your choice, and in what you call arbitrary
action. What is the view? How do you interpret the respon-
sibility of the Senate under the Constitution for a decision
of this kind? . . . Do you think we should just cut off money?
Is that the only power we should exercise? Or should we
have some influence on policy, and if you think v/e should
have, how do we exercise it? /Italics supplied_^/
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SECRETARY RUSK. It seems to me this is not a question
of constitutional prerogatives on the two sides, but a
question of how those prerogatives are used.
I would respectfully suggest that a mathematical limita-
tion on the number of countries /which could be provided
military or economic aid -- 40 countries, in the case of
map/ is not a determination that takes account of the
situation in the different countries to which aid is provided.
It has, in fact, little relationship to what is going on in the
rest of the world, and what the needs might be.
For example, if you want to deal with 500 million people
in India, one can do that in working with one government.
If one wants to deal with about 500 million people in
Africa and Latin America, that means 60 governments.
The needs of those half billion people in those two areas
are of great importance to us.
Then I think also. Senator, that there is a problena
about the pace of events in world affairs, and the pace of
the legislative process. They are not adways the same.
... I think the question is not how to resolve potentially
one of the many impasses that could exist under our con-
stitutional system, but what would be the wise way for
both sides to exercise constitutional authority. '^
The one man, responsible, above all others, to the President for
United States foreign policy had been asked directly and in simple terms
by a much respected member of the Congress whether he thought that
Congress should "have some influence on policy" -- ajid, if it
should, how should that influence be exercised. This could have been
the most significant dialogue of the entire congressional - executive
repertory on the subject of foreign assistance -- economic or military
--in the year of 1967. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State chose to
respond by focusing on one specific issue, the arbitrary limitation of





countries, and by rephrasing the question. Senator McCarthy had
asked for alternatives to simply cutting off money; this would have
been an appropriate time to have defuzed growing congressional
criticism of the foreign aid program by making some kind of positive
or conciliatory gesture. Secretary Rusk seemingly had nothing better
in hand than his prepared statement. The moment passed, and
another opportunity was lost.
The United States and International Security
Senator Fulbright found it difficult to reconcile the reality of
the war in Vietnam with the stated goals of economic and military
assistance.
MR. CHAIRMAN. Mr, Secretary, perhaps I do not view it
in the right perspective. But when you talk about building
a peace, while at the same moment we are waging an ever
increasing war, it leaves one with a sense of schizophrenia.
On the one hand, we are waging war, we have ever-increasing
war costs, cuid we read of casualties now of some 12, 000
deaths and 70, 000 wounded. This does not seem to fit the
picture of building the peace. I do not know whether, even
if we had the money, our minds are capable of giving real
attention to these contradictory policies at the same time
SECRETARY RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do not consider
that contradictory at all.
MR. CHAIRMAN. You don't?
SECRETARY RUSK. This Nation has entered into alliauices
with more than 40 nations for mutual security. They were
approved by the Senate on the basis that these alliances
were a stabilizing factor in the world situation, and were
organized to help keep the peace.
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I cannot imagine that the peace would be sustained
by those who are promoting the world revolution, some
by peaceful coexistence so-called, and some by militant
action, if they should discover that they could pursue
these purposes with impunity -- particularly against
those countries with whom we have made formal alliances,
I just believe we have to get a world situation in
which those who are tempted by the idea of aggression
realize there is no future in it. VltaTicssuppIiedTT^T
It would be difficult to find in the public record a more succinct
statement of the administration's philosophy of employing the United
States as a global policeman. The Vietnam controversy, however,
had, since the previous year, begun to share national attention with
certain domestic ills -- Senator Fuibright chose to shift his attention
now as well.
MR. CHAIRMAN. . . . are you not disturbed about the
deterioration of our own economic and social situation in
this country which, after ail, in the long run, is the basis
for our whole position in the world? Every day, it seems
to me,,, certainly every once or twice a week, there is a
new outbreak of violence here within our own country, and
there is great internal dissatisfaction which, I think, stems
froin the neglect of most of our domestic programs. . . . We
had three different States call out the National Guard within
one ijveek just a short time ago, which seems to me a very
ominous development.
SECRETARY RUSK. I do not minimize at all the seriousness
of those developments. I do not think they represent a deter-
ioration in objective factors, such as the standards of
living, earning capacity, and questions of that sort, so
much as a realization there is a great deal of unfinished
business in this country to which we must address our-
selves urgently. ... I think this is one of the things, for




exarapie , that adds special urgency to efforts to do some-
thing in the field of ar^ns limitation. ^2
Responsibility of the Congress '
If Senator Fulbright was having trouble juxtaposing Secretary
Rusk's positions on global peacekeeping ajid domestic "unfinished
business," his colleague, Senator Morse, was as much concerned
with the problem of policy making authority as Senator McCarthy had
been. Unlike Senator McCarthy, however, Senator Morse was not
interested in inquiring what the Secretary's views might be -- he had
very definite views of his own.
SENATOR MORSE, I think that there has developed in
this country in recent years a growing public insistence
that this Congress do a more effective job in its constitu-
tional checking.
That is what we are doing. Under our constitutional
system we have a legislative responsibility to check when-
ever we think that there is a discretion being exercised
by the executive branch of the Government that is not in
the public interest, and some of the reasons for the course
of action which ha s been taken by this committee in execu-
tive se ssion is we want to call a halt to your exercise of
what we think is arbitrary discretion that ha:E not resuIted
in the public interest. /Italics supplied. If Secretary Rusk
had been ignorant, to this point, of the way in which his pro-
gram had already been mangled by the committee, he now
at Least had a hint. /
We are seeking to recommend to the Senate that it exer-
cise the check of the purse strings for we think you have
gone too far. We think some of your requests cannot be
justified on their merits. There are honest differences of




judgement between the two branches. But that is the
constitutional system.
. , .
I want to say we are insisting on a greater exercise
of constitutional check, and I think you people ought to
welcome it with open arms ajid come in and cooperate
with us in regard to it because when you can make a case
you do not have any trouble with us, in my judgement.
We are petit jurors on the evidence. . . .
I do not know where we ever got the idea that the
President has unchecked authority in the field of
foreign policy. He just does not have it. We have a
duty to cooperate with our President in supporting his
programs when he can sell his programs within the
checking principles of the Constitution. . . .
What we have to do is be a team; what we have to
do is to find a basis where the executive branch and
the legislative branch can meet embraced on the exer-
cise of constitutional checks. . . .
I wanted to say this, Mr. Secretary, because . . .
I \would not want the public to think that some of us at
least on the Foreign Relations Committee do not disagree
with you in regard to what I think is the overall presenta-
tion you made this morning. I do not think it differs
materially from the presentation we have heard up here
for ten years, and we have had our honest differences
before. I think this bill must be cut. I think it should
be cut more. I think in the military aspects, the sales
aspects, the military goods that we are selling, subsidizing
the producers of munitions in this country and airplanes in
this country, ought to be checked, /italics supplied^ /73
Senator Morse had made clear his feelings about the Military
Assistance Program during his brief visit to Senator Symington's
subcommittee hearings; now he not only reiterated them, but he
afforded the administration, at the Cabinet level, a preview of the
action which the Congress was likely to take in regard to the program.
Another preview was provided by Senator Frank J. Lausche (D - Ohio),




SENATOR LAUSCHE. Now then, I put to you this questioa:
Would it be advisable to adopt a policy that we will not
provide economic aid to any country that is spending its
money on military equipment instead of using it for the
constructive purpose of building up the infrastructure of
the Nation?
SECRETARY RUSK. Senator, I think it would be most
unfortunate to try to draw that sort of a conclusion on a
legislative basis, because a good many of these countries
need arms and equipment --as well as economic assistance
-- if they are to carry out their own purposes and are to be
able to act in common interest with the United States. . . .
SENATOR LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, how can you control
the conduct of a country that insists on spending its money
for military equipment while it is begging for economic aid
from our country? How do you succeed in that?
SECRETARY RUSK. There are real concerns in the executive
branch, just as in the Congress, on that particular point.
What we have tried to do has been to consult with countries
about keeping their defense expenditures within manageable
limits and in proper relation to their economic and social
development needs. ^4
Situations such as Senator Lausche described /Algeria was a
prefect example/ had been brought to the attention of the Congress
three months previously -- thanks to Congressman Passmaji and the
efforts of his subcommittee in early April. If any of the members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were impressed with the
administration's solution to the problem -- consultation -- they failed
to say so.




The United States and International Security-
Senator Church, who had already voiced on the floor of the
Congress the most coherent criticism of the Military Assistance
Program evoked by congressional reaction to the June Arab - Israeli
war, now took issue with Secretary Rusk's solution to worldwide
75
aggression.
SENATOR CHURCH. I know that there are those who say
that our capacity is limitless, and that what we are doing
is really not as sizable as perhaps it should be, that we
should do more instead of less. Perhaps this is so. But
I am not convinced that we can conduct a $25 billion war
in Vietnam and then go ahead with foreign aid as usual as
though the war did not exist, that the cost did not exist.
Yet it seems to me that this is what we are doing.
I am not convinced that our resources are limitless
when I see the continuing gold drain that has drawn down
our reserves to a peril point and that at any time might
set off chaos in the international markets if a run on
the dollar should develop,
I am not convinced that our resources are limitless
when I consider the size of the deficit which the war in
Vietnam is creating this year and the news in the paper
this morning that a special war tax must be levied on the
American people to pay for it.
I am not convinced that our resources are limitless
when I see how far we are from accomplishing the goals of
the Great Society in our own country and then hear comment
about transporting ajid erecting it abroad and when I know
that the Congress will be making substantial cuts in pro-
grams that are needed by the American people in this
country for domestic programs. . , .
So I think that Congress has to take into account the
extraordinary costs of the war, the capacity of the United
75/ Senator Church's speech, "Arsenal Diplomacy; The
Failure of a policy, " is found in U.S. Congressional Record, 90th
Congress, 1st session, Vol. 113, pt. 3 (June 26, 1967), pp. 17305-
17310. Excerpts were quoted in Chapter III, footnote 75.
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States, and it has to scale oar aid program accordingly.
Mr. Secretary, nnost of the countries to which we
give aid are not the kind of countries that you des-
cribe, but are totalitarian countries, ctnd most of
the free world that we refer to in this way is not
free in our sense at all. So I just cannot accept the
argument that with aid we are somehow going to pro-
vide a peaceful means whereby countries will evolve
from their present totalitarian character into a denno-
cratic character something like our own. I do not
think history bears it out, and I do not think our
experience with the aid program bears it out..
/italics supplied._/ '"
Military Assistance to the Middle East
Although the Secretary of State had not seen fit to devote a
great deal of his opening statement to the situation in the Middle East,
the problem was very much on the mind of Senator Church -- he
watnted to know whether the Secretary could recommend some cuts in
the proposed program.
SENATOR CHURCH. Take, for example, in 1968, you
plan about $50 million in grants and sales of military
equipment to Arab countries. Now, has that been called
off? Is that a place where we can make a $50 million
cut in view of the Middle East crisis where the Arab
countries surrounded and threatened Israel with oblitera-
tion?
SECRETARY RUSK. I would think not. Senator, because
there are Arab countries and Arab countries. If we
could get agreement anniong the principal arms suppliers
as well as arms recipients to put some tangible limits
on the build-up of arms in that area, then it might be




possible for arms supplies to that area to be cut back. . . .
SENATOR CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, on the point of the
Arab countries, I think we ought to begin to change our
policy over there. For years we have justified the exten-
sion of military aid to Arab countries on the ground that
we must avoid a polarization in the Middle East. We
have distributed $335 million worth of military equip-
ment to these Arab nations.
When the time came when they had to choose up sides,
all this equipment did, it seems to me, was add to the
military capacity of the Arab countries. Jordan, for
exsunple , used American equipment in the war against
Israel. I might add, I think it takes greater omniscience
than ordinary mortals possess to engage in these balancing
acts that are supposed to somehow avoid a polarization.
The polarization will occur because these Arab countries
recognize v/e were a midwife at the birth of Israel and they
are going to associate us with Israel as long as there is
the basic, passionate, inflammatory cause of trouble in
the Near East, just as they did within the past month, and
in the end they all lined up against us: they all declared
the Soviet Union as their champion, and they used some of
the military equipment we supplied in the battle against
Israel. When they lost by virtue of the Israel brilliance on
the battlefield, they then blamed us for their defeat.
I think if we do not base our foreign policy on the
realities at the time of reckoning, all the talk about
polarization and this kind of thing is meaningless.
SECRETARY RUSK. Senator^ lann prepared to discuss it
with you on the basis of reality. I think you are setting
to one side two of the three major issues that are involved
in the Middle East in the present situation.
One of them is the longstanding problem between Israel
and the Arab State s . ...
A second . is an internal struggle within the Arab
world.
A third is the problem of whether or not this area is
going to be penetrated by any other great power, particu-
larly the Soviet Union, in a way that woiiid adversely affect
the interests of the West. ...
There are differences of view about how a stable peace in
the Middle East can be organized. I woald think that v/e had
better wrestle with conaplexity than accept the simplicity
involved in letting the Soviets be the principal arms supplier
and, thereby, possibly the dominant influence in that area.
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/Italics supplied. / ... We do not, I would suppose, want a
major polarization to occur there which would leave the
Small state of Israel surrounded in the decades ahead with
hundreds of millions of Arabs.
SENATOR CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, didn't the polarization
occur there just last month, despite our policy to avoid one?
Do you think that our giving arnns to the Arab countries was
really proved to be successful? In the light of what happened,
do you think this was a wise policy for us to have followed?
/Italics supplied. /
SECRETARY RUSK. Yes; I do, sir.
SENATOR CHURCH. You do. /itaiics suppHed/7" 77
It would seem from the testimony that the Secretary of State
placed greater weight on the employment of the Military Assistance
Program as an instrument of competition with the Soviet Union than
on any of its other functions, at least insofar as the Middle East was
concerned. Whether or not a polarization had occurred -- as Senator
Church suggested -- while the administration had been "wrestling
with complexities, " may be debated. Certainly a continuing flow of
arms, both through grant aid and sales, to Jordan, Lebanon, and
Saudi Arabia has provided those countries, among Israel's neighbors,
with some degree of resistajice to the lure of Soviet weaponry (and
Soviet influence). It is doubtful, however, whether that flow of arms
has made those neighbors more sympathetic towards Israel. Should
aunother Arab - Israeli war occur, cind Jordan again participate




(or, less iikeiy, should either or both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia choose
to take part this time), critics of the program will again argue that the
United States, having "armed both sides, " has again fueled a regional
conflict. Given the importance of the interests at stake (control of oil
resouxces, preservation of the Jewish homeland, super-power pres-
tige, etc. ) and the enormous number of variables involved, it is
difficult not to agree, with Senator Church, that balancing acts in the
Middle East require "greater omniscience than ordinary mortals
possess. " At any rate, it seems unlikely that the Secretary, whose
testimony was completed shortly after the exchange with Senator
Church, had inade any significant impact on the Foreign Relations
Committee or had said anything which might lead even some of its
members to reverse a restraining process which, apparently, was
already well underway.
Coverage by the Press
Nearly two weeks would pass before the next, and last, witness
(the Secretary of Defense) would appear to testify before the commit-
tee. During that interval the Military Assistance Program would
gain considerable attention and some notoriety. The press, thus far,
had focused only slight and irregular attention on the program. The
New York Times article of January 30, 1967 which had noted the pub-
lication of Dr. Bader's staff study, was brief, concise, and drew no
editorial conclusions. The article in the same newspaper of June 27,
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1967, which reported Senator Church's floor speech decrying "Arsenal
Diplomacy, " was also restrained. In the five months between those
two articles the press had almost completely ignored the subject of
military assistance.
On July 19, 1967 -- five days after Secretary Rusk's appear-
ance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (and two days
after the House Banking and Currency Committee held a hearing on
Export - Import Bank financing of country - X loans (discussed at
length in the following chapter))-- the press comraenced drumfire
coverage of the Military Assistance Program. This coverage, on a
daily basis, detailed for the public nearly every aspect of the existing
prograna and laid particular emphasis on the controversial issues of
credit arms sales asid U.S. contributions to regional arms races.
This intensive exposure of the program did not diminish until the
foreign assistance authorization bill had passed both houses of the
Congress (in vastly different forms) in late August, 1967, and did
not abate entirely (or almost entirely) until the final approval by both
houses of a compromise foreign assistance appropriation bill in mid-
December 1967. Pertinent examples of this newspaper commentary
will be included in this thesis.
The following articles appeared between the testimony of Secret-
ary Rusk and that of the Secretary of Defense:
- On July 19, the first of a two part series by Neil Sheehan,
entitled, . "Annaments Sales: U.S. is Principal Supplier to the World. "
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Illustrated with a picture of Mr. Samuel Cummings, president of the
International Armaments Corporation, seated at his desk and surround-
ed by a small cannon and several types of automatic weapons, this
article noted that, between mid-1949 through June 1966, the United
States had sold $16. 1 billion in weaponry and given away $30. 2 billion
in arms and military equipment -- exclusive of private sales -- making
the United States the world's leading supplier of arms. Mr. Henry Kuss
and Mr. Cummings were both identified and their respective business
volumes were compared.
Since World War II, the marriage of Government and
the armaments industry into the so-called military -
industrial complex has transformed the international
arms trade. The private arms salesman is a midget
corapared with the Government salesman. Mr. Cummings'
annual sales are, he says, well below $100 million, am
obviously substantial amount, but a pittance beside the
78Government business.
Senator McCarthy was quoted as saying, "If nothing else, the
Arab - Israeli war should convince us to re-examine our entire arms
sales cuid military assistance programs, " and Defense Department
figures were given which showed that the total of arms transfers
included, among others: 16, 630 aircraft (8, 300 of which were jet fighter-
bombers), 24 submarines, 19, 827 tanks, 26, 845 artillery pieces, and
45, 360 missiles. Miscellaneous small arms exported by the United
States totaled over 3.6 million. Various arguments in support of the
78/ The New York Times, July 19, 1967.
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Military Assistance Program (mutual defense, balance of payments,
etc. ) were mentioned, auid an inset provided biographical data on Mr.
Kuss, describing him as "a brilliant ajid aggressive salesman,
thoroughly familiar with production curves, research and development
costs, credit problems and other intricacies of the international
traffic in arms" -- and a recipient of the Meritorious Civilian Service
Medal from Secretary McNamara for " 'unparalleled ability as a
negotiator. ' '»79
- On July 20, the second part of the series, entitled, "U. S.
Arms Sales Spurred by Large Field Force and Complex Credit
System, " was illustrated by a picture of an American - built Sherman
tank, driven by Israelis, entering Jerusalem during the June war.
This article credited Mr. Kuss with developing the "offset" method
of arranging arms sales -- through which, West Germany, for example,
agreed to purchase hugh amounts of military equipment from the United
States, provided the latter would pick up the costs of training large
numbers of Germatn military personnel in America. Mr. Kuss was
also credited with encouraging other nations to do their military pro-
curement plcuining on a five-year basis. By assisting in this planning
Mr. Kuss identified potential sales and could make suitable arrange-
ments with American defense industries to secure purchase orders.
The article noted that 12, 353 servicemen and civilians were assigned
79/ The New York Times, July 19, 1967.
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to Military Assistance Advisory Groups abroad and "function to some
extent as on-the-spot salesmen." Further, according to the article,
"the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force each maintain separate central
arms-sales offices to assist and supplement Mr. Kuss' teams. " The
Defense Department's revolving credit sales fund was described as
was the participation of the Export - Import Bank in financing arms
sales. "Seventeen countries, 12 underdeveloped, were the recipients,"
noted the story, of loans for military equipment financed by the Bank.
The country - X feature also received attention. An "intangible
element" which promoted arms sales was "the exposure of tens of
thousands of officers from scores of countries to American military
doctrine and weaponry through training courses under the Military
Assistance Program. " The article concluded with the comment that
Mr. Kuss, "seems to assume implicitly that the central world arms
race between the industralized Western nations axid the Soviet Union
will continue indefinitely, with greater opportunities and challenges
Q n
for the adept arms salesman. "
- On the same date, in the same newspaper, a related article
quoted Senator Fulbright as saying that he had.
, , ,
detected a growing desire by the Senate to reclaim
its constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities in
foreign affairs.
It is too soon to tell, but there are signs in the
Congress, particularly in the Senate, of a growing
80/ The New York Times, July 20, 1967.
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awareness of the loss of congressional power, of a
growing uneasiness over the extent of Executive power,
cind a growing willingness to raise questions that a
year or so ago might have gone unasked, to challenge
decisions that would have gone unchallenged, and to
try to distinguish between real emergencies and
situations which, for reasons of Executive convenience,
are only said to be emergencies. ° '
- On July 21, an article by James Reston entitled, "How to
Make Things Worse Than They Are, " noted that the Congress was
"troubled . . . about the vast traffic in military weapons" and had
charged the administration "with deploring the arms race while
leading the arms race. " Mr. Reston reported tha.t "serious men like
Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota and Representative Henry
Reuss of Wisconsin /aT member of the House Banking and Currency
Committee/ are leading a campaign to get control of this mischief. "
Mr. Reston, However, ended his article by rema.rking that.
. . . the present Middle East problem indicates the
dangers in a one-sided withdrawal from the arms
race. To keep control of the oil out of ttie hands of
the Soviet Union is a vital interest of the United
States and its NATO allies, and this cannot be
done by pious speeches in the Congress about "the
merchants of death. " °
- On July 23, in a piece entitled, "Arms Sales Facing Congress
Inquiry, " E. W. Kenworthy reported at length on the hearing conducted
81/ The New York Times , July 20, 1967.
82/ Ibid.
,
July 21, 1967. .
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by the House Banking and Currency Committee (July 17) into the
Export - Import Bank financing of anris sales. A point of nnajor
importance which was raised during that hearing (and which will be
discussed in the following chapter) was whether or not the Congress
had been advised as to this utilization of the Bank's facilities. The
administration contended that congressional leaders had been so
advised. Mr. Kenworthy now quoted Senator Fulbright, Chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, as saying that he had been "unaware
until recently of the Bank's arms credits." Senator Mike Mansfield
(D - Mont. ), the Majority Leader, when asked about such credits,
replied that he "had never heard of them. "83
- On July 24, in an editorial entitled, "Feeding the Arms Race, "
The New York Times alerted the public that.
Some members of Congress are beginning to ask
searching questions about America's Government-
sponsored, booming international arms business.
It's about tinae. A series of events in recent years
has cast serious doubt on some of the basic assump-
tions that underlie the arms aid and sales programs.
In a number of situations, it is clear that the decision
to sell or give American arms has done more harnn
than good to the interests of the United States. . . .
The United States is also shipping increasing
ajnounts of weapons to the developing nations -- $1.2
billion worth in the last five years --in the name
of "mutual security. " This is an area of the arms
basiness particularly open to question. ...





July 24, 1967. .
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- In the same issue of July 24, an article by Neii Sheehan
entitled, "Symington Says U.S. Is Failing to Control the Resale of
Arms, " provided the public with an abridged version of the hearings
conducted by Senator Symington's Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Subcommittee. This material, it should be noted, had been
ticking away quietly -- like a time bomb -- since the early spring.
Declassification of the testimony had finally been accomplished by the
Defense Department and the hearings had been published, without
fanfare, on July 11, 1967. This article focused particularly on the
testimony of Mr. Samuel Cummings (see Chapter III), and repeated
verbatim his disclosure that the transfer of F-86 jet fighters from
West Germany to Pakistan via Iran had been "common knowledge in
Europe at the time" and that the arrangement was accomplished "by
Q C
Luftwaffe pilots in civilian clothes. "
- On July 25, an article reported a news conference held by
Senator Symington at which the Senator characterized the country - X
loan program as "back-door financing" and a means by which the
administration was circumventing congressional limitations on arms
shipments to Latin American countries /presumably the limit of $85
million in grants and sales/. In a related article the Senator announced
his support for an ajnendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 which
85/ The New York Times, July 24, 1967. One reason for the delay
in making these hearings available to the public — aside from the prob-
lem of declassification -- was that the final session of the hearings
(the appearance of Mr. Kitchen of the State Department) did not take
place until June 22, 1967.
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had been proposed by his colleague in the Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Church. This amendment would abolish the Defense Depart-
ment's revolving credit arms sales fund. Still another related article
quoted excerpts from the discussion between Senator Fulbright and
Mr. Cummings during the latter' s appearance before the Symington
subcommittee (see Chapter III). 86
- On July 26, the day on which the Secretary of Defense was to
make his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
an article appeared which must have warned the Secretary that his
reception by that committee might be less thaji sympathetic. The
article noted that on the previous day, July 25, a hearing had been
held by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee -- which was now
engaging in the same reexamination of the conduct of the Export-Import
Bank that had occupied the House Banking and Currency Committee on
July 17. Although the testimony taken on July 25 had not yet been
published, the article reported that the Deputy Security of Defense, Paul
Nitze^cind Under Secretary of State Rostow had insisted that the Con-
gress had approved the use of the Bank's facilities to finance arms
sales. As to whether or not the administration had informed the
Congress of this activity as it had occurred, the article noted that,
Secretary Rostow
. . .
asserted, however, that the
Administration had kept members of the Senate and House
86/ The New York Times, July 25, 1967.
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Foreign Relations /_si_c/ Comnaittees adequately informed
ajid \vould now provide such information on "a classified
basis" to the banking committee members. ZMt. Rostow
had, in fact, said it was the appropriations committees
which had been so informed -- see Chapter V. /
Senator J. W. Fulbright chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Missouri
Democrat, said this was not true. They said that the Admin-
istration did not mention the Export-Import Bank's involve-
ment to the committee until the group had discovered this
itself axid published partial information about the bank loans
in a staff report on arms sales in January /presumably Dr.
Bader's staff study^/87
Testimony of the Secretary of Defense
By the time that Secretary McNamara entered the committee
chamber to give his testimony in support of the Military Assistance
Program not only had all parties concerned, and the public, been
brought up-to-date on most of the pertinent issues inherent in the
program, but distinct lines had been drawn across the subject of the
administration's handling of the arms transfers, and legislators and
executive officials were finding themselves on opposite sides of those
lines in adversary relationships. The preparations for the Secretary's
appearance had been less than auspicious.
Senator Fulbright began the hearing on July 26 with some brief
remarks to the effect that he considered it "unfortunate" that the
Secretary of Defense had refused to appear in public session; he went
on to say,
87/ The Nev/ York Times, July 26, 1967.
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This committee, for a number of reasons, has taken
a greater interest this year than usual in the military
aid cLnd sales program. The Senator from Tennessee, Mr.
Gore, and the Senator from Missouri, Mr. Symington, have
conducted extensive hearings before their respective sub-
committees, which have added greatly to the knowledge
of the members of this committee in their concern about
our arms sales and the grajat problems in the field of
arms.
There have been lengthy discussions among the members
aboat this subject during our markup on the foreign aid
bill, but the committee agreed to withhold action on the
military aid portion of the bill until it heard testimony
from you, Mr. Secretary. 88
In. response. Secretary McNamara promised the chairman that,
insofar as making the hearings available to the public, he would be
"quite happy to cooperate in both a prompt security review and a
review that will permit everything to be released that is both pertinent
and also will not adversely affect the foreign policy of our Govern-
ment. "89 hq then proceeded to make exactly the same prepared
statement which he had made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. If he had been upset by the commentary in the newspapers,
he took pains not to show it.
Following his statement, which had simply reiterated the basic
rationale for the various portions of the Military Assistance Program
(and which reaffirmed the careful control procedures in the adminis-
tration of arms sales), the Secretary of Defense became engaged for
88/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 ,
p. 24 l7"
89/ Ibid. , p. 242.
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some time in fielding questions pertaining to the war in Vietnam.
Senator Fulbright inquired about the use of military personnel from
the Philippines in that conflict. It was his opinion that funds program-
ed for the Philippines under MAP were a quid por quo for the presence
of the Philippine flag in Vietnam. "I suspect, " he said, "although
we cannot prove it, that this whole /MAP/ payment was in response
to their showing a token support for Vietnann policy. " The Secretary
failed to rise to this bait. ^
Senator Gore wanted to know v/hether the Defense Department's
request to shift Thailand and Laos to the Defense budget implied that
there were plans afoot to expand the war into those countries. The
Secretary did not rise to this bait either. Questions on the general
situation in Vietnam, on the trend in casualties, ajid on the semantics
of offensive and defensive postures all drew responses that were brief,
confident and persuasive. Thus far, the testimony was typical of
Secretary McNamarals usual style.
Arms Sales Decision Making
Finally, after having fenced inconclusively on the subject of
strategy. Senator Gore approached a topic more gernnane to the hear-
ings.




SENATOR GORE. I really do not wish to pursue this /dis-
cussion of strategy/. I must admit that it is a bit confusing.
And not being a military man, I wish to go, Mr. Secretary,
to something with respect to the foreign aid bill.
As the chairman said, Senator Symington and I have
directed some hearings with respect to the sale of armaments,
There is in the pending bill new authority requested which
would put the Department of Defense in the banking business
by authorizing it to purchase commercial paper from
private arms suppliers who have sold to foreign govern-
ments of foreign customers.
I just wondered what you thought the justification is
for putting the Department of Defense in the business of
buying and selling commercial paper.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I think the basic question,
Senator Gore, is what is in the interest of our Nation, or
what military sales are in the interest of our Nation, and
then how should those sales be financed. I think this is
a very difficult question.
SENATOR GORE. Could you clarify^ for us who naakes
this decision?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Yes, I can indeed. The answer
is basically, that within the President's policy, the decisions
are made by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense. We do not actually initial in writing the sale of
$300, 000 of spare parts to one of the Latin American
countries, for example. But every major arms sale is
personally approved by either the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Security of Defense.
/Italics supplied^/
SENATOR GORE. Approval of both Departments is required.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Yes. /TtaUcs suppliedT/
SENATOR GORE. Does it go to the White House?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Not always. That is not to say
the President is not infornaed but that we are operating under
established policy.
In many of these cases, the matter does go to the White
House because it is brought to the White House by the foreign
government. For exanaple, the F- 1 1 1 sale to the United
Kingdom was the subject of discussion initiated by Prime
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Minister Wilson with the President. . . . Norinaiiy the
general run of the mill military sale does not come to the
attention of the President. Sales are only made, however,
if the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
believe that they are consistent with the policy of the
Government. " ^
The Function of Mr. Kuss.
It is obvious by his testimony that the Secretary of Defense
considered himself a coequal with the Secretary of State in the making
of at least this phase of foreign policy -- if it is to be conceded that
decisions made to provide arms to some countries and to withhold
arms from other countries are the stuff of foreign policy. No member
of the committee, however, chose to challenge the Secretary on this
point. Rather, Senator Gore wished to voice his concern about the
activities of Mr. Henry Kuss.
SENATOR GORE. I for one have had the apprehension that,
Mr. Kuss, for instance, has been a little wide ranging in
his activities and perhaps without due administrative
supervision by the Department heads in dealing not only
with governments but more specifically with arms merchants
within other countries. That is why I asked you about the
decision making process.
. . . Not that I wish to pry into
executive secret operations, but I, for one, would like
some satisfaction that his is not being handled irres-
ponsibly. /Italics supplied^/
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Let me say I think that the
subject is a controversial one and deserves discussion.
But I do not think that in any way it is being handled irres-
ponsibly, nor do I believe that your apprehension as to Mr.
Kuss's wide ranging and perhaps acting without proper




direction from either the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Defense is well founded. /Here the
Secretary provided an example of Mr, Kuss' activities
in negotiating the sale of F- Ill's to the United Kingdom
-- negotiations which included the working out of a
complex "offset" agreement which necessitated the
salesman's "ranging" throughout the British economy
in search of potential counter-purchase procurement
items_^/ So Mr. Kuss has ranged widely, but not out-
side the limits of policy, /italics supplied. /
SENATOR GORE. You can understand from your own
description of his functions why the committee might have
such a feeling as I have stated.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I can indeed, and I do quite
understand it. ^^
If it had been Senator Gore's intention to determine whether or
not Mr. Kuss was virtually autonomous in his putsuit of arms sales,
the answer which he received from the Secretary of Defense may
have simply added to his confusion. On the one hand, the chief of
International Logistics Negotiations was empowered, through the
mechanism of arranging "offset" agreements, to deal at his own
discretion with whonnsoever he pleased in foreign countries (either
government agencies or commercial businesses) in behalf of either
the United States Government or American weapons manufacturers --
but on the other hand, in doing so, he was not to stray "outside the
limits of policy. " If Mr. Kuss' authority represented less than a
carte blanche, it might be difficult to say in what way.




Arms Sales Decision Making
Senator Syraington now took his turn at questioning the witness,
If the press coverage of the previous two weeks had not ruffled the
Secretary of Defense, it had drawn out the Senator from Missouri.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I had other
questions I was going to ask this morning, but the staff
has just given me a statement made yesterday /jJuly 25/
by Deputy Secretary Nitze in a hearing before Senate
Banking and Currency /see Chapter Vj . As a matter of
personal privilege as well as for the information of the
Committee, I will comment and then Mr. Secretary please
make any comments you care to. Secretary Nitze says
in his statement:
•'I note that Senator Symington's press release /of
July 2^ yesterday charged the administration with
a lack of coordination and stated that "there is evi-
dence to suggest that the amount, type, and destina-
tion of American military equipment sold abroad is
determined by middle level officials in the Depart-
ment of Defense ..." I want to state flatly and in
the strongest terms that this is simply not true. "
That -was Mr. Nitze 's statement yesterday, I would just
observe in passing that is a strong statement. During
last •week . . .1 asked the staff of this Committee to
draw up a release based on the testimony j/^from the Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee hearings/
that had been declassified and released. I thought the
language of the subsequent release was strong, so I
asked the head of the staff, Mr. Marcy, if he was sure
the testimony justified it. Mr. Marcy submitted the
evidence. I read it carefully and felt the statement
was proper. I take full responsibility for every word.
/italics supplied. /9 3
The initial contributions of the staff of the Senate Foreign




Relations Committee to raising the whole issue of arms sales --
particularly those of Dr. Bader -- have already been noted. It seems,
now, that if the decision to take the issue to the press was not actually
made by the staff, they were at least providing the material which
would appear in print. This committee staff, apparently, possessed
the energy for sustained effort.
Senator Symington followed his justification for the press re-
lease with a documented case supporting his point of view.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. I originally became interested in
these matters as a result of some very fine hearings on dis-
armament held by Senator Gore. The committee was told
at that time by different witnesses that the senior inter-
departmental group was the control point for coordinating
arms sales at the highest level. The committee was also
told in the Gore disarmament hearings that a State Depart-
ment coordinating committee chaired by Mr. Kitchen handled
many of the important decisions on arms sales.
In February of 1967 Senator Gore asked AID, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Treasury, and the Bureau
of the Budget to describe their role in four important U. S.
decisions to sell arms:
1. The F-4's to Iran.
2. The F-5's to Morocco.
3. The F-104's to Jordan,
4. The A-4's to Argentina.
A summation of the answers on the extent of their participa-
tion from, four agencies . . . most concerned with arms sales
is as follows: _/_The complete answers themselves are at
Appendix I --it should be recalled that these four sales
were the ones originally flagged by Dr. Bader in his staff
study.
/
1. The senior interdepartmental group did not meet on the
F-104's to Jordan or the F-4 sale to Iran. The group was not
established until after the F- 5 and A-4 sales had been made.
2. The State/Defense Coordinating Committee did not meet
on the F-4 sale, the F-104 Sale, or the A-4 sale. It did meet
on the F-5 sale but neither ACDA, Treasury, or the Bureau
of the Budget /were present at the meeting/.
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All this in spite of the contention by Mr. McNaughton
as brought out in the March 2, 1967 hearing /See Chapter
Illi italics supplied^
*'The process of policy reviews always allows for the
presentation of views by State, Defense, Treasury, and
AID. It may also involve the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency and the Bureau of the Budget. "94
The evidence indicated to Senator Symington that there was
conflict between the procedure for the control of arms sales as out-
lined by the then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNaughton, and
the actual practice as it had been reported to Senator Gore by the
various agencies queried. This led him to comment that.
If the major sales are not considered at the highest
level, naturally one wonders about the less significant
sales. One can only conclude that the arms sales
decisions are made at desk levels at the State Depart-
ment in cooperation with Mr. Kuss and Mr. Kitchen.
This is in my viev/ at the middle level. 95
Senator Symington then went on to read into the record the testi-
mony which he had elicited from Mr. Kuss (during his subcommittee
hearings) wherein that official had admitted that the Congress could
not expect to be informed of arms sales until six to nine months after
the sale had been acconnplished. He also quoted from Mr. Kitchen's
remarks before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee
to the effect that the chairman of the State/ Defense Coordinating







Committee "was not familiar" with country - X loan transactions,
Having made his case. Senator Symington said.
I regret there is a disagreement between Deputy
Secretary Nitze and myself on this matter, and regret
also that, without calling me up, or requesting any
information as to the testimony of which he is obvious-
ly ignorant, he would haul off and make a flat denial
of that character, accusing me of making an untruthful
statement. /Italics supplied^/ *^^
The Senator's press release of July 24, which was written by
the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, had produced the side
effect of throwing a gauntlet across the Potomac -- Senator Symington
could now add indignation to his other feelings concerning the Military
Assistance Program and those who administered it. The Secretary of
Defense was forced into the occupation of mending fences.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I am afraid there has been a
misunderstanding, Senator Symington, on the way in which
these sales are authorized. I am sure Mr. Nitze didn't
intend in any way to contradict your beliefs, but merely
to correct what may have been a rai sunder standing; and I
suspect, also, that misunderstanding by the members of
the committee arose because of the failure on the part
of the executive branch witnesses properly to explain
the procedure.
So I accept the responsibility for whatever misunder-
standing did develop.
But let me assure you that there is a misunderstanding
because you imply that the record indicates that the four
specific transactions you referred to -- F-4's to Iran,
F-5's to Morocco, A-4's to Argentina and F-104's to Jordan
were not approved at the highest level of the Government




but approved at desk level or middle management level.
Suck is not the case. I personally approved every one
of those four deals, and I think it is correct to say these
were approved by Secretary Rusk as well. . . .
These are typical arms sales agreements, every one of
which, if it is of any importance, coraes to my direct
personal attention.
I aim fully prepared to say we may have made errors of
judgement, but I don't think we did in these particular cases.
I could not, however, support an interpretation that these
important matters are decided upon by desk level officers,
and I fear we may have left that impression with the commit-
tee. If so, I apologize. _/ltalics supplied^/ 9^
Dr. Bader's staff study had been published at the end of January.
Mr. McNaughton and Mr. Kuss had made their appearances before the
subcommittees shortly thereafter. The "impression" that importa-nt
arms sales decisions were being made at echelons below Secretary
McNamara's level was already of long standing. Is it possible that
the Secretary had been ignorant of the testimony given by his subor-
dinates, or had failed to see in it the naaterial from which a false
impression could be gathered? It is difficult to imagine that an official
of Mr. McNamara's experience could overlook the development of
any "weapons" in the congressional arsenal. The Secretary's
apology for his Deputy's rash response to Senator Symington might
have been acceptable, but his assumption of all responsibility for arms
sales decisions which had, for nearly four months, been attributed to
lesser officials, may have come too late. Secretary McNamara's




attempt to set the record straight was out of date and might be con-
sidered evidence of a cavalier disregard for the impressions made
on the Congress.
Export-Import Bank Financing of Arms Sales
The Secretary of Defense, in an apparent effort to correct another
impression, then made several references to examples of disclosures
of the role of the Export- Import Bank in financing arms sales. He
mentioned some testimony of Mr. Kuss of April 1964, and a report of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated June I, 1964, both of
which referenced the Bank as a financing agent for arms sales. He
quoted a portion of his testimony before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on June 23, 1964, in which he stated:
We estimate that in the current fiscal year a total of
$213 million of military sales will be financed through
private institutions and the Export-Inaport Bank. "°
Ifeving provided those evidences of good faith and disclosure.
Secretary McNamara concluded.
I think, against the record of previous testimony, that
is perfectly clear. I really think you are doing a disservice
to me, gentlemen, by saying, in effect, that I lied to
the Congress. 99






Senator Symington, apparently somewhat mollified, noted that
the Defense Department seemed to lack rapport with the staff of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. It may be, if there was closer
coordination, there would not be this mistiness. If you
had the time, which I know you have not, to read the
hearings of Senator Gore and myself, you would agree
it is very, very difficult not to be confused, based on
the testimony itself, as to what is going on.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Well, Senator Symington, I
think you are quite right on that. ... I think that the
problem in the past, and it is one that perhaps we should
assume responsibility for correcting in the future, is a
lack of effective liaison with this committee on these
matters. We are in close association and contact, as
you know, with the Armed Services Committees because
they are our primary authorizing committees.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. But they are not particularly
interested in military aid.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. They have not, for one
reason or ajiother, dug deeply into this. ^^^
One or two of the senators inquired about the rationale for mili-
tary assistance to various countries and about the workings of the
revolving fund and the Export-Import Bank in the financing of arms
sales. The Secretary of Defense responded with the same information
that his subordinates had already given to the Gore and Symington
subcommittees. Finally, Senator Fulbright concluded the hearing
with the following exchange with Secretary McNamara.




THE CHAIRMAN. Do yoa know who Mr, Cummings is?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I read of him in the newspapers.
THE CHAIRMAN. Don't you know him personally?
SECRETARY McNAMARA, No, sir. I have never seen
the man.
THE CHAIRMAN. He is a resourceful fellow. He says
the West Germans are asking roughly $2 0, 000 for an
M-47 tank. Is that ours?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. That is our tank.
THE CHAIRMAN. While the same thing only brings
$2, 000 as scrap, and they obviously do mot want to
scrap them. He buys and sells arms and makes a
great fortune. . . .
Mr. Secretary, it is very late, and I apologize,
but you know the committee is very concerned about
this matter. ... I do not know what we axe going to do.
I think this is a very serious matter, and I do not know
what you think would happen if we intend to cut down
the aid program. ... do you have anything further
to add?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Yes, sir; I do. ... It is
true that our expenditures are high. It is true that in
particular our defense expenditures are Mgh. It is not
true they are higher in relation to our income then they
were 5 or 6 years ago.
It is true that the failure to address the domestic
social ills existed then because of lack of will of our
people to face them, to finance them, to adopt the
corrective measure.
It is true that our domestic social ills remain un-
corrected today, and for exactly the same reason --
failure of our people to address the issue and to pro-
vide the necessary financing to begin to correct it. ^^^
The Secretary of Defense ended his testimony before the Foreign




Relations Committee almost exactly the same way he did before
CongressmaJi Morgan's Foreign Affairs Committee -- with a socio-
economic lecture. In this instance, however, he chose to blame "the
people" rather then "the Congress" for failure to administer to the
domestic problenas which were in competition with his programs. He
would have only one more opportunity in 1967 to testify in behalf of
the Military Assistance Program -- before the Senate Appropriations
Committee. That hearing would not take place until mid-November,
nearly four months later. Between July and November the mood of
the Congress, vis-a-vis military assistance, would produce serious
legislative restraint on the program and the hearings before the Senate
Appropriations Committee would amount to the administration's final
appeal. Everything that would matter in the drafting of the authoriza-
tion and appropriation bills had already been said.

CHAPTER V
RESTRAINT ON THE EXPORT - IMPORT BANK
In early- March of 1967, a bill (S. 1155 and H. R. 6649) had been
introduced into Congress at the request of the Export - Import Bank of
Washington. ^ This bill would: shorten the name of the Bank (dropping
the words "of Washington"), extend the life of the Bank for five years
(beyond June 30, 1968), increase the Bank's lending authority (from
$9 billion to $13. 5 billion), increase the Bank's authority to issue export
credit insurance and guarantees against fractional reserves (from $2
billion to $3.5 billion), and increase the rate of per diem allowance for
members of the Bank's Advisory Committee.
Mr. Harold F. Linder, President and Chairman of the Bank,
dutifully made appearances before both the House and Senate Banking
and Currency Committees (on April 11, and May 16^ respectively),
providing testimony in support of this bill. Despite his having been
closely questioned by Congressman Fkssman (incident to his testimony
before the House Appropriations Committee on March 20) in regard to
the Bank's participation in so-called country - X transactions, no





questions relative to this function of the Bank were forthcoming from
either of the Banking and Currency Committees. Mr. Linder did not
volunteer any information along these lines ajid the subject passed
unchallenged.
By mid- July, however, congressional concern with the adminis-
tration's handling of arms transfers had penetrated even the shell of
these relatively noncontroversial coinmittees. Although the House
Banking and Carrency Committee had already filed (on May 11) a
report recomntending favorable action on the Bank bill, one of its
members, William B. Widnall (R - N. J. ), had become sufficiently
aroused to address the following letter, dated July 12, 1967, to the
Committee Chairman, Wright Patman (D - Tex. ):
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It has come to my
attention that the Export-Import Bank since July 1,
1962, has advanced credit of nnore than $1 billion
for the sale and shipment of arms to seventeen
different countries many of which are clearly in
the umderdeveloped category and hardly in a
position to be expending vast sums of money for the
purchase of arms. In fiscal year 1967 alone, I
am advised that Eximbank provided credits for
the saJ.e of more than $300 million in arms
traffic. Much of this has been in what is termed
"country - X loans" where Exinn itself knows
neither the names of the recipient countries
nor the items to be sold. This is unpleasantly
reminiscent of numbered accounts in Swiss
banks.
Most disturbing to me, however, is the fact that
raXj. oar Committee hearings this year and in
previous years, no inkling whatsoever of this
type of activity was revealed. Moreover, at
this year's hearings on extending the life of the
Eximbank we had not only Exim witnesses but
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also Department of Defense and CIA at which time
one would assume that this recent large-scale
activity of the Bank would have been revealed
to the Committee. Certainly broad policy and
budgetary questions are involved.
I realize that H. R. 6649 has already been
reported and is awaiting clearance from the
Committee on Rules. Nevertheless, I am ad-
vised that the Committee on Appropriations has
looked into this matter in some detail in hearings
earlier this year and I know you share iny feeling
that we would certainly want to avoid the embarrass
•
ment of not having had this information when H. R.
6649 is being debated on the Floor.
For these reasons, I urgently request that
Eximbank and Department of Defense witnesses
be called before our Committee in Executive
Session at the earliest opportunity.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM B. WIDNALL^
Responding to this request; Chairman Patman scheduled a return
engagement for Mr. Linder for Monday, July 17. The administration
was by now, of course, fully alerted to congressional anxietie s about
arms transfers and, so, provided the Bank President with an escort
of some of its ablest knights: Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs; Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the
Treasury; Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and John T.
McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
2/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, Hearing Before the
Committee on Banking ajid Currency, 90th Congress, 1st session,
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 2. According
to Congressman Widnall (see his letter, dated March 30, 1972, at
Appendix N) this facet of the Bank's activities had been brought to his
attention by the staff of the Senate Fore ign Relations Committee which





HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY '
In matter-of-fact terms, ajid without reference to any previous
omission of information concerning Bank financing of arms transfers,
Mr. Linder informed the committee that the shift in the US Military
Assistance Program away from grant aid and towards sales arrange-
ments had focused administration attention on export trade and credit
availability -- the natural provinces of the Export - Import Bank. The
Bank president traced his organization's initial financing of arms
transfers to 1962; client states at that time being only "financially
strong and friendly industralized countries. " The Department of
Defense, according to Mr. Linder, provided only its approval of the
arrangements for the sales and the applicable credit terms. It was
not until Congress itself, through sections 503 and 509 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended for 1964 and 1965, authorized the
Department of Defense to guarantee financing by others of military
export sales that the Bank had become involved in transactions which
3/ Assistant Secretary McNaughton left the hearing that noon
and died in an airplane crash 2 days later on July 19, 1967. Townsend
Hoopes, his principal deputy, became Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs.
4/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 3.
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provided arms to developing countries. Pursuant to this legislative
authorization, Mr. Linder explained,
. . . cin arrangement was worked out between Eximbank and
the Department of Defense whereby the Bank would acquire
from the Department of Defense obligations, guaranteed
by the Department of Defense, arising from sales nego-
tiated by it with certain countries to which the Bank
was otherwise not prepared to extend credit for mili-
tary goods. Under this arrangement Exirabank provides
financing but does not deal with the buyer and is not
infoirmed of the buyer's identity. -'
Mr. Liinder pointed out to the committee that he had, in fact,
discussed the Bank's plans to embark on this type of financing with
the chairman of both the Senate and House Banking and Currency
Committees on two occasions, one in 1962, and again, in 1965. By
way of demonstrating that the Bank had no intention of keeping its
role in the financing of arms transfers secret from. Congress, Mr.
Linder cited four occasions on which that particular function of the
Bank had been brought to the attention of Congress: his own testimony
before the House Appropriations Committee that year (Passman's interro-
gation on March 20); the staff study, "Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, "
published for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Bader's opening
petard); Secretary McNaughton's testimony before the Disarmament
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (given on
February 7, and March 2, in something less than gratuitous fashion);
5/ U.S. Congress, House of Repre sentative s, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 4.
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and, finally, a speech of his ( Linde r ' s ) own delivered before the
Bankers Association for Foreign Trade meeting at Boca Raton, Florida,
in April 1966. Whether or not these occasions would constitute open
and abundant disclosures would be judged by the committee members.
Export - Import Bank cooperation with the Department of Defense
in the business of fincincing arms transfers had been "carried out
under express authorization from the Congress, " claimed Mr. Linder.
^/Italics supplied^/ ° That authorization, he noted, could be found in the
House Foreign Affairs Committee report on the 1965 amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This report explained a provision
which would prohibit the Department of Defense from charging a fee
or premium in connection with its guarantees if the recipient of the
guarantee was another agency of the US Government and, quoted Mr.
Linder, "is primarily designed to apply to the Export - Import Bank
which, at present, is the only US Government agency expected to be
•7
aifected by it. '• Whether or not this somewhat oblique reference
constituted express authorization from the Congress would also be
judged by the committee members.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze followed Mr. Linder' s state-
ment with his own. It was important, he told the committee, to the
United States that nations which are defending their own independence
6/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import





be militarily strong and internally secure. To this end, it was some-
times necessary for such nations to acquire their military equipment
on credit from the United States. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there
were three standards which were applied by the Department of Defense
in determining whether to make military sales:
1. We will not sell equipment to a foreign country
which we believe it cannot afford or should not have.
2. We will never ask a potential foreign customer to
buy anything not truly needed by its own forces,
3. We will not ask any foreign country to purchase
from the United States anything that it can buy
cheaper or better elsewhere. °
Additionally, according to Mr. Nitze, sales ofmilitary equipment
benefited the following sectors of the United States:
(a) American labor (providing about 1. 4 million man-
years of employment in the United States over the past
five years);
(b) American industry (providing over $1 billion in
profits over the same 5 - year period of time); and
(c) the American Government (in generating favorable
gold flow to the extent of over $5 billion in cash
receipts already in hand resulting from $8. 1 billion
of sales over the past 5 years).
Mr. Nitze concluded his statement by endorsing the continuation
8/ U.S. Congress, House of Representative s, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 6.
9/ Ibid. , p. 6,
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of the Export - Import Bank's "key role" in providing credit financing
for which the Department of Defense had a "vital need" in order
"to carry out our military sales programs essential to our national
interests. "^^
Next, Under Secretary of the Treasury Barr explained his
department's point of view in regard to the Bank's financing of credit
for arms transfers. The issue was, he suggested, "divisible,"
The sales to the developed nations -- Italy, Australia,
New Zealcind, and the United Kingdom -- are very
definitely a part of our attempt to make our military
alliances financially viable. They are part of the
attempt on our part to preserve oar responsibility as
a reserve currency nation, as well as meeting our
military responsibilities. In order to do this we
must make sure that the money we spend overseas
to maintain these military alliances is covered by off-
setting foreign exchange transactions. ' ^
On the other hand.
In the case of the developing nations, the situation
shifts a bit as far as we _/the Treasury DepeLTtment/
are concerned. We cannot claim that the balance-of-




10/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import











It is our opinion that one way or another these
developing countries are going to get the arms
that they need for internal security and a minimum
of external security. If they are going to get these
arms they should get them on the most adv^antageous
credit terms from the United States. ^ -^
Mr. Barr concluded his statement with something like a
disclaimer of responsibility for his department:
We in the Treasury have no opinion, Mr. Chairman, as
to whether or not these sales should be made. This de-
term±nation is made by the President, by the Defense
Department, and by the Department of State. If these
people, who have this responsibility, determine that
credit should be extended, we say we might as well
get the business and we should finance it on the most
advantageous credit terms. 1"*
Finally, Under Secretary of State Rostow spoke on behalf of the
I
Export - Import Bank's authority to finance arms sales arrajiged by
the Defense Department. Keeping such authority intact was, according
I
to Mr. Rostow, "fundamental. " Cutting it off would be "in certain
sensitive areas -- the Middle East, for example -- very serious. "•^^
. 13/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
' Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 7.
14/ Ibid.
, p. 7. This argument is not very different from that
,
presented by Mr. Samuel Cummings in his testinaony before the Sub-
f committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (April 13, 1967),
to wit: if there is going to be a profitable arms business then the United
|i States should make the most of it,
15/ Ibid. p. 7.

312
Central to the problem, in his view, was the fact that,
The level of Soviet and Chinese arms sales has put the
world in an appalling dilemma. In some regions, the
presence of those arms are in themselves an incitement
to war, releasing the danger of hostilities. If they
are not countered, aggression may occur. But, if they
are countered an arms race may begin, absorbing
resources those countries need desperately for develop-
ment. We _/the United State^/ cannot manage this
process single handed, so long as others refuse to
cooperate. But we cannot wash our hands of the whole
problem, and leave arms supply in large part to the
Soviet Union and Communist China. ^°
Mr. Rostow argued that the safety of the United States was most
easily protected in a stable system of world power.
The aim of our policy, therefore, has been to help
friendly developing countries meet their legitimate
security needs while at the same time using our in-
fluence and managing our sales in such a way as to
develop regional arms controls and to prevent
1 7
excessive investment in military forces.
To this end.
In every instance in which an arms purchase is re-
quested, we weigh such factors as:
(a) The threat to the internal or external security
of the purchaser;
(b) The imbalance caused by Communist arms
provided to neighboring countries, and the
degree of counterbalancing actions required;
16/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import





(c) The need to channel purchasing country resources
into constructive economic and social development and
to avoid their wasteful diversion to unnecessary-
military investment;
(d) The ability of the purchasing country to pay
without excessive fiscal and budgetary strain;
(e) The risk of arms escalation by neighboring
countries or of improper use of the equipment by
the recipient country; and
(f) The risks that would result from U. S. refusal
to approve the request, including the consequences
of failing to help a friendly country. 18
"After considering all of these factors, " Mr. Rostow pointed
out, "the Government authorizes a sale only when it is on balance
found to be in our national interest. "•'•" Further, he claimed.
We pursue a fundamentally negative military sales
policy, especially for countries of the developing
w^orld. Our aim is not to sell arms; we do so only
when it is demonstrably in the overall U. S. national
interest. Indeed, the magnitude of political sales
which are turned down by the United States annually
far exceeds the value of actual sales consummated. ^0
With the conclusion of Mr. Rostow's statement, the administra-
tion officials rested their case for Export - Inaport Bank financing
of credit arms sales. The justifications they had given ranged from
helping the balajice-of-payments, through just plain good business,
and on to competing with and offsetting Soviet and Communist Chinese
18/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bauik and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 9.





arms sales. The criteria which they described for determining
whether individual sales would be made seemingly covered every
benefit and penalty imaginable. Unfortunately, however, they had not
assessed accurately the real problem that was agitating mcuiy of the
members of the House Banking and Currency Committee. Hardly
had Mr. Rostow finished his statement, when, to the obvious dis-
comfort of Chairman Patman, Congressman Widnall (the member at
whose urgent request these additional hearings were being held) began
his attack.
MR. WIDNALL. I would like to ask this question in
view of the fact that Mr. Linder has just testified that
the appropriate committees of the Congress have been
informed, kept constantly informed and I would like to,
by a show of hauids, know how many on this committee
have, up to this last weekend, known anything about
this activity of the Export-Import Bank. Will those
raise their hands?
THE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Widnall, you
are not taking over the chairmanship.
MR. WIDNALL. Not a single soul on this committee
7 1has raised their hands. ^^
Although Congressman Patman underscored the publication of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study and McNaughton's
published testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament in an
apparent effort to demonstrate to his fellow committeemen that at
21/ U.S. Congress, House of Representative s, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 10.

315
least some public disclosure of the Bank's activity had been made,
Mr. Widnall would not be put off.
MR. WIDNALL. Mr. Linder, I ana deeply disturbed by
the fact that you say that the appropriate committees
have been informed. Apparently we are not an appro-
priate committee of the Congress.
MR. LINDER, Mr. Widnall, as I indicated, I thought
this Awas information to which we did not want to give
wide publicity, certainly in detail, although as I
indicated I thought the mennbers of the House Banking
cuid Currency Committee were familiar with it as
well as the Bankers Association to whom I inade a
reference on this subject in an address at their
meeting --
MR. WIDNALL. They get better information than
we do?
MR. LINDER. No. I also indicated, sir, that as
early as 1962 I consulted the chairman of both the
House and Senate Banking and Currency Committees
and that I did so again when the volume of this
business appeared to be going up. ^^
If, as Mr. Linder testified, disclosure had, in fact, been made
on more than one occasion to the committee chairmen it seems that
they may have kept this information to themselves -- noting Congress,
nnian Widnall' s following complaint:
MR. WIDNALL. What has shocked me so much in
learning about this is the fact that I have been on this
committee now, I think, for 17 years and I have been
quite cognizant of the activities of the Export-Import
Bank and I have tried to make myself as well informed
22/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 11.
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as possible in connection with it. I have also and I
have always had tremendous respect for its activities,
for the manner in which the bank has been run. And
I have always told the people back home that these
loajxs going out through the Eximbank have been for
the purpose of aiding the developing countries
economically and to help with our trade, and that
we are very proud of the record. Now I am not
proud of the record when we cannot tell the
American people openly and above board what
we are doing in this respect.
Apparently not having been coinpletely informed by his chairman
as to the Bcink's involvement with arms sales, Mr. Widnall began to
probe directly for information.
MR. WIDNALL. What percent of the loans to the
developing countries last year were made for arms
purposes?
MR. LINDER. There I am not in a position to
answer, but I will be glad to furnish it to you.
MR. WIDNALL. Would not the figures show some-
where between 70 and 80 percent to the developing
countries in the last year?
MR. LINDER. No, no, no. I am certain not.
(The following information was subsequently provided:)
Gross loan authorizations and gross military authoriza-
tions to developing countries in fiscal year 1967
_/Thou sands of dollar_s_/
A. Gross authorizations 1,360.9
B. Of which: Military authorizations 353. 1
C. divided by A. (percent) 25. 9
Figures for fiscal 1967 are preliminary""*
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Leaving the Baink President for a moment, Mr. Widnail began to
question the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
MR. WIDNALL. Mr. Nitze, you said, No. 2, we will
never ask a potential foreign customer to buy anything
not truly needed by its own forces. In how many of the
countries where we furnished aid have we had American
military advisers there ahead of obtaining the military
equipment?
SECRETARY NITZE. We don't fortunately make trans-
actions of that kind to deliver the equipment unless
we have people there in advance of the delivery.
MR. WIDNALL. So that they could request it as a
result of the advice given them by the American
military advisers with their country; is that not so?
SECRETARY NITZE. Generally, it is the reverse of
that, Mr. Widnail. Generally our advisers discourage
them from buying things which we believe they don't
need. We have had many instances in which the country
itself and their military wanted to buy a great many
things w/hich we thought were too sophisticated and
too advanced and our military people there have been
very effective in pointing out to them that these are
not the things that they should have, that they should
have less and less sophisticated equipment than what
they wanted. ^^
Turning again to Mr. Linder, and referring to Export - Import
Bank loans to developing countries for arms purchases:
MR. WIDNALL. You say you do not want to know
anything about where they go or who gets it.
MR. LINDER. Only in respect of the 30 percent
25/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
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/apparently an off-the-cuff estimate made before the
data on the preceding page -- showing 25. 9% -- was
in hand/ of the military loans did I not want to know.
And the reasons I don't want to know are perfectly
clear, Mr. Widnall. I am sure you understand that
no one, as Mr. Rostow said, no one can be sure of
the absolute desirability in a particular irtstance.
... It is conceivable that in certain areas of the
world where conflicts arise, I would not vs/ish to
have it known that the Export-Import Bartlk had
done specific financing for one side or the other.
Such information might conceivably deny me the
opportunity to continue with my normal ccammercial
business. '^°
Notice of the Bank's activities and Mr. Widnall' s line of
\ questioning had, by now, prompted the curiosity o£ other members
of the committee; as his allotted time expired others took up his
cause. Among them, Congresswoman Florence I>wyer (R - N. J. ):
MRS. DWYER. Have private banks participated in
the sale of arms to other countries?
MR. LINDER. They have to the extent that they
have bought certificates of participation ira our losuis,
MRS. DWYER. Why have they not participated
more than they have at the present time directly?
MR. LINDER. They have in some instances, at
least one that I can recall, participated directly.
But the reason for not participating more does
not relate to military loans, but relates ta the
general tightness of the money market and dis-
inclination of the banks to lend money without
some of the perquisites which come irora.
normal commercial banking. That is, they do
not get compensatory balance Sj they do not get
26/ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
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as high a rate of interest as they might be able to
charge to other borrower Sj and when there is a
shortage of money naturally the money drifts
toward the people who pay the largest amounts.
We have had to adopt the sale of participation
certificates through the market in order to attract
institutions other than the commercial banks ^_such
as pension funds, insurance companies, and private
investorsT to provide money for us, ^ '
Congress-woman Dwyer then turned to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
MRS. DWYER. Does the Defense Department have
a sales force promoting the sale of military arms?
SECRETARY NITZE. No, we do not. We have 24
people who work on these transactions, bat as I said
earlier, our main effort is to really cut down on the
requests for the purchases below those which the
countries would themselves have wanted apart from
the three criteria which are mentioned in my prepared
statement. ^°
Another congresswoman, Mrs. Leonor Sullivan (D - Mo),
wanted to inquire about the recipients of the loans that were guaranteed
by the Department of Defense.
27/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
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, p. 18. It is difficult to reconcile this rather negative
description of the mission and performance of the International Logis-
tics Negotiations branch of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA)
with the actual activities and sales record of Mr. Henry Kuss and his
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whose aggregate number certainly exceeded. 24.
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MRS. SULLIVAN. . What terms do they get?
MR. LINDER. With regard to the $590 miiiion
of guaranteed loans /_totai amount since the begin-
ning of the Bank-Defense Department Program/,
about $370 million were at 5-1/2 percent, $190
million at 4-7/8 percent, and $30 million of
loans made in December 1965 at 3-1/2 percent.
MRS. SULLIVAN. In case they do not pay -- and
it looks as if these are some of the countries
whose arms are probably wiped out -- in case
they do not pay, it will just be a matter of
this country furnishing thena with their arms
free, since the Department of Defense w^ill
guarantee the Eximbank repayment, and the
money still comes out of the U. S. Treasury, does
it not?
MR. LINDER. If they do not pay, it is a cost to
the U. S. Government, that is clear. But that is
true as well of any connmercial loan which isn't
paid. 29
Congressman Del Clawson (R - Cal. ) had been aroused by this
suddenly revealed policy of the Export-Import Bank and wished to
pursue the question of disclosure.
MR. CLAWSON. In response to Mr. Widjiall's
question about raising hands of how many members
of this committee were aware of these sales,
military sales -- I am still curious, Mr. Chairman,
about that very thing because apparently the mem-
bers on this side_/Republican minoritx/ were not
29/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
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in the June 1967warwere among the recipients of country - X loans.
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aware of it, even though Mr. Linder indicated it
was rather public knowledge, and I am wondering
how many on the majority side were aware of these
sales prior to last week?
MR. CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to interrogate
them yourselves.
MR. CLAWSON. I probably will.
THE CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is appropriate
for you to do that now. You can ascertain that.
MR. CLAWSON. I did not ask them to raise their
hands. So far none have indicated that th.ey were
aware of these sales. Perhaps the chairman was
aware. The rest of us were not. ~'^
Of all the members of the House Banking and Currency Committee,
excepting, perhaps, Mr. Widnall, no one was more apparently antago-
nized by the Bank's financing of arms sales than Congressman Henry
Reuss (D - Wis. ).
MR. REUSS. Mr. Linder, the Export-Import Bank
Act, section 9, requires that the Export-Emport Bank
transmit to the Congress a complete cind die tailed
report of its operations. That is the correct reading,
is it not?
MR. LINDER. I believe so.
MR. REUSS. Your most recent report is ithat of
October 17, 1966, being a report for fiscal year
1966, is that correct?
MR. LINDER. Yes, sir.
30/ U.S. Congress, House of Representative s, Export-Import
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MR. REUSS. Until last week I was totally unaware
of these arms sales, and I have sat on this com-
mittee 14 years. As my neighbors to my left and
right, Mrs. Sullivan and Mr. Ashley, have just
told me, they too, were completely in the dark.
It is for this reason that I want to lead you
through some of these reports. In the text of
this report for the year 1966 and forward, I
find not a word about the arms business, yet it
is a fact, is it not, that in fiscal year 1966
of the total Eximbank authorizations of $2. 1
billion inilitary authorizations were $497 million
-- about 23 percent of the total. That is a fact,
is it not?
MR« LINDER. It is, I believe. It was approximately
25 percent.
MR. REUSS. I now look at the pictures accorapanying
the foreword -- which contain no raention of the
military business, and I find they are the following
-- page 3, a picture of an electric generator being
sent to Japan. On page 4, a picture of a commer-
cial cargo plane being sent to Zambia. On page
6 a picture of U. S. machinery spinning out tin
plate to fill Brazil's needs. On page S is a
picture of the very benign looking laboratory
technicicui in India in a papermill. On page 11
a photograph of a power generator. I do not see
etny other pictures, and I ask you if I have
correctly described the format of your report?
MR. ULNDER. I think you have, sir.
MR. REUSS. I next turn to your testimony in
which you state that Exim policy was changed
in July 1962 and I believe it is your testimony
that the only member of this House Banking
and Currency Committee, which has jurisdiction
over the Eximbank, that you told about this
change was the then chairman, is that correct?
MR. UNDER. If I may, I think I was careful to
say, that we did not -- not as a matter of policy
-- but just did not have an occasion to finance
military sales before 1962.

3Z3
MR. REUSS. But in 1962 you did and when this
occasion presented itself, is it your testimony
that the only person, majority and minority,
on the House Banking and Currency Committee whom
you told of this new development was the then chair-
man of the committee? '
MR. LINDER. That is correct, sir.
MR. REUSS. And it is a fact, is it not, that
the then chairman of the coramittee was Mr. Spence
of Kentucky, who was then 88 years old and shortly
retired? /italics supplied^/
MR. LINDER. I didn't know what his age was.
MR. REUSS. He was of advanced years, was he not?
MR. LINDER. Yes. ^^
Congressmam Reuss, a graduate of Harvard Law School, a veteran
lawyer, and, for many years, a distinguished legal counsel to high
government officials, obviously could not resist leading his witness
into a virtual admission of contrived deception. Mr. Linder was
definitely in for a difficult day.
MR. REUSS. I now refer to your testimony before
this committee in April of this year when you
were asking,for extension of the Eximbank author-
ity. In your testimony did you say so much as a
word about the fact that Eximbank was engaged very
heavily in the financing of military exports?
MR.. LINDER. I did not, and my statetemt made
clear that I was prepared at that time, as I
testified at length, only 3 weeks earlier, at
31/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 21.

324
the House Committee on Appropriations, that I
would have been perfectly pleased to answer in
execiitive session anything that I have said here
today.
MR. REUSS. However, since none of us knew any-
thing about it, the chances of our asking about
this would be equal to our asking whether you
were in the narcotics business or in white
slavery, /italics supplied. /^^
Not content with the Bank President's testimony thus far, Mr.
Reuss again called attention to his report of the Bank's activities for
fiscal year 1966.
MR. REUSS. All right. Let us go to page 30
which has Italy on it and Italy got, we now
discover, $40 million worth of armaments that
year from you, but under the listing, you list
for Italy nothing broken down except for various
U. S. exports again. On your point that elsewhere
you told us exactly what you had given, and I
look up above to Ireland and there I find that
you do not tell what you gave them. There is no
reason for any member of the committee to be put
on his guard when he sees "various U. S. exports. "
From here on, I will be on my guard.
MR, L.INDER. May I point out in respect to Ire-
land, these are guarantees and we never describe
the detail of the guarantees because there are
just too many of them. Where we made a direct
loan, however, they are described unless they are
a loan of the kind we made to the Institute Mobil-
aire Italian© of $20 million which represented a
great variety of machinery and equipment which it
wasn't feasible to describe. That is to say, it
wasn't a large project loan but there were a
num.be r of them.
32/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
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MR. REUSS. That is what I assumed this meant
cind I find it disingenuous. Under Australia
you've got various exports which I take to
mean these nuts and bolts ajid odds and ends.
Now I find that $134 million of those were arma-
ments -- all of the credits given to Australia
that year were armaments, so you fudged the
whole thing, /italics supplied^ . . . why could
you not have said military shipments, and is it
not a fair inference that there is an effort to
deceive the House Bajiking ajid Currency Committee
by this kind of report?
MR. LINDER. I am afraid I will seem redundant
if I say again that I had good reason to think that
it was unwise for the Bank to indicate in its
annual report the fact that it was conducting
military business, the bulk of which was in be-
half of countries whose credit I did not think it
was necessary to challenge.
MR. REUSS. You thought it was unwise because
you knew that members of the committee would
object to it. I certainly would have, /italics
suppliedV-^^
Seeming to forget his fear of redundancy, Bank President Linder
again reiterated his consulations with past and present chairmen of the
House and Senate Bctnking and Currency Committees in regard to his
Bank's arms sales activities. However, it he was successful in con-
vincing the committee members of even this much disclosure, that
success must have been short lived. The Committee Chairman,
Congressman Patman, one of those few who was supposed to have
enjoyed Mr. Linder' s confidences, was so eager to show his unqualified
33/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
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support for the administration that he gratuitously entered the follow-
ing statement into the record:
MR. CHAIRMAN. May I say this word? I am
greatly encouraged that the administration took
the stajid that it did to do something to protect
the national interest. The fact that I find out
later something that I did not know about, does
not discourage me at all and does not disturb me
at all because if the administration in power had
done v/hat -was in the interest of the country, and
for the national security in achieving permament
and lasting peace, I am very much encouraged and
I agree with them, although I did not know about it.
It doesn't offend me in the least, /italics supplied^ •^'*
Whatever embarrassment Mr. Linder and his administration
colleagues must have felt on hearing the sympathetic chairman's
inadvertent confession of ignorance went, of course, unrecorded. It
had become obvious, however, that some retreat was called for if
some of the more disturbed committee members were to be prevented
from bringing on a rout. Mr. Joseph Barr, the Under Secretary of the
Treasury, a previous congressman and inember of the House Banking
aJtid Currency Committee, was the logical official to initiate that retreat.
MR. BARR. I must admit that the degree of infor-
mation that this connmittee had was unknown to me,
also. It came to my attention this weekend. I con-
sulted with my colleagues, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Rostow,
and Mr. Linder, and I informed them, and there was
absolutely no dissent, that we should come before
34/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Innport
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this committee. In effect, Mr. Linder called you,
Mr. Chairman, to say that we would be delighted
to appear here and to try to get this record straight.
I cannot speak for what is past, but I do want to say
that the questions that have been raised here are
valid. They do need exploration. I just want to put
it this way, Mr. Chairnnan: I cannot speak for what
is past, but we are here today, voluntarily, in an
attempt to get this record straight, if we can. "^
Following a luncheon recess. Chairman Patman moved to incor-
porate himself w^ith the retreat by inserting his own act of contrition
into the record.
MR. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Linder, I expect I am en-
titled to criticism on this matter in following
Chairman Spence. Mr. Spence, of course, was
acting in the very best of faith. I think he was
fully justified in saying, in effect, now, if you
make it satisfactory with the Foreign Affairs
cominittee and Armed Services Committee, it
will be satisfactory with our committee. He
said that. That was his policy, I know it was.
/italics supplied. / Then, when I was approached,
I said, go ahead, just as long as it goes to the
other committees. I see no reason why not.
Possibly I made a mistake in this in not
saying to conn.e down. I can see now where it
would be in order, and I am in sympathy with
some of the criticism Mr. Reuss and others
naake about why you did not confer with me as
you did with the other committees. . . .
Suppose we have an agreement now that in the
future anything concerning the Export-Iraport
Bank, any information you give to any other
committee in executive session or otherwise,
you will make available to us at the same time.
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Would you be willing to do that?-'"
Whether or not his committee members (particularly those who
had practiced law) would accept this "evidence" of disclosure of the
Bank's activities. Chairman Patman had made a gallant effort to
salvage the hea.ring and to mollify their indignation at having been
ignored. Mr. Linder, perhaps according to a scenario devised at
lunch, had only to acquiesce to the Chairman's request in order to
escape with dignity.
MR, LINDER. I thought I had done nay duty by inform-
ing, as I said earlier, the chairman of both comnaittees
on two different occasions. It seemed to me that it was
their judgement as to what ought to have been done from
there on. However, I want to say now that we are per-
fectly prepared at any time, and surely a.t regular inter-
vals if the committee chooses to meet in executive session
or in public session if the matter is not one of security,
37to discuss any aspect of the Bank's business.
If the lun-cheon recess had given the administration officials an
opportunity to provide themselves with a graceful way out of ctn
awkward situation, it had also allowed tinae for other committee
members to digest the morning's dialogue and to frame questions of
their own. Mr. Linder was still in trouble.
MR. BLACKBURN. _/R - Ga^ Mr. Linder in your dis-
cussion with Mr. Reuss - - I do not know if you yourself
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realized the full impact of some of the answers that
you gave to Mr. Reuss. As I recall, the act under
which you operate requires that you make a full dis-
closure of the Bank's operations at the end of each
year, is that true?
MR. L.INDER. I understand that to be true.
MR. BLACKBURN. I recall that you testified
earlier that you financed sales to countries where
you yourself did not know and did not want to know
of the name of the country involved.
MR. LINDER. That's correct.
MR. BLACKBURN. What you are telling this commit-
tee, is, that there is a provision of the law that you do
not see fit to comply with and I am just wondering,
are there any other provisions of the law under which
you operate that you do not feel any requirement of
compliance ?
MR. LINDER. Mr. Blackburn, If you were here this
morning as I believe you were, you will know that I
indicated that the Congress of the United States had
specifically authorized us to do this business. . . .
If I have broken a law, then I regret it very much,
but it seems to me my conscience is fairly clear.
/Italics supplied. / ^
The hearing was, now, clearly on the verge of a rout. Congress-
mcUi Blackburn, in summing up his own displeasure, probably voiced
the feelings of at least several other committee members.
MR. BLACKBURN. How can we as Congressmen
exercise our trust in seeing that agencies over which
we supervise operate in accordance with our wishes
unless we have knowledge of the countries with whom
38/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, pp. 36-37.
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we are dealing? I get some comfort when you say we
do these things out of national interest. It may be
that some of us may not agree with your phrase
of what i s in our best national interest. How
can we evaluate these things it we do not know
about it? /italics supplied^/ 39
The senior officials present from the departments of State and
Defense, content until this point with Mr. Linder's advocation of
administration policy, now felt obliged to second his promise of
complete future disclosures.
MR. ROSTOW. Mr. Blackburn, I would like to add
a few swords irom my point of view and that of the
Department of State. We favor conversations with
the Congress about matters of policy. I feel it is
not only a pleasure but a duty, a constitutional
duty, and if we can't explain our policy to general-
ists in the Congress, and to the country at large,
then there is something wrong. ... In this particul-
ar case -- and no one regrets more than I do the
misunderstanding that has been revealed here --
we all feel that it is a misunderstanding that has
developed naturally as a result of the transfer
from grant aid to sales in the arms field. We
welcome the suggestion of the chairman and the
offer of Mr. Linder that there be fuller consul-
tations in the future. I am sure the Defense
Department agrees. We shall be very happy to
cooperate fully in this policy. ^^
Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze did agree and assured the
committee that his department did "thoroughly support the view that
we should make the information available to the appropriate committees
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of the Congress. "^'
Indignation over not being informed as to the Export-Import Bank's
role in financing arms Sales to both developed and underdeveloped
countries was, of course, only part of the reaction of the committee
members. The question of a possible misuse of the Bank's resources
was central to the whole issue and was brought up by Congressmain
Bingham (D - N. Y. ).
MR. BINGHAM. The purpose of the Export-Import
Beink as clearly stated in the act is not to assist in
the development of underdeveloped countries Tas has
been intimated by the case made for Bank financing
of arms sales to underdeveloped countrie_s/ but to
aid in the financing of exports and imports. Now
that this policy ^financing arms sale^/ has become
public knowledge, it would seem to me that it is
quite an unfortunate thing for the inaplication to
be carried abroad that an agency whose purpose is
to encourage and stimulate American exports is en-
gaged in doing that in the arms field; in other words,
that we are actively as a government trying to
stimulate our export trade by selling arms around
the world. '*^
The Under Secretary of State responded to the congressman with
a precise statement of one of the key tenets of American "cold war"
philosophy:
MR. ROSTOW. There is no way to promote develop-
ment, especially for the underdeveloped countries
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but equally for the developed countries unless they
are reasonably safe and secure in this extremely
unsafe and insecure world. Unless basic conditions
of order are assured their developnnent efforts will
be in vain and indeed will be impossible. There is
no inconsistency between exports designed to help
assare security and those designed to help assure
deveiopnnent. They are ail part of the same process
of development] /italics supplied^ 'i-^
Although, he seemed to have missed Congressman Bingham's
point (it having already been clearly established by him and other
committee members that the Bank's purpose was the encouragement
of U.S. export trade and not economic development), Mr. Rostow was,
in fact, underscoring his own (and his department's) major preoccu-
pation with containing the communist threat through the provision of
military and economic support to non- communist states. The question
of whether the United States Government was stimulating export trade
by selling arms and how that might look to other nations may well have
seemed inconsequential to Mr. Rostow. At any rate, when further
questioned as to the feasibility of finding other means than making use
of the Export-Import Bank to finance arms sales the Under Secretary
of State assured the committee that "there was no really practical
alternative to the use of this instrumentality. " Mr. Barr, the Under
Secretary of the Treasury, however, pointed out that there really were
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some alternatives; "you can do it through the appropriations process.
You cam try to do it through the cominerciai banking system. . . .J_pTj
you can create an Eximbajik in Defense. "
!
After citing the difficulties of attracting financing from commer-
cial banks for many arms sales and listing the already numerous
agencies of the government that were competing for available funds in
the naoney market Mr. Barr suggested only two options to the conamittee:
MR. BARR. I would say it boils down to this ... in my
opinion: You can either go the direct appropriations
route or you can use the Export-Import Bank, /italics
supplied^/ . . . this is the issue that is before this
committee.'*"
Congressmaji Garry E. Brown (R - Mich. ) had, apparently, been
giving some thought to the same kinds of problems inherent in arms
transfers that had been surfaced earlier in the year by the subcom-
mittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. '
45/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 41.
46/ Ibid.
, p. 42. In view of the restrictive legislation later
enacted, this wrouid be a prophetic statement. Less than one year
later, the administration, prohibited from so employing the Export-
Inaport Bank, would be requesting direct appropriations, via the
Foreign Military Sales Act, for the purpose of financing future arms.
sales.
47/ It is undetermined whether Congressman Brown had versed
himself in the hearings of the Subconnmittee on Disarmanaent or Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs (held in the winter and early spring
of 1967) or had arrived at his questions independently. In any event,
they were sufficiently remote from the subject matter before his com-
mittee as to warrant being noted here.
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MR. BROWN. On these occasions /arms sales to
foreign nation_s_/ does title pass really to the initial
purchaser, but you reserve in effect, by a covenant
that it will not be in any way permitted to find itself
in another country's hands without your approval?
SECRETARY NITZE. That is correct. That is an
absolute provision.
MR. BROWN. Now, then, in the event of a breach
of that, in a case where it might go to a third country
or a second country which you would not have initially
dealt with, how would you reposses it?
SECRETARY NITZE. I would have to ask counsel
but I would rather have this researched cuid provide
you with an answer.
(The following information was subsequently provided:)
REPOSSESSING SALES EQUIPMENT
Military equipment sold to foreign governments
pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, carry the sanae strict control of transfer
to 3rd countries that the grant assistance carries.
In other words, in every sales agreement the pur-
chaser agrees that he will not transfer title to, or
possession of, the items furnished unless the
consent of the U. S. Government has first been
obtained. Also, the purchaser will not disclose,
dispose of, or permit use of any plans, specifica-
tions, or information pertaining to any items
furnished except as authorized by the U. S. Govern-
ment. Sales through commercial sources, and
commercial license agreements for production
abroad, are also restricted under the provisions
of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
of the Department of State. These regulations
require prior written approval of the State Depart-
ment of any resale or transfer by the original
recipient; they also require (1) the identification
of all countries in which manufacturing, sale or
any other transfer is licensed, and (2) a state-
ment that production in or sale of countries under
Communist control is not authorized.
How the U. S. would repossess illegal transfers
would depend on the circumstances involved and
all legal measures would be utilized to prevent
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any possible misuse of this equipment in conflict
with, the U.S. national interest. ^8
Another problem which had been noted before in different
committees sparked Congressman Brown's next question.
MR. BROWN. If we talk about the developing
countries ... in the Inter-American Development
Bank: -we are talking about extending credits on the
basis that they can improve their economy and all
this. It seems to me at the same time, through
these other transactions, Exim and ail that, we
are by and large drawing upon the capital aspect
of the country, its ability to develop by selling
arms to them. Now, isn't it somewhat incon-
sistent 7^9
The Under Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Barr, responded that
in his opinion, and "on the advice of our colleagues in State and
Defense . . . tKese countries /Xiatin American/ do need a certain
modicum of arms for internal security and a minimum of arms for
external security."-'^ This being true, it only seenaed reasonable
to Mr. Barr that the Latin American nations "get these arms on the
most advantageous credit terms that we can provide, to leave for
them the greatest cunount of resources necessary for their development,
for their economic development. "^^
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Mr. Rostow, speaking for the State Department (and probably-
interested in preventing the question of arms sales to Latin American
countries from becoming an issue in this committee -- as it already
was in others), quickly volunteered the following:
MR. ROSTOW. If I may add this on the Latin Americsin
problem., the Latin American countries spend less than
2 percent, 1. 75 of their gross national product on their
defense budgets, less than any other part of the world
except sub-Sahara and Africa.
They have the smallest percentage of men in their
armed forces of any part of the world. A very large
part of their military budgets are devoted basically
to public works. There is of course, the conspicuous
items, the supersonic planes and so on that get a good
deal of attention. But fundamentally these military
budgets are low.
We have been trying to get agreement among these
countries about arms levels. It is an extremely diffi-
cult thing to negotiate, very much more difficult for
them than for us, for reasons of internal political
sensitivity, but basically these expenditures are kept
to an absolute minimum, and we try and they try to fit
them into their development programs, so as to pro-
vide a minimum burden.
If any of the members of the House Committee on Banking and
Currency (other than Congressman Brown) were really cognizant of
the issue of illegal arms transfers to third countries, dissipation of
scarce development capital through arms sales, or the bolstering of
Latin Axnerican non-democratic governments through the provision of
modern weapons, they chose not to challenge the administration on this
52/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 50.
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occasion. No one moved to press Mr. Brown's probes deeper and the
responses made by Mr. Nitze, Mr. Barr, and Mr. Rostov/ were
apparently accepted as being satisfactory. The members were,
however, still very much upset about the now disclosed role of the
Export-Import Bank in financing the sale of U. S. manufactured arms.
Congressman Reuss again singled out the Ba-nk president, Mr. Linder,
for close interrogation.
MR. REUSS. I call your attention to section 3 of
the KadLmbank legislation which says that the Export-
Impoirt Bank, "shall constitute an independent agency
of the United States, and neither the bank nor any
of its functions, or duties shall be transferred to
or coEisolidated with any other agency or department
of the Government unless the Congress shall author-
ize by law. "
Daaa't you think what you have done in the last 2
years is to turn over more than half a billion dollars'
worth, of lending discretion to the Department of
Defease, which collides with the mandate?
MR. lUNDER. No, I do not, sir. As a matter of
fact, I have made no commitment for the current year
as to vsrhat we would do in respect to the Department
of Defense guarantees. It is a concsious decision
nnade by our Board of Directors, which as you know
is a bipartisan board. Each decision has been raade
unaniTTOOusly with respect to these sales. What we
are doing is to say in effect that, in these specialized
cases, we are making loans on the basis of a good
and valid guarantee. We must assume that they are
in the Jiational interest, since both the State Depart-
ment and the Department of Defense want the loans
made. We have not transferred our authority, be-
cause we determine each time whether we will do it
or not:, and we give the Department of Defense a total
limit within any particular fiscal year. /Italics supplied_^
53/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, pp. 60-61.
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It would seem that the sense of Mr. Linder's rather disjointed
reply was that he had not "collided with the mandate" of the Bank's
authorizing legislation because each arms sale transaction involving
Department of Defense guarantees had been made freely, consciously,
and unanimously by his Board of Directors on the assumption that each
such sale was in the national interest. If it was Mr. Linder's intention
to obscure the point that while decisions on country - X transactions
may have been free, conscious, and unanimous, they were based on
practically no information, it would be the pleasure of Mr. Reuss and
Mr. Widnall to bring that point to the committee's attention.
MR. REUSS. I notice that recently we have been on
both sides of the arms race in the Middle East con-
tributing on the one hand to Israel and on the other
among others to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Does that
seem wise ?
MR. LINDER. I do not think that is a question which
I should answer, sir, because I did not know we were
on both sides or either side of that race.
MR. WIDNALL. Why do you have a Board of Directors?
Do they approve the loan and have nothing to do with
the loan? Should we not eliminate this nonsense?
MR. LINDER. There was no nonsense about it.
MR. WIDNALL. They don't know what the loan is, to
what country it is going. They don't know what country
it is going to. Why should the Export-Import Bank be
involved?
MR. LINDER. It is a financing agency . . . The Board
of Directors of the Bank has this function to play --
to determine to what extent it wishes to extend credit
based upon the DOD _/_Department of Defense/ guarantee.
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which guarantee is set aside from, appropriated
funds. 54
It had, by this time, grown late in the day and both the committee
members and the distinguished pajiel of witnesses must have been tired.
Mr. Reuss, however, had two further points to raise. The first
dealt with control of the Bank's lending power and the second with
rates of interest for country - X loans.
MR. REUSS. Let me ask, Mr. Linder, isn't it a
fact that there are now no limits on the amount of
guarantee loans which Export-Import BarLk can make
for armament shipments ail around the world?
MR. LINDER. Certainly there are limits. For example,
the Appropriations Committee each year determines the
total amount of loan guarantees amd insurance we can
make in each given year. This is not a limit just on
military business. But our Board of Directors must
take this limitation into account when makdng decisions
on the various types of nonmilitary, commercial commit-
ments it will make, and the various types of direct and
guaranteed military commitments it will innake.
MR. REUSS. But in practice since you have used last
year more than 2 5 percent of your total without informing
the committee, there would have been nothing if we had
not had today's happening, there would have been nothing
to stop you from using 90 percent, /italics supplied_^/
MR. LINDER. Well, I think our own prudence might.
MR. REUSS. Except your own prudence.
MR. LINDER. Our prudence niight have been sufficient
54/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
Bcink and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 61.
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to be sure we would not distort our business
completely. ^^
Apparently satisfied that his fellow committee members had
registered this point. Congressman Reuss brought up the question of
interest rates.
MR. REUSS. You made some of these loans
jMcountry - X, presumably/ to Jordan, Morocco,
Pakistan, Venezuela, at interest rates as low as
3 percent. That does not begin to pay the Govern-
ment the cost of raising that money, does it? -'°
After some hedging as to which branch of the administration had
provided the committee with that information (it was the Treasury
Department), Mr. Linder admitted that the Bank had made such loans.
MR. REUSS. Well, when you make a loan at 3 per-
cent interest, when you have to pay 5-1/4 for your
certificates of participation, the taxpayer is in
effect making a grant of that interest, is he not?
MR. LINDER. Mr. Reuss, at that time we did not
have to pay 5-1/4 or 5-1/2.
MR, REUSS. But you have to pay more than 3.
MR. LINDER. That is a charge to the borrower.
It is not our charge /apparently referring only to
the 3 percent figurje_/.
MR. REUSS. I know it, but you have to get the
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money from somewhere, ajid the somewhere is the
U.S. taxpayer. . . . Can you give me examples of
Eximbank loans to countries for peaceful goods
which you made at 3 percent interest rate?
MR. LINDER. No, I have not made any of these
at 3 percent interest rates.
MR. REUSS. The DOD does at 3 percent if you
guarajatee it.
MR. LINDER. The interest rate coming to us is
not that. Let me explain that during the last year
all of the loans that we made under DOD guarantee,
if I recall correctly, were at 5-1/2 percent. Now,
what DOD charged the borrower I do not know. ^ *
A few minutes later, Mr. Linder, answering a question from
committee member Brown, further emphasized this interesting
interest rate differential.
MR. LINDER. What their /DOD'T/ relationship
with the borrower is I do not know, and when I say
that, they may conceivably have decided to lend the
money at 2 percent. I don't suggest that they do.
All I am suggesting is that in 1967 . . . all of our
loans were made at 5-1/2 percent, /italics supplied^
MR. BROWN. Then you can say that in fact you
do establish the interest rate?
MR. LINDER. I do. I do say so, to DOD, not to
the borrower. DOD can negotiate another rate with
the borrower if they so choose. ^° ^/italics supplied.T
If-, in fact, the Department of Defense had been (and was still)
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able to negotiate credit arms sales at low interest rates in the vicinity
of 3 percent bat was, on the same loans, repaying the financing
agency (the Export-Import Bank) with 5-1/2 percent interest, anyone
might be tempted to ask where the Department of Defense was obtaining
the funds which made up the difference. Mr. Barr, the Under
Secretary of the Treasury, attempted to clarify this question in
favor of the Department of Defense by giving the following example:
MR. BARR. Let's say you had a $30 million loan,
Exim picked up 20, MAP, the Defense Department
kept 10. Now, Exim determines the interest rate
on their portion of the loan. Say it is 5 percent
on the 20. DOD can determine the rate of return
on their portion of the loan. The two combined, let's
say one was 5, the other was 3, you would come out
with a ratio of some place around 4-1/2.
Looked upon as really separate loans, those portions financed
by the Export-Import Bank at, perhapsjS- 1/2 percent interest would
be assumed to be repaid by the borrowing country at 5-1/2 percent
interest; those portions financed by the Department of Defense at,
perhaps, 3 percent interest would be assumed to be repaid by the
borrowing country at that rate. Both portions of such loans, therefore,
would be repaid to their respective lenders at their respective rates
eind no one lender (the Department of Defense, in this case) would be
obligated to "make up" any rate differential. The point was still not
59/ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 70.
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clear, however, to Congressman W. E. Brock (R - Tenn. ).
MR. BROCK. But the point is the interest paid
to DOD is not the same as the interest DOD paid
the Eximbank. The loan that Mr. Linder makes
for all practical purposes is to DOD and not to
any country. The loan between the country ajid
DOD is negotiated between those two, and it has
no relevance to the 5-1/2 percent that Mr. Linder
may charge DOD.
MR. BARR. Oh, yes. If they decide they are
going to cut the 5-1/2 percent rate, then DOD
has to subsidize the loan by giving a lower rate
of interest on their portion.
MR. BROCK. That is what I am saying. ^^
Congressman Jonathan Bingham (D - N. Y. ) wanted to be ab-
solutely clear about the interest rates and asked the Deputy Secretary
of Defense the following question.
MR. BINGHAM. Am I correct in saying first of all
that on that portion of the loa-n which is laid off to
the Eximbank, the charge to the borrower is the
same as the interest rate that the Eximbank receives
from DOD?
MR. NITZE. I think it is, but Mr. Linder may have
a reservation.
MR. BINGHAM. It is not a matter for Mr. Linder to
answer. It is a matter for you to answer, Mr. Nitze,
it seems to me. Mr, Linder does not know what the
interest rate charged to the borrower is. Ail he
knows is what the interest rate is charged to the DOD.
60/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 70.
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MR. NITZE. You are quite right. My understanding
is that that portion of the loan which is laid off to
Eximbank, the rate is the same to the borrower as
it is from DOD to us . ^ ^
It would not be surprising, from the testimony, if some of the
committee members left the hearing that day with the impression that
the Department of Defense, in playing its role of "honest broker"
between customer nations for credit arms sales and the financing
agency -- the Export-Import Bank -- might be enticing buyers with
3 percent terms while using the taxpayers' money to meet repayments
to the Export-Import Bank at the higher rate of 5-1/2 percent. This
is typical of the misunderstandings prone to occur when fairly compli-
cated and previously hidden administrative procedures are finally
cind reluctantly brought before the Congress.
At the end of this long day of testimony, after some very court-
roomlike cross-examination of the administration witnessess, many
of the cotnmittee members could likely have made the same philo-
sophical comment voiced by Congressman Thomas Ashley (D - Ohio).
61/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Export-Import
Bamk and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 71. Despite Mr. Nitze's
statement, aji article by Neil Sheehan in The New York Times of July
31, 1967 interpreted the testimony taken at this hearing to mean
that, "the Defense Department has apparently been subsidizing the
interest rates on its arms sale loans to underdeveloped countries
by charging the recipients lower rates than it pays to the Export-
Import Bank for money it borrows. "
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MR. ASHLEY. The question logically must present
iteslf in our minds and in yours as to where this
may lead. We see an increase in the very few years
frora zero percent to about 25 percent. We are told
that there is no statutory inhibition that will prevent
this from escalating to a very considerably increased
proportion. What is the thinking in this regard?
To what extent are we going to allow a dilution in
the financing of nonmilitary exports and imports
which really, truly, was the original purpose of
establishing the institution? You cannot have
both. To the extent that there is a limitation on
the Bank's resources, you are going to finance
one or the other, /italics supplied. / ^^
HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY
One week later, on July 25, 1967, the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee held its hearing on the subject of Export-Import
Bank participation in the financing of credit arms sales. Like its
House counterpart, this committee had already heard testimony from
the Bank's president, Mr. Harold F. Linder (on May 16, 1967) in
support of extending the life and the lending powers of his organization.
Like its House counterpart, this committee had also not been advised
at that time of the Bank's role in the financing of arms sales arranged
by the Department of Defense. This hearing, on July 25, was held in
executive session, as was the hearing before the House Banking and
Currency Committee during the previous week. The transcripts of
62/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Export-Import
Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 67.
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both hearings were subsequently ordered to be printed for the public
record, the executive branch having had some opportunity to make
various deletions for security purposes.
As had been the case in the House, the Senate committee had
already made a favorable report on the Bctnk extension bill (attaching
only two cLmendments -- shortening the name of the Bank and prohibit-
ing the Bank's participation in credit extensions in connection with the
purchase of any product by communist countries or any product known
to the Bank to be designed principally for use in or sale to a coinmunist
country). The chairman of the Senate committee. Senator John
Sparkman (D - Aia. ), had, it seems, narrowly avoided addressing an
amendment offered just before the July 4 holiday recess by Senator
63Allen J. Ellender (D - La. ). Senator Eilender, a member of the
Senate Appropriations Committee (but not of the Banking and Currency
Committee), had a long-standing reputation of hostility towards
military assistance to the developing countries. He had been instru-
mental in the Senate's adoption of a $55 million limit on military
equipment furnished to the Latin American countries and a $25
million limit on like equipment furnished to the African countries.
In 1964, Senator Ellender had opposed passage of the amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act which provided the authorization for 25
63/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, Hearings Before
the Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Congress, 1st session,
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 2.

347
percent guarajitees by the Department of Defense on credit arms sales.
Now, in 1967, he was dedicated to the proposition that Congress never
intended that the Export-Import Bank should permit its facilities to be
used to provide credit for arms sales. If the administration officials
responsible for military assistance and arms sales were going to lock
step their way through just one more pass in the legislative terrain,
they must first confront Senator Ellender who was intent on heading
them off there.
The same representatives of the administration, Mr. Rostow,
Mr. Nitze, Mr. Barr, and Mr. Linder, presented themselves before
the Senate Baxtking and Currency Committee. Senator Eilender had
been invited (at his request) to attend and was extended the privilege
of joining the regular committee members at their table. He was also
invited to begin the hearing with a statement of his position.
Senator Ellender outlined the history of the Bank, describing an
organization that was chartered by the New Deal administration of the
mid- Thirties simply to help promote economic stability in the United
States by assisting the movement of American exports abroad. The
Bank then, he reminded the committee, was strongly neutralist in
character -- reflecting the mood of the neutrality- period. In 1940,
a special proviso was enacted, prohibiting the Bank from financing
credit arms sales and aligning it with the Neutrality Act of 1939.
This proviso remained in force until the Bank was reorganized in
1945; it was not renewed, according to Senator Eilender, because
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"no thought was given to the possibility that the Bank would someday
be used to finance the exports of our arms and munitions factories. ""^
The newly discovered use of the Bank's facilities to do exactly that
amounted, he felt, to
. . .a perversion and a contradiction of its
efforts to further the economic development
of those less-developed nations with which
we trade. This perversion has been accomp-
lished supposedly as a means of assisting our
balajice- of-payments position, but in reality
these transactions are of very minor import-
ance. It has also been justified on the
grounds that we must send arms abroad
because of the activities of Russia and Red
China. If this is true, and if a valid foreign
policy objective can be met by the export of
arms to less-developed nations, the Depart-
ment of Defense has ample authority on hand
to accomplish this end without involving the
Export-Import Bank in this program.
Although Secretary of Defense McNamara had acknowledged that
the Export-Inaport Bank was not chartered for the purpose of extending
credit for procurement of military weapons (in testimony before the
Senate Appropriations Committee in 1964 -- quoted now by Senator
Ellender), it was now doing exactly that, and apparently at the behest
of Secretary McNamara. Senator Ellender pointed out that the
Secretary had, in 1964, promised him that the Department of Defense
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"would not use credit guarantees to foster procurement of equipment
from us when it meant that a developing nation, such as most of those
in Africa and Latin America^ would be diverting needed funds from
economic development to military procurement. """ The Senator
voiced some shock at discovering now that (according to figures which
he introduced) in fiscal 1967 the Department of Defense possibly had
not only exceeded the monetary limits for proposed military assis-
tance gra-nts to Latin America and Africa ($72 million and $31.8
million respectively, according to the Senator), but that the Depart-
ment seemed to be circumventing those limits through the use of
credit arms sales ($29. 6 million to Latin America, $25. 6 million
of which were financed by the Eximbank with Department of Defense
guarantees, and $16. 5 million to Africa, $14. 2 nnillion of which
67
were financed by the Export-Import Bank).
As an even more flagrant exannple of the administration's use of
the Export-Import Bank's lending authority to outflank congressional
intent. Senator Ellender cited the following case:
. . . la.st year, then the final vote came on the
foreign aid bill, when I found out that $57
million of the amount appropriated in the
66/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 6.
67/ Ibid.
, p. 9. These figures were provided to the committee
by Senator Ellender and were said to have been obtained from the
Department of Defense by the Senator's staff.
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foreign aid bill was going to be used in order to
sell military hardware to Pakistan and India.
I objected to that and I presented to Congress
reasons why I thought the $57 million should be
stricken from the foreign aid bill. Congress
agreed with me. My amendment was adopted
and the House concurred in the amendment.
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress
eliminated the $57 million from the foreign
aid bill, DOD, through the Eximbank, sold to
India and to Pakistan $7 5 million worth of
equipment. I just think, Mr. Chairman, that
this is going too far. /Italics supplied_^/ "°
Senator Ellender had, prior to the July 4 recess, attempted to
introduce before the comnaittee a strong amendment which would
clearly prohibit the Export-Import Bank from participating in ajiy way
with any credit sale of any defense article to any foreign country, or
agency or national thereof. Chairman Sparkman had put him off at
that time -- the bill having been already voted out of the committee.
Congressional interest having now demanded another set of hearings
on the Bank extension bill, Senator Ellender was given another oppor-
tunity to press his amendment. He had by now, he told the committee,
discussed his stringent proposal with Mr. Nitze, Mr. Rostow, Mr.
Barr, and Mr. Lander. They had suggested to him, he stated, that
existing US Government commitments to developed countries such as
England and Japan would be jeopardized by such an amendment.
Senator Ellender, therefore, proposed to the committee two alternative
68/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 9.
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amendments; one, making the same strict prohibition but allowing the
enforcement of contracts already negotiated, and, the second, pro-
hibiting the Bank from participating in any way w^ith any purchase of
any defense article by any less-developed country and, also, prohibit-
ing Bank participation in connection with the furnishing or sale of
any defense article to any foreign country under the military assis-
tance portion of the Foreign Assistance Act. °"
Following Senator Ellender's appearance, it must have seemed
to the administration's representatives that they could hardly have had
a less auspicious introduction. Each of them in turn, read statements
to the committee which were very similar to those which they
have given before the House Banking and Currency Committee a week
before. Mr. Linder, for his part, reiterating the legal basis for
his bank's participation in financing credit arms sales and also his
claims of disclosure to the chairman of both the Senate and House
Committees on Banking ajid Currency. These remarks immediately
drew the fire of Senator Wallace Bennett (R - Utah), the minority
leader in the conamittee, who was upset because he and other minority
members had never been informed of the Bank's connection with arms
sales. Senator William Proxinire (D - Wis. ), a majority member of
69/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, pp. 10-11. The




the committee, was also upset and demanded to know if the Bank
president would keep the committee informed in the future, not just
of what iocins the Bank had made but what loans it would propose to
make in the future. Perhaps chastened by his experience before the
House, Mr. Linder assured the Senators that he would keep them
informed in the future and would "weigh the committee's advice
most carefully" should the committee feel that the Bank was "going
too far. "^°.
.
Mr. Roatow repeated his "unsafe and insecure world" thesis,
again citing communist competition in the provision of arms to the
third world, and again reviewing the various criteria for arms sales
' decisions. Mr. Barr again provided the Treasury Department's views
I
supporting the continued involvement of the Export-Import Bank
in making arms sales. Finally, Mr. Townsend Hoopes (now the
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs -- and Mr. Henry Kuss' new innmediate superior) spoke for
I Mr. Nitze and the Department of Defense. Mr. Hoopes traced the
shift away from grant aid and towards sales within the framework of
the Military Assistance Program. Then, moved by recent criticism
in the press, he launched into a discussion of policy control.
Let me say a word about the important, and widely
misunderstood, question of policy control over military
70/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, pp. 17-18.
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sales. I note that Senator Symington's press release
yesterday Pfhe New York Time s, July 25, 1967.7
charged the administration with a lack of coordination
and stated that "there is evidence to suggest that the
amount, type, and destination of American military
equipment sold abroad is determined by middle-level
officials in the Department of Defense. " I want to
state flatly and in strong terms that this is simply
not true. The Defense Department does not conduct
a military sales policy independent of other elements
of the U.S. Government. Our entire arms policy is
in fact an instrument of foreign policy, and the mili-
tary sales program is an accurate reflection of
considered agreement at the highest levels of
authority. No policy question arises with respect
to military sales to our NATO allies, for it has
been our purpose for 20 years to strengthen them
against major military threats to us both. However,
all requests for arms purchases from countries of
the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa
are subject to the most intensive review and debate
within our Government; . . . On every government-
to-government credit sales transaction, the Secret-
ary of State and Defense have given their approval,
and the matter has been frequently carried to the
President, /italics supplied. /71
Mr. Hoopes admitted, however, that.
It is true that a number of minor commercial trans-
actions for cash do not receive the same degree of high-
level policy scrutiny. Even these, however, require
the issuance of an export license by the Munitions
Control Office of the State Department, and are sub-
ject to careful review within established policy guide-
lines. In all borderline cases, the Defense Depart-
ment is consulted before a license is issued. ^^
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It is interesting to note the administration's sensitivity to this
question of policy control of arms sales. Senator Symington, whose
charge had sparked Mr. Hoopes' response, was not a member of the
Banking and Currency Committee, nor was he present at this meeting
in a like capacity to Senator Eliender. The question of policy control
had not been raised by the House Banking and Currency Committee
and there seenas to be no evidence to indicate that it would be a
likely issue at this hearing. It had, of course, been axi issue before
other committees earlier in the year and, perhaps, the administra-
tion officials realized that they were now appearing before one of the
last forums of the Congress before the whole matter of foreign aid,
military assistance, and arms sales would begin to undergo the test
of voting --in short, they may simply have wanted this day in court
in order to plead as much of their case as possible.
If the House committee had felt it necessary to wring from the
Bank president and the other officials of the administration guilty
admissions about disclosure and strenuous justifications for their
policy, the Senate committee had no such intention. Following their
initial presentations at the Senate hearing. Senator Edmund Muskie
(D - Me.) addressed the representatives of the State, Defense, and
Treasury Departments and the President of the Export-Import Bank
in a straightforward maumer.
SENATOR MUSKIE. Getting to what seems to me to be
the heart of the problem before this committee, the
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first question we face is one over which we, strictly-
speaking, do not have jurisdiction. The principal
question is whether or not we should be involved in
sales of military hardware to any countries overseas.
Those countries fall into two groups, first the indus-
trial countries and second the developing countries.
Senator Ellender's position is not that we ought
not to be selling military hardware to the industrial
countries. His objection seems to be that we ought
not to be selling through the medium of Eximbank
financing.
I don't know of any opposition in the Congress to
sales of inilitary hardware to the industrial countries,
. . . The question is as to whether or not it ought to
be done with Eximbank finsuicing.
Senator Muskie then set about in a businesslike way to determine
whether, a) it was essential that credit be available for sales to indus-
tralized countries, and b) there might be some alternative means of
arranging for credit, other than through the Export- Import Bank,
Mr. Linder recited, as he did before the House conamittee, all of the
reasons why ready cash was not nornaally available, even in the
industrial countries for large arms purchases and why commercial
sources of credit were not interested in financing arms sales (e.,g.. long-
term contracts, low interest rates, time lags between the extension of
credit and the initiation of repayment, and the yearly budget uncertain-
ties of loan recipients). Senator Muskie next asked about the impact
of Senator Ellender's most restrictive amendment, should it be enacted,
on any arms sales which might now be coming "over the horizon" aund
73/ U. S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
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which might be in the national interest. Mr. Barr pleaded that sales
would be necessary to Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in
order to offset our balance -of-payments costs in those areas -- the
maintenance of a forward defense posture being in the United States
national interest. Mr. Rostow provided an example of a potential
customer for arms in the developing world.
MR. ROSTOW. In this tense and delicate situation
in the Near East where the main thrust I suppose
is going to be from the radical Arab countries
toward the moderate Arab countries in whose future
we have an enormous stake, we have problems now.
For example, Morocco is next door to Algeria
which is becoming the leader of the radical Arabs.
Enormous quantities of Soviet arms have been poured
into Algeria. The Moroccans are anxious, and under-
standably so. To insure their security, they may
need to make certain additional arms purchases,
and in any such transactions, credit will have to be
supplied. /Italics supplied^/ ^"^
It is certainly noteworthy that even now, in late July, after nearly
seven months of the strongest congressional criticism of the adminis-
tration's policy of "encouraging arms races in the third world, " the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs would volunteer this
little scenario, flagging still another American supported arms race
now visible "over the horizon. " Obdurateness -was definitely a facet
of Mr. RostOAw's character.
Despite the relatively hospitable reception v,'hich the Senate
74/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 35.
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cominittee had thus far provided the representatives of the adminis-
tration, a vein of ire on the subject of disclosure did lay close
beneath the surface. As Mr. Barr, the Under Secretary of the
Treasury, attempted to explain the problem of financing credit sales
to developing countries he drew this reaction from Senator Bennett,
SEISTATOR BENNETT. I think a large part of your
problem grows out of the fact that you have treated
this comnxittee according to the old formula that
w^a.s- described when I was very young for the way to
get aulong with girls you took out on a date. . Take
them nowhere and tell them nothing. That is what
you have been doing.
MR» BARR. I would concur with your observation.
That is the reason we hope these hearings will be
as forthright and as candid as we can make them.
We would like to repent for past sins, /italics
supplied./ 75
If, by his ready contrition, Mr. Barr hoped to forestall additional
criticism on the same subject, he would be disappointed. Senator
Proxmire's feelings were still ruffled.
SENATOR PROXMIRE. I have carefully read the
hearings in the House. Fronn Congressman Widnall,
who is very much concerned about this, and very
angry- about it, and I think dead right, and Congress-
man Reuss, none of these people are against selling
arms as I understand it. As Senator Muskie brought
out, there is nobody opposed to providing arms for
our friends. It is a nnatter of being deeply concerned,
(a) about being kept informed, and (b) about making
sure that in the future there is sufficient consideration
75/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
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on the part of the Congress so that we have some
thing to say about it. /Italics suppiied^^t*
Mr. Rostow, responding to Senator Proxmire, echoed Mr.
Barr's apology.
MR. ROSTOW. With respect to the question of
congressional briefing, we recognize there has
been a problem here between the Executive and
fhe legislative branch in connection with these
transactions, how much briefing, when and how.
The relationship between Congress and the
Executive on foreign policy matters is a prob-
lem I suppose that nobody has really been able
to describe very exactly since 1789. What has
happened here with respect to briefing your com-
mittees on Eximbank arms sales I think lias
been an oversight and a development that we
regret, /italics supplied^/ 77
The administration's position with regard to its apparent failure
to seriously apprise the Banking and Currency Committees of its
utilization of the Export-Import Bank's lending facilities was to be
that it was simply an "oversight" -- and a unique oversight at that;
the other appropriate committees of the Congress having been kept
properly informed. Even that position, however, immediately was shown
to be vulnerable. While defending the use of the Bank as opposed to
other alternatives, Mr. Rostow invited this exchange,
76/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation





MR. ROSTOW. There is no particular reason why-
loan transactions should be handled from appropri-
ations when they can be handled by loaji, with the
strength of the Eximbank's credit.
SENATOR PROXMIRE. Except that this does involve
a substantial commitment of appropriations of funds
by the Congress. I don't see any reason why the
Congress shouldn't be informed through the appro-
priation processes. Otherwise it is a back door
method, isn't it?
MR. ROSTOW. But the Appropriations Conamittees
have been informed about these transactions.
SENATOR PROXMIRE. I am on the Appropriations
Committee. I have been on it for 5 years. Nobody
ever told me a thing about this. /Italics supplied. / '
There had already accumulated, of course, considerable testi-
mony from the hearings of the House Appropriations Committee, as
well as the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (and its subcommittees) which intimated that
disclosure had, in fact, been significantly less than the administration
was now claiming. Senator Proxmire chose, however, not to press
this point; he was much more interested in finding a suitable alter-
native to using the resources of the Export-Import Bank for financing
arms sales.
SENATOR PROXMIRE. Why wouldn't it simplify it
for you if this were handled by direct appropriation,
authorized by the Foreign Relations Committee in the
78/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
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Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee in
the House, and handled by an appropriation of
the Appropriations Committee. Then you can
forget about this committee and the Eximbank
and the appropriation is cleared, and Congress
can debate this. It is obviously highly contro-
versial, not in terms of whether we should
make sales. Of course we should. We have
to. But whether we should make sales to
.Jordan, whether we should make sales to
Egypt, and some of the other countries.
/italics supplie d. / 7^
Throughout all of the hearings conducted on the issue of foreign
assistance and military assistance and arms sales during that spring
auid summer of 1967, perhaps no more direct challenge had been made
to the administration's hegemony in the field of foreign policy. The
dispensation of military equipment, whether through grants or sales,
is in itself the making of foreign policy. Indeed, the provision of
arms to some and the withholding of arms from others is one of the
most virile demonstrations of foreign policy -- short of war --of which
a nation is capable. °^ The determination of who among client states
should be armed, the types of weapons they should receive, and the
manner of payment that should be made has always been a zealously
79/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Inaport Bank Participation
and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles, p. 41.
80/ The provision of arms is frequently a concomitant of other
demonstrations of foreign policy such as alliances, treaties, or
guarauitees, and ranks immediately below the provision of troops
(as in NATO or Korea) as an indication of commitment. The provision
of arms may also, however, constitute a demonstration in substitution
of the more binding commitments -- the apparent intention of the
Nixon Doctrine is asi example of this utilization of military assistance.
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guarded function of the chief executive and his close associates. To
surrender this function to the Congress, to hand over to congressional
debate the ultimate decisions as to which friendly nations should be
armed by the United. States and, inevitably, when, how, and under
what terms they should be armed would not only invite indiscretion
but would relinquish to the Congress one of the sinews by which the
President exercises foreign policy. Senator Proxmire's suggested
alternative had been offered, at least at face value, as a means of
"simplifying" the evolution of arms sales; the adoption of his alterna-
tive would have doubtlessly simplified the role of the President in
maldng foreign policy as well. Committed to the cold war philosophies
of contaiirment of and competition with the communist powers, the
United States Government would be, then, restricted to arming only
those of its friends that might have sufficient cash to pay outright for
weapons. Arms sales to the rest, industrial and developing, would
depend upon resolution of the many conflicting interests within the
Congress -- just as grant aid military assistance had always done.
More disturbing, that resolution could only come after subjecting
each transaction to the test of public debate --a questionable pro-
cedure for essentially diplomatic business that is frequently delicate.
It would not have been surprising if the Under Secretary of State
had taken issue with Senator Proxmire over this suggestion. He did
not. Instead, Mr. Barr asked to be allowed to supply for the record
the Treasury Department's reasons for feeling why the Export-Import
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Bank was the appropriate instrument of government for financing arms
sales. Mr. Barr's reasons were pragmatic and without reference to
the larger question of which branch of the government should exercise
foreign policy through arms sales decisions. Among those he gave
w^ere; export financing being principally a banking function, the famili-
arity of the Eximbank with the naoney market, the promise of full
disclosure of the Bank's involvement, the difficulty of predicting the
amount of required credit (which would be a Jiecessity under any appro-
priations scheme), and the reversal of the downward trend of military
assistance appropriations (together with an increased budget deficit).
Perhaps, because they had already been made to feel so vulnerable on
the subject of disclosure -- or perhaps just because it was by now
nearly six o'clock in the evening, the administration officials com-
pletely sidestepped the really central issue of the whole debate on
military assistance and arms sales -- the question of who would
exercise foreign policy through the control of the program.
The hearing was concluded with some remarks by Senator Gale
W. McGee (D - Wyo. ), who, like Senator Muskie, wanted to maintain
the issue in an appropriate perspective for this committee.
SENATOR McGEE. I gathered from what the chairman
said, earlier this afternoon that he interprets the juris-
diction of this committee to be in this case not the re-
exa.mination of the fundamental policies at stake here
in terms of foreign policy or defense policy, but
whether the Export-Import Bank has a proper place
in this operation. ... It seems to me what this com-
mittee has to decide then is whether, if these are to
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be oar policies, what the other options are,
whether there is somebody better than Export-
Import Bank to do it.
The significance of this hearing, and of the House Banking and
Currency Committee hearing of the previous week hardly needs to be
underscored. The issue of Export-Import Bank participation in the
financing of arms sales had been nourished throughout the spring and
early summer in hearings before other committees and in the press --
the committees which had jurisdiction over the Bctnk could hardly
ignore the seeming notoriety which had come to be associated with
this function of the institution. As the testimony before both the House
and Senate Banking and Currency Committees clearly indicates, what-
ever efforts the adnxini stration might have made to acquaint those
committees with the Bank's increasing role in this regard had been,
at the very least, ineffectual; committee members sinaply did not know
that the Bank v^as financing the sale of military equipment. Aside
from the rancor caused by this absence of disclosure, the attendant
issues of administration encouragement of arms sales to under-
developed countries and the possible perversion of the Bank's sup-
posedly benign mission tended to estrange members of the Congress
who had previously offered no threat to the prosperity of the Military
Assistance Program. The legislative action which the Banking and
81/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation
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Currency Committees would finally recommend that year would act
to restrain one of the essential portions of that program.

CHAPTER VI
THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINT TAKES FORM
With the exception of the Senate Appropriations Committee, aii
of the committees of the Congress whose jurisdictions touched on the
Military Assistance Program (and arms saies financed by the Export-
Import Bank) had completed their review of the program by mid-July
1967. The Senate Appropriations Committee had, of course, to await
the passage by the House of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1968 before it could conduct its
j
hearings and decide what its amendments to that act would be. The
I first clear indication of the results of nearly six months of legislative
oversight of the Military Assistance Program would come in the form
of the reports of those committees which had finished their hearings.
The committee reports would establish the positions of those key mem-
bers of the Congress responsible for the passage of the three pieces of
1/ The jurisdiction of the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees could be said to touch tangentially on the Military Assis-
tance Program, in that the program supported allied forces which v;ere
largely designed to complement the United States Armed Services over
which these committees had primary legislative responsibility. In 1967,
however, these committees did not enter into the controversy v/hich





legislation which regulated the conduct of the Military Assistance
Program (that is, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 which authorized
the program, the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act which would provide funds for the program, and the Export-
Import Bank Extension Act.which would address Bank participation in
financing arms sales).
PASSAGE OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967
The Committee Reports
The draft Foreign Assistance Act which the executive branch had
sent to Capitol Hill in February 1967 had been somewhat ambitious in
regard to suggested changes to the Military Assistance Program. In
addition to the requested obligationai authority of $596 iniiiion (which
was not a large figure when compared with previous program authoriza-
tions), the administration asked that military assistance authorizations
be made on a bi-annual basis, thus lapsing the requirement for a yearly
approach to the Congress and evidencing "Congressional recognition
that military assistance is in our national interest, that the program
does occupy an established place in our overall foreign policy, and
that there is a long term security job to do. " The draft also suggested:
2/ "Explanation of Amendments Proposed by the Executive Branch
to Part II (Military Assistance Program) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as Amended," found in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
Foreign A ssistance Act of 1967, Hearings Before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 90thCongre ss, 1st session (Washington: U.S. Govern-
nrient Printing Office, 1967), p. 188; see at Appendix O.
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the transfer of support for Laos, Thailand, NATO infrastructure, and
International Military Headquarters to the defense budget (as was noted
earlier); the elimination of the "40 country restriction" which the
Congress had previously imposed on military assistance as "an
arbitrary restriction on the President's ability to respond quickly to
changing world requirements;" the reimbursement of the Military
Assistance Program for material procured with its funds and bartered
with foreign countries for other material which was then transferred to
any other United States Government agency; and, finally, that authority
be given the Defense Department to
. . . arrange in advance with U. S. suppliers ^of arm_£7
to acquire from them promissory notes issued by foreign
countries and either hold these or dispose of them, in
whole or in part, to appropriate financial institutions. "^
This last suggestion, the executive branch had pointed out,
"would only provide an additional optional means of utilizing available
funds to carry out approved programs for the assumption by friendly
countries of a larger share of the burden of their own defense. " In
view of the growth of arms sales under the Military Assistance Program
the administration considered it suitable that foreign military sales be
3/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis
tance Act of 1967
, p. 188.
_4/ Ibid. , p. 189.
5/ Ibid., p. 189.
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accorded a separate chapter of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act,
firmly establishing sales as a coequal function, with grant aid, of the
Military Assistance Program.
The report which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued
on August 9, 1967 not only virtually ignored the changes suggested by
the executive branch but recommended that the Congress enact the
following strong restraints on the Military Assistance Program:
1. That the authority of the Defense Department to finance
commercial sales of military equipment be repealed and that the
revolving fund used to finance credit sales to underdeveloped countries
be abolished no later than December 31, 1967 (this amendment was
suggested by Senator Church).
2. That all forms of assistance be denied to any country which
diverted U.S. assistance to military expenditures, or where develop-
ment aid permitted diversion of other resources to military expenditures,
to an extent which interfered with economic development or increased
the danger of a regional arms race (this amendment was suggested by
Senator Symington).
3. That the $85 million ceiling on the annual value of military
^ assistance and sales to Latin America be reduced to $50 million.
4. That the $25 naillion ceiling on the annual value of grant
military assistance to Africa include sales and training as well.
5. That military assistance to the Central American Republics
in excess of $1. 5 million each fiscal year be used only to promote the
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integration of military forces in that region.
6. That the President submit reports to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on any agree-
ments entered into with a foreign country concerning disposition to a
third country of arms which the country acquired through the Military
Assistance Program.
7. That the Secretary of State make semiannual reports on ail
exports of significant weapons or military materials, whether under
government auspices or through private trade channels. "
The committee further recommended that the Military Assistance
Program be authorized to expend only $475. 1 million in lieu of the
$596 million which had been requested. '
In making these highly restrictive recommendations the committee
acknowledged in its report that,
In view of the significance of several proposed amend-
ments concerning the military assistance program, no action
was taken on that section of the bill until after the committee
heard testimony in executive session from Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara on July 26_/T967/. The commit-
tee had hoped that Secretary McNamara woald be willing to
testify in open session on the military assistajice program
6/ U, S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st
session. Report Number 499 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), p. 3.
7/ The authorization of this lesser sunn would acknowledge the
transfer of military assistance for Laos and Thailand to the defense
budget but would retain NATO infrastructure and International Military
Headquarters within the military assistance budget.
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but he did not wish to do so. The committee completed
action on the bill on July 27 . ~ /Jtaiics supplied_^/ ^
Recommendation of the Church and Symington amendments alone
must have required at least some deliberation; certainly they were not
devised and accepted by the committee in the one day following the
appearance of the Secretary of Defense before action on the bill was
completed. In fact, the report v.ent on to explain:
The Subcommittee on Disarmament, under the chairmanship
of the senior Senator fronn Tennessee, Mr. Gore, and the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, under
the chairmanship of the senior Senator from Missouri, Mr.
Symington, have studied at length many questions concerning
the U.S. arms sales program. The information developed
during hea^^ings by these two subcommittees was a major
factor in the full committee's decision -- by a vote of 12
to 6 -- to abolish the revolving fund. ^
The Foreign Relations Committee had, apparently, made up its
mind in regard to at least this recommendation months before it re-
ceived the testimony of the Secretary of Defense (the hearings before
j
. the Gore and Symington subcommittees had, for the most part, taken
place in February, March and April). This is a tribute to the work of
those subcommittees and, of course, to Dr. William Bader, whose
study mapped the route for the subcommittees to follow. Indeed,
8/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Report . . .
, p. 4.
9/ Ibid. , p. 9.
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portions of the committee report seera to match Dr. Bader's study in
tone ajid text. For example.
The purpose of the amendment /abolishing the revolving
fund/ is to get the Department of Defense out of the business
of financing sales of sophisticated military hardware, on
liberal credit terms, to countries which, in the committee's
judgement, do not have defense needs which justify American
subsidization on involvement. Current policies have resulted
in tJ. S. furnished arms appearing in the hands of both sides
in all too many regional disputes around the globe, sapping
scarce resources which should be used for economic develop-
ment, and creating an "arms merchant" image for this
country which contrasts with our basic objective of promoting
world peace. The committee's actions will help force the
executive branch to practice what it preaches about preventing
arms races and discouraging wasteful military expenditures
by poor nations. ^^
Or, the following in reference to the Symington amendment.
The objectives of the foreign assistance program are not
advanced if U.S. economic aid only enables the recipient
country to finance a military establishment beyond its
finajicial capacity and its legitimate needs. The end result
is the same if a country diverts U. S. economic aid to mili-
tary uses or if aid enables it to divert its own resources
to military purposes. Economic growth suffers regardless
of the device used. And the American taxpayer has nothing
to show for his investment in helping his fellow man but a
mass of nonproductive weapons of war. . . . Effective enforce-
ment of this new requirement should provide additional
leverage for the United States in situations where arms
expenditures are a strong inhibiting factor on economic
growth, or a stimulant of regional arms races. And, hope-
fully, it will restrain some of our own officials. /Italics
supplied, /i 1








In regard to the reduction in budget authorization, the report
stated that,
Members of this committee have not been presented
with any persuasive evidence that the national interest
will be served, in any way, by exempting foreign aid
from bearing part of the burden of paying for the
Vietnam war. With the cost of the war mounting each
day, from an annual rate of some $25 billion-plus; with
the Federal Government facing its largest deficit since
World War II; with the fabric of our society in danger
of being torn asunder because of inattention to domestic
problems; and with the threat to the dollar continuing
without letup, it is hardly reasonable to expect the
American people to be very enthusiastic over a proposal
to increase foreign aid .... In the committee's judge-
ment the executive branch did not make a persuasive
case for continuing nnilitary assistance at the same
level as last year. It has, therefore, cut the proposed
authorization by approximately one -third. 1^
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had thus made it clear
that it had taken seriously Dr. Bader's call for legislative oversight
of the Military Assistance Program and, more over, that it was opting
for the passage of legislative control which would strenuously restrain
the program.
Within two days (on August 11, 1967), the House Foreign Affairs
Committee published its report on the draft Foreign Assistance Act.
In sharp contrast with the Senate report, the House document recom-
mended all of the suggested changes made by the executive branch
(excepting that it wished to retain NATO infrastructure and International
12/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Report . . .
, p. 6, p. 14.
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Military Headquarters funding within the military assistance budget).
Even more, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that
the military assistajice budget be set at $650 nniliion for fiscal year
1968 and at $714 million for fiscal year 1969 (this was "total"
obligationai authority, new obligational authority would have been
$590 million for fiscal 1968) -- ±hus not only providing nearly the
authorization that the administration had requested, but establishing
the basis for bi-annual authorizations. The report went on to recom-
mend that the existing ceiling on military assistance and sales to Latin
America be raised from $85 million to $100 million. The "40
country restriction" on military assistance was expunged from the
recommended bill and the report noted that military assistance was,
in fact, being planned for 50 countries for fiscal 1968.
In support of its hearty endorsement of a strong and expanding
Military Assistance Program the House report quoted from the testi-
mony of General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairmaun of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, given during his appearance before the committee:
Equivalent dollars applied to U. S. force levels will
not provide an equivalent free world posture .... The
fiscal year 1968 Military Assistance Program reflects
the best judgement of the country team, the unified
commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, , . . It reflects the
absolute minimum of assistance considered necessary
for those countries that are of particular importance
to our security, and to those nnilitary forces within





relation to our own forces.
In. its own terms, the House Foreign Affairs Committee con-
sidered itself justified in recommending an even more generous
program than had been requested because,
If we believe that the armed forces of certain nations
make an important contribution to our national security
and that it is in our interest to help other countries
to defend themselves against Communist-instigated sub-
version, we should continue to provide military assistance. . . .
If the ability of the forces of other nations to perform
a predetermined mission, either in implementing a common
defense strategy or merely in dealing with internal subver-
sion, is of concern to the United States, we have an interest
in the quality and effectiveness of the equipment of such
forces and in their being trained to carry out their missions.-^
It would be difficult to imagine more different versions of the
same piece of proposed legislation. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee had translated its members' several dissatisfactions with
the Military Assistance Program into a scheme of recommended
restraint. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, seemingly oblivious
to the issues which were disturbing its Senate counterpart, had recom-
mended the repeal of some of the few existing checks on the program
and the enactment of measures which could only encourage the growth
of those facets of military assistance which most dissatisfied the
13/ U.S. Congress,. House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 19 67, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th
Congress, 1st session. Report No. 551 (Washington: U.S. Government





Senators. Any compromise which would produce mutually acceptable
legislation was certain to be difficult to achieve.
The administration must have immediately realized that unless
the Senate as a whole could be prevailed upon to reject the report
of the Foreign Relations Committee in favor of a bill more in common
with the recommendations of the House the Military Assistance Program
"- and particularly its arms sales component -- vpould be in serious
jeopardy. Two hasty efforts to persuade the Senate towards a more
benign consideration of the program were made just before the dis-
similar bills were submittedto floor votes.
On August 14, 1967, Senator Richard B. Russell (D - Ga. ),
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and possibly the
most influential member of the Senate (given his 34 years of member-
ship and the enormous jurisdiction of his committee), was handed a
letter by General Wheeler which represented the views of the General
and of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This letter told
of the "grave concern" of the heads of the Armed Services in regard
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report. The restraints
which that report recommended imposing on the Military Assistance
Program
. . . could only weaken the free world's collective
defensive position. ' A weakening of that position
might be misunderstood by the leaders of the Soviet
Union and the Peoples' Republic of China as an un-
willingness by the United States to stand firm.
This could invite new probes, increased support
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of subversion and possibly even open aggression. ^^
This letter was read on the Senate floor by Senator Henry M.
Jackson (D - Wash. ) (also a member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee), who then proposed an amendment to the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967 which would have eliminated the restraints recom-
mended by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Jackson cimendment,
co-sponsored by Senator John G. Tower (R - Tex. ), was reported by
The New York Times to have gained immediate bipartisan support
froin many senior Senators -- among them: Everett McK. Dirksen
(R - 111. ), the Minority Leader; Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R - Iowa),
the senior minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee;
Jacob K. Javits (R - N. Y. ), a member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee; and John J. Sparkman (D - Ala. ), chairman of the Senate
Banking cind Currency Committee and second only to Senator Fulbright
as a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee. It was
apparent from this list of Senators who were anxious to repudiate the
recommendations of the Foreign Relations Committee that the consent
for those recommendations had been far less than unanimous.
The second effort to forestall the imposition of restraint on
the Military Assistance Program occurred on the following day,
15/ General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, letter to Senator Richard
B. Russell, quoted in The New York Times, August 15, 1967.
16/ The New York Times, August 15, 1967.

377
August 15, 1967. With debate on the Jackson amendment in progress,
22 Senators were invited to a meeting in the office of Senator Mike
Mansfield (D - Mont.), the Senate Majority Leader. Present at this
meeting were the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul A. Nitze, the Under
Secretary of State, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development. Felix Belair, Jr.
,
Washington correspondent for The New York Times, reported that the
purpose of the meeting "was to win support for the bipartisan effort
to retain the President's present authority /jEo conduct the Military
Assistance Program/ ajid for restoration of funds cut from the
/Foreign Assistance/ bill by the Foreign Relations Committee.
If the first administration effort had seemed successful (with
General Wheeler's letter leading to the Jackson amendment), this
second effort had an abrupt and surprising failure. Having seen the
draft Foreign Assistance Act only in the form in which the Foreign
Relations Committee had reported it, the Senators were not really
aware of the extent to which the administration had recommended en-
hancing the versatility of the Military Assistance Program. In
particular, they were apparently not aware of the executive proposal
to allow the Defense Department to buy promissory notes issued by
foreign countries to arms naanufacturers in the United States. This
new authority was included in the Jackson amendment and its sudden
revelation in Senator Mansfield's office completely upset the adminis-
tration's campaign to retrieve the security of the Military Assistance
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Program. Mr. Belair observed that.
It "was at the meeting, just off the Senate floor,
however, that some Senators, including Mr. Mansfield,
became aware of the new authority for the Pentagon
to purchase "supplier's paper. "
"Now they have gone too far, " one influential
Denaocratic Senator remarked as he hurried from the
meeting to vote on Mr. Jackson's amendment. ^'
Within a few minutes, according to Mr. Belair, six Democratic
Senators and one Republican Senator had deserted the administration's
position. On the floor of the Senate, the Jackson amendment was
being described by Senator McCarthy as "the most arrogant proposition
we have had in. some time, " and by Senator Symington as "a plan that
would continue the arms race without the consent of Congress. It
was not drafted by the nnilitary, but by civilians who want to promote
the sale of arms all over the world. . . /and was7 just another develop-
ment in the arms race that can only be an additional danger to future
world peace. "*° Finally, a vote was taken and the Jackson amendment
was defeated 46 to 45. The movement to restrain the Military Assis-
tance ProgrcLm, dignified by the prestige of the Foreign Relations
Conamittee and reenforced with last minute allies, had successfully
passed its first encounter with the opposition of the executive branch.
17/ The New York Times, August 16, 1967.




Only two days later, on August 17, the Senate approved the
Foreign Assistance Bill, as it had been recommended by the Foreign
Relations Committee, by a vote of 60 to 26.
The House of Representatives, unmoved by the victory of the
Senate's version of the bill, passed its own version on August 24,
1967. " In accordauice with routine procedure, a conference committee
was immediately appointed to undertake the reconciliation of the two
measures. Headed jointly by Senator Fulbright and Congressman
Morgan this ad hoc connmittee slowly began to negotiate toward some
compromise legislation that could accomodate the widely separate
viewpoints of the Foreign Relations and the Foreign Affairs Committees.
August passed into September, and October came and went without
agreement. A State- Defense Joint Position Paper which was prepared
for the conference committee argued that final passage of the Foreign
Assistance Bill in the Senate version "would necessitate a cut of
^/military assistance funds to the/ forward defense countries (Korea,
Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Republic of China) by about 40 percent
in order to leave necessary funds for Latin America, Africa, Indonesia,
and the Philippines. "^^ There is no evidence that this paper had any
impact on the deliberations of the committee in regard to military
19/ Although the House vote was close (202 to 194), there was
little evidence of sharp division on the same issues which marked the
Senate proceedings.







Finally, on October 31, The New York Times reported that the
work of the conference committee was nearly complete and that the
"only rennaining issue between the conferrees is the Defense Depart-
ment's $400 million revolving fund for guarantying credit extended by
the Export-Import Bank to undeveloped countries for purchase of U. S.
arms ajid other military equipment. "^ Given the different points of
departure of the conferrees, it was evident that much had been accom-
plished in nine weeks, however, according to the report, the commit-
tee had reached an impasse on the matter of the revolving fund.
The Senate version of the authorization calls for
termination of the fund on Decenaber 31 /_19677. The
House passed measure has no corresponding provision.
But House negotiators proposed a compromise settlement
that would gradually end the revolving fund and arms
credit sales to poor countries by June 30, 1969.
Mr. Fulbright said that this proposal was unacceptable
to the Senate conferrees. He said that he had made a
counterproposal calling for an end of the sales by next
June 30 /_i9b8j . "The House conferrees have rejected our
offer, " he said, "and thats where the matter rests. The
prospects don't look good. "23
21/ Apparently this paper had little impact on any feature of the
foreign assistance legislation under consideration. It also addressed a
House passed measure which would have banned assistance to countries
which permitted shipping of their registry to trade with North Vietnam.
This measure was included in the final compromise bill.




One of the prospects, of course, was that the Congress might
reach adjournment without having passed authorizing legislation for
either economic or military assistance. Considering the existing
commitments and the large bureaucratic structures associated with
both forms of assistance, the lack of such legislation would cause
a fiscal calamity. The pressure of time seemed to work to the
advantage of the proponents of restraining the Military Assistance
Program. Sensing this. Senator Fulbright announced that "he was
prepared to let the legislative authority for the $Z. 7 billion foreign
aid program lapse rather than pernnit a continuation beyond next
June 30 of arms credit sales to poor countries. "'^ This served
notice on Congressman Morgan and his House conferees that Senator
Fulbright and his colleagues would be satisfied to endure a deadlock
in the negotiations and the consequences which v/ould follow. The
House must either accept restraint of military assistance or forfeit
the entire foreign aid program. As phrased by an editorial in
The New York Tipmes,
This extraordinary deadlock is the result of a
profound cleavage over a basic principle. Mr. Fulbright
and his supporters on the issue attack the Pentagon fund
as a device that has succeeded both in eluding Congressional
control and in ballooning arms sales to underdeveloped
regions to dangerous heights. The House conferees who
have rallied behind the Administration in the controversy
defend the fund as a mechanism that gives the U. S. the
24/ The New York Times, October 31, 1967.
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flexibility it needs to make sales in the interest of
collective security. . . . The flexibility given the
Administration by the revolving fund has been
abused. It has made it too easy for the Pentagon's
salesmen to arrange arms deals that could not
always be justified on the basis of the national
interest.
The importctnt principle is that the Pentagon must
go to Congress and not to the Export-Import Bank for
arms credits deemed vital to collective security.
^/italics supplied^/ An obvious compromise would
be to get rid of the Pentagon fund and the shadowy
procedure it engenders, and to have Congress appro-
priate money for such credit as part of the regular
foreign aid program. Whatever sales were then made
would have to be justified in the open. ^^
The deadlock would not be broken, however, on the initiative
of Senator Fulbright or Congressmaja Morgan (or on the advice of
the press). Rather, the decisive move which ultimately brought
about resolution of the revolving fund issue came out of House
action on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill.
Congressman Conte and the Appropriations Bill
During the time that the conference committee had been attempt-
ing to negotiate away the differences in the foreign assistance authori-
zation bills, the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations had been drafting its report on the Foreign
Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for fiscal 1968.
The House managers of this bill had realized that the deadlocked
25/ The New York Times, November 1, 1967.
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authorization bill might be long delayed and had laid plans to bypass
its passage altogether by bringing the appropriations bill before the
House as soon as it was reported by the cognizant committee. In order
to do this it was necessary to ask the House Rules Committee for a
special rule "barring points of order against taking up the appro-
priations bill on the House floor before a vote was taken on the
authorization legislation. " According to Washington newsmaji
Belair, "this matneuver was calculated to put pressure on the con-
ference committee to reach an early agreement on the authorization
bill and to remove one of the obstacles in the way of an early congres-
sional adjournment. "^
'
CongressmaJi Silvio O. Conte, who had shown himself during
the hearings to be of like mind with those who would restrain the
Military Assistance Program, felt that the overall situation (the
authorization deadlock, the pressure of time, and the growing con-
gressional interest in curtailing the spread of arms) afforded an
opportunity for the introduction of restraining measures which he
considered appropriate. He proposed that the follov/ing two amend-
ments to the appropriations bill be included in his subcommittee's
report;
26/ Plans to request this special rule were reported in The New
York Times




1. That none of the funds contained in this
paragraph and none of the funds contained in the military
assistance credit sales revolving fund shall be used to
finance directly or indirectly the purchase or acquisition
of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile
systems and jet aircraft for military purposes by or
for any underdeveloped country (as defined on page 142
of part 2 of the printed hearings of the House Committee
on Appropriations on the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assis-
tance Appropriations) other than Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea:
Provided further. That the military assistance program
for ajiy country shall not be increased beyond the amount
justified to the Congress, unless the President determines
that an increase in such program is essential to the national
interest of the United States and reports each such deter-
mination to the House of Representatives and the Senate
within thirty days after each such determination.
2. The President is directed to withhold economic
assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent
by any underdeveloped country (as defined on page 142
of part 2 of the printed hearings of the House Committee
on Appropriations on the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assis-
tance Appropriations) other than Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines and Korea
for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems such as
missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes
from any country. °
Congressman Conte's amendments (v/hich were co- sponsored by
Congressman Clarence D. Long -- amd, hence, known as the "Conte-
LiOng amendments") drew an immediate response from the executive
branch. Mr. Belair reported that,
28/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Foreign A s sis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1968, Report of the
Committee on Appro^jriations, 90th Congress, 1st session. Report




The White House has served notice on George H. Mahon
(D - Tex. ), v^ho is chairman of the Appropriations Commit-
tee, that both of Mr. Conte's amendments would tie the
President's hands in carrying out U.S. foreign policy and
should be rejected. Thus a routine subcommittee session
called to consider "perfecting language" for the Conte
proposals was transformed into a heated session attended
by Mr. Mahon as an ex-officio member of the subcommittee
But in the end, Mr. Conte, with support from several
Democratic members persuaded a majority of the group
that the money /appropriations/ bill would have little
chance of acceptance on the House floor without his
amendments. ^9
According to Mr. Belair's impression,
It was in an effort to brighten the otherwise
dismal prospect confronting the aid legislation
that Mr. Conte proposed to modify the money bill
with his two amendments. . . . The proposals . . .
were also designed to placate Senate opposition
to consideration of a foreign aid money bill with-
out prior approval of the authorizing legislation. ^^
Whatever Congressman Conte's reasons, his efforts in favor of
restraining the Military Assistance Program had met with success, at
least thus far, and his amendments were included in the report published
by the Appropriations Committee. In an appendix to that report Mr.
Conte provided a comprehensive statement of his viev/s on foreign
assistance in general and military assistance in particular. He pointed
out the "extraordinary circumstances" which faced the United States:




the war in Vietnam with its hugh cost, the "staggering budget deficit"
ajid potential financial crisis, and the "ever increasing" domestic
problems. In view of these circamstauices, Mr. Conte felt himself
compelled to support a reduction in appropriations for military assis-
tance. Moreover, he felt compelled to take some initiative in restrict-
ing the sale of "sophisticated weapons. " Mr. Conte stated that.
It is obvious that one guiding principle which we must
follow in the administration of our programs is to provide
that particular assistance in that particular area which
will most benefit the recipients.
There is another guiding principle which is equally
important but not as obvious in application.
Our assistance must not be in conflict with the basic
goals and precepts of this nation.
The interpretation and the interplay of these two
principles can result in strain and conflict. It is important,
therefore, to understand the intent of any actions in order
to deal with the realities of the situation rather than with
illusions.
Our bill this year has two new provisions dealing with
the sale of sophisticated military weapons. One provision
in effect prohibits the use of our military assistance pro-
gram and the Defense Department's revolving credit sales
fund to finance the purchase of sophisticated weapons for
or by most underdeveloped countries.
The second provision states that a reduction will be made
in our economic assistance to any of these underdeveloped
countries equivalent to the anaounts which they spend to
purchase sophisticated v,/eapons fronn. any country.
What are the realities of these provisions? What are
the illusions ?
Last year I quoted the following statement from the
report of the Foreign Affairs Committee:
It is important that less developed countries not be
encouraged to divert their limited resources from
programs of economic and social development to
building military establishments larger
than are necessary to maintain internal security
and defend against border incursions.
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Last year I quoted that statement favorably and with
hope. This year I cannot.
Today, it is not sufficient "not to encourage. " Positive
steps are now required. We must neither assist nor support
these highly dangerous self-defeating actions.
It is illusion to answer this by stating -- Who are we,
the United States, to decide what are highly dangerous
and self-defeating actions for others to take.
It is absolutely true that we do not have the right to
decide that question for others. This is not what is being
advocated. /Jtaiics supplied^
What we do have the right to do, and what these two
provisions do advocate, is for us to conduct our own
foreign assistance programs in such a manner as to
assure that we will not be a party to actions which we
believe to be incorrect, dangerous and wasteful. This
is not only our right; it is our responsibility.
I am deeply concerned with and disturbed by the
development of an arms race in Latin America. As I
stated earlier, I have held this concern since I first
came to Congress. I am similarly concerned with an
arnris race developing in Africa. These are frightening
consequences.
The control and limitation of arms in the world today
ranks second to no issue.
And we are dealing with countries who simply cannot
afford to and do not have any need to invest their precious
limited resources in the sophisticated devices that man
has invented to destroy himself.
The greatest threat to security in Latin America today
comes from within, not from without. A-ny dangers there
to national sovereignty are from internal unrest and dis-
satisfaction, not from external attack aund aggression.
You do not meet dangers such as these with jet fighter
aircraft or missile systems.
You do meet them with economic and social and health
and educational programs.
You meet them by fighting to inaprove daily existence
by fighting disease, poverty, illiteracy and starvation,
not by preparing to fight an enemy that is not there and
that does not exist.
What then will you acconaplish by an arms race? You
stand the good chance of creating that enemy that presently
is not there.
For as all of the countries of Latin America find them-
selves more and more heavily armed, there is more and
more a chance that one country is going to use this
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armament against another. And then the attacked country-
is going to use its armament to retaliate. At that point
you will have completed a "successful" arms race.
This is what I fear. Our efforts should be directed toward
preventing anyone from reaching this "peril point"; in no
event should we be of any assistance in bringing it about.
I do not agree with those who say if we do not sell others
will and they will reap financial benefits which we should
just as well obtain. We must make a total effort to prevent
this from happening. We can do no more than try, but we
must try. ^ 1
Congressman Conte concluded his statement justifying his position
with the following argument concerning the misuse of resources.
. . . we are concerned here with underdeveloped countries
countries that have basic and essential problems that must
be dealt with on an immediate basis.
These countries must deal with problems which our
nation has been fortunate enough never to have faced. They
must deal with them further more, with severely limited
resources relative to the scope and the difficulties that
the problems entail.
No country can afford to be wasteful and these countries
least of all.
The purchase of sophisticated weapons of war by these
countries Ccui be classified in no other category than that
of being wasteful. We should take no part in assisting or
encouraging this unfortunate misuse of limited resources.
We are on the one hand trying to supplement limited
resources in order to assist these countries in developing
to their fullest capacity as quickly as possible. If, on the
other hand, w^e turn around and sell them weapons that they
cannot afford and do not need, we are defeating our ov/n
programs. /Italics supplied^/
Similarly, if we provide assistance to an underdeveloped
country which, in turn, uses its own resources to purchase
sophisticated weapons, it is as if our economic assistance
31/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives . Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies ... Report No. 891, pp. 27-29.
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was being diverted to the purchase of these sophisticated
weapons, a result which cannot be justified. . . .
By no stretch of anyone's imagination can the purchase of
sophisticated weapons by underdeveloped countries be con-
sidered an efficient mobilization of resources. It is just
the opposite. By diverting the country's own resources
from being used in an effective manner, it completely
dilutes, the effectiveness of our assistance.
It makes our assistance -- aid provided as a substitute
for meaningful self-help -- aid wasted. -^
The success which Congressman Conte enjoyed in persuading his
fellow subcommittee members to endorse his amendments did not go
unnoticed by the congressmen who were still trying to resolve the
deadlock on the authorization bill. Mr. Belair noted that.
In the aftermath of the _/Foreign OperationJ7 subcommittee
action, Thomas E. Morgan (D - Pa.), chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, ordered a caucus of
his conferees on the authorization measure and, there-
after, requested another meeting with negotiators in
the Senate. -^
It must have occured to Congressman Morgan that, should the
final appropriations legislation contain the Conte- Long amendments,
the major objection which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
held against the Defense Department's revolving fund (that the fund
was used to finance arms sales to underdeveloped countries) could no
longer be strictly relevant. It would really make little difference then
32/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies ... Report No. 891, p. 30.
33/ The New York Times, November 1, 1967.
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whether the fund was abolished in 1968 or 1969. There was still no
question of weaning Senator Fuibright away from his position; he had
only just reiterated his argument on the floor of the Senate, proclaim-
ing that,
. . . the public interest would be better served by
no foreign aid bill than by the bill v/hich passed the
House, /a bill which/ would allow -- indeed encourage
--a continuation of the policy of arming poor and
underdeveloped countries.
The report which contained the Conte-Long amendments (and
Mr. Conte's statement) was published on November 6, 1967. On
November 7, the conference committee advised both houses of the
Congress that the deadlock had been broken. The House conferees
had accepted the compromise offered by Senator Fuibright -- the
revolving fund would be abolished on June 30, 1968- .
The Form of Restraint in the Authorization Act
Having finally arrived at a compromise, the joint leaders of the
conference committee presented their report -- and the final form of
the authorization act --to their respective committees. In this
form it was apparent that most of the provisions restraining the
Military Assistance Program had been retained -- the Senate conferees
seemed to have compromised very little, while those from the House
34/ The Nevv- York Times, November 1, 1967.
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abandoned virtually all of their recommendations for expanding the
program. The resultant "compromise" report noted the following
items:
1. The authority of the Defense Department to guarantee the
financing of arms sales would be terminated on June 30, 1968; like-
wise, the revolving fund would be abolished on that date.
2. The President was directed to take into account, when furnish-
ing economic assistance, "the percentage of the recipient or pur-
chasing country's budget which is devoted to military purposes, " and,
"the degree to which the recipient or purchasing country is using its
foreign exchange resources to acquire military equipment. " When
such a country was either diverting U. S. assistance to military expen-
ditures or "diverting its own resources to unnecessary military
expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its develop-
ment" the President was directed to terminate economic assistance
35
"until he is assured that such diversion will no longer take place. "
(This is the form of the Symington amendment agreed upon by the
conference committee. )
3. The ceiling on military assistance and sales to Latin America
was established at $75 million (an even split between the $50 million
recommended by the Senate ajid the $100 million recommended by the
35/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Public
Law 87^195, 75 Stat. 424, Section 620 (s)jadded by Section 301 (f) (4)




4. The ceiling on military assistance (including ail sales, grants,
training aoid services) to Africa was established at $40 million (raised
from, the recommended $25 million in recognition of the concern of the
House conferees "that adequate authority be available to innplement
the military sales ajid grant programs for those African countries
where military installations used by the United States are located as
well as for those countries threatened by the Soviet arms buildup in
that area'.'^^).
5. The limitation of $1. 5 million on military assistance to the
Central American Republics recommended by the Senate was "receded"
by the Senate conferees.
6. The President v/as directed to "promptly submit a report to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate on the implementation of each agree-
ment _£consented to by the President with any recipient countryV to
transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article so furnished to
37
it /by the U. S^ to any person, organization, or government. "
7. The Secretary of State was directed "to transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
36/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives , Conference Report
on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, 90th Congress, 1st session, Report
No. 892 (November 7, 1967) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), p. 32.
37/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 521 (c) (2),
addedTy Section 201 (o) (7) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.
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Relations of the Senate semiannual reports of all exports during the
preceding six months of significant defense articles on the United
States Munitions List to any foreign government, international organ-
ization, or other foreign recipient or purchaser. "-^^
8. The amount of funds agreed to be authorized for military assis-
tance expenditure was $510 million -- of which $24. 1 million would be
spent for International Military Headquarters (to be retained within the
military assistance budget). Thus, the amount which would be available
for grant military assistance in fiscal year would be $485. 9 million --
pending acceptance of a corresponding amount in the appropriations
bill.
9. The "40 country restriction" on military assistance, which
was recommended by the House to be dropped, was retained, at the
insistence of the Senate conferees.
In his statement incident to presenting the conference report to
the Senate, Senator Fulbright took justifiable pride in the results
which he and the other Senate conferees (Senators Sparkman, Mansfield,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams)
had obtained.
I believe that this conference report approached
more closely the action of the Senate then at any
other time since I have handled the foreign aid bill
/which he had done as chairman of the Foreign
38/ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 634 (g), added by
Section 302 (h) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.
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Relations Committee since 1959/. ... I take a greater
measure of satisfaction tha-n is usually the case each
year in presenting the conference report on foreign aid
for the Senate's consideration. When the foreign aid
bill passed the Senate I promised that I would" . . .
let the bill languish in conference indefinitely if we
cannot reach a satisfactory agreement on the major
proposals. " This conference report, I believe, sus-
tains the Senate position on all basis issues, and
in particular, its position on arms sales. . . .
The conference agreed, with slight modification,
to the amendment of the Senior Senator from Missouri
_/_Syrn.ington/ which prohibits aid to countries which
divert our aid, or their own resources, to military
purposes to the extent that economic development is
impaired. This is a very significant annendment which,
if used effectively by executive branch officials,
should act as a restraint on useless military spending
by aid recipients. It is also intended to restrain
our bureaucracy who, all too often, whet the arms
appetites of foreign generals and admirals. ... In
too many countries our economic aid goes in one
pocket and comes out the other in the form of
sophisticated -- but useless -- weapons, often bought
from the United States. /Jtalics supplied^ . . .
Finally, I come to the point which was most trouble-
some in conference -- the amendment of the Senior
Senator from Idaho JjZharchT, . . . which repealed the
Department of Defense's authority to finance long-
term credit sales to underdeveloped countries through
a revolving fund. . . .1 believe that the repeal of the
guaranty program and the abolition of the revolving fund
are importajit steps tov/a rd bringing about a foreign
policy designed to meet our long-range interests of
building a more stable and peaceful world. The true
interests of America are not served by a program
which puts sophisticated weapons in the hands of
poor people around the world while giving lip service
to stopping arms races. The repeal of this arms sales
authority will do much to make the officials in the
executive branch practice what they preach, ^/italics
supplied."/ ^9
39/ U.S. , Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session,
Vol. iTT, pt. 23 (November 8, 1967), pp. 31713-31714.

395
Senator Fulbright could not have made it more clear that his
purpose, cind the purpose of his colleagues, in restraining certain
features of the Military Assistance Program (and the bureaucrats
who conducted the program) was to exercise influence on the foreign
policy of the United States. Certainly enough restraint would be
imposed on the Military Assistance Program to reflect the foreign
policy wishes of the Congress wherever that program was applied.
The leading conferee for the House of Representatives, Congress-
man Morgan, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was under-
stajidably less excited about presenting the conference report to
his side of the Congress.
Mr. Speaker, the conference on the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967 has been long drawn out and frustrating. The
managers on the part of the House found themselves in dis-
agreement with the representatives of the Senate on funda-
mental issues. . . . Under the circumstances, it was very
difficult to establish a basis for reaching agreement on
important provisions of the legislation. . . .
The most difficult and time-consuming issue which the
conference had to deal with involved sales of military
equipment on credit terms and the authority for the
Defense Department to guarantee such credits. The Senate
conferees took the position that the guarauntee program
existed primarily to encourage the governments of the
underdeveloped countries to spend money for military
equipment they could not afford. ...
It has always seemed to us that we should never put
ourselves in the position where we would say to a country,
"We will give you equipment free but we won't let you pay
for it, " or where the Pentagon would find it easier or
more attractive to make grants than to negotiate credit
sales. . . .
The House managers found thenn.seives unable to re-
fute arguments made by the Senate in opposition to
certain provisions of the House bill which had been
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adopted during floor consideration of the bill. When,
we were asked about the implications or consequences
of some of this language, we had to admit that these
matters had not been explored in detail by the com-
mittee or by the House, and that we did not know all
of the answers. '*0
Congressman Morgan had been handling the foreign aid bill for
the same length of time as had Senator Fulbright (having also become
chairman of his committee in 1959). It is somewhat surprising that
he should have been so ill prepared to deal with either Senator
Fulbright's arguments or his intransigence. The Foreign Affairs
Committee had conducted 31 days of hearings on the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967; I, 372 pages of testimony had been taken from 92
witnesses (Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler had each appeared
twice to testify auid Vice Admiral Heinz, the Director of Military Assis-
tance, had returned to the comnnittee five times). In contrast, the
Foreign Relations Committee had met for only three days, during which
they heard 15 witnesses (none more than once) ajid accumulated only
322 pages of testimony. True, as the Foreign Relations Committee
report had admitted, much of the information on which that committee
based its decisions had come from the hearings conducted by the Gore
and Symington subcommittees. These two subcommittees had met a
total of 12 days and had received testimony pertinent to the Military
Assistance Program from six witnesses (Assistance Secretary
40/ U. So Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session.
Vol. iTT, pt. 23, (November 8, 1967), pp. 31742-31743.
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McNaaghton appeared twice before the Gore subcommittee). Even
including the work of the subcommittee, it is obvious that the Foreign
Relations Committee members had given themselves only minimum
exposure to the faces and arguments of the executive officials charged
with the conduct of the Military Assistance Program. Yet, the Foreign
Relations Committee report stated that the committee had "not been
presented with any persuasive evidence, " and that "the executive
branch did not make a persuasive case. " Noting the difference
between the time devoted to examination of the Military Assistance
Progrctm by the two committees, one might well ask whether the
Foreign Relations Committee had given the executive branch sufficient
opportunity to provide evidence and to make a case that would have
seemed persuasive to the committee.
One has only to scan the testimony taken by the two committees
(and the two subcommittees) to see that, where the Senators had
approached each nneeting in a mood that challenged persuasion, the
congressman had not. Indeed, the naood of the congressmen seems to
have been one of friendly curiosity. Where the Gore and Symington
subcommittees -- and the Foreign Relations Committee itself -- had
sharply questioned the adnninistration's witnesses (one might say,
according to a "script" provided by Dr. Bader), the Foreign Affairs
Committee had contented itself with a hospitable dialogue. The
Foreign Relations Committee had used its tinne to gather evidence which
supported its point of view and which tended to corroborate the conclusions
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which Dr. Bader had set out in his staff study. The Foreign Relations
Committee had recognized a certain vulnerability of the executive
brajich (which -was conveniently pointed out by Dr. Bader) and had
shrewdly planned to capitalize on a thrust against that weak point.
The Foreign Affairs Committee, on the other hand, apparently enter-
tained no other motive in conducting its hearings than the routine
performance of its duty of legislative review.
All in ail, it would seem fair to say, based upon the hearings
conducted by the committees, the reports which they authored, and
the outcome of the deliberations of the conference committee, that
while the Foreign Affairs Committee had limited its work to the barest
legislative oversight, the Foreign Relations Committee had passed
beyond oversight and moved towards legislative control. When they
met in conference, the House conferees who had, until then, ignored
the issues inherent in the Military Assistance Program were simply
no match for their counterparts from the Senate.
In what amounted to an apology to his colleagues in the House
for emerging from the conference with a foreign assistance bill so
different from the one which they had passed. Congressman Morgan
warned that there would be little likelihood of overcoming Senator
Fulbright's opposition by returning the compromise bill to the con-
ference committee.
I just want to say that if this bill is sent
back to conference, any bill that we might bring
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back is not likely to satisfy very many of the
critics. '*!
Having observed the tedious progress of the conference committee
for two months, the members of the House apparently concurred with
Congressman Morgan's pessinnistic appraisal of any further action.
The House agreed to accept the compromise bill.
Almost simultaneously, but in a rather different mood, the Senate
also agreed to accept the compromise bill. Within a week, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967 had been signed into law by the President (on
November 14, 1967).
PASSAGE OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1968
The House Appropriations Committee Report
The report on the foreign assistance appropriations bill which
the House Appropriations Committee submitted on November 6, 1967,
had contained more than the Conte-Long amendments which have already
been noted. The proper function of the appropriations bill was, after
all, the designation of funds in discrete amounts which could be drawn
from the United States Treasury and expended in the ways approved by
the companion authorizing legislation. The Foreign Operations Sub-
committee of the Appropriations Committee had responded to the
41/ U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session,
Vol. m, pt. 23 (November 8, 1967), p. .31743.
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administration's request for $596 million for the Military Assistance
Program by recommending that a maximum of $365 nnillion be appro-
priated. Thus, Congressman Passman demonstrated the seriousness
of his concern about federal spending by cutting the budget request
which General Wheeler had described as the "absolute mininnum"
by slightly over 40 percent. Included in the reduction was disapproval
of the request for $60 million for the credit sales revolving fund.
Whereas most of the restrictions in the authorizing legislation (and
the Conte-Long axnendments in the appropriations bill) were aimed at
the arms sales component of the Military Assistance Program, this
drastic budget reduction recommended for the appropriations bill
was targeted on the very core of the program -- grant military assis-
tance. The $510 million which the authorization measure had provided
was in itself a considerable cut below the "absolute nainimum. " A
reduction of 40 percent might gut the program and render ineffectual
many of the allied forces which were supposed to play a complementary
role with United States forces within a framework of collective security.
The continued viability of the Military Assistance Program had
suddenly fallen into jeopardy.
The appropriations bill, however, was still only a bill and not
yet a law. Before the House of Representatives could vote on the
version recommended by the Appropriations Committee it had first to
decide whether it was proper for that committee to have inserted the
Conte-Long amendments (and certain other amendments) into the bill.
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These amendments, it seemed, looked like "legislation, " as opposed
to pure "appropriation" auid, therefore might be considered out of
place. Legislation was the prerogative of the "legislating committees"
of the House -- such as the Committee on Foreign Affairs -- ajcid,
traditionally, the Appropriations Committee was never permiitted to
address any part of legislation except the amounts of funding keyed
into authorizing legislation. These amounts the committee could
increase or decrease and whatever language it eraployed was normally
limited to explcinations for the changes which it made. The Conte-Long
amendments obviously seemed to go beyond the traditional contribution
of the Appropriations Committee; therefore, it was necessary to
arrange for House approval of a special rule which would waive
"points of order" that might be raised against consideration of an
appropriations bill containing such amendments. While passage of
the appropriations bill was thus delayed in the House, the executive
branch used the time to plead its case for a strong Military Assistance
Program before the last congressional forum to hold hearings on the
subject.
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations
Judging from the experience of congressional action vis-a-vis
the foreign assistance legislation up to this point in 1967, it was
apparent that the administration would require a strong champion in
the Congress simply to preserve the Military assistance Progrann as
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it had been -- the hope for any sort of enlargement of the prograna died
when the authorization measure became law. Although the Senate
Appropriations Committee would prove to be sympathetic with the
arguments of the executive branch, it was historically a less than
rewarding "court of last appeal, " and not a likely group to provide
the needed champion. An excellent study of the comparative behavior
of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees during the period,
1947 to 1962, showed that,
"What the Senate Committee usually did when the House
voted a decrease /_in an executive budget request^/ was to
increase the appropriation above the House figure. This
it did 62. 7 per cent (96 cases) of the time. But, again,
in 66 of those 96 cases, the Senate figure still put the
agency at an appropriations level lower than the previous
year. When the House Committee decides to keep an agency
below its previous year's appropriation, the Senate usually
-- in 123 of 153 cases (80. 4 per cent) -- concurs.
One reason why the Senate Appropriations Committee normally
reflects the action of the House is because its members "act after the
House has acted, they know what the House has done, and they sit as
43
an appellate court to hear agency appeals for restoration. " Another
reason is that the Senators, all of whom have several committee
responsibilities, simply do not have the time to educate themselves
42/ Richard F. Fenno, Jr. , The Power of the Purse; Appropria-






on the details of each budget proposal. They are, therefore, much
less well prepared to pronounce on those details than their House
counterparts whose only committee responsibility is the preparation of
the appropriations bills. Some reliance is always placed on the pre-
vious decisions of the House when the Senate finally comes to the con-
sideration of any budget proposal.
The hearings which the Senate Appropriations Committee began
on November 14, 1967, were somewhat premature in that House action
on the foreign assistance appropriations bill had not yet been completed
(the matter of approving the insertion of the Conte-Long amendments
was still to be resolved before a vote cound be taken). The time of
adjournment was approaching, however, and the Senate's bill had to
be recommended out of the committee.
It was not until the second day of hearings (the first having been
devoted to testimony on the Peace Corps, the Ryukyu Islands, and
assistance to refugees) that testimony was received relative to mili-
tary assistance issues. On November 15, Mr. Harold Linder, the
44/ According to Professor Ffenno, "Executive officials are
virtually unanimous in describing Senate /Appropriations/ Committee
hearings as being less well attended, less detailed, less intensive, less
focused, and shorter than hearings before the House ^AppropriationsV
Committee.
. . . they consider their relationship with the House Coin-
mitee as the nnore consequential. House members are seen as
devoting themselves single-mindedly to the appropriations tasks. And
House members are seen as setting the basic framework of decision. "




president of the Export - Import Bank appeared to justify his budget
request for support of the Bank. Mr. Linder, it will be recalled,
had given testimony before the Passman subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee in March and before both the Senate and
House Banking and Currency Committees in July. On all three
occasions he had been interrogated about the Bank's participation in
the financing of arms sales, and, in particular, about country - X
loans. The House Appropriations Committee had reported a recom-
mended cut of $300 million in the Bank's budget (as a foreign assis-
tance "related agency"); now Mr. Linder was appealing for a re-
instatement of those funds.
The nominal chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee
was Senator Carl Hayden (D - Ariz.), however, it was Senator John
O. Pastore (D - R. I. ) who presided on this occasion. Senator Hayden
considered it his duty to attend the hearings, but being 90 years old
(and in his 40th year in the Senate) he was content to allow others to
lead the progress of the meetings.
Senator Pastore was a little unsure about how to begin question-
ing the Export - Import Bank president.
SENATOR PASTORE. How much of /the Bank's $1.5
billion contribution to the U. S. balance of payments/
would be arms sales?
MR. LINDER. Very little because the arms sales
that we made have been made on 5 to 7 year terms . , ,
SENATOR PASTORE, The reason why I raised the
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question is because there had been this hassle over the
arms sales. In the authorization act which is now tied
up in the J_Hou.seJ Rules Committee, does that have the
Conte amendment ?
THE CLERK. No; the Conte aimendment is on the '
appropriation bill itself.
SENATOR PAST ORE. On this one? /italics suppiied*7
MR. MIDDLETON. /Vice President of the Bank?. The
Conte amendment is in the appropriation bill. '*^
It would be difficult to find a better example of a lack of prepara-
tion on the part of a Senator for a committee meeting, and especially
a meeting over which he would preside. The authorization act for
foreign assistajice was not "tied up in the /_House/ Rules Committee"
-- it had been signed into law the previous day by the President. The
Conte-Long amendments were a major controversial issue in the bill
which the Senate Appropriations Corninittee was meeting to review.
If Senator Pastore was unsure of the issues. Senator Allen J.
Ellender (D - La.) was not. It was Senator Ellender who had appeared
at the July 25 session" of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
to urge that comnnittee to deal severely with the Bank's increasing
involvement in arms sales. At that time he had characterized that
involvement as a "perversion. " Now he was on hand to prejudice the
45/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968, Hearings Before the
Committee on Appropriations, 90th Congress, 1st session (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 254.
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administration's case before the Appropriations Committee, of which
he was a member.
SENATOR EL.LENDER. My position, as you know,
has been against loaning money guaranteed by a
Federal agency. You say that in your contemplated
loans for fiscal year 1968 you have $180 million
that you expect to handle should DOD present them
to you.
MR. LINDER. No, sir, we will not handle them until
the House and the Senate have finally made a deter-
mination. Now they have made certain determinations
incident to the AID /"foreign assistance_/ authorization
bill. These are the provisions of the Church amend-
ment, which will impose some limitations on us. When
Congress has completed all relevant legislation, if we
are permitted to make such loans, I think we will be
prepared to do up to the amount of about $180 million.
But until they make theraselves clear we are not going
to do cLnything. . . . we are dead in the water at the
moment. We are dead in the water because of the
foreign aid legislation which we are discussing now and
the fact that there is no continuing resolution. So we
have no. basis on which to do anything today until this
legislation which you are discussing at the moment
has been enacted. . . . /jtalics supplied^
SENATOR EL.LENDER. I hope that you and your board
looks into this very carefully and not further tarnish or
blemish the good reputation of the Export-Import Bank
in using its facilities to make loans for military hard-
ware to underdeveloped countries. I think it is shame-
ful for that ever to have occurred. ^^
It is interesting to note that, at least according to Mr. Linder,
credit arms sales financed through the Export - Import Bank (which
46/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1968, pp. 256-258.
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included ail country - X loans) had been brought to a halt by this
date. Not quite 11 months after the publication of Dr. Bader's study
a good deal of the Defense Department's enterprise, headed by Mr.
Kuss, was "dead in the water" -- and congressional action in restraint
of the Military Assistance Program was not yet completed.
Apparently recognizing that Mr. Linder could provide little
further sport, the committee dismissed him and turned (the following
day) its attention to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Secretary McNamara arrived before the committee very much
upset about the budget reduction in the authorization act (which was
no^w law) and even more distressed about the potential reduction in
funds for the Military Assistance Program which the House seemed
about to enact. Referring to the latter reduction, he told the committee.
Accommodation of a cut of this magnitude will
involve difficult choices between equally undesirable
alternatives. The program cannot be decreased further
without diminishing the free world common defense pos-
ture v/e rely on as an extension of our own national
defense and to which we are often committed by treaties.
The inevitable result of a sudden, sharp curtail-
ment would be what I referred to three years ago when,
in May 1964, 1 fj,3iidj . . . that" "The alternatives are
clear: If nnilitary assistance is cut, the United States
must make up for the redactions with U.S. forces, or
must retrench its foreign policy. " /italics supplied^^/
The issue is even more critical today. Our current
deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam makes the first
alternative even less acceptable than before, and the
second does not recommend itself at a time v/hen a
weakening in our support of free world common defense
efforts elsewhere might enaboiden potential aggressors
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and weaken the resolve of our allies. . . .
I hope, therefore, that this Committee will bear with
me while I restate the basis for our proposals and that
it will then recommend legislative action which will,
to the extent now possible, ensure the minimum adequate
ongoing contribution of military assistance to the
security of the United States and the conduct of its
foreign policy. Both are presently predicated on the
existence of a collective security system which cannot
yet operate effectively without the moral and material
support provided by the United States through the
Military Assistance Program. '^^
Secretary McNamara then demonstrated for the committee the
arguments pertinent to the proposed allocation of military assistance
for each of the "forward defense countries" -- Korea, the Republic
of China, Turkey, Iran, and Greece. In each case he stressed the
contribution which that country was making to the whole scheme of
collective security which had long been the cornerstone of United
States foreign policy. Capping those arguments, the Secretary of
Defense said.
I believe the total reduction of $22 5 million, pro-
vided for in the House bill, would signal to free world
and Communist countries alike a substantial weakening
in our commitment to collective security. Programs for
the "hard core" forward defense and base rights countries
would have to be cut back very sharply. The Soviets
would not be slow in benefiting from the vacuum. To me,
it appears absurd to jeopardize the security we planned
to buy with a $70 billion defense budget because of a
failure to provide a few hundred million in military
assistance. It would be equally foolish, as I see it.
47/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1968, p. 328.
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to emasculate the complementary foreign nniiitary sales
program which, during the past six years, has become aji
increasingly important instrument of national policy
enabling us to terminate our grant aid programs to many
countries. ^^
The Secretary then provided the Senators with a list of those
countries for which military assistance was planned. After having
justified the amounts which he would have allocated to each country,
he challenged the members of the committee.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. The problem is to scan that
list and ask yourself where you would take out $225 mil-
lion /the amount which the House had recommended cut-
ting/. It is just impossible to take it out without disas-
trously aifectingoursexiriTt^ 77^. /italics supplied^/
SENATOR PASTORE. The problem ... if I may say
something, is that the House committee recommended
$365 million. If the House, itself, sustains that, even
if you go back with $510 million /the amount given in the
authorization act/ there is going to be a compromise.
SECRETARY McNAIvIARA. And then it will be
disastrous, /italics supplied^
SENATOR ELLENDER. Mr. McNamara, you have been
using that same language for the past 5 or 6 years.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. No, sir; I don't believe so.
SENATOR ELLENDER. The record will show it.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I wish you would point to it
in the record, I don't believe I have. "
48/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related





Perhaps if Secretary McNamara had painted the reduction in
funds for military assistance as dramatically as this during the earlier
committee hearings in 1967 he might have done a better job of per-
suading members of those committees not to recommend such drastic
cuts. (A survey of Secretary McNamara's testimony before this com-
mittee in the years 1961 to 1966 indicated that his language -- contrary
to Senator Ellender's charge -- had always been less emotional. )
In the colloquy between the Secretary of Defense and the members
of the Senate Appropriations Committee there were numerous evidences
of sympathy for the Secretary's position; the following examples illus-
trate the feelings of certain members and also the attitude of the
Secretary in regard to facets of the Military Assistance Program and
the legislation which would restrain it.
SENATOR SMITH. /Margaret C. Smith (R - Me.jT" Mr.
Secretary, for some tiine now I have been a supporter
of military assistance, as you know. I have specifically
defended military assistance to the Latin American
countries. . . . But the opposition to military assistance
is growing in the Senate. . . . The basic reason for such
opposition is that our military assistance supports
military dictatorships. What is your answer to such
arguments by distinguished leaders in the Senate who
so oppose military assistance?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. The total amount of military
assistance we propose to give to Latin America -- with
21 nations and a population of 240 million -- /is/ $45
million. Far from being the foundation for dictatorships
or the catalyst that supports movement toward dictatorships,
this $45 million is, in my opinion, a restraining influence,
an influence toward democracy. Perhaps even nnore im-
portantly, because it is a more powerful influence in this
other area, it is an influence toward restraint on military
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expenditures. . . .
This very small military aid program has been
used to hold down, not to expand, the military forces
of Latin America. Beyond that, it has been used to
exercise a restraint on the forces of autocracy and
the forces of privilege in Latin America. ... '
SENATOR SMITH. I am sure you can understand the
dilemma that I have found myself in when in the past
I have supported cund defended military assistance,
and I continue to do so and want to do so. However,
when, such people as the majority leader ^/Senator
Mansfield/ and the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee /Senator Fulb right/ ajid other leading
members of the administration's party are opposing it
so strongly, I need some additional information from
you so I can strengthen my position.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. We are grateful for your support.
SENATOR SMITH. If you can give me any help, I will
be glad to have it. Mr. Secretary, will you give us a
one, two, three statement on v.^^hy v/e should strike the
House language on/_the Conte-Long amendments/?
SECRETARY McNAMARA. Certainly. (The statement
follov^s:)
Amendment Prohibiting Use of Military Assistance
or Credit Sales Revolving Funds for Financing Weapons
Purchased by Underdeveloped Countries.
1.. The apparent intent of the anaendment is to prevent
the U". S. military aid programs from contributing to arms
races or the diversion of development resources to un-
jiecessary military expenditures. Avoidance of such results
is and has been Executive Branch policy -- one which the
President has used persuasion and the influence of U. S.
military and economic aid to further. No additional
legislation is needed to state or enforce this policy.
2. The amendment would be harmful. The effects go
far beyond its apparent intent. It sets up a rigid and
arbitrary standard which sinnply ignores less developed
countries' needs and political realities.
. . .
The proposed amendment does not recognize the legiti-
mate defense needs of less developed countries other than
the seven countries specifically exempted. ... In the
rapidly changing international situation there will alnnost
certainly be other areas of the world where aggressive
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regimes create legitimate self-defense requirements among
neighboring countries and where peace may depend upon the
restoration of local balance of power. The proposed amend-
ment, however, with its blanket prohibition against all
"sophisticated" weapons fails to distinguish the legitimate
from the excessive. The exception contained in the amend-
ment only takes a partial "still" picture of a constantly
changing world situation and arbitrarily disregards defense
needs of additional countries in the present as well as of
other countries for whom valid weapons needs might quickly
arise in the future. . . .
3. Finally, the proposed amendment is almost impossible
to administer from a technical standpoint. There is no
effective standard for definition of "sophisticated weapons
systems. " Many types of jet military aircraft which v/ere
considered sophisticated a few years ago are obsolete or
obsolescent today. Other weapons systems which may be
sophisticated today will be obsolete tomorrow. The less
developed countries are at widely varying stages of develop-
naent. A jet aircraft which might be a sophisticated weapon
in the Congo might be basic equipment in. a relatively advanc-
ed country such as Spain. Moreover, some missile systems
and other advanced weapons are of use not only for defense
but also for counter-insurgency.
The technical deficiencies are not simply a question of
definitions. Rather they reflect the basic difficulty of
ajiy prohibition which seeks to apply a single arbitrary
standard to widely and constantly varying, situations.
/Amendment Reducing/ Economic Aid Because of
Military Purchases.
The Executive Branch opposes the amendment because its
inflexibility and excessive scope would be harmful in many
situations. . . . the recently passed Foreign Assistance Act
of 1967 already contains a provision /the Symington amend-
ment/ which effectively required such a policy. . . .
The proposed amendment recognizes neither the legitimate
defense needs of less developed countries, other than the
seven countries specifically exempted, nor the importance of
providing economic assistance to achieve important U. S.
foreign policy objectives. For example, should Thailand,
Laos, or South Vietnam find it necessary to purchase jet
aircraft, the amendment v/ould require reductions in
economic support for their efforts to counter Communist
insurgency. . . .
The proposed amendment puts achievennent ;f U. S.
policy objectives at the mercy of sales efforts of
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other nations, whether western European or Communist.
The proposed amendment discrinninated against
countries \«.'hich do not or cannot manufacture sophis-
ticated weapons themselves, but must obtain them from
other countries. In effect, it puts a premium on
the diversion of L.DC_/less developed countryV pro-
ductive capacity from development- oriented industries
into the production of armaments. ...
Finally, the proposed amendment is almo3t impossible
to administer from a technical standpoint. How is the
United States to determine what a particular less
developed country "spends" for "sophisticated weapons
systems"? Is the United States to consider actual
expenditures or commitments to buy? . . .
SENATOR SMITH. That is all for the moment. Thank
you very much.
50SECRETARY McNAMARA. You are very welcome. ^
The nex± example provides an indication of the extent to which the
Senate Appropriations Committee was willing to cooperate with the
Secretary of Defense.
SENATOR PASTORE. Are there any other remarks you
want to make with reference to the legislation, Mr. Secretary?
SECBLETARY McNAMARA. The legislation this year is
particularly restrictive, Mr. Chairman. Because so
many of the restrictions are included in the authorization
bill, it is impossible at this point to eliminate them.
Therefore, I will not take the time of the committee to
discuss them. I will wish to do so, however, next year.
The main problems we have with the House /appropriations/
bill are two. One is the amount of money proposed --
the $365 nxillion which is completely unsatisfactory and
which needs to be raised back to the $510 million ...
In any event, the first problenn we have is with the monetary
amount. I plead with you to raise it back to the authorized
50/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related




The second problem we have is with the so-called Conte-
LiOng axnendment which restricts the grant or sale of so-called
sophisticated equipment to certain countries. That is a very-
serious restriction.
SENATOR PAST ORE. Could we rewrite that in a way
that would be acceptable to you without eliminating it
entirely? /Italics supplied^/ The reason why I say that
is for practical purposes. Reading the section, it has
a tremendous amount of appeal. I think it is a matter
of carrying out your objective, yet preserving it and
yet rewriting it in such a way that it will be acceptable.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. I think the Congress has
realized over the years that there are a number of
restrictions in the foreign aid legislation which are
desirable v?ith certain exceptions, and it has provided
for those restrictions and for the exceptions by Ian- '
guage which, gives the President, upon his determination,
authority to make exceptions in those cases. I think we
might be able to apply that principle to this particular
provision.
SENATOR PASTORE. Try to work out some alternative
language, /italics suppTiedTT
SECRETARY McNAMARA. We will do so, Mr. Chairman.
/italics suppliedry ^^
The committee had not only asked the Secretary to provide them
with talking points which could be used in arguments on the Senate
floor and in conference with the House Appropriations Committee, but
had also given him carte blanche to help write alternatives to the
Conte-Long amendments -- this was certainly different from the treat-
ment which Secretary McNamara had received from the Passman
51/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related




The concluding discussion at this hearing could almost be deS'
cribed as a strategy session between the executive branch and the
committee.
SENATOR PASTORE. Chairman Hayden would like to
ask a question.
CHAIRMAN HAYDEN. I want to say this is the most
negative piece of legislation at which I have ever looked.
I hope that in your suggested amendments there can be
some way to take some of the do-nothings out of it,
prohibitions on it, so that we may act freely.
SECRETARY McNAMARA. We would Hke the advice
of your committee as to how far to go. This is a
problem of tactics with the House. We have a number
of suggestions. We would like to work with the staff
on those. We would like your guidance, /italics supplied_/7
SENATOR SMITH. The problem is more the language
than the money?
SENATOR PAST ORE. It will be both. I think we can
reshape tkat language. Where the President feels in
the nationa.1 interest thus and so, and leave it intact.
You have to have a saving clause rather than a complete
deletion, because the deletion would get us into a hassle.
On the moriey part it is a question of how the committee
feels. Yoa know how I feel, Mrs. Smith. I think I know
how you feel.
SENATOR HOLLAND. /Spessard L. Holland (D - Fla.jJ
It looks to me like we have to return to the full amount of
the authorization bill on military assistance and fight every
way we know hov/. 52
With Secretary McNamara's departure from the Senate
5Z/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropria.tions For Fiscal Year 1968, p. 368.
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Appropriations Committee hearing, the administration's access to
congressional forums on military assistance was closed out for 1967.
Had the Secretary (or his subordinates) enjoyed the same rapport with
the other committees which had reviewed the Military Assistance Pro-
gram that year the legislative outcome nnight have been very different.
Whether the Secretary's final appearance could affect the ultimate form
of the appropriations act depended upon the ability of the committee
members to sway not only their colleagues in the Senate at large but
also their counterparts in the House of Representatives.
The House Resolution and House Passage of the
Appropriations Act
At the same time that Secretary McNamara was addressing the
Senate Appropriations Committee, a debate was in progress in the
House on the subject of the appropriations bill recommended by the
House Appropriations Committee.
In order to preclude objections from members of the House
(particularly from members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs)
concerning the legislative nature of the Conte-Long amendments, a
resolution was initiated through the Rules Committee (House Resolution
Number 978) which would waive all points of order against the appro-
priations bill recommended by the House Appropriations Committee.
Although by no means unique, this procedure was sufficiently rare to
prompt considerable debate on the House floor. One congressman.
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John P. Saylor (R - Perm.)» expressed his opposition to the resolution
and the inclusion of the Conte-Long amendments in the appropriations
bill.
MR. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, the issue that is before
the House todays/November 16, 19677, in my opinion,
transcends the Rules Committee, the Foreign Affairs
Committee, and the Appropriations Committee. What
is involved is whether or not the House of Representatives
will respect its own rules. . . . Rule 1 1 of the 90th
Congress defines the powers and duties of committees,
and the jurisdiction of all the standing committees of
the House are therein clearly defined. Nowhere can
one find any authority for the Appropriations Comraittee
to legislate. Their duty is to "provide for the appro-
priation of the revenue for the support of the Govern-
ment. "
Today the Rules Committee has presented us with a
special rule asking that the House lay aside its rules
and permit the Committee on Appropriations to present
a bill, which clearly violates the rules of the house . . .^
Congressman Conte rose to defend the resolution. At stake were
his efforts to restrain the Military Assistance Program.
MR. CONTE, Mr, Speaker, I hope that the rule will
be adopted. Really, I do not know what some members
are getting so upset about with respect to a rule waiving
points of order. The whole underlying fact seems to be
that they are afraid to debate the amendments and let the
House work its will. . . .Mr. Speaker, I have sat on the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations for 9 years on the
Committee on Appropriations. I have never tried to tres-
pass upon the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Mr. Speaker, for 9 years I have heard members
from the executive branch come before our committee and
testify that they agree with us that these developing
53/ U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session,
Vol.llTTpt. 24 (November 16, 1967), p. 32861.
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nations and these underdeveloped nations throughout the
world should not have these sophisticated weapons of
war, . . . And year after year when they would come back
we would ask them the same question and they would have
some excuse as to why they sold or gave these weapons
to these underdeveloped nations.
MR. HAYS. _^ayne L. Hays (D - Ohio]? Did the gentle-
man read the /authorization/ bill and does he know that
in the authorization this is prohibited?
MR. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I have read the authorization
bill ajid it simply does not go far enough with respect to
the issues covered in our appropriations bill.
Mr. Speaker, if any of these countries in Latin
America or in Africa get into an arms race in sophis-
ticated weapons of war, their economic assistance
should be cut down accordingly. Mr. Speaker, these
people in Latin America and Africa face very difficult
circunastances. They have to overcome severe problems
of poverty, disease, and illiteracy. They cannot afford
this type of operation. Furthermore, to the extent they
partake in these operations, they substantially diminish
the effectiveness of our programs by not making sufficient
efforts of their own. . . .
Mr. Speaker, I am sick and tired of the fellows with
the striped pants coming up here and telling us what to
do. I think it is time that we told them what to do.
/italics supplied. / ^^
Congressman Long, the co-author of the amendments also rose
to defend the resolution.
MR. LONG. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule.
The amendments that were put into this bill were put in
to prevent a hideous waste of the taxpayers' money. That
is surely the fundamental purpose of the Committee on
Appropriations. ... I feel that the amendments to the
foreign assistance appropriations bill which we are
considering today are limitations, and do not constitute
54/ U.S. Congressional Record, pp. 32861-32862.

419
legislation. They apply solely to the appropriations
under consideration and do not operate beyond the fiscal
year for which the appropriation is made. In addition,
they do not prescribe affirmative directions to adminis-
trative action and they do not change or modify existing
law. 55
Apparently the arguments of Mr. Conte and Mr. Long were per-
suasive for the majority of the congressman in the House. The resolu-
tion was passed by a vote of 200 to 190. The way was cleared for a
floor vote on the appropriations bill.
The debate which tookplace on November 17, 1967, incident to
the passage of the appropriations bill by the House, was centered
about the Conte-Long amendments rather than the amounts of nnoney
which the bill would appropriate. Some of the arguments raised during
this debate served to illustrate the shortcomings of the restraints
proposed by Mr. Conte and Mr. Long. The congressman who saw those
shortcomings most clearly was Jonathan B. Bingham (D - N. Y. ).
MR. BINGHAM. I know what the gentleman /Mr. Conte?
is trying to do and I agree with his objectives, but I do
not think the language as it appears in the bill is well
calculated to achieve these objectives. I think on the
contrary it may do a great deal of damage to the economic
and technical assistance progranns which are provided
for in this act. . . . The section as it is drawn I believe
to be -wholly unworkable for this reason: There is no
such thing as a given figure for any particular country's
AID program, from which the amount of arms purchases
could be withheld or deducted. It is like saying "2 cents
off. " Two cents off what?
55/ U. S. Congressional Record, p. 32863.
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The AID agency does not start off . . by saying to
Ethiopia, "We have $10 miliion for you this year. Now
let as figure out how we are going to spend it. " That
is not how it is done. We talk about projects, and we
sign project agreements, and when those project agree-
ments are signed, as we come to the end of the year,
then we may have a total of what the AID program for
that country will be for that year.
What the Conte amendment would require us to do is,
if sorae arms purchase is made that we dislike, that we
would then have to go back and say, "no, we will have to
back away from this or that project contract. We cannot
go through with it. "
Finally, I think . . . this is a punitive provision as
it is now drawn. I think it would poison relations with
a lot of countries. ... I think the effect of the language
as it is now drawn will not be to stop the use of military
equipment but simply will be to interfere with and poison
cund destroy the usefulness of the technical and economic
assistance programs which are covered in this bill,
^/italics supplied_^/ 56
From Congressman Conte 's response to Mr. Bingham, it is clear
that the author of the ainendment failed to appreciate the danger in-
herent in his work which had just been pointed out to him.
MR. CONTE. I can give the gentleman the answer about
Ethiopia. I feel that there should be no raore arms for
Ethiopia. ... I have been in Ethiopia twice. I have
traveled that country from top to bottom. They have
more misery and sickness in Ethiopia than any country
in the world, and they are spending all of their money
on military equipment, and not by my vote are they
going to get any more, /italics supplied^/
MR. BINGHAM. The gentleman misses the point that
I have tried to make.
MR. CONTE. Let the United Nations go in there and




take care of the situation. I ara not going to be a
peddler of war armaments. /Italics supplied_^/^ '^
In order to justify his rather naoralistic point of view, Mr. Conte
expanded on his reasons for wanting to prohibit arms fronn going to
underdeveloped countries.
MR. CONTE. Let me read a statement from the Foreign
Minister of Chile, Gabriel Valdez:
Each year $1.4 billion is being spent for
military assistance in Latin America. /Pre-
sunaably this figure represents local defense
budgets_//
He further stated that these costs, and I will quote:
Take the clothes off the backs, and food
from the stomachs, and education from the
minds, of children.
I could not agree with him more. For 9 years I have
stood in this well a-nd I have pleaded for foreign aid
. . . but I cannot go on. I cannot continue supporting
aid to countries who need inoney so desperately for
food and for clothing and for medicine and for education,
and who take this desperately needed money and divert
it to buy weapons of v/ar. -'"
It seemed that Mr. Conte could not be shaken from the essentially
moral purpose of the legislation which he proposed, however, Mr.
Bingham was moved to try once more (and in so doing, underscored
what would be a major difficulty in administrating the law as Mr.
Conte would have it).





MR. BINGHAM. The gentleman_7Mr. Conte? speaks --
and most of the references this afternoon have been also
-- to Latin America, and this is where some of the
outrages have occurred. There are no external threats
of aggression to amount to anything in Latin America.
I would agree to that. But this section is not limited
to Latin America.
. . . The whole point here is that it is
a great danger to try to list specific states and to say,
"Now for the next year, these are the only states we in
the Congress say can buy sophisticated weapons. If other
states do it, we will penalize them. We will hurt them. "
There is another point. We will have to be snooping
around, for all of these countries, to see whether they
do buy sophisticated weapons. We will have to be snoop-
ing around in various African countries. Nigeria has
been, in trouble lately. I do not know whether Nigeria
is using sophisticated weapons in the rebellion or not.
We would have to go snooping and see. If we found that
they were we would have to say that the technical assistance
we give Nigeria, which is not large, would be reduced or
cut out. . . .
I believe in this economic and technical aid program.
I hate to see underdeveloped countries misuse their
resources for military assistance, But please do not
use this kind of meat-ax approach, that would allow no
flexibility, that would be regarded as punitive by these
various countries, as interfering with their sovereignty. ^
As in the previous day's debate on the resolution, it was Mr.
Conte 's arguments which had the greater persuasive force. The floor
vote taken on November 17 passed the recommended appropriations
bill -- with the Conte-Long amendments intact -- by a vote of 167
to 143.
59/ U.S., Congressional Record, p. 32973.
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The Senate Report and Compromise on the
Appropriations Act.
The report of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which was
published on November 28, 1967, recommended that the appropriation
for the Military Assistance Program match the amount authorized in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 -- $510 million -- because,
... it /the committeeT" firmly believes that a
reduction of the magnitude made by the House would
have a seriously adverse impact on the present
security objectives of the United States. The re-
duction incurred by the military assistance program
during the authorization process approximates 18
percent of the budget estimate, which the committee
thinks is an appreciable cutback, perhaps more than
this program should be required to endure during
these perilous times.
In addition to recommending the restoration of funds which the
House desired cut, the Senate committee struck out one of the Conte-
Long amendments altogether (the provision which would have directed
the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent
to that spent by an underdeveloped country on sophisticated weapons),
and recommended altering the language of the other (which would have
prohibited Defense Department financing of sophisticated weapons sales
to underdeveloped countries) to bring it into line v/ith the intent of
the Symington amendment to the already passed Foreign Assistance Act.
60/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1968, Report of the Committee on Appro-
priations, 90th Congress, 1st session, Report No. 807 (November 28,
1967) (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 13.
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The amendment, as recommended by the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee would read;
: Provided further, that none of the funds appropriated
in this paragraph (including funds used for the military-
assistance credit sales revolving fund) shall be used to
finance directly or indirectly the purchase or acquisition
of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile sys-
tems ajid jet aircraft for military purposes, by or for
any underdeveloped country, when the President finds that
such funds or the recipient or purchasing country's own
resources are being used for unnecessary nnilitary expen-
ditures, to a degree which materially interferes with its
development. In making such finding, the President shall
take into account (1) the percentage of the recipient or
purchasing country's budget which is devoted to m.ilitary
purposes, and (2) the degree to which the recipient or
purchasing country is using its foreign exchajige resources
to acquire military equipment. "^
True to their understanding with the Secretary of Defense,
Senator Pastore and his colleagues had done their best to repair the
damage which the House was in the process of wrecking on the Mili-
tary Assistance Program, Reconainendation of the $510 million amount
was the best that the committee could do in the way of appropriation
because the authorization act, which was now law, had provided for
no more thaji that. In rhyming one of the Conte-Long amendments
with the already enacted Symington amendment, and in dropping
reference to the other amendment, the conamittee was probably going
as far is it dared in defying the intent of the House. "Whether or not
the Secretary of Defense had proposed the amendment language which
61/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1968, p. 15.
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appeared in the committee report -- as he had been invited to do --
is not known. Certainly he could not have altered the Conte-Long
amendments much more effectively (in his favor) had he done so.
I
The appropriations bill, as it was recommended by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, passed the Senate on December 7, 1967, by
a vote of 56 to 22. A conference between the two houses of the Congress
was, of course, inevitable -- the versions of the bills which had been
passed were hardly less dissimilar than the versions of the authori-
zation act had been. When the conference report was called up before
the House of Representatives one week later (on December 14, 1967) it
'was obvious that the House conference conferees had nearly had their
way in legislating restraint of the Military Assistance Program. In his
comments introducing the conference report (House Report No. 1044),
Congressman Passraan -- wha had been the leading House conferee --
said.
Mr. Speaker, last night at 9 o'clock I received a call
from one of my very dear friends and colleagues. He said,
"Otto, I understand you have finished your conference on
foreign aid. Are you bringing back a good foreign aid
appropriation bill?"
This was my response: "No, my friend, I am not.
Insofar as I am concerned, there is no such thing as
a good foreign aid bill. But I can assure you that I
am bringing back to the House for its consideration
the best foreign aid appropriation bill considered by
this congress. " ...
Mr. Speaker, I have never believed in spending
nnioney we do not have for things we do not need, trying
to be everything to everybody, everywhere.
That is my philosophy. So I have reasons today for
being happy and elated because, in my candid opinion,
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never in the history of the Congress has any group of
House conferees ever had a greater victory in reducing
the amount of Senate increases in a major appropriation
bill than did the Foreign Operations Subcommittee mem-
bers. /Nearly all ofwhom had been House conferees
on the conference committee. Both Mr. Conte and Mr.
Long had been conferees^/
Congressman Passman had reason indeed to be "happy and
elated. " The compromise reached by the conference committee pro-
vided for a Military Assistance Program appropriation of $400 million
-- hardly much of an increase above the $365 million recommended by
the House, but a significant decrease from the $510 million recommend-
ed by the Senate, and an enormous cut below the $598 million which the
administration had so confidently requested ten months before. In
addition, the House managers of the appropriation bill had brooked no
wholesale disregard of the Conte-Long amendments. The alternative
language proposed by the Senate was rejected -- the House conferees
agreeing only to.
. . .
offer a motion to insert language similar to
that proposed by the House together with a provision
that the President may use such funds _/appropriated
for military assistanc_e_/ when he determines that the
furnishing of sophisticated weapons to underdeveloped
countries is vital to the national security of the United
States and reports within 30 days each determination
to the Congress, ^/jtaiics supplied^/ ^
62/ U. S, Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session,





The other amendment, which the Senate had recommended be
striken altogether, would be retained -- however, the House conferees
promised to,
. . . offer a motion to insert language sinniiar to
that proposed by the House together with a provision
that an equivalent amount of economic assistance
need not be withheld when the President determines
that purchases and acquisitions of sophisticated
weapons by underdeveloped countries is vital to the
national security of the United States and reports
within 30 days each determination to the Congress.
/Italics supplied. /64
The hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee had
concluded with a promise by Senator Holland to "fight every way we
know how" for the Military Assistance Program budget. The outconae
of whatever fight Senator Holland (he was one of the Senate conferees)
put up was much less than satisfactory for the program. Senator
Pastore, on the other hand, had promised to "reshape" the language
of the Conte-LiOng amendments -- "where the President feels in the
national interest thus and so. " It would seem that he had been at least
partially successful. Each amendment, when it became law, would
contain the "saving clause" allowing the President to cirvumvent the
intent of the araendment whenever he determined it to be "vital to the
national security of the United States" to do so. In each case, the
Congress would be assured that it would be advised of such a determination
64/ U.S. Congressional Record, p. 36521.
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in a timely manner. Given Congressman Passman's conviction that
'•there is no such thing as a good foreign aid bill, " and Congressman
Conte's adamant belief in the necessity for his amendments, (ajid the
pressure for adjournment before Christmas) it would have been sur-
prising had the Senate been able to go further in affecting the will of
the House.
The following day, the Senate and the House both agreed to accept
the compromise appropriations bill as it was recommended by the
conference committee. The President signed the Foreign Assistance
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1968 on January 2, 1968,
and, in so doing, officially recognized nearly all of the restraint which
the Congress would impose on the Military Assistance Program. Only
one other restraining action remained to be taken -- the Export -
Import Bank had yet to be prohibited from financing credit sales of
arms and military equipment.
PASSAGE OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK EXTENSION ACT OF 1968
Having received the testimony of the President of the Export -
Import Bank and also of other administration officials (Mr. Rostow,
Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Barr) -- and having listened to Senator Ellender's
case for restraint of the Export - Import Bank -- on July 25, 1967,
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee was convinced of the
desirability of curtailing the Bank's participation in the financing
of credit arms sales to underdeveloped countries. In its report.
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published August 4, it recommended the following amendment to the
bill which would extent the life and the financial strength of the Bank:
It is further the policy of the Congress that the Bank
in the exercise of its functions shall not guarantee, insure
or extend credit, or participate in an extension of credit
in connection with any credit sale of defense articles and
defense services by the Government of the United States
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 19^1, as amended,
or by United States exporters, the repayment of which is
guaranteed under section 503 (e) and section 509 (b) of
said Foreign Assistance Act: Provided, That whenever
the President determines that such guarantees, insurance,
extension of credits, or participation in credits, would be
in the national security interest and reports such deter-
mination (within thirty days after nnaking the same) to the
Senate and House of Representatives, such guarantees,
insurance, or extension of credits may be made, or par-
ticipated in, by the Bank notwithstanding the policy here-
in stated. "-*
By way of explanation of this recommended amendment, the
report stated:
The committee does not recommend any restriction on
Eximbank financing of defense article sales to the indus-
trialized countries. Such credit sales are made to friendly
governments in Europe and Oceania who are able to make
repayments on schedule and who need the type and quality
of military equipment financed not only for their own
security but for that of the free world as -well. In addition,
such sales further our balance- of-payments position.
However, che committee recognizes th.e problems involved
in the sale of military equipment to sm.aller and less develop-
ed nations. The committee feels that the Eximbank should
65/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Act Amend-
ments of 1967
,
Report of the Committee on Bankirtg and Currency, 90th
Congress, 1st session, Report No. 493 (August 4, 1967) (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 13.
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participate in financing such sales only after the most care-
ful and prudent study at the highest level of government,
taking into consideration the impact of such sales upon
international security and upon the economic development
of the nation involved. Accordingly, the committee re-
commends that congressional policy be expressly slated
against such financing to less developed countries unless
the President determines it to be in the national interest
and so reports to the Congress.
The committee expects such reports to be made on all
transactions and to include the name of each country and
the dollar amount and general type of equipment involved
in each transaction.
In addition, the committee feels that this program should
continue to be subjected to the most careful legislative
oversight from appropriate congressional committees.
The Banking and Currency Committee intends to dis-
charge its responsibilities in this area and has been assured
and expects full cooperation from the proper Government
departments and the Eximbank in this respect. °o
Three members of the committee felt that, although they agreed
with the ajmendment restraining the activity of the Export - Import Bank,
the body of the report did not sufficiently express their displeasure
with the Bank's previous involvement in the financing of arms sales.
Consequently, Senator William Proxmire (D - Wis.) and Senator
Harrison Williams (D - N. J. ) insisted that their individual views,
which included the following statement, be appended to the report.
We have grave reservations on the practice of using
the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank to finance
the sale of military equipment to underdeveloped countries.
We find it even more disturbing that this policy was carried
out in secrecy and that the Committee on Banking and
Currency was not kept informed on the growing arms
66/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Act Amend-
ments of 1967, p. 6.
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business of the Bank. In the last 2 years $604 million
of so-called country - X loajis have been made. Under
this procedure the Export-Import Bank extends liberal
credit terms for arms shipments to underdeveloped
countries with the entire transaction guaranteed by the
Department of Defense. The arms business has grown to
such an extent that 36 percent of the Bank's loans are to
finance military equipment. Yet in requesting additional
lending authority from the Banking and Ciairrency Committee
on May 16, 1967, not one word of testinxony was given by
the Bank regarding its heavy involvement in the arms
business.
In addition to secrecy, the program was also financed
through the back-door spending authority of the Bank, thus
bypassing effective control by the Foreigjn Relations and
Appropriations Committees. The President of the Export-
Import Bank testified that had the Banking and Currency
Committee raised questions regarding the arms traffic,
he would have supplied the information. However, in
view of the veil of secrecy surrounding tls.e program, it
is not surprising that no questions were asked. Thus,
effective congressional oversight over this sensitive
and controversial program has been hampered by
secrecy cuid the proliferation of responsibility between
different congressional committees."'
Senator William B. Spong, Jr. , (D - Va. ) also had his individual
view attached to the report.
The export of arms to the less developed countries
is a matter of deepest consequence to our foreign policy
and the peace of the world. Such exports should be under
the continuing scrutiny and control of the President and
the Congress. The use of Export-Import Bank financing
and the Department of Defense revolving fund guaranteeing
such loans denies the Congress effective oversight and
control.
The Congress should regain its influence in this vital
area of foreign policy by preventing the Export-Import
Bank from extending credit for such sales and by
67/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Act. Amend-
ments of 1967, p. Zl.
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financing such exports by annual appropriations. This will
put the entire financing of the program under the annual
review of the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Com-
mittees which have the expertise and primary jurisdiction
concerning this subject. Such action will not prevent the
sale of arms to any country, but will assure that the
Congress exercises its proper control over the policies
governing such sales.""
The amendment which the Banking ajid Currency Committee
suggested was not, however, considered stringent enough by Senator
Eilender. As a debate began on the Export - Import Bank Extension
Act, Senator Eilender proposed an amendment more to his liking:
It is further the policy of the Congress that the Bank
shall not in the exercise of its functions under this Act
or any other law, issue guarantees, insurance, coinsurance
or reinsurajace, make loans, or in any other way extend
or participate in an extension of credit, in connection with
the purchase of any defense article (as defined in section
644 (d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended)
by any less developed country, or agency or national
thereof. ^*^
Argument in the Senate on the merits of the Eilender amendment
revolved around the question of disclosure of the Bank's arms sales
activities by the executive branch. In the opinion of Senator Frank
Church (D - Ida. ),
It came as a surprise, indeed, a shock to the Congress
to discover suddenly that in excess of $600 million worth
68/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Act .Amend-
ments of 1967, p. 26.
69/ U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st session,
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of Export-Import Bank credit had been extended to finance
these sales of military hardware to underdeveloped
coantries. • ^
Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D - Me. ) protested that the record
showed that adequate disclosure had been made. Pointing to the
Congressional Record since 1962, he said.
.. . that congressional small print is a clear indication
that -we knevi/ what we were doing; that we authorized the
guarantee program; that we knew the Export-Import
Bank was involved. ' ^
Senator Church was not satisfied that the Congressional Record
constituted adequate disclosure.
Mr. President, I think the Senator from Maine lets the
executive branch off too easily regarding its responsibility
to the Congress of the United States. If Congress had been
informed as to what this was all about, what was the
occasion for the sudden uproar in both Houses, which has
filled the newspapers? It is not enough to slip the infor-
mation to us in small print. The obligation is on the
executive branch to properly inform the Congress.
I have yet to see any previous testimony disclosing
the extent to which the Export-Import Bank was being
used to finance the large-scale distribution of arms to
the underdeveloped countries of the world. As a matter
of fact, it \vas not until the staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee began to look into this question in early
January that we began to get some idea of the rapid
growth and startling dimension of the program. It
was then we commenced the course of inquiry which
led both the Foreign Relations Committee and the





Bankixig and Currency Committee and committees of the
House of Representatives to look into the whole question.
I think the uproar the disclosures caused in Congress is
sufficient evidence to validate our argument that the
Congress was never adequately informed. We were, in
truth, kept blindfolded, /jtalics supplied^ '^
The Eiiender amendment was defeated by a vote of 48 to 40 and,
on August 11, 1967, the Senate passed the Export - Import Bank
Extension Act in the form which had been recomraended by the Senate
Banking cuid Currency Committee.
House Action and Final Passage of the
Export-Import Bank Act
The House Committee on Banking and Currency had also had an
opportunity (on July 17, 1967) to question the President of the Export -
Import Bauik and other executive officials about the Bank's growing
involvement in the financing of credit arms sales. Action on the bill
extending the life of the Bank was held up in the House, however, due
to consternation over a projected Bank loan which would have financed
machinery the ultimate destination of which would have been a Fiat
automobile plant in the Soviet Union. The House Committee on
Rules did not report approval of a resolution providing for considera-
tion of the Bank bill until November 28, 1967 (this was done through
House Report No. 990, in reference to House Resolution 993). Other
72/ U.S., Congressional Record, p. 21796.
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business and the holiday adjournment further delayed action until
February 6, 1968. By this time, of course, both the foreign assis-
tance authorization and appropriations bills had become law and con-
siderable restraint on the Military Assistance Program had already
been imposed.
Congressman Wright Patman (D - Tex. ), chairman of the House
Banking and Currency Committee proposed the following amendment
to the Export - Import Bank bill:
The Bank shall not guarantee, insure or extend credit,
or participate in an extension of credit in connection with
any credit sale of defense articles ajid defense services
to any country designated under section 4916 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 as an economically less developed
country for purposes of the tax imposed by section 4911
of that Code. The prohibitions set forth in this paragraph
shall not apply with respect to any transaction the consum-
mation of which the President determines would be in the
national interest and reports such determination (within
thirty days after making the same) to the Senate ctnd House
of Representatives. In making any such determination the
President shall take into account, among other considera-
tions, the national interest in avoiding arms races among
countries not directly menaced by the Soviet Union or by
Communist China; in avoiding arming nnilitary dictators
who are denying social progress to their own peoples;
and in avoiding expenditures by developing countries of
scarce foreign exchange needed for peaceful economic
progress. '^
Where the Senate had desired to restrain the activities of the
Export - Import Bank in regard to those credit arms sales which
73 / U.S. , Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 2nd session.
Vol. fli, pt. 2 (February 7, 1968), p. 2433.
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depended upon the Defense Department's guarantee authority (through
its revolving fund), the House, in recognizing that the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1967 had abolished the revolving fund and the guarantee
authority (effective June 30, 1968), aimed their restraint at any and
all transactions with less developed countries that included defense
articles or services. The Senate had included a "saving clause"
which provided for Presidential determinations (and prompt reports
to the Congress) and the House had done the same. The House clause,
however, was subject to three caveats: the President must take into
account the national interest in avoiding arms races, in avoiding
arming military dictators, and in avoiding expenditures by developing
countries of scarce foreign exchange.
The conference report which was presented to the Senate (on
February, 21) and to the House (on February 27, 1968) reconciled
the two versions of restraint on the Export - Import Bank by accepting
the House amendment word for word.
Agreed to in both houses with almost no debate, the Export -
Import Bank Extension Act was then signed into law by the President
on March 14, 1968.
Legislative oversight of the Military Assistance Program,
called for by Dr. Bader in his staff study 14 months before, had
become a reality. Moreover, the Congress had, in the process of
this oversight, moved beyond a critical review of the program and
had initiated legislative control in the form of restraint. Response
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to that restraint by the executive branch would determine whether
the Congress had designed their control sufficiently well to achieve
the goals which had been avowed in the hearings and the reports and
the floor debates of 1967.

CHAPTER VII
EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO RESTRAINT OF THE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The various restraints imposed upon the Military Assistance
Program by the 90th Congress could be said to cover three facets of
the program -- its fiscal assets, its operational scope, and its adminis-
trative responsibility. In order to measure the response of the execu-
tive branch to these restraints it is helpful to consider them according
to those three categories, as follows:
a. Fiscal; the budgetary limitation of $400 million.
b. Operational: the military assistajice ceilings to Latin
America and Africa ($75 million and $40 million respectively); the
first Conte-Long amendment which prohibited the dispensing of
"sophisticated -weapons" to "underdeveloped couxitries" (subject,
of course, to the exceptions given and to Presidential determination);
the termination of the Defense Department's guarantee authority and
the abolition of the revolving fund; and the prohibition of Export -
Import Bank participation in the financing of credit sales of defense
articles and services to "less developed countries" (which was also




c. Administrative: the second Conte-Long amendment which
required the President to monitor defense expenditures of "under-
developed countries" for "sophisticated weapons" and to withhold
like amounts of economic assistance (again, subject to certain excep-
tions and to Presidential determination); the Symington annendment
•which required the President to monitor "unnecessary military
expenditures" on the part of U. S. aid recipients in order to detect
the "diversion of resources" and to withhold all economic assistance
pending the termination of such diversion; and the reports which were
required of the President {on agreements for military equipment
transfers to third countries) and the Secretary of State (on weapons
or military materials exported from the United States).
EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO FISCAL RESTRAIISTT
Discovery of the "Pipeline"
In his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Secretary of Defense McNamara had characterized the proposed cut
in the Military Assistance budget as "disastrous. " He went so far as
to predict that "the inevitable result" of such a cut would be that
"the United States must make up for the reductions _/in foreign forces
supported by the Military Assistance Program/ with U. S. forces, or
must retrench its foreign policy. " Judging by his statements, one
would suppose that the record of expenditures for military assistance
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in fiscal year 1968 would show a marked decrease below that of pre-
vious years. Strangely, the reverse is true. All but one of the
five so-called forward defense countries received markedly greater
amounts of military assistance in fiscal year 1968 then they had in
the previous year. The one exception -- Iran -- had already begun to
shift from grant aid to arms sales (reflecting its improved economic
condition) and nearly doubled its purchases of military equipment in
fiscal 1968 over 1967. Even those countries which were receiving
military assistance as quid pro quo for United States base fights
(such as Spain, the Philippines, and Ethiopia) received more assis-
tance in 1968 then they had in 1967. The countries of Latin America,
whose primary justification for grant military assistance was "internal
security, " received as a group nearly $14 million more in such assis-
tance in fiscal 1968 then they had in 1967. What exactly had averted
the disaster predicted by Secretary McNamara?
The year 1968 began, it shoud be recalled, with a sudden in-
crease in tension between the divided countries of North and South
Korea. On January 23, 1968 the North Koreans captured the USS
PUEBLO which was engaged in the collection of electronic intelligence.
An attempted assassination of the President of South Korea (the "Blue
House Raid") and a demonstable increase in the numbers of North
1/ U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign
Military Sales Facts -- March 1971 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971), pp. 10, 11, 22; see excerpts at Appendix D.
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Koreans infiltrating South Korea for the purpose of establishing
guerilla activity followed the PUEBLO incident amd underscored the
unrelenting hostility of the North Koreans. The argument that a strong
Military Assistance Program was a positive asset in containing com-
munist aggression seemed more than ever pertinent in regard to the
situation on the KorecUi peninsula. In mid- year the administration
requested from the Congress a $100 million supplemental appropriation
specifically for military assistance for South Korea. This addition
to the Military Assistance Program budget was granted for fiscal 1968,
thus bringing the total appropriation to $500 million. This figure was
still below the $596 million which the administration had originally
requested and it was considerably short of the $718. 7 million which
the Defense Department's records indicate were actually spent for
2
military assistance worldwide in fiscal 1968. Where had the funds
come from which v/ere spent in excess of the appropriation?
The records of the Department of Defense show that during the
first four years of appropriations for military assistance (fiscal years
1950 to 1953) the department actually expended only a fraction of those
appropriations. The time required to produce weapons and military
equipment in response to government requests is frequently in excess
of one year, therefore, funds may be obligated by the Defense Depart-
ment for long periods against the final delivery of purchased items.
2/ U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign
Military Sales Facts -- March 1971, p. 11.
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In fiscal year 1953 the pool of obligated funds had risen to over $12
billion. In addition, the requirements for certain items of military-
assistance sometimes chctnge or even lapse altogether between the
time that appropriations are requested ajid the time they are finally
granted. This causes a surplus of funds which are neither expended
nor obligated. In fiscal 1953 this surplus had risen to nearly $2 billion,
and the following year it rose still further to over $2.4 billion. During
the years between fiscal 1953 and fiscal 1966 these two large pools of
obligated and unobligated funds gradually shrank (except for the years
1961, 1962 and 1966, when less money was expended for military
assistance thstn was appropriated) as expenditures caught up with
obligations. This process of delayed spending was frequently referred
to as the "pipeline. " It was this pipeline, then, which continued to
finance the Military Assistance Program despite the budget reduction
•aimposed by the Congress in fiscal year 1968.
The use of pipeline, or obligated, funds to deficit finance the
Military Assistance Program had, of course, some disadvantages.
The most obvious being that the procurencient of new equipment (for
which funds had been obligated) was sacrificed in order to meet the
current operating costs of the standing forces supported by the Mili-
tary Assistance Program. During the early years of the program
3/ In fiscal year 1969 only $375 million was appropriated by the
Congress for the Military Assistajice Program ($420 million had been
requested by the administration), but $589. 4 million was expended;
see the "Summary Status of Funds" at Appendix P.
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investment costs (new procurement) had consumed most of the funds
expended for military assistance. As the newly created forces grew
larger, however, more and more funds had to be committed to main-
tenance and operating costs (fuel and lubricants, spare parts, and other
consuinables). By fiscal year 1968 these operating costs had grown
to over half of the total military assistance expenditures. Meeting
these costs was paraimount, consequently funds had to be reallocated
within the reduced budget for 1968 and new procurement for force
modernization was deferred or cancelled in order to release funds
previously obligated. The essential forces supported by the Military
Assistance Program -- those of the forward defense countries -- were
valuable assets only so long as they were viable. If they were allowed
to become obsolete over time due to the absence of funds for new
procurement they would loose their viability (against an enemy whose
forces were constantly being modernized). Should that happen, the
funds spent on operating costs would be wasted. Fortunately, however,
it seems that the Defense Department had accumulated a sufficient
reservoir of obligated and unobligated funds by 1968 to sustain at
least a few years of low military assistance budgets. In fact, once
having been "discovered" by the administration, the pipeline was
considered tc hold ample funds to supplement the budget request for
the following year, fiscal 1969, which was the lowest ($420 million)
in the history of post World War II military assistance. The results
of fiscal restraint were not, then, as disastrous as had been advertised.
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EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS
The Military Assistance Ceilings
There were, as we have noted, several different operational
restraints imposed upon the Military Assistance Program. The
arbitrary ceilings which were placed on the value of military assistance
and sales to Latin America and Africa seemed to cause the adminis-
tration little particular difficulty. Defense Department records in-
dicate that military assistance grants to Latin America in fiscal year
1968 were below the ceiling (being only $72. 8 million), but that when
arms sales were added the total rose to $120. 1 million. This was
considerably above the previous ceiling for Latin America of $85
million and even above the $100 million which the House Foreign
Affairs Committee had recommended. This provides some indication
that the administration had not taken the ceiling seriously (since arms
sales consummated in fiscal 1968 were likely negotiated prior to that
time). By the following year, however, the administration had brought
the level of combined grants auid sales within the ceiling -- Defense
Department figures for fiscal 1969 showing grants of $37. 9 million
and sales of $35. 3 million. Total grants and arms sales to Africa for
fiscal 1968 were $40. 7 million and for fiscal 1969 were $34. 5
million. The executive branch seemed prepared to respond to these
4/ U, S, Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign
MilitaTy Sales Facts -- March 1971, pp. 10, 11, 22, 23.
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restraints within a reasonable period, and, moreover, seemed
finally to under stcuid that the Congress was prepared to enforce
attention to the ceilings which it established.
Restraint of Credit Arms Sales
Termination of the Defense Department's guarantee authority,
the abolition of the revolving fund, and the prohibition against Export -
Import Bank participation in the financing of credit arms sales to
less developed countries brought an end, of course, to country - X
loans. Accepted without response, these restraints would have nearly
brought an end to the whole arms sales program. Taken together with
the Conte-Long amendments, they would have had the effect of limiting
arnns sales to those made to developed countries on a strictly cash
basis, Mr. Barr, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, and others
had testified as to the difficulties of attracting commercial financing
for credit arms sales (during the hearings before the House and
Senate Banking and Currency Committees). The only alternative
which the executive branch officials had suggested was to replace the
existing mechanism for arranging credit arms sales (which so dis-
tressed members of the Congress) with some system of direct appro-
priations. Once the restraining legislation had been enacted, the
administration had no recourse but to make a request for such appro-
priations from the Congress. This request took the form of the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968.
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Faced v/ith a drastic curtailment in its arms sales program, the
administration hastily devised draft legislation which separated the
program from the Foreign Assistance Act in such a way as to establish
foreijgn military sales as a distinct element of United States foreign
policy, alongside economic and military assistance. As such, the
Foreign Military Sales Program would entreat the Congress for an
appropriation in its own behalf. The appropriation requested for fiscal
year 1969 (following the terminated guarantee authority and abolished
revolving fund) was $296 million. As in the past, the President --
through the Department of Defense -- could guarantee repayment of
loans made for arms sales and could obligate the funds appropriated
(the $296 m.illion) in amounts equal to 25 percent of contractual
liabilities in the interest of such guarantees. The President could
not, however, as in the past, make such guarantees to any United
States Government agency -- thus excluding the Export - Import Bank--
and could not retrieve funds once obligated in order to make additional
obligations. All de obligated funds were to be reclaimed by the
Treasury -- thus there would be no revolving fund. Without the
kind offices of the Export - Import Bank and the flexibility provided
by a self-sustaining fund the Office of International Logistics Negoti-
ations would have to more than redouble its efforts to mcdntain its
impressive sales posture.-"
5/ Defense Department figures (see at Appendix D ) indicate that
arms sales to countries in East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America
dropped appreciably in fiscal years 1969 and 1970, however, sales to
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By the time the Foreign Military Sales Act was enacted (October
22, 1968), it had become weighed with all of the restraints which had
been written into the Foreign Assistance Act and its appropriations
legislation. In addition to banning participation by the Export - Import
Bamk-cind insuring against any reestablishment of the revolving fund,
the new law prohibited sales which "would have the effect of arming
military dictators who are denying social progress to their own people,
(an. amendment introduced by Congressman Henry Reuss) and sales
which might ultimately furnish arms to any but the designated recipient
(thus expressing congressional interest in preventing the retransf er
of American weapons to third countries) without the President's con-
sent. The ceilings on military assistance, including arms sales,
to Latin America and Africa were reaffirmed and both of the Conte-
Long amendments were included. In response to the administration's
urging, however, the Presidential determinations appended to the
Conte-LiOng amendments were authorized in cases wherein, in the
President's view, it was "important" to the national security of the
United States -- as opposed to "vital" to the national security --
that exceptions be made. The difference between "vital" and "im-
portant" being thought to be sufficient to allow the President a greater
countries in the Near East, South Asia, Europe and Africa rose in the
same years. The yearly value of all arms sales increased from fiscal
1967 to fiscal 1970 by nearly 56%.
6/ The Foreign Military Sales Act, Public Law 90-629 , 82 Stat.
1320; found in U. S. Congress, Joint Committee Print, Legislation on
Foreign Relations -- April 20, 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970), pp. 216-225.
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latitude should lie choose to make such determinations. Complete
reports on all sales and guarantees nnade to "economically less
developed countries" were to be made by the President to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. Detailed reports on each phase of every sales transaction
were to be made to the Congress on aji annual basis -- no longer
would any portion of the arms sales program be allowed to escape the
attention of an alerted Congress.
With the passage of the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Congress
made it clear that if the executive branch wanted to foster the sale
of airms auid military equipment by the United States, it would do so
only on the terms of the legislative branch. The carte blanche once
enjoyed by the "wide raxiging" Mr. Kuss had been definitely circum-
scribed.
Response to the Conte-Long Amendments
The executive brcuich tended to regard the Conte-Long amend-
ments in a piece, despite their affecting different facets of the Mili-
tary Assistance Program -- one being "operational" in nature: while
the other was "administrative. " In fact, initial executive response
also included the Symington amendment. This response occurred
almost immediately after enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1967 and the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropri-
ations Act for Fiscal 1968. In a "Memorandum For The President, "
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dated February 13, 1968, the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, informed President Johnson that he, the Administrator
for AID, William Gaud, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations, William Macomber, had approached members
of the Congress about the application of the Conte-Long ajid Symington
amendments. ' As a result of the conversations which were held, Under
Secretary Katzenbach gave the President the following appreciation of
the situation:
My. general impression is a relatively hopeful one.
While I think we will continue to get a certain amount
of general static from the Hill on arms sales to LDC's
/Less Developed Countrie_s7, I also believe that there
is a better understanding of the kinds of tough problems
these Amendments give us. We are now far less likely
to get serious adverse reaction from the Hill if we
decide to move on a number of really difficult cases.
To assure continued calm, I recommend that we consult
key Congressmen and Senators, as we did on Jordan,
prior to decisions on key cases where we anticipate
possible trouble. /Italics supplied_^/^
It was the recommendation of the Under Secretary of State that at
least some members of the Congress be incorporated into the arms sales
decision making process. If the Conte-Long (and Symington) amendments
had had no other effect, this single change in executive branch philosophy
7 / Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "Memorandum For The President, "
dated February 13, 1968, on file in the Department of State.
8/ Ibid. The administration had decided to recommence mili-
tary assistance and arms sales to Jordan which had been curtailed
during the June 1967 war.
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would have justified their having been written into law (certainly in
the eyes of many members of the Congress, at any rate). In order
not to invite congressional criticism of Presidential determinations
in arms sales cases which met the criteria of the Conte-Long amend-
ments it would be better -- in Under Secretary Katzenbach's view --
to consult with legislators "prior to decisions. " The responsibility
for those decisions then, would be shared to some extent with the Con-
gress. During the hearings on the Foreign As si stajice Act of 1967
which were conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator McCarthy had asked Secretary of State Rusk "what the /State/
Department's position is as to what voice the Congress ought to have
in deciding what countries you ought to give aid to" and "should we
/the Congress/ have some influence on policy"? Secretary Rusk had
equivocated on that occasion. Now, seven inonths later, his principal
deputy was recommending a procedure through which the Congress
might have a voice and might exercise some influence in this contro-
versial segment of foreign policy. Legislative restraint had achieved
at least that much.
The following excerpts from conversations with members of the
Congress, reported in aji attachment to Under Secretary Katzenbach's
9/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress,
1st session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967),




memorandum, illustrate the feelings of some of the Congressmen ajid
Senators who had framed the restraining legislation.
Congressman Silvio Conte -- Conte said that when he
proposed his amendments he was interested primarily
in Latin America and sub-Sahara Africa, although he
realized that it would apply elsewhere and might give
us difficulties. . . . He is also prepared to consider
the question of whether it might not be possible to
modify or rewrite the amendment somewhat in next year's
appropriation act. Insofar as individual countries are
concerned, he said he will say nothing if a waiver is
granted for Jordan;he believes a waiver would be
appropriate for Ethiopia because of our communications
facilities in that country; he is less sure on Morocco,
... he might go along with C-130's for the Congo; and
he would apply the amendment strictly to small sub-
Sahara African countries. He feels the amendment should
apply to India and Pakistan if they buy sophisticated
military equipment during the balance of this fiscal
year.
With respect to South America, he is delighted that
we have held back our /aID/ program loan to Peru and
feels the amendment should be applied to other Latin
American countries if they buy either F-5's or Mirages.
AAs Peru had contracted to buy Mirage jet fighters^/
If it must be one or the other, he agrees that we
should sellF-5's rather than let them buy Mirages --
although in either case we should deduct the amount
spent on their purchase from our economic aid.
Congressman Clarence Long -- Long's overall reaction was
relatively reasonable. He recognized that the Administra-
tion had a difficult time in interpreting and reconciling
the Conte /Long and Symington Amendments. He said that he
thought his ainendment would make it easier for the US to
"stop the next level of arms purchases, or the one that
would follow that. " He admitted that he has little hope
that the amendments will hold off any of the present
round of arms purchases. He also said he believed his
amendment -- since it is nondiscriminatory -- made it
easier for the Administration to reduce aid to arms
purchasing countries ("We are not discriminating against




_/XiOiig7 was adamantly against arms sales to Latin
America (he said that his Amendment had been principally-
aimed at the Latins and sub-Sahara Africa). Long did
recognize, however, that we have real problems in the
Middle East. He said that during the drafting of the
Amendment he and his colleagues had recognized that
Middle East arms sales might be necessary, but that
it was politically impossible for them to exclude any
Arab country from the effects of the Amendment. He
said he "would be willing to consider exceptions" for
the Middle East.
'' Congressman Henry Reuss -- After the Under Secretary
/Katzenbach_/ explained in some detail the technical
difficulties that we faced in applying the Conte-Long
and Symington Amendments, Congressman Reuss indicated
that he would support the Executive Branch against un-
fair attacks over the way it applied the Amendments
as long as he was convinced that Executive Branch
officials were honestly and consistently pursuing the
spirit and objectives of these Amendments. By way of
illustration of his "flexibility", Reuss indicated that
he had no difficulty over our decision to proceed now
to supply arms to Jordan. Reuss' "flexibility" ceased,
however, when the subject turned to F-5's for Brazil.
He was adamantly opposed to our countenancing such
a transaction and deeply disturbed that we should be
agonizing over the decision.
Congressman Otto Passman -- Mr. Gaud talked to Chairman
Passman Friday about these amendments. He is satisfied
with the way we are handling them. He says he did not
realize that the waiver provision was as tight as it is
_/presumably the determination that a sales case was
"vital" to the national securitjr/, and does not believe
it should be that tight. He volunteered the information
that he would do his best to get these anaendments out of
his bill altogether next year, and said he v/ould strongly
recommend this to Chairman Mahon, /it^-lics supplied. /
He added that it would be much easier for him to get
rid of thera - and maybe he could only get rid of them -
if the President told the Congress (or Mahon) that the
amendments impaired the ability of the Administration -to
protect the national interest.
Senator Fulbright -- Senator Fulbright displayed no
sympathy with respect to the problems created for the
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Administration by the Symington and Conte-Long Amendments
He indicated that he understood the Executive was going to
try to weaken these Amendments in the next session of Con-
gress and he expressed considerable unhappiness over this.
He thought we should be spending our energies in applying
these amendments, rather than getting, them altered or re-
moved, /italics supplied^/
Senator Stuart Symington -- Symington told the Under
Secretary that it was "up to the President to decide
if a Presidential determination should be made, " and
that he "would not be terribly concerned" about any
of the President's decisions. He also said he would
be willing to see what he could do to lessen the
impact of Conte-Long if it gives us real problems.
^talics supplied^/ The Senator recognized that his
Amendment was most useful as leverage in persuading
countries to limit arms expenditures, and that it was
of less use after decisions had been taken on the arms
purchase and expenditure; therefore, he left it up to
the President. . . . The Senator said that he would
never have introduced his Amendment in the first place
if he had not been misled about F-4 sales to Iran.
j/ltalics supplied^ ^^
It is interesting that the attitudes of those members of the
Congress who were (among others) instrumental in enacting the Conte-
Long and Symington amendments should be so mixed. Senator Fulbright,
on the one hand was unhappy that the administration should plan to
weaken the restraining legislation, while Congressman Passman, on
the other hand, was himself planning to delete at least the Conte-
Long amendments at his next opportunity. The attitudes of Congress-
men Conte and Long reflected their arguments given in the hearings
and the floor debates, but that of Senator Symington resembled more
10/ Katzenbach, "Memorandum For The President, " Tab A.
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the reaction of a petulant child who had gotten his way (and demonstrated
his influence) and no longer cared to be bothered with the issue. It was
clear from, his statement, however, that the peculiar disclosure policy
which the adraiiu stration had followed in regard to informing members
of the Congress about arms sales (that is, they were told little or
nothing) had caused the enactment of at least one piece of restraining
legislation.
Having completed exploratory conversations with the appropriate
members of the Congress, the administration then drafted its operating
procedures for the application of the Conte-Long amendments to arms
sales. The Political-Military Group of the State Department (later
known as the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) was charged with
interagency coordination of the executive branch response to these
amendments ajid, by March 21, 1968, had established "Conte-Long
procedures" which were agreed to by all of the executive departments
and agencies concerned. (These were: the Agency for International
Development, the International Security Affairs Branch of the Defense
Department, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Bureau of the
Budget, ctnd the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ) Another
effect of the nev/ restraining legislation seems to have been a heightened
awareness on the parts of those departments and agencies of the role in
coordinated decision making which they were responsible to play.
If actual machinery had not previously existed (or had simply not been
used) for complete interdepartmental participation in arms sales
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decisions, the necessity of coping with the Conte-Long amendments
forced the baptism of that degree of organizational confluence.
The agreed operating procedures for application of the Conte-
Long axnendments were designed to assure that:
(a) cases for which Conte-Long provisions apply or
which require a waiver are handled in an orderly
and consistent way and are properly recorded; and
(b) economic and military assistance actions, and
government and commercial munitions sales, which
are not prohibited or otherwise affected by the
Conte-Long Amendments proceed smoothly but with
full regard for the Amendments. ^^
The State Department memorsLndum which published the pro-
cedures acknowledged that the term "sophisticated weapons systems"
had not been fully defined and, therefore, a "warning list" was pro-
vided which indicated the types of military equipment which was thought
to require Conte-Long review. This list included: all fighter, fighter-
bomber, and bomber jet aircraft; long range jet and turbo-prop trans-
port aircraft; modern destroyers and subinarines; all missile systems
except for short range unguided rockets and recoiless type weapons;
military radar systems (excluding surveillance, navigational, and air
1 ->
traffic control types); and self-propelled artillery and tanks.
The operating procedures were as follows:
11/ Arthur D. Foley, Staff Director, Political - Military Group,
Department of State, memorandum entitled "Conte-Long Procedures, "




1. The warning list was circulated to intelligence collection
agencies and to embassies who were asked to report informa-
tion on possible sales or purchases of relevant military equip-
ment from third countries. This information was to include
the type ctnd source of equipment, the terms of purchase,
and the timing of possible expenditures during fiscal year
1968 "and subsequently. " The Bureau for Program and
Policy Coordination of the Agency for International Develop-
ment was tasked with collating "information on possible
arms sales and purchases to identify countries which require
continuing attention auid possible review of economic assis-
tance;" the interested IRGs /interdepartmental Regional
Groups/ would be kept informed of countries so identified.
2. Countries which had not been identified as requiring special
attention would be continued to be furnished with economic
assistajnce "in the normal course. " All new economic commit-
ments for project assistance over $10 million and program
assistance over $5 million would be screened for Conte-Long
applicability. Upon notice of an actual or potential "sophisti-
cated weapons system" problem for a country, the Agency
for International Development would be responsible "for
assuring that adequate provision is made for a deduction which
may be required ... in the absence of either (a) a favorable
resolution of the "sophisticated weapons system" issue, or
(b) a Presidential waiver. "
3. The Office of Munitions Control within the State Department,
in processing export license applications, would screen for
Conte-LiOng applications which would require special review.
4. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs) or any other office which initiated action
for military grant or credit assistance would "ascertain
whether the articles in question fall outside the Twarniiig/
list" and so note in all documentation.
5. "To insure consistency in interpretation and decisions, "
the Political-Military Group would clear all deterrhinations
relating to the applicability of the Conte-IjOng amendments
to items on the warning list. The Group would also maintain
records of relevant decisions on interpretation and refine-
ment of the warning list.
6. Decisions as to whether or not military equipment included
on the warning list was to be considered "sophisticated" in
the context of aid or sales to any particular country would be
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made at the IRG level. A decision would then be made at the
same level as to whether to refuse a U.S. military grant or
sale, deny axi export license for comnriercial sale, or reduce
economic assistance. Alternatively, the IRG could recommend
a Presidential waiver in cases where it considered "such
purchase or acquisition of weapons systems vital to the nation-
al security of the United States. "
7. Formal review of Conte-Long issues would "in general"
proceed in the framework of the IRGs with the Political-
Military Group kept informed and special advice provided by
the Group as required. In event of disagreement as to the
applicability of Conte-Long, the matter would be referred
to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
to determine whether the problem could be resolved informally
at that level. If not, or if it appeared that penalties might
have to be invoked or a waiver sought, the case would proceed
to the Senior Interdepartmental Group level.
8. Determinations that economic aid programs should be re-
duced as penalty for the purchase of "sophisticated weapons"
would call for prompt review of ongoing military grants and
sales for the country concerned. ^^
\
Executive branch response to the operational restraints (including
both the Conte-Long amendments) was timely, except for the delay of
one year in complying with the $75 million ceiling on military grants
and sales to Latin America. In less than three months after the pas-
sage of the appropriating legislation for economic and military assis-
tance the organs of the executive branch were prepared to reconcile
their programs with the desires of the Congress -- albeit the adminis-
tration was piaroiing to press the Congress to lift the restraints in the
following year.
13/ Foley, "Conte-Long Procedures, " The wording of these
procedures has been paraphrased here for brevity.
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EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRAINT
For bureaucratic reasons the administration had found it simpler
to handle the Conte-Long amendments as one, as Ave have seen. The
reports which were required by the restraining legislation --of the
President and the Secretary of State -- posed no serious difficulty,
Aside from increasing the workload within the cognizant offices, the
reports helped the administration by innplementing its promise to pro-
vide the Congress with more complete and timely disclosure of the
magnitude and detail of arms transfers.
Response to the Symington Amendment
The remaining administrative restraint was that paragraph of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 which had come to be known as the
Symington amendment. This required the President to monitor "un-
necessary military expenditures" on the part of the recipients of
United States foreign assistance in order to detect any "diversion
of resources. '• The penalty of loss of all assistance would be invoked
against any recipient country found guilty of such diversion. This
amendment was a restraint on the Military Assistance Program only
in that it would forestall the sale of weapons and nailitary equipment
by the International Logistics Negotiations Office to certain countries
whose purchase might be considered "unnecessary" or whose resources
might be judged to have been "diverted. " Because these considerations
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and judgements were inherently as much economic as military in nature,
the task of devising decision making procedures was assigned to the
Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) of the Agency for
International Development.
By March 8, 1968, the PPC had formulated a systenn for arriving
at decisions which would implement the Symington amendment, auid had
won approval of the system by an ad hoc Interagency Symington Commit-
tee (which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
International Security Affairs Branch of the Defense Department, the
Bureau of the Budget, the Political-Military Group of the State Depart-
ment, the Treasury ajnd Agriculture Departments, the White House,
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). The system consist-
ed of a screening ajialysis (to be undertaken primarily by AID, but
with step-by- step consultation with the rest of the Interagency
Symington Committee), the purpose of which was to identify those
countries which were likely "suspects" under the terms of the amend-
ments, and a review and recommendation process.
The screening analysis was structured as follows:
1. All countries which were recipients (or which were likely
to become recipients) of United States economic assistance or of
food deliveries under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) were to be
divided into regional areas -- Latin America, North Africa and
Middle East, "rest of Near East, South Asia and East Asia, " and
the "rest of Africa. "
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2. Each country was considered in relation to its regional
context according to three indicators:
a. Whether the country's "defense share" (defined in terms
of defense expenditures as a percentage of total government and total
public expenditures and in terms of foreign exchange expenditures
for military equipment as a percentage of total imports) was high
relative to the average for its region.
b. Whether the country's "defense share" was rising
significantly over time.
c. Whether the country was making substantial acquisitions
of major military investment items.
3. Those countries with high or significantly rising "defense
shares" suid/or those making substantial military acquisitions were
identified as "problem" or "amber-light" countries. The remaining
countries were considered as "green-light" or non-related to the
Symington amendment.
4. AID then prepared an analysis on each "amber-light"
country, determining (a) whether the country's "defense share" was
materially interfering with its development progress, and, if so, (b)
whether the country's "defense share" could reasonably be judged
necessary.
5. "Amber-light" analyses were then subraitted to a permanent
Interagency Committee to Advise on Economic-Military Matters (whose
membership was the same as the Interagency Symington Committee).
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This committee would recommend to the Administrator of AID one of
three courses of action:
a. Transferring a country from the "amber-light" list to
the "green-light" list.
b. Terminating United States aid.
c. Taking "intermediate actions to use U. S. influence to
restrain defense expenditures. "
The decisions made by the Administrator for AID were subject
to final review by the Senior Interdepartmental Group. ^
This whole procedure in response to the Symington amendment
was established as an annual exercise and integrated with economic
and military assistance budget planning. Whether or not Senator
Symington was, himself, "terribly concerned" about the decisions
which would be made through this procedure, the process was none-
theless thorough and responsive to the Senator's expressed desires.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE
It is interesting to compare the executive response to the legis-
lative restraints imposed on the Military Assistance Program by the
90th Congress with the first coherent recommendations for restraint
14/ This procedure is outlined in detail in: Paul G. Clark,
Assistant Administrator for Program ajid Policy Coordination, Agency
for International Development, memorandunn entitled "Approved
Symington Procedures and Criteria, " dated March 14, 1968, on file
in the Agency for International Development.
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which were made by Dr. William Bader in his staff study. Dr. Bader
had recommended more and better reports in the interest of full
disclosure of military assistance matters. Such reports were now
required by law and were duly submitted by the executive branch.
Dr. Bader had recommended a full accounting of the use of the
Defense Department's revolving fund. The fund, itself, had now been
abolished and the Defense Departnnent was required by law to submit
its arms sales plans in detail to the Congress in requesting its annual
budget for foreign military sales.
Dr. Bader had recommended that the role of the Export - Import
Bank in financing of arms sales be carefully examined by the Congress.
The examination had been made and the Bank had been expressly for-
bidden by law to participate in credit sales to less developed countries
(and the Foreign Military Sales Act ruled out Defense Department
guaranties of any credit arms sales financed by the Bank).
Dr. Bader had recommended that the Congress consider making
all military export credits and guarsunties the subject of a simultaneous
review with economic development loans. The Conte-Long and Syming-
ton decision making procedures which were established within the
executive branch in March 1968 -- in response to the restraining
legislation -- provided mechanisras for integrating the programs and
philosophies of military and economic assistance and for insuring
that decisions taken in behalf of one type of assistance would not run
counter to the goals of the other type of assistance.
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Dr. Bader had recommended that the Congress examine the
decision making process of the arms sales program to determine
whether the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was meeting its
responsitilities. That agency was now included in the deliberations
leading to all Conte-Long cuid Symington determinations and was thus
privy to all arms sales decisions.
Finally, Dr. Bader had recommended that the United States take
the initiative in organizing regional conventional weapons "free zones.
Strict executive adherence to the Conte-Long and Symington amend-
ments would virtually rule out United States participation in supplying
"sophisticated " conventional weapons to nearly any "underdeveloped'
country and nnight succeed in discouraging the purchase of such
weapons from sources other than the United States.
The Congress had certainly been responsive to Dr. Bader'
s
recommendations and the executive branch had been responsive to the
Congress. Unfortunately, the Department of State has refused the
authot's requests for specific information on cases wherein arms
sales have been refused or aid withheld due to Conte-Long determina-
tions or cases wherein countries have been identified as "amber-
light" (and aid terminated) due to Symington determinations. ^^It is
impossible to measure accurately, therefore, either the sincerity of
the executive response to these restraining measures or the impact




which they had on the Military Assistance Program. One document,
however, which was drawn up by the Director of the Military Assis-
tance and Sales Office within the State Department's Political-Military
Group is indicative of the attention which the administration paid to
the restraints which the Congress had imposed on arms sales. Entitled
"Justification of a Proposed Credit Sale, " the document served as a
guide in arms sales decision making and delineated departmental
responsibilities for supporting information. Justification for each
credit arms sale was to follow a certain format:
1. The Defense Department, "in consultation with Treasury
and State, " would provide the basic information on the terms of the
proposed sale (rate of interest, repayment period, etc.) together
with "a statement supporting the use of appropriated funds, as against
alternative means of funding (cash, commercial financing). " Any
concessionary terms, such as interest rates lower than the "current
cost of money to the U. S. , " had to be justified. Commitment of
future year funds had to receive the concurrence of the Director of
the Budget.
2. The Defense Department (again in consultation with the State
Department) was required to justify the sale in terms of national
security and to answer the following questions:
a. Did the sale meet a inilitary requirement derived from a
U.S. approved force goal (found in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan)?
b. If not, did the sale meet a requirement related to a threat
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recognized by the U. S. ?
c. Did the sale complement any existing grant military assis-
tance program and did it take into account military assistance
priorities?
d. Did the sale represent an important advance in weapons
sophistication?
3. The Defense and State Departments were required to justify
the sale in terms of foreign policy and to answer these questions:
a. How did the proposed sale support U. S. foreign policy
objectives in the recipient country and in the regional area?
b. Would the sale affect the regional arms balance or con-
tribute to an arms race?
c. Did the sale involve a sophisticated weapons system within
the meaning of the Conte-Long amendments" If so, was the sale justi-
fied on the basis of U. S. national security and would a Presidential
waiver be sought?
d. Was the recipient country "run by a military dictatorship
which denied social progress?" (This related to a prohibition inserted
in the Foreign Military Sales Act by Congressman Reuss. )
4. Finally, the State Department (AID) was required to provide
economic justification for the sale and to answer these questions:
a. Was there a demonstrable financial need for credit
assistance ?
b. Was the country on the " green-light" list for Symington
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purposes and would the sale change that status?
c. Would the proposed sale create a repayment obligation
which would place an undesirable burden on the country's foreign
exchange resources, produce excessive claims on future budgets, or
otherwisematerially interfere with its development?
d. What other arms purchases was the country making which
would be relevant to the proposed sale?
e. How did the proposed sale relate to whatever U. S.
economic aid program might be in progress within the recipient
country? ^°
Provided that the executive branch actually undertook such
rigorous justification for each credit arms sale, the goals expressed
in Dr. Bader's recommendations and in the restraining legislation
enacted by the Congress should certainly have been accomplished.
Executive response to restraint of the Military Assistance Program .
appeared to be appropriate in nearly every respect. The passage of
time would be required before it could be determined whether the
restraining legislation was, itself, appropriate.
16 / C.A. Chapman, Director of Military Assistance and Sales,
Political-Military Group, Department of State, memorandum entitled
"Justification of a Proposed Credit Sale, " dated February 18, 1969,
on file in the Department of State.

CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS OF RESTRAINT OF THE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
SUMMATION OF CONGRESSIONAL - EXECUTIVE INTERACTIONS
Examination of the evidence which has been presented indicates
the following sequence of congressional-executive interactions incident
to the imposition of restraints on the Military Assistance Program by
the 90th Congress.
- The executive branch had, by the end of 1966, adapted its
administrative procedures to accommodate a large and growing arms
sales program. In order to reap the maximum benefits which might
accrue from this program to the balance of payments, the Department
of Defense had established a sales office under the direction of an
energetic bureaucrat -- Mr. Henry Kuss. Given coequal status with
the Director of Military Assistance and wide discretionary power in
the negotiation of arms sales (and considerable encouragement from
the Secretary of Defense), Mr. Kuss was instrumental in increasing
the volume and variety of United States arms sales dramatically. In
order to facilitate the success of his program, Mr. Kuss was provided




by congressional appropriations but which was not strictly exposed to
regular congressional scrutiny. In addition, the lending facilities of
the Export - Import Bank were incorporated by the Defense Depart-
ment through a credit guarantee arrangement. Credit arms sales
which were "politically sensitive" -- and nearly all sales to under-
developed countries -- were accomplished with the Bank's financing
but without its knowledge of the specifics of the sales (hence the
sobriquet "country - X loans"). A function of the success of the
arms sales program was its increased visibility. As it became more
obvious it attracted attention not only to itself (and to its mechanics --
such as its use of the Export - Import Bank), but also to the Military
Assistance Program as a whole and to the issue of national respon-
sibility for the proliferation of conventional weapons throughout the
world.
- The Congress, by the end of 1966, had only begun to become
aware of the arms sales program and had not yet assessed its impli-
cations. During the previous year, the Senate Foreign Relations
Conrmittee had utilized its annual review of the Military Assistance
Program (as a portion of foreign assistance) as an open -- and well
publicized -- forum for criticism of the administration's involvement
in Vietnam. This had established a base for the further exploitation
of military assistance related issues. Eager for a test of congres-
sional influence on United States foreign policy, the chairman (Senator
Fulbright) and other influential members of the Foreign Relations
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Committee were receptive to suggestions of executive vulnerability
in the conduct cuid control of military assistance. Other factors,
such as the opportunity costs of large scale military grant aid (the
normal province of the Military Assistance Program) in terms of
pressing domestic demands and the budget competition between the
Vietnam war and all other programs contributed new congressional
critics of military assistajice. The time was propitious for an attack
on the Military Assistance Program by the legislature -- the only
requirement being the dissemination of a coherent plan demonstrating
the program's most vulnerable sides and pointing out the most likely
approaches for effective action. This plan was provided, in January
1967, by Dr. William Bader, a staff consultant for the Foreign
Relations Committee. In his one-man staff study, entitled. Arms
Sales and Foreign Policy, Dr. Bader brought to light the degree to
which the Defense Department's arms sales program had prospered
and explained the mechajiics of the program's operation. Although he
touched on several possibly undesirable aspects of the United States
Government's promotion of arms sales -- such as the difficulty of
reconciling such sales with a viable system of anns control and the
impetus which the sales inight give to competition in the world's arms
markets -- Dr. Bader focused mainly on the question of whether or
not the government's machinery for the management of the arms sales
program was adequate. In his view, the evidence suggested that it
was not. The staff study might have gone unnoticed had not Dr. Bader
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served in the capacity of consultant to Senator Gore's Disarmament
Subcommittee. In this role, he could, amd did expose the tenets of
his study to the heat of congressional inquiry. Senator McCarthy (a
member of the Foreign Relations Committee) had already endorsed
Dr. Bader's work via an article in The New York Times -- himself
having written on the Scime subject in a similar vein the previous
summer. The Gore subcommittee hearings demonstrated that the
administration was, in fact, vulnerable along the lines suggested by
Dr. Bader, and, with the apparent blessing of Senator Fulbright,
Senator Symington enlisted in the promotion of further congressional
examination of the arms sales program. Using the platform of his
own subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to conduct
additional hearings. Senator Symington chose to employ Dr. Bader
as his groups' consultant. The result was tajitamount to an informal
investigation of the administration's arms sales program, its manage-
ment machinery, its decision making processes, and, indeed, its
conduct of the whole Military Assistance Program.
- The executive branch, taken by surprise with Dr. Bader's
critical analysis and with the attention given that analysis by the
Congress, reacted with indignation (and, perhaps, with some embarrass-
ment). Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, the principle
official under the Secretary of Defense responsible for the conduct of
the Military Assistance Program and its arms sales component, aimed
his testimony at rebutting Dr. Bader's arguments and set the tone for
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the later testimony of other executive witnesses. Mr. McNaughton
took the position that governmental machinery for the majaagement of
the arms sales program was appropriate to the foreign policy implica-
tions inherent in the arms sales themselves. The highest officials of
the government were purported to be intimately involved in arms sales
decision making and it was Mr. McNaughton' s claim that each decision
was the product of interdepartmental coordination. Unfortunately, the
subsequent testimony of executive witnesses (including Mr. McNaughton,
hinnself) conflicted with this position, as did correspondence with
certain executive departments. The executive branch apparently did
not coordinate the testimony of its officials in order to provide a united
front to the Congress during these initial hearings. The net impression
left with the Gore and Symington subcommittees was of a Military Assis-
tance Program whose ramifications (such as the resale of U. S. equip-
ment and the undesirable transfer of equipment to third countries) had
not been seriously considered by its executive managers -- ajid of an
arms sales program that had outgrown its administrative restraints.
Dr. Bader, in his study, had recommended that the Congress exer-
cise greater legislative oversight of the government's arms sales
endeavors. The mixed response of the executive bramch at this
juncture virtually insured that this oversight would be forthcoming.
- The Congress, in its annual review of the authorizing and
appropriating legislation for the Military Assistajice Prograin (Part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act) utilized the groundwork laid by the
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Gore and Symington subcominittees and by Dr. Bader in framing a
critical scrutiny of military assistance and arms sales. Congressman
Conte, of the House Appropriations Committee, had long been critical
of the provision of arms to underdeveloped countries. Having learned
of Dr. Bader' s study through "the mass media, '' he drew heavily on it
in phrasing his own inquiry into the conduct of the Military Assistance
Program. The replies which he received from Secretary of Defense
McNamara and his subordinates did nothing to persuade him of the
propriety of the administration's program vis-a-vis those under-
developed countries. Together with Congressman Long, Congressman
Conte authored amendments to the appropriating legislation in restraint
of the Military Assistance Program. Senators Church and Symington
were likewise unimpressed with the executive branch presentation
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and they authored
restraining amendments to the authorizing legislation. Senator
Fulbright assumed an intransigent role in support of that restraint
against the much more lenient recomraendations of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and forced its acceptance. By enacting restraint
of the Military Assistance Program the Congress passed from the
legislative oversight recommended by Dr. Bader to legislative control,
and, in so doing, exercised its influence on that portion of foreign
policy associated with the dispensation of arms.
1/ Congressnnan Silvio O. Conte letter, dated April 27, 1972,
found at Appendix R.
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- The executive branch, seemingly unaware of, or at least
uBConcerned with the growing mood of the Congress to reassert its
influence on foreign policy in general, and on military assistance in
particular, took no coordinated action in behalf of its prograjns until
mid-summer, 1967, when the use of Export - Import Bank facilities
_was directly challenged. Members of the House Banking and Currency
Committee had been made aware of the Bank's involvement in country
- X transactions by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(who had shown them Dr. Bader' s study). Hearings on the Bank
Extension Act which had been completed were reopened in both the
House and the Senate and were attended by the president of the Bank,
closely supported by high ranking officials of the State, Defense, and
Treasury Departments. Despite the united front established by these
officials, the hearings only seemed to prove that the executive branch
had obscured the actual workings of its arms sales program (at least,
those with which the Export - Import Bank was connected) from the
attention of many members of the Congress. The net result of these
hearings was a loss of congressional trust in executive branch manage-
ment of the arins sales program. The publicity given to congressional
indignation over the administration's questionable disclosure policy
served to increase tension between the two branches of the government.
The executive branch coordination shown before the Banking and Cur-
rency Committees did not seem to extend beyond those hearings. The
Secretary of Defense found himself apologizing before the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee for statements made the previous day by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense before the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee. Throughout all of the hearings held on the subject of
military assistajice in 1967 there seemed to be little evidence of the
kind and degree of coordination in policy making which was said to
exist by the executive branch -- and which the Congress had every
right to expect should exist. The basic philosophy of the principal
arms salesman, Mr. Kuss, was contradicted by his most important
point of contact in the State Department, Mr. Kitchen, head of the
Munitions Control Office and chairman of the State-Defense Coordinating
Committee. The Director of Military Assistance, Vice Admiral Heinz
would not, or could not, reconcile the goals of some of his programs
with those of apparently counteracting programs controlled by the
Administrator for the Agency for International Development. Faced
with executive testimony which was in such obvious disarray the Con-
gress might have 'been expected to draw the conclusion that the adminis-
tration's management of the arms sales program, the military assis-
tance program which encompassed it, and, perhaps, even the entire
foreign assistance program was in similar disarray.
- The Congress, acting in response to internal pressures to
reform the Military Assistance Program (as it had found the program
to exist), enacted a variety of restraining legislation. Some of this
legislation was straightforward --as was the reduction in appropriated
funds, the prohibition of Export - Import Bank participation in loans
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to less developed countries, the terraination of the Defense Department's
guaranee authority and the abolition of the revolving fund. Other legis-
lation was not straightforward -- rather, it was exceedingly difficult
to administer, questionable in its logic, ajid potentially counterproductive
to the ultiraate goals of United States foreign assistance and foreign
policy. Passage of the Conte-Long and Symington araendments (which
will be critiqued later in this chapter), legislation of the latter descrip-
tion, might not have been possible, had the executive branch demon-
strated a greater capacity for managing its programs in a more
coherent way. As evidence accumulated which indicated that Dr. Bader
was correct in his judgement that the government's management
machinery was inadequate, certain members of the Congress (Conte,
Long, and Symington, for instance) must have felt the time appropriate
for making intrusions into the control of the Military Assistance
Program.
- The executive branch, the testimony of whose officials had
been unpersuasive, failed almost categorically in its efforts to fore-
stall or even to moderate the restraining legislation. Secretary
McNamara' s "laslappeal" before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
despite the dranaatic language in which it was couched, was futile
because of that committee's lack of dynamic leadership and its tradition-
ally weaker position in comparison with its counterpart in the House.
The concerted attempt to restore the Defense Department's guarantee
authority and revolving fund (made at the naeeting in Senator Mansfield's
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office) failed because the administration had never made clear its
full plans for enlarging the arms sales program -- not even to those
Senators who routinely supported the Military Assistance Program.
In failing, this effort only served to alienate additional members of
the Congress cind to drain away even more of the reservoir of congres-
sional good will which the Military Assistance Program had enjoyed
for so many years. Finally, confronted with the enacted restraining
legislation, the executive braunch was forced to overhaul its manage-
nient machinery. The newly devised "Conte-Long and Symington
procedures" -- taken together with the existing IRG - SIG apparatus --
really provided for no more intensive military- economic analysis
and no more widely coordinated decision making than that which the
executive branch had protested was already in existence. The new
procedures did, however, insure a certain amount of coordination
with members of the Congress, if only to determine whether or not
policy decisions were likely to attract renewed congressional censure.^
By itself, this enforced awareness of congressional interest in the
control of arms sales and the progress of the Military Assistance
Program was an important achievement and illustrated a means by
which the Congress could exert its influence directly on one implement
2/ Congressman Conte has indicated (in his letter at Appendix R )
that he was approached "many times" by the executive branch as part
of its arms sales decision making process.
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of United States foreign policy. The other executive branch responses
to the restraining legislation -- such as drawing down on "pipeline"
funds to finance military assistance expenditures, and requesting
new legislation (the Foreign Military Sales Act) to provide for some
continued arms sales -- proved that the Military Assistance Program
could sustain at least that much restraint without "disaster" and also
proved that the administration was sufficiently flexible to adapt quickly
to the imposed restraint without complete disruption of its large sales
program.
These congressional-executive interactions ended clearly in a
major success for the Congress. By restraining the Military Assis-
tajice program across so wide a range of its endeavors, the Congress
had shown itself capable of besting the executive branch in a test of
wills over a dearly held executive program. Because this program
was an important ingredient in United States foreign policy, the Congress
-- by extension -- had also successfully tested its influence over that
policy and demonstrated that it still maintained the power to have its
wishes taken into account.
It should not be concluded, however, that on the basis of this
one test the Congress is always likely to score so successfully against
i
the executive branch. For, in this example, the administration had
already so crippled itself that no amount of protests or convincing
arguments could have protected the Military Assistance Program from
restraint once the Congress had been made aware of its questionable
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practices. By failing to establish a really adequate disclosure policy
which would have kept the Congress better informed vis-a-vis changes
in the nature of the Military Assistance Program and by so expanding
the program that much of it no longer related to original {and accepted)
rationale, the executive branch had made of its program an easy and
almost indefensible target.
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE THESIS
The two-fold argument of this thesis, as stated in Chapter I,
was that: the executive branch had deliberately obfuscated certain
aspects of its Military Assistance Prograra and had disregarded
congressional interests and opinions to such an extent that it had
invited a test of influence and had so prejudiced its own case that
the test could only result in legislative restraint; and, the executive
branch had so expanded the Military Assistance Program that it no
longer rested on the structural rationale which had originally supported
it. Evidence in support of this thesis has been presented throughout
the text in the manner thought to be the most coherent. It is collected
below in order to clearly substantiate the thesis.
Evidence Indicating Deliberate Obfuscation
The congressional hearings related to the Military Assistance
Program wMch were conducted in 1967 disclosed two cases wherein the
executive branch was obviously obscuring important facts which the
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Congress was entitled to have. One case was the rearming of Pakistan.
The other case was the participation of the Export - Import Bank in the
financing of credit arms sales.
The rearming of Pakistan --in the face of an embargo on arms
to that country -- apparently took two forms; the first, being a covert
channel through Iran for complete items of equipment such as jet air-
craft and tanks; and the second, being the resumption of the delivery
of spare parts for so-called lethal weapons already in the hands of the
Pakistanis. Dr. Bader had noted the movement of F-86 jet fighters to
Pakistan in his study and had prompted inquiry into that transaction by
the Symington subcommittee. Mr. Kuss, the first administration wit-
ness asked about these aircraft replied that they had been made in
Canada under United States license -- the inference being that it was
Cajiada, therefore, which was responsible for any breach of the embargo.
His tater testimony indicated that the disposal of the F-86's was, infact,
covered by an end-use agreement which required the approval of the
United States. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Kitchen,
testified that the approval function had been waived in this case upon
acceptance by Canada of an Iranian bona fide that there would be no
retransfer. But, testimony by Mr. Samuel Cummings, the president
of the International Armament Corporation, indicated that the transship-
ment of the aircraft through Iran to Pakistan had been "common know-
ledge" in Europe. The West German Air Force, according to Mr.
Cummings, had even provided pilots for the delivery of the F-86's.
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The retransfer of the jet fighters was, it seems, only part of a con-
siderable flow of weapons of United States origin from West Germany-
through Iran to Pakistan. If that flow was common knowledge in
Europe, how did it escape the attention of those United States officials
who were responsible for enforcing both end-use agreements in general
and the arms embargo to Pakistan in particular? Once the F-86's had
appeared in Pakistan it might have been expected that the United States
Government would remonstrate with the Canadian and West German
Governments -- and possibly the Irauiian Government as well. Accord-
ing to Mr. Kitchen, there was no serious remonstration. Dr. Bader
produced evidence at the Symington subcommittee hearings which sub-
stantiated the testimony of Mr. Cummings -- to the effect that foreign
private firms were negotiating the retransfer of weapons through Iran to
Pakistan. When asked about this, Mr. Kuss at first pleaded ignorance,
but then confirmed for the record the role of the West German Me rex
Corporation in the retransfer of the F-86' s. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (for International Security Affairs), Mr. Townsend
Hoopes, also professed ignorance of the activities of these firms, but
later provided the subcommittee with information about the Levy Auto
Parts Company (which was allegedly reselling American tanks) which was,
unfortunately, deleted prior to publication of the hearings. It cannot be
proven that the United States Government was encouraging the rearming
of Pakistan through this covert channel, but if it was not, certainly those
executive officials who should have been the most knowledgeable about
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the international arras trade and the disposal of weapons of United
States origin were both poorly informed and incredibly naive since they
took no action to prevent such weapons from reaching Pakistan.
The resumption of delivery of spare parts for lethal weapons
which were already owned by the Pakistanis was not covert but was
not strictly conspicious either. The policy decision which included
the resumption of cash sales of such spare parts also included other
facets which contributed to an appearance of overall restraint in
the provision of military support and equality in application to India
and Pakistan. Under questioning by the Symington subcommittee, Mr.
Hoopes admitted that the other facets of the policy really had little
relevance to the current circumstances; the net effect of the policy
being to provide Pakistan with a mesins of refurbishing its armed
forces (the Indian armed forces being mostly equipped with weapons
of non-United States origin). The executive branch was, of course,
aware that its policy decision about spare parts would work to the
benefit of Pakistan {knowing as it must certainly have the Pakistani
order of battle), but Mr. Hoopes admitted this only reluctantly under
questioning -- and the decision itself was couched in such a way as
to camouflage this net effect, not only from the Indians (whonn it might
upset), but from the Congress of the United States. What ever the real
intention of the executive branch as to the rearming of Pakistan, it
was clear that major foreign policy implications were either not being
made known to the Congress, or -- much less likely -- were being
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overlooked or ignored by the administration.
The case involving Export - Import Bank participation in the
financing of credit arms sales showed a flagrant lapse of legitimate
disclosure. Despite the fact that nearly 26 percent of the Bank's
loan authorizations in fiscal year 1967 had gone to finance credit arms
sales, the president of the Bank, Mr. Harold Linder, avoided all ref-
erence to that portion of the Bank's business when he originally appeared
before the House and Senate Banking and Currency Committees in
support of the Bank Extension Act. The Bank's annual report (as later
hearings would show) omitted any mention of arms sales, either to
developed or underdeveloped countries. When first asked about the
Bank's authority to finance the sale of military equipment (during
hearings conducted by Congressman Passman's subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee), Mr. Linder admitted that he did
not know of ctny specific authorization by the Congress for such activity.
Dr. Bader had devoted considerable attention to this use of the Bank's
facilities in his study and he had flagged the country - X loan arrange-
ments which were steadily increasing. These arrangements were
questionable on at least three counts: they provided for the commit-
ment of some of the Bank's resources without any prior reference to
the Congress; they entailed the exportation of weapons, which was
something not envisioned when the Bank was established (and, hence,
might be termied a "perversion" ); and they abetted international arms
traffic, especially among underdeveloped countries. Members of the
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Congress such as Senator Gore, Senator Ellender, and Congressman
Conte were prepared to criticize this affiliation of the Bank with the
Military Assistance Program on these and other counts. When Dr.
Bader's study was shown to Congressman Widnall, a member of the
Hoase Banking and Currency Committee, the Congressman was sufficient-
ly agitated to request that hearings be reopened on the subject of the
Bank's activities. At these hearings, Mr. Linder claimed that there
was, in fact, express authorization from the Congress for Bank partici-
pation in arms sales. The "authorization" which he cited (and which
was later cited by other executive branch witnesses) was an oblique
reference in a report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, dated
1965. Although the actual law which governed the operation of the
Export - Import Bank and the law which provided for the conduct of
the Military Assistance Program (the Foreign Assistance Act of 19^1)
did not expressly forbid Bank participation in the financing of credit
arras sales, neither did they authorize that participation in terms
sufficiently clear for the members of the Congress to have been aware
that they had permitted it. The evidence indicated that the executive
branch simply read into the law the authorization which it wished to
see there. The record of the hearings held in mid- July 1967 by the
House and Senate Bajiking and Currency Committees clearly shows
that the members of those committees had not been informed as to this
utilization of the Bank's facilities. The president of the Bank protested
that he had disclosed the Bank's participation in credit arms sales to the
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chairmen of both of these committees on more than one occasion.
However, under questioning, Mr. Linder admitted that, in the case
of the House committee, the disclosure had been made to a previous
chairman who was of advanced age and who, apparently, had not
passed on the information. The current chairman, in an obvious
effort to smooth over his membership's indignation, volunteered the
admission that he did not know about the Bank's role in credit arms
sales. Other executive branch witnesses protested that adequate dis-
closure had been made to other committees of the Congress, but
members of those other committees (such as Senator Proxmire of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Senator Fulbright, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) -- and even the Senate
Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield -- denied that they had ever been
informed about this use of the Bank's lending powers. The president
of the Bank took credit for his own testimony before Congressman
Passman's subcommittee and for Assistant Secretary of Defense
McNaughton's testimony before Senator Gore's subcommittee as
evidence of willing disclosure. But the records of those subcommittee
hearings show that neither testimony was given gratuitously and that
neither testimony revealed the exact workings of the Bank's participa-
tion or the degree to which the Bank had become involved in financing
credit arms sales. Ironically, Mr. Linder even resorted to citing Dr.
Bader' s study as evidence of appropriate disclosure.
Finally, ail of the executive branch officials who testified on this
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subject -- including Secretary of Defense McNamara -- admitted that
there had been " a misunderstanding" or "an oversight" in regard to
the lack of disclosure. The Secretary of Defense attributed the fault
to "a lack of effective liaison. " This was poor commentary on the
efficiency of the large permanent congressional liaison staff which was
maintained within the Department of Defense. In promising to rectify
the previous lack of disclosure, most of the executive officials echoed
the statement of the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Barr, who
3
said, "We would like to repent for past sins."
Evidence of Disregard of Congressional Interests
Aside from the fact that the executive branch had been less than
thorough in informing the Congress as to its conduct of the Military
Assistance Program, there is other evidence which indicated that the
leaders in the administration and many of their subordinates were not
willing to give due attention to the interests and opinions of members
of the Congress. It could be argued that the whole procedure for
financing credit arms sales without recourse to direct appropriations
by the Congress -- a procedure characterized by several members of
the Congress as "backdoor financing" -- was an example of blatant
3/ U.S. Congress, Senate, Export-Import Bank Participation and
Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles
,
Hearing Before the Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, 90th Congress, 1st session (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 39.

486
disregard for the congressional responsibility to maintain some over-
sight of an important executive program. There were numerous other
exajTiples -- for instance:
- the gradual transfer of important (and controversial) programs
from the military assistance budget to the defense budget.
- the initial refusal to provide information about country - X
loans to the Congress (specifically, to Congressman Passman's
subcommittee).
- Secretary McNamara' s response to the budgetary concerns of
Congressman Gross and the domestic social concerns of Senator
Fulb right -- that is, by arguing that the fault was in the Congress.
- Secretary McNamara' s dismissal of Congressman Passman's
concern about "training- only" military assistance programs leading
to deeper United States involvement -- by arguing that such had not
been the trend during his term of office.
- Secretary Rusk's dismissal of Senator McCarthy's request for
am opinion as to the responsibility of the Senate in arms sales decision
making -- by setting aside the Senator's question and responding to
another point altogether.
- Assistant Secretary McNaughton's (and others') claims that
arms sales decisions were all made with the fullest coordination and
with the direct supervision of the raost senior executive officials --
when later evidence indicated that coordination had frequently been




- Mr. Kuss' "flippant" testimony before Congressman Passman's
subcommittee (as he, himself, had characterized it) and his lack of
sensitivity to the reaction of his audience -- demonstrated by his
giving an initial impression that "thousands" of arms salesmen were
being given clearance to sell weapons abroad.
The congressional-executive interactions which have been traced
through the year 1967 indicate the extent to which obfuscation on the
part of the executive branch, coupled with its frequent disregard for
the interests of the legislative branch, acted to spur the passage of
restraining legislation. That passage might not have been effected,
however, had every portion of the Military Assistance Program rested
firmly on the relatively undisputed rationale which had originally
given rise to railitary assistance.
Disassociation of the MAP From Its Rationale
The second argument of this thesis is that, by the end of 1966,
the Military Assistance Prograra had been expanded to include some
58 countries, but so little attention had been given to the justification
for that expansion that the executive branch could no longer rely upon
solid congressional support for the assistance given to each country.
The original rationale for the provision of military assistance (in the
post World War II period) was the need to support free countries against
communist military aggression. As the executive branch moved beyond
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that rationale in enlisting new countries into the Military Assistance
Program, it gradually weakened congressional support until, by 1967,
it was no longer possible to rally enough legislators to the aid of
the program when it became threatened with restraint.
Throughout all of the hearings relating to the Military Assistance
Program which were held in 1967 there was almost no criticism about
those programs which supported the so-called forward defense countries,
(Assistance to Greece aind Turkey was questioned -- by Congressman
Conte -- out of concern for their regional disputes. Assistance to
Iran was questioned -- by Senator Symington -- out of concern in
regard to the Iranian purchase of Soviet equipment. ) The basic anti-
communist rationale for military assistance -- both grant and sales --
was never really called into question. Neither was there criticism
of military assistance provided to certain countries as quid pro quo
for United States base rights. In fact, Congressman Conte, who had
made an impassioned plea on the floor of the House against providing
arms to Ethiopia (on the basis of that country's economic condition),
later informed Under Secretary Katzenbach that he would support a
waiver of the Conte-Long amendments in regard to Ethiopia because of
the requirement for United States comnaunications facilities in that
country.
When the executive branch expanded the rationale of the Military
Assistance Program to include "internal security" and began providing
military assistance in return for local influence congressional support
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for the program began to recede. Members of the Congress, such as
Congressman Passman and Congressman Conte and Senator Fulbright
and Senator McCarthy, were appropriately concerned with the economic
progress of the underdeveloped countries. Items of military equipment
provided (through grajits or sales) to such countries in the interest of
internal security would have to stand the scrutiny of those legislators.
As sales replaced grajits within the Military Assistance Program,
and as the elements of buyers choice and opportunity cost entered the
picture, the internal security justification for many items of military
equipnaent became very tenuous.
The situation was similar in the case of military equipment
distributed in the interest of obtaining local influence. While it
may certainly have been true that military assistance could be used
as a lever which might affect political decisions in recipient countries,
there was never any insurance that the decisions would be favorable to
the donor. The Indonesian communists who were slaughtered with
weapons provided by China and the Soviet Union serve as one example.
American fishing boats which are almost routinely seized on the high
seas around South America by warships of United States origin serve
as another example (although, fortunately, one less severe). Again, as
sales replaced grants, the influence justification for military assistance
was penalized -- this time by the mechanism of "preemptive selling. "
Once the United States Government was committed to obtaining influence
in a country or regional area through the provision of military assistance.
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it was also committed to blocking other nations from competing for
that influence. When countries were prepared to buy their military
equipment the United States was faced with the necessity of either
satisfying their requests or risking the loss of influence to another
nation by default. A great deal of testimony was given by executive
branch witnesses during 1967 to the effect that the United States more
frequently refused requests than it fulfilled them, however, no real
evidence of this was provided. The charge of preemptive selling was
never really laid to rest.
Still another rationale for the provision of railitary assistance
appeared " in embryo" during the hearings -- the concept of "balancing. "
If this new rationale had not almost immediately fallen into discredit --
due to the Arab-Israeli war --it might have quickly taken its place
alongside internal security and influence as blanket rationale for the
inclusion of any nation whatever within the Military Assistance Program.
Congressmen and Senators who entertained doubts about the size
or expense of the Military Assistance Program were probably reluctant
to attack the program in terms of its application to the containment
of communism or in terms of its purchase of required base rights
abroad. These applications were always too closely allied with the
national security of the United States to be seriously debatable.
The extension of the Military Assistance Program, however, to cover
many, many countries in the interest of internal security, influence,
or even balancing, made the whole program vulnerable to challenge.
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Congressman Conte could comfortably attack grants and sales made to
Latin American countries (for internal security), which, in his opinion,
competed with economic development. Congressman Passman could
loudly question the grajits and sales made to North African countries
(for influence and balancing) which he felt were counterproductive with
development efforts in those countries. Where the executive branch
had acted upon weak rationale and could only defend its programs in
terms of "military and economic vacuums" and 'iproximityn to strategic
areas, those programs were successfully challenged -- and the efforts
toward legislating restraint of the whole Military Assistance Progrann
gained new momentum.
Given all the criticisms of the conduct, control, and effects of
the Military Assistance Program which were aired in the Congress in
1967, and which ultimately resulted in a wide range of legislative
restraint, it may be an oversimplification to attribute the enactment
of that restraint to the two-fold argument demonstrated in this thesis.
Other factors were certainly present which argued for restraint:
concern with the growth of the military-industrial complex; revulsion
at the thought of "blood money" earned from arms sales; abhorance
of the responsibility for arms races and regional conflicts; the fear of
irreversible involvement in foreign struggles; and, of course, the
ever-present domestic demands for the use of American resources.
All of these factors were mentioned from time to time in the hearings,
on the floor of the House or of the Senate, and in the press. The
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evidence indicates, however, that none of them had yet captured
enough support to arouse the Congress in a movement to restrain the
Military Assistance Program. It was not until the executive brsinch
had inspired congressional indignation with a policy of obfuscation
and an attitude of disregard -- and had, nneanwhile, weakened the
supporting rationale for military assistance -- that all of the factors
which argued for restraint could locate a banner around which to
assemble. It was only then that each of the proponents of restraint
could be assured of a sympathetic audience in the Congress.
CRITIQUE OF THE LEGISLATION
Separate from the argument of this thesis, but important to the
topic, is analysis of the legislation which the Congress used to impose
restraint on the Military Assistance Program. Chapters VI and VII
examined the structure of the legislation as it took form and as the
executive branch responded to it. Sonae of the legislation -- such as
the reduced budget appropriation, the termination of the guarantee
authority, the abolition of the revolving fund, and the prohibition
of Export - Import Bank participation in the financing of credit arms
sales to less developed countries have already been analyzed in
sufficient detail to allow the reader to judge their effects. Other
portions of the legislation -- specifically, the Conte-Long and
Symington amendments -- require additional commentary.
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Critique of the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments
Those amendments authored by Congressmen Conte and Long and
by Senator Syraington are critiqued apart from the rest of the legis-
lation which acted to restrain the Military Assistance Program because
they were different in several respects: they contained lajiguage that
was vague and ill-defined; they called for actions vis-a-vis foreign
countries which went beyond the giving or withholding of military
assistance;, cind they stood in jeopardy of bringing on results counter-
productive to the avowed goals of United States foreign policy.
The Conte- Liong amendments denied sophisticated weapons to
underdeveloped countries. Because both the terms "sophisticated"
and "underdeveloped" are relative and have no fixed meaning the
difficulty of administering these amendments might have been enormous,
The executive branch, sensitive to the intent of the Congress to curb
the Military Assistance Prograna, did not rely on the legislative
history of the amendments for appropriate definitions, but resolved
many of its questions concerning the application of the legislation
by going directly to the authors of the amendments. This had the
effect of incorporating at least some of the members of the Congress
in the arms transfer decision making process.
The Symington amendment spoke of the diversion of an aid
recipient's resources "to unnecessary military expenditures to a
degree which materially interfered with its development. " Once again.
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"unnecessary military expenditures" is relative and has no fixed
meaning. Moreover, the question of exactly at -what degree such
expenditures would "materially interfere" with development could
only be one of judgement. Unlike Congressman Conte, who was
obviously delighted to be consulted about the exact intent of his amend-
ments. Senator Symington was "not terribly concerned" about the
administration of his amendment, and, therefore, left the definitions
and judgements up to the executive branch. As -we have seen in
Chapter VII, the Agency for International Development did design
a procedure for abiding insofar as was possible with the intent of the
amendment according to its legislative history.
The Conte- Long amendments, aside from denying sophisticated
weapons to underdeveloped countries, called for the withholding of
economic assistance in amounts equivalent to whatever such countries
might spend for the purchase of sophisticated weapons from sources
other than the United States. As Congressman Bingham pointed out
to Congressman Conte during the floor debate on the latter 's amend-
ments, in order to administer this feature it would be necessary for
the United States to ascertain exactly what military equipment was
being purchased by all the underdeveloped countries who were recipients
of United States assistance. (Possibly a difficult task for a goverrunent
which claimed to have been unaware of the large scale retransfer of
jet fighters and tanks to Pakistan -- but, given modern intelligence
techniques, probably not completely beyond the capabilities of the
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United States. ) Further, due to the manner in which economic assis-
tance was programed, invoking the required penalties would involve
"de- obligating" expenditures agreed to in contractual arrangements
which had already been entered into.
The Symington amendment likewise called for the termination
of economic assistance as a penalty for the diversion of resources
for military purposes. Again, in order to administrate this legislation
appropriately, the United States would find it necessary to collect data
from all countries which were recipients of United States assistcuice
and would, should penalties be required, deprive the recipients of
assistance which they had been led to expect they would receive.
The implementation of these ajnendments -- both those of
Congressmen Conte and Long and that of Senator Symington -- would
risk jeopardizing the goals of United States foreign policy in whatever
country or regional area in which they were applied. Resentment and
hostility toward the United States are hardly desirable attitudes to
forster in foreign countries. The normal conduct of foreign policy
avoids the encouragement of such attitudes. Indeed, in addition to
the achievement of some economic developnaent, it is the purpose of
United States foreign assistance to promote attitudes of friendship and
mutual esteem. Although there is probably no question that the United
States could skillfully gather all the intelligence necessary to make
the judgements required by these amendments without risking serious
objections by the underdeveloped recipients of American assistance,
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it is much less likely that penalties could be imposed without objections
-- auo-d without resentment and hostility. It is difficult to imagine that
a recipient country -would not consider the existence of these amend-
ments as either a threat to its sovereignty or as a bribe in its conduct
of its own policy. The exactment of penalties could hardly be expected
to elicit gratitude or a spirit of cooperation. Congressman Conte has
indicated (in his letter, at Appendix R) that penalties have, in fact,
been exacted. Unfortunately, the details of nearly all such instances
have been classified by the executive branch -- due, it would seem,
to the sensitivities of the recipient countries involved. The Department
of State has denied the release of information pertaining to penalty cases
for use in this thesis (see the Department of State letter, at Appendix
Q). -- therefore, complete analysis and thorough criticism of the
Conte- Long and Symington amendments is impossible.
The first exactment of a penalty under the Conte- Long amend-
ments was, however, fairly well documented. Under Secretary of
State Katzenbach's '^Memorandum for the President" mentioned
that an AID loan to Peru had been held back. The New York Times
of May 17, 1968, reported that $37 million in AID funds already appro-
priated for both general budgetary support and for specific economic
development projects in Peru had been withheld due to the purchase,
by Peru, of 12 French MIRAGE supersonic jets,
4/ The Nev/ York Times, May 17, 1968
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The representative government of Belaunde Terry was already beset
with serious domestic problems; rapid inflation had caused currency
devaluation and a general strike had nearly paralyzed commerce in
1967. President Belaunde Terry had claimed that he could not oppose
his military chiefs when they demanded the jets be purchased.
Dissatisfied with the performance of the government, the
military elite, led by General Juaji Velasco Alvarado, seized power in
October, 1968 -- thereafter, Peruvian relations with the United States
deteriorated steadily. The junta government instituted rapid national-
ization of American owned oil and copper enterprises and seized
United States fishing boats on the high seas. In February 1969, mili-
tary assistance sales to Peru were completely suspended by the United
States. In response, all United States Military Missions were expelled
by the junta. Only strenuous diplomatic efforts by the United States
prevented a complete rupture of all relations with Peru. The devastat-
ing earthquake which Peru experienced on May 31, 1970, occasioned
American emergency assistance of such magnitude that the trend of
growing animosity between the United States and Peru was abruptly
halted. During the two years which followed the first exactment of
a penalty under the Conte-Long amendment, however, Peru was
sufficiently disenchanted with the foreign policy of the United States
to cause it to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet
Union.
The Peruvian example indicates that, although application of the
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Conte-Long amendments may not by itself cause a rupture of diplomatic
relations, such application certainly does exacerbate situations wherein
relations may already be somewhat strained. It would be imprudent to
assume that the practice of extraordinary diplomacy or the chance
happening of an act of God will always redeem a foreign policy which,
by its nature, precipitates crises.
While Congressinen Conte and Long and Senator Symington
certainly deserve credit for their recognition of the dilemma in
providing military and economic assistance to underdeveloped
countries and for their sincere desire to resolve that dilemma, the
amendments which they authored may simply have replaced one
unsatisfactory foreign policy arrangement with another. Only time
will indicate whether their solution is an improvement.

APPEMDH 4
PERCENT OF FOREIGIN ASSISTAITCE FP.0G!V_M I95O-I967 RL'PRL-SKNTED BY
MILITARY ASSISTA'/JS
' ($ Millions)
Total Foreign % f rrogram
Fiscal Assistance Econonic Military for Military
Year Program Assistsmce Assistance As sistance
1950 $ 5,042.4 $ 3,723.4 $ 1,314.0 26.1
1951 7,^5.0 2,262.5 5,222.5 69.8
1952 7,284.4 1,5'*0.4 5,744.0 78.9
1953 6,001.9 1,782.1 4,219.8 70.3
195^^ i+,531.5 1,301.5 3,230.0 71.3
1955 2,781.5 1,588.8 1,192.7 40,9
1956 2,703.3 1,681.1 1,022.2 37.8
1957 3,766.6 1,7^9.1 2,017.5 53.6
1958 2,768.9 1,423.9 1,340.0 48.4
1959 3,443.1 1,933.1 1,515.0 ^3.9
i960 3,225.8 1,925.8 1,300.0 40.3
1961 4,431.4 2,631.4 1,800.0 40.6












TC $71,572.3 ;^35,129.6 $36,442.7 50.9
1967 3,396.0 2,469.0 917.0 27.1
1/ Includes $30.0 million appropriated for Investment Guarantee Pi'ogram.
2/ Includes Section 510 "Special Antho^lty" Ffl -foTrovs: FY 19^5 - $75-0 ninion
FY 1966 - $300.0 Tr.mion.
Source: U.S. Departnent of Defense, Military Assistance Facts,




FU\CT10X8 AN'D DUTIES OF A M.V.\G IX A COUNTRY ReCEIVTSO MiUTABT
Gra.nt Assistance
•'•Mitarj' Assistance Advisory Groups in couDUnes receiving military grant
*attince r-*»rform rhe foUoTicir fiinotir-ris
:
a- llofrei-ent the Department of Defen^^e with the government to which they
Jwacciedited, niaiarain the U.S. Military preseuce. and establish a relationship
«**uinai trust and confidence with the Mini.?try of I»efense and the armed forces
«^th.tt country.
b-
.'"'lake recommendations concerninc: military as.^istance in their respective
ew#i\-ies to the Commander of the Unified Command concerned.
C- O' yeinp niilitary as.<i>rance phins a ad [)roi'rn'r!S in 'noneration with the
i^*^ '•'
the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and other eleuients of the Country Team
^W.ii limit them to the Commander of the Unified Command concerned.
d. Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished by and personnel
trained by the U.S.
e. When directed by appropriate authority, cooperate with represetunrivt^^ <.f
specified U.S. firms in furrhering sales of U.S.-produced military equipmeiit tu
meet valid country requirements.
f. Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to reoinip:it
countries on military assistance, including training assistance and military a.s-
sistance purchases.
g. Work directly with the Military Departments and appropriate military area
commands in arranging for rceipt and transfer of military assistance niatfrid.
training, and services to recipient nations.
h. Provide liaison with the country involved with respect to weapons prolnc-
tion and residual offshore procurement mattei's.
i. With re:.-ard to tlie ho>t countries' imfilementation of that portion of ir«
military pro::ram financed by <)ther U.S. a;:encies with T'.S.-owned ioc:il cur-
rency, develop and execure a prniram of review and observation r.i Sf^rvp n« a
basis for renderin? an appropriate report to the Chief of the U..*^. Pipliim.ui'^
Mission and the Chief. U.S. Agency for International Development Mission.
j. When appropriate. n< t as channel of (-ominunication for the Direcior for
Defense Research and En^rineerin^ keeping Unified Commands informed regard-
ing research and development mat'er* Ketween tiie U.S. and the soverrunenr tn
which they are accredited. .Act as channel of communication for the .X.^T" I.vl. i
regarding pro(!uocion and otlier logistic ::iatters between the U.S. and the ;;overn-
ment to which they are accreilited.
k. Provide the point of contact for the exchansre of information on fori ps.
budgets, weapons and '"3pabilitie« as rccpiired.
1. Assist Commanders of Unified Uomniand' in planning for pa'siMo T'..*'!.
support of country wartime locrisfic '•equire:nent<.
m. Provide liaison with the "ounrry to which accredited with r<>sp»ii t to arv
other military a*^«israncp refiuirements or locistir^ matters of the F" )D anci
perform such other function.s as may be required under Foreign Assistance
legislation.
SottTcei U^. Congress, House of Repres«itatives, Foreigi Aaajstanoe
Act of 1967, Hearings Before the Coaraittee on iforcign
5ffairs, 5<^h Congress, 1st session (Washington: U,S.




U.S. Arms Sales, Grants — 1952-69
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal 1952-61 Grants Sales Total
1952 $ 4.440 $ 532 $ 4.972
1953 1,965 230 2.1 95
1954" 1.323 82 1.405
1955 2,556 98 2.654
1956 657 174 831
1957 1.283 663 1.946
1958 1.381 340 1.721
1959 1,318 853 2.171
1960 1,034 963 1.997
1961 1,450 630 2.0S0
Ten-year total $17,407 $4,565 $21,972
1960 695 1,793 2.493
1967 • 541 1.946 2.487
1908* 400 1,929 2,329
1969* 390 1.530 1.920
Eight-year total $5,747 S13.197 S18.944
* 1967 ficjre U.V prrUntna-^ /!*>? cid 19^1:awrs utrf Com mttler esttmate*.
Fif^rtlattd i:i:.jres. >ee sr^ry p Ji




MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DELIVERIES /EXPENDITURES, BY FISCAL YEARS
(Dollars in Millions)
Country FY 1950 - 196J» FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 19 ,'0 FY 1950 - 197.
East Asia
Cambodia 86.8 .3 . - - . U.8 91.9
China, Rep of 2,088.
U
81*. 8 76.5 70.1* 115.0 55.3 37.9 2,528.2
Indochina 709.6 . . * . . - 709.6




29.6 1.2 29.1 3.6 .3 .6 655.1
Korea 173.1 153.1 11*9.8 197.1* 210.0 216.3 2,930.3
Malaysia . » .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 1.0
Phlllpplnea 279.1 18.2 26.0 21.0 29.1 18.8 15.7 1*08.0
Thailand '67.7 36.1* 1*0.8 1*1*. . - - 5£<!.8
Vietnam 1,031.8 271*. 7 169.9 - - - - 1,U76.3
Regional Costs ** h^.^ 59.2 ,68.3 82.9 3-1 2.6 2.U 653.
u
East Asia Total 7,779-9 678.1* 536.6 398.2 351.5 291.0 281.8 10,317.1*
Near East & South Asia
Afghanistan 2.8 .1 .2 .1 .3 .3 .2 U.O
Ceylon . - . - « .1 .1 .2
Greece 1,128,1 101*. 78.7 1*1*. 1*5.0 56.2 30,2 l,Ub6.2
India A A A 2.1 .2 1.0 .7 A
Iran 583. U '9.9 uri 1*1.1 38.7 50.9 15.2 820.3
Iraq 1*6.2 .2 .2 .1 * ' - U6,7
Jordan 28.7 1*.6 2.8 11.9 2.1 1.8 1.0 52,9
Lebfiiion 8.5 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 9.0
Nepal A A A .5 .5 .2 • A
Ptikl8t«n A A A » .1 .1 .2 A
Saudi Arabia 29.9 .8 1.5 .8 1.0 .6 .5 35.1
Syria • « • • - - .1
Turkey 2,095.7 118.1* 100.5 U8.5 130.9 108.8 116.6 2.7S9.3













• - 766. u
220,2 161*. 6 6,010.2
Eurof«
Austria 97.1 .3 » « * • • 97.5
Beltjlua 1,229.2 i*.a 1.6 .1 1.9 • - 1,237.6
Denmark 5U2.1 1*8.1 20.1 7.5 - - - 617.9
f"runce ',11*9.7 i.^ - - - - - u, 153.1
Germany 900.7 .1 . - - - - 900.8
Itiily 2,200.0 81.6 3.2 5.5 - - - 2,290.3
Luxfmt/ourg 8.2 . - - - - - 8.2
NellierlundB 1,161*. 1* 1*9.7 • 2.8 . - - 1,217.0
Norway 71*2.2 35.3 1*2.8 32.6 21*.
2
U.O .3 6-bc.U
Portugal 299.'* 7.5 1.5 2.2 3.2 2.7 1.3 317.9
Spiiln I*'j6.5 1*0.6 35.5 8.0 U.8 15.0 10.9 578.3







, l-" 1.1* •? 1.1 2.0 •3
211.1
Europe Total i3,n'>.5 275.3 106.1 59.6 1*2.3 30.8 12.8 iU,:-!-0.3
Notes Totals may not add due to rounding,
Less than §50,000.
( ) Indicates negative amounts.
* Includes classified data.
& Indicates classified datao
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign




nitlTAKY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DELIVERIES/EXPENDITURES BY FISCAL YEARS (Continued)
- (Dollare in Millions)
Country FY 1950 - 196k FT 1965 n 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1950 - 197
Ifrlca
Cameroon .2 - - - - - . .2
Con«o 5.1 2.3 3.6 5.1 3.8 2.1 3.1 25.0
Drhomey .1 - - - - - • .1
Ethiopia 72.6 8.3 10.8 8.9 17.1* 11.1* 11.2 \Uo.G
Qiana • - - - • • .1 .2
Guinea - « .7 .2 - - - .9
Ivory Coast .1 - - - - - • .1
Liberia 2.7 .5 .5 1.3 1.1 .7 .U Y.l
Libya 6.0 2.2 1.7 2.6 1.6 1.3 .3 15.5
Mill 1.1 .5 .5 .7 . . » 2.8
Morocco 16.1 2.3 3.1 5.2 6.6 2.0 1.2 36.5
Hlger .1 - - - - - - .1
Nigeria .2 • 3 .k .2 .2 » » 1.2
Senegal 2.2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .1 « 2.8
Sudan .1 * .3 .3 • - - .7
Tunisia lU.2 .9 .6 .7 1.7 3.6 5.1* 27.1
Upper Volta .1 « » - - - - .1
JteglonaL Coata - * • - • .1 • .1
(kfrica Total 120.7 17.3 22.2 25.2 32.6 21.3 21.8 261.0
Lotln Anerlca
Arijiriitina ^.3 6.0 6.U 6.8 10.9 5.8 2.U U2;6
Bolivia 8.6 1.9 2,U 2.8 3.5 1.6 1.2 22.2
Brazil 159.7 ll.U 9.5 13. »» 12.6 6.6 U.3 217.7
Chile 59.8 6.3 8.1* l».8 7.5 2.7 2.0 91. i»
Colombia ^5.6 5.7 8.3 7.9 12.2 6.7 3.9 90.1*
Coata Rica 1.3 .2 .1 .1 .1 . . 1.8
Cuba 10.6 . . . . . . 10.6
Dominican Republic 9.7 1.2 1.6 l.^ 2.3 2.2 2.1 22.7
Ecuador Zk.Q 2.3 3.9 3.1 2.8 2.0 2.0 Ul.O
El Salvador 2.6 ,8 .7 .6 .6 .3 .2 5.9
Guatemala 6.7 1.5 1.2 l.U 2.3 1.1 2.0 16.2 "
Haiti 3.2 . . - . . .. 3.2
Hunduras 3.0 .7 .7 1.0 1.0 .6 .3 7.3
Jamaica .2 .U . .3 .3 . 1.1
Mtxlco
• 9 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 1.8
NlcHragaa 5.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.3 .7 1.1 12.0
Punlima 1.2 .2 .! .5 .3 .U .!« ^.^
Paruguay 2.1 .9 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.0 .8 8.7
Peru 51.1 8.2 7.3 6.6 8.7 2.9 1.9 86.7
Uruguay 29.3 2.U 2.5 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.7 Ul.l
Venezuela 3.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 .9 .8 9.3
Regional Costs 7-5 3-0 1.8 1-3 1.0 .6 .2 15.3
Latin America Total W»0.9 55.9 58. u 59.1 72.8 37.9 27.'* 752. If
Son- Regional (131.6) 107. 1* ?2.1 i3. (11.6) 1 13.1 2,76^..?
Iraiid Total 24,^10.5 1,2V..7 i,of..-^.u 8^^-? P'-T ^•jw.'*
= 21. 6 3'*,3"i.r

1i04
DiELIVERIES OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, BY FISCAL YEARS
(Dollara in Millions)
1
! Country n 1950-1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1950-1970









































































































































































































































































































































































DELIVERIES OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES BY FISCAL YEARS (Continued)
(Dollara in Millione)












































































































































































































































586.4 1*5.0 37.7 30.7 17.9 28.0 49.7 797.2
itlonal Organiza-
tions 89.4 6.1 U.l 17.8 _26j. 47.9 23.8 «gl4.j.





STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE
[ISeiiioentts tn roman. Republicans in iiaiic$]
Appropriations '
( Meeta*• call of chairman)
CazI Hayden, of Arizona.
Richard B. Russell, of Georgia.
AHen J. EUender, of Louisiana.
Lister Hill, of .\Libaiua.
John L. McClellan, of Arkansa-s.
Warren G. Mamuson. of Washington.
Spessard L. HoLl^ind, of Florida.
John Stennis, of Mississippi.
John O. Pastore, of Rhode Island.
A. S. ilLke Monroney, of OkLihoma.
Alan Bible, of Nevada.
Robert C. B^Td, of West Virtrinia.
Gale W. McGee, of Wyoming.
Mike Mansfield, of Montana.
E. L. Bartlett, of Alaska.
WHliam Proxmire, of Wisconsin.
Balph W. Yarborougb, of Texas.
Thomas J. Scott,
Milton R. Young, of North Dakota.
Karl E. Mundt, of :;outh Dakota.
Margaret Chase Smith, of Maine.
Thomas U. Kuchel, of California.
Roman L. Hruskn, of Nebraska.
Gordon Al'.utt, of Colorado.
Xorris Cotton, of New Hampshire.
Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey.
Jacob K. JauUs, of New York.
Chief Qerk
Ranking and Currencj
( Meets atrood Tuesdar)
John J. Sparkman, of .\Iabama.
William Proxmire. of Wisconsin.
Wo'lace F. Bcnnrtt. of Utah.
John G. To'VT, of Texas.
A- WiUiami, Jr.,Harrison
Jersey.
Edmund S. Muskie. of Maine.
LoniT. of Mis^juri.







Walter F. Mocdale. of Minnesota.
Gale W. McGee. of Wyoming.
William B. Spong, Jr., of \ irginia.
Brook'', of Ma<-'achusott.-
Charles H. Percy, of Illinois.
Lewis G. Odom, Jr., Chief of Staff
Foreign Relations
( Meeta Tuesday)
J- W. Fulbright, of Arkansas.
John J. Sparkman, of .\labama.
Mike MansfiCld, of Montana.
Wayne Morse, of Oregon.
Albert Gore, of Tennc-sce.
Frank J. Lausche, of Ohio.
Frank Church, of Idaho.
Stuart Symington, of Missouri.
Thomas J. Dodd, of Connecicut.
Joseph S. Clark, of Pennsvlvania.
Oaibome Pel!, of Khode Island.
Eugene J. McCarthy, of Minnesota.
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, of Iowa.
George D. Aiken, of Vermont.
Frank Ca-lson, of Kansas.
John J. Williams, of Delaware.
Karl E. Mundt, of J»outh Dakota.
Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey.
John Sherman Cooper, of Kentucky.




STANDING COM>UTTEES OF THE HOUSE
(Dwnoctsts In ram«a; Bepublicans In italic4]
Appropriations
refects open call orchmirman)
George H. Mahon, of Texas.
MichiX't J. Kinran, of Ohio.
Jamie L. U'tut'eii, of ML-si^v-ippi.
George W. Andrews, of Alab;una.
John J. Rooney, of New Vork.
Rtrfjert L. F. ^ikes, of Florida.
Otto E. Passman, of Loiu>iaiUi.
Joe L. Evin>. of Tennesj^e.
Edward P. Boiand, of -M.i>.-achusetts.
Waiiam H. Natcher. of Kentuciiy.
Daniel J. Flood, of Peiui-ylvania.
Tom Steed, of Oklahoma.
George E. Shipley, of liiir.oL?.
John AL Slack, Jr., of U e.-t \ irgiaia.
John J. Flyat, Jr., of Georgia,
Neal Smith, of Iowa.
Robert N. Giaimo, of Connecticut.
Jiiiia Butler Hansen, of Washington.
Charles S. Joel?on, of Now Jersey.
Joi^eph P. Addubbo. of New York.
John J. McFoll, of California.
W. R. Hull, Jr., of ML-souri.
JeEfery Cohelac, of California.
Thomas G. Morris, of New .Mexico.
Edarard J. Patten, of New Jersey.
Clarence D. Lon?, of Mapihind.
John O. Marsh, Jr.. of N'irginia.
Sidney R. Yates, of Illinois.
Bob Casey, of Texas.
Da\-id Pryor, of Arkansas.
Kenneth Sprankle, Clerk
Banking and Currency
<M«e(« first and third Taesdaral
Frank T. Bote, of Ohio.
Charles R. Jonas, of North Carolina.
Mflrin R. Laird, of Wi.-con^in.
Elford A. Ceikrhtrrg, of -Michigan.
GUnard P. Lipscomb, of California.
John J. Rhoiies, of .\rizona.
William E. Minshail, of Ohio.
Robert H. Michel, of Illinois.
Silvio 0. Conte, of Massachusetts. -
Odin Langen, of Min!ie.-ota.
Ben Reifel, of South Dakota.
Glenn R. Davis, of Wisconsin.
Howard IV. Robison, of New York.
Garner E. Shriver, of Kansas.
Joseph M. McDade, of Pennsylvania.
Mark Andre'cs, of North Dakota.
William H. Harrison, of Wyoniin;?.
Louis C. W:,inan, of New Hampshire.
Burt L. Talcott, of Califonua.
Charlotte T. Reid, of Illinois.
Donald W. Riegle, Jr., of Michigan.
Wright Patman, of Texas.
Abraham J. Multer, of New York.
William A. Barrett, of Pennsylvania.
Leonor Kn-tzer (Mrs. John B.) Sullivan,
of Missouri.
Henrj' S. Reu-=, of Wisconsin.
Tliomas L. .Vshley, of Ohio.
William S. Moorhead. of Pennsylvania.
• Robert G. Stephens, Jr., of Georgia.
Femand J. St Germain, of Rhode
Island.
Henry B. Gonzalez, of Texas.
Joeeph G. Mini^h, of Nfw Jersey.
Richard T. Hanno, of Califomia.
Tom S. Gettys, of .'^oarh Carolina.
Frank .\nnunzio, of Illinois.
Tbomas M. Rees, of California.
Jonathan B. Bin^zham. of New York.
Nick Galifianaki-, of North Carolina.
Tom Bevill, of Alabama.
Peter N. Kyros, of r^Iaine.
Paul Nelson, Clerk
Foreign
William B. Widnall, of New Jersey.
Panl A. Fino, of New York.
Fhrfnre P. Dwjtr, of New .Ier=ey.
Seiimour Halpern, of New York.
William E. Brorh Sd. of Tcnnes-ce.
Del Ctairson. of California.
Albert W. Johnson, of Pf^nn^ylvania.
./. William Stanton, of Ohio.
Chrtiter L. Mize, of Kansas.
Sherman P. Llo'/d, of Utah.
Benjamin H. Blarkhurn, of Georgia.
Garry E. Brown, of Michigan.
Lawrence G. Williairui, of Pennsylvania.




Thomas E. Morgan, of Pennsylvania.
Clement J. Zablocki, of Wisconsin.
Omar Burleson, of Texas.
Edna F. Kelly, of New York.
Wayne L. Hays, of Ohio.
.Armistead I. Selden, Jr., of .\Iabama.
Barratt O'Hara, of lUinoi-.
L. H. Fountain, of North Carolina.
Dajste B. Fa-cell, of Florida.
Leonard Farbstein, of New York.
Charles C. Di'j!:-. Jr.. of Michigan.
Wiiliam T. Murpliy, of Illinois.
Cornelius K. tiaHachf^r. of New Jer.-ey.
Robert N. C. Nix, of Pennsylvania.
John S. Moragan, of Connecticut.
Donald M. Fra-er, of Mini.r-ota.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, of New York.
Edward R. Roybal. of (.'alifornia.
John C. Culver, of Iowa.
Lee H. Hatniltori, of Indiana.
Tvesdar)
Frances P. Bolton, of Ohio.
E. Ross Adair, of Indiana.
William S. Mailliard, of California.
Peter H. B. Frtlinghwisfn, of New Jersey.
William S. Drootnjlebi. of Michican.
J. Irving Whailei/, of Pennsylvania.
H. R. Gro-s. of Iowa.
E. Y. Berry, of South Dakota.
Edward J. Derv.-inski. of Iihn(jis.
F. Bradford Morse, of Ma-saciiu-i-fts.
I'tmon ir. Thomson, of Wi<con-in.
James G. Fulton, of PennsyKania.
Paul Findleij, of Illinois.
John Buchanan, of Alabama.




COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
SCBCOilUITTEE ON DiSAHMAMENT
ALBERT OORF, Tennessee, Charrnin
FRANK CHtmCn. IJato BOtRKE D. niCKENLOOPER, Iow«
flTUAHT SYMINGTON", Mlssonrl aKOROE D. AIKEN', Vprrcoot
J0>;EPH 3. CLARK. Pennsylv .cia JOHN SHERMAN' COOPER. Kentucky
CLAlBORNi: PELL. RiwUe IsUaJ
. ._ WnUAif B. B^CCB, CamulUiU
SuBcoifuiTTEE ON Neak Eastep.n axd r^ocTn AsfAN Affairs
STXTART SYMIN'GTON', Miisouri. a.inr-.n
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabin.a E'>rniCE n. nU'KKNLOOrFR. I. W3




sraCOMMITTEE ON" FOKKIGN OPLItAXION-S AND RITLATED AoENCIES
OTTO E. PASSM.VN, Louisiana, Chairvian
>r\ J. ROONET. New York GAHNER E. SIIRIVER, Kansji
;• MA BCTLER HANSEN, AVn'-Lin^ton SILVIO O CONTE, Massachus-tts
:::FFERZCOnELAN". C.iiif rcla CIIAULO I'TE T. UEiD, Illiaols
'
:. \UENCE D. LONG. MarylmJ DONALD W. IlIEGLE, Jr.. iUcUlijan
.•'JUS J. McFALL. California
Framcis G. M£itBii.L, Btaff AKttstant to the Suhcommitte«
Sooreet Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, Ist session





FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Boise, Idaho; born July 25, 1924, at Boise;
atteaded Boise public schools; A.B., LL.B., Stanford University; Phi Beta Kappa;
enlisted as private in United States Army during World War H and coniniissioned
as oSccr on 20th birthday, serving with ^Military Intelligence iu China, Burma,
and India; engaged in private law practice in Boise; married to former Bethine
Clark, daughter of United States District Judge and former Idaho Governor
Chase A. Clark; two sons: Forrest, IS, and Chase, 9; State chairman, Cnisade for
Freedom, 1954-55; State chairman, Young Democrats of Idaho, 1952-54;
Natiaaal Jaycee Outstanding Young Man, l'J57; Ke\-noter, Democratic National
Convention, 1960; elected to the United States Senate on November 6, 1956;
reelected November 6, 1962; U.S. delegate to the 21st General Assembly of the
United Nations.
ALLEN JOSEPH ELLENDER, Democrat, of Houma, La.; bom in Montegut,
TefrclwJnnc Parish, La., September 24, 1S90; lawyer and farmer; graduate of
>t. Aloysius College, New Orleans, La., and Tulane University of Louisiana, at
N'cw Orleans, witii degrees of AI. A. and LL. B.; married to Miss Helen Calhoun
Ihinnelly (died Sept«jnber 30, 1949); one son, Allen J., Jr.; served in World
W;ir i; city attorney of Houma, 1913-15; district attornej*, Terrebonne Parish,
i?15-lG; delegate to Constitutional Convention of Louisiana in 1921; member
.f the house of representatives of Louisiana, 1924-30; floor leader, 1928-32,
..'tiring administration of the late Hucy P. Long, Governor; speaker of the house
«>f representatives, 1932-36; Democratic nominee for United States Senator from
Ixiuisiaaa, and elected without opposition in the general election held on Novem-
Irt-r 3, 1936, for the term ending January 3, 1943; reelected November 3, 1942, in
tlic Reaeral election, without opposition, for the terra ending January 3, 1949;
rtrlccted without opposition in the general election field on November 2, 1948,
f.ir the term ending January 3, 1955; atjain reelected without opposition in the
ti-nerai election held on November 2, 1954, for the term ending January 3, 1961;
rilected November 8, 1960, for the term ending Januarv^ 3, 19G7; reelected
November 8, 19GG, for the term ending January 3, 1973; Democratic national
committeeman from Louisiana, 1939-40.
J W FULBPaCHT. Democrat, of Favetteville, Ark.; son of Jay and Roberta
Waueh Fulbright; University of Arkansas, B.A.; Rhodes Scholar. Oxford Uni-
versity B A., M.A.; George V/ashington University LL.B.; attorney. United
States Department of Justice; instructor in law, George Washington University;
prc-^ident University of Arkansas; elected to the 78th Congress on November 3,
194'>- elected to the 'United States Senate November 7, 1044, for the term ending
Janiuirv 3, 1951; reelected November 7, 1950, for the term ending January 3,
1957; reelected November 6, 1956, for the term ending January 3, 1963; reelected
November 6, 1962, for the term ending January 3, 1969.
EUGENE J. McCarthy, Democrat-Farmer-Labor, of St. Paul, Minn.; bom
in Wat-kins, Minn., March 29, 1916; graduated from St. John's University, College-
ville Minn., in 1935, from the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis with M. A.
degree; taught social science in high schools for 5 years; professor of economics
and education at St. John's University 1940-42; civilian technical assistant in
the Military Intelhgence Division, War Department: married Abigail Quigley
in 19-15; they have three daughters and one son—Ellen Anne, ALary Abigail,
Margaret Alice, and Michael Benet; acting chairman of sociology department of
fit Thomas College 194G; chairman of the Ramsey County Democratic Farmer-
Labor Party in 1948; delegate at large to the Democratic National Convention
in 194S; elected to the Sfst, S2d, S3d, S4th, and S5th Congresses; elected as
United States Senator for a G-ycar term beginning January 3, 1959; reelected
November 3, 1904; member of Senate Committees on Finance and Foreign
Relations; Select Committee on Standards & Conduct, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Memorial' Commission, Democratic Steering Committee; in 1959 and 1960
cluirman of the Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems; author
of the book Frontiers in Ayncrican Democracy (1960), Dictionary of American
Politics (1962), and A Liberal Answer lo the Conservaiiie Challenge (1964).
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STUART SYMINGTON, Dpmocrnt, of Cl.iyton, St. Louis, Mo., C3invbom June 26, 1001, in Amherst, Mass.; enlisted in the Armv at 17; V.ale, lOl'j.23 (A.B.); started in sled husine.<5S as a niolder; marrii-d to' Evelyn' W'ad^wort''
daughter of Senator James W. Wadsworth; two .sons, Stnnrt and James- bccini-
president of Emerson I::icctric •Mamifacturins? Co. of St. Louis; entered Govon-
mcnt service July 16, i'.)45, serving succossivclv as chairman of Surplus Proncrlv
Board; A.<^i3tant Secretary of War for Air; Secretary of the Air Force; chairmr
of National Security Ivesourccs Board; Administra'tor. Rcconstnictio'n Fininc'
Corporation; Episcopalian; Mason; elected United Sutes .Senator for Mi^sour.
on November 4, 1952; reelected November 4, 1958; reelected November 3, IDGl




at GetiL-iiu jciuciric ^o. in rmsneia Dciore joining s<;aDees in World war n.i
served in Southwest Pacific: attended Boston Ooll-','e and Boston College Law'
(Vhool. piduating in 1940; admitted to the bar same year; in November 1950
,\.cU.-<i to the _ Massachusetts State Senate; served as Scaiator from Berkshire
;,.,trict 19j1-o8; served as chairman of Senate committees on Constitutional
i.iw. Insurance, Judiciary, and a^ chairman of Legislative Research Council
^,H-ri» Comnu^sion Investigating Health aud Welfare Trust Funds, Commission
.,;, hish and Game, Commission Investigating Accident and Health Insurance
roiiuni.ssion Investigating the Increase in Tank-Wagon Prices of Gasoline and
Fuel Oil, Commission studying Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Commission Investi>.atine
l)i>cnmiuatory Practices in Fraternities and Societies in Massachusetts Col'leo-ei
».,J Universities; selected by Massachusetts Junior Chamber of Commerce°as
„.:t.-landuig young man of the year in 1954: member of platform committee at
.::.• i:q)ub!ican National Convention in 19G0 and 1964; director of the PitUHold
«;irLi Club; director of HiUcrcst Hospital; member of Berkshire Bar Association
.\rus.saciiu.sett5 Bar Association, Federal Bar Association; maintains congressional
r,!l;ce at / >.orth Street, Pittsfield, Mass.; married to the former Corinne Duval
f':"*"
"o'c k'"^'.^ '^^'^r.r^u 'i^ ^^^^ Congress November 4, 195S; reelected to the
S. Ill, SSth, 8ytn, and 90th Congresses.
H. R. GROSS, Republican, of Waterloo, Iowa; bom, Arispe, Iowa, June 30,
1899, and raised on a farm; education, rural schools. University of Missouri School
of Journalism; profession, newspaper reporter and editor from 1921 to 1935;
radio news commenttiior from 1935 to 1948: military service, Mexican Border
Service 1916, American Fxpeditionary Forces World War I: member Presbj-teriaa
Church. Masonic Lorlge, Elks, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars;
married to Hazel E. Webster, Cresco, Iowa, June 29, 1929; tv,-o sons, Phil and
Alan; elected to the SIst Congress on Xovember 2, 19J8; reelected to the 82d,
83cl, S4th, 85th, S6th, 87 th, SSth, 89th, and 90th Congresses.
CLARENCE DICKINSON LONG, Democrat, of Ruxton, Md.; born in South
5'i-nd, lud., December 11, 190S; received B.A. from Washington and JeCTerson
folh-ge, 1932, and M.A. in 1933; M.A. from Princeton University in 1935 and
!"'i. D. in 1938; Guggenheim Fellow; member. Institute for Advanced Study,
i'.'iiiceton, 1941-43; served in the U.S. Navy as a licuteHant in World War II;
l-r.ifessor of economics at the Johns Hopkins University siace 194G (on leave 19G3-
"•5); associate task force director of the first Hoover Commission in 194S; senior
•'-"tir member of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President 1953-54 and
l'J.»G-57; acting chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee of Maryland
I''Gi-G2; author of seven books and many articles on unemployment, wages,
'J>or force, and economic fluctuations; married to the former Susanna Barter;
|.';^<» children, Clarence Dickinson 3d and Su.sanna Elizabeth: elected to the SSth
^<J"grcs3 November G, 1902; reelected to the 89th and QOtii Congresses.
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Democrat, of FredericktoTVE, Pa., bom in Ellsworth,
Pa., October 13, 1906; attended the public schools of Washington County, and
was graduated from East Bethlehem Township High School at Fredericktown,
Pa., in 1926; was graduated from Waynesburg College, Waynesburg, Pa., in 1930
with a bachelor of science degree; from Detroit College of Medicine and Surgery,
Detroit, Mich., in 1933 with a bachelor of medicine degree, and from Wayne Lni-
versity in 1934, with a doctor of medicine degree; ser%-ed internship at Grace
Hospital Detroit, Mich., and since that time ha-s practiced medicine and surgery
at Fredericktown, Pa.; married Winifred Stait of Portage la Prairie, Manitoba,
Canada, August 26, 1937; they have one daughter, Mrs. Gordon \oungblood;
member of numerous fraternal and civic organizations; elected to the /9th Coa-
gress on November 7, 1944; reelected to each succeeding Congress; chairman
of House Foreign Affairs Committee, S6th, 87th, 8Sth, SO'th, and 90th Congresses.

511
OTTO ERNEST PASSMAN, Democrat, of Monroe, La.; »)om on a farm in
Washington Parish, near Franklinton, La., June 27, 1900, of Irish-Frcnch-HoUand
Dutch extraction; married; owner of Pas-^rrian Iiivostmcnt Co., Monroe, La.;
served a.s officer in U.S. Navy during World War II; member, First Baptist
Church, Monroe, La.; past State Commandor, American Veterans of World War
II, Inc.; member, American Legion; .33d degree Scottish Rite Mason; member,
Red Cross of Constantine of York Ilito of Freemasonry; past Grand Ma.stcr,
Grand Lodge of the State of Louisiana, Free and Accepted Masons; elected oa
November o, 1946, to the SOth Congress; reelected to the 81st, 82d, 83d, 84tb,
85th, 86th, 87th, SSth, 89th, and 90th Congresses.
WRIGHT PATMAX, Democrat, of Texarkana, Tex. ; born at Patman's Switch
near Hughes Springs, Cass County, Tex., August 6, 1893; finished high school at
Hughes Springs, 1912; received LL. B. degree, Cumberland University, 191G;
United States Army, 1917-19, enlisted man and first lieutenant—machine gun
officer; married Miss Merle Connor, of Winnsboro, Tex., February 14, 1919 (they
have three sons, all having served in W^orld War II) ; member of Texas Legislature
for 4 years; district attorney, fifth judicial district of Texas, 5 years; elected in
1928 to the 71st Congress and reelected to each succeeding Congress; chairman
of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives, member
of the Joint House and Senate Defense Production Committee, member of the
House Select Committee on Small Business, and member of the House and
Senate Joint Economic Committee; he and all members of his family affiliated
with the First Baptist Church of Texarkana, Tex.; member of Masons, Flks,
Eagles, Shrine, American Legion, Disabled American Veterans; associate member
of National Press Club; member of State Bar Association and admitted to practice
before Supreme Court of the United States; administrative assistant, Baron I.
Shacklette, Waldorf, Mrl., phone: r^II 5-8931 (area code 301); secretarv, Mrs.
Dorothy F. Councill, 3525 Paul Street, Alexandria, Va., 22311, phone: 481-2881.
HENRY S. REL'SS, Democrat, of Milwaukee, Wis.; born in Milwaukee,
Wis., February 22, 1912; educated in Milwaukee schools, A. B. Cornell University,
LL. B. Harvard Lav,- School; lawyer; lecturer (University of Wisconsin, Milwau-
kee), and writer; author of "The Critical Decade," 19G4; member of Milwaukee
School Board, 1953-55; married to Margaret Magrath, 1942; four children
—
Christopher, Michael, Jacqueline, .\nne; assistant corporation counsel, Milwaukee
County, 1939-40; assistant general counsel OPA, Washington, D.C., 1941-42;
entered United States Asmy as private, January 1943; commissioned second lieu-
tenant, Infantry, at Fort Bcnning, Ga., November 1943; served in G3d and 75th
Infantry Divisions 1943-45; chief, Price Control Branch, Office of Military Gov-
ernment for Germany, June-December 1945; awarded Bronze Star Medal for
action at Rhine crossing and Bronze Battle Stars for Normandy, Nortliern
France, and Central Germany; deputy general counsel, Marshall Plan, Paris,
France, 1949; special prosecutor, Milwaukee County Grand Jury 1950; personal
counsel to Secretarv of State Fred Zimmerman in Reapportionment Case, Wis-
consin Suprcnie Co"urt, 1953; former president, White Elm Xursery Co., Hart-
land, Wis.; former director, Marshall and Ilsley Bank, Milwaukee, Wis., and
Niagara Share Corporation, Buffalo, N.Y.: past jpresidcnt, Cornell Alumni Asso-
ciation of Wisconsin; vice president, Chi Psi Alumni .'\isociation ; director, Chil-
dren's Service Society; vice chairman, Junior Bar Association; Board of Alumni
Visitors, Harvard Law School, 1957-60; Board of \'isitoi-s, Cornell University;
National Board, Youth Hostel Association; elected to the S4th Congress Novem-
ber 2 1954; reelected to S5th, 8Gth, S7th, SSLh, 89th., and 90th Congresses.
WILLIAM BECK WIDNALL, Republican, of Saddle River, N. J.; born in
Hackensack N. J., March 17, 1900; Episcopalian; educated in the Hackensack
public schools; graduated from Brown University Ph. B. in 1926 and ronri
the
New Jersey Law School (now part of Rutgers University), LL B., m 1J31,
profession is law; uiarried Marjorie Soule in 1933 and has two children-Bartora
and William S • member of Bergen County Bar Association; member of the New
Jersey Ke of Ts.-.emblv 1946-49 and reelected for ^'^^9j'-^\^'^[^^^ :^^\l'^i,]'
the 81st Con-roFs in a special election held February 0, 19o0; reelected to
the b-'d,
83d, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, SSth, S9th, and 90th Congresses.

APPENDIX F
The Uaden in arms sales overseas
[In millions of dollars]
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Sotsrcc; D«/ense Department data.




Foreign mUitarv tales program hy weapon* systems; fiscal years 196Z-66 and
outstanding coinjnitments







Ammunition all types 447.3
Support equipment 344.6
Supply support arrangements 29G. 8
Guided missile destroyers 281.6
Hawk missile system 291.6
Pershing missile systems 253.1




Sergeant missile systems 165.7































Foreign military sales program, fiscal years 1962-66 and outstanding commitments













































, 1,518.3 1.376.7 1,26Z0 1.969.7 1.936.9 3,039.3 11.102.9
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Good - your questions are clear and I will do my best to answer them.
1. The initiative for the staff study was mine. No other member of
the staff participated in writing the study. With the obvious ex-
ceptions of Carl Marcy and Pat Holt, the rest of the staff never
even knew about the study until it was published. The study was
given normal distribution with no special effort to bring it to the
attention of the rest of the Congress or the press. In fact, the
report was -sleeper. No-one involved kad any idea that the study
would draw so much attention and cause so much controversy. L^.
was probably one of those cases where the staff study acted as the
last dhop of acid before the litmus turned.
The idea for the study came after listening to Sam de Palma say
to the Committee during a nominati^ef hearing that ACDA had no
voice in the decisions on arms sales.
2. No it was not anticipated that McNaughton would so react. I did
not think DOD would react at all. The letter of "rebuttal" was
printed in the hearing and the hearing given the same distribution
as the study. In fact, given a wider dissemination because of the
growing controversy around the issue. You should know, however,
that the publications of the FRC really do not follow a "distribution





- Page 2 -
I would describe Kuss as most cooperative and informative during
the interview. He clearly was proud of what he was doing - after
all, he had a mandate from McNamara and received a decoration
for his efforts.
3. No.
4. Both Symington and I were intrigued by a munber of articles on
Cummings and I lived in Alexandria (home of Interarmco). This
was an example - in all conde-r - of how decisions are often made
about witnesses. After listening to Cummings I can believe that
he really enjoyed the idea of testifying and, more importantly,
putting the "commander" to some of his competitors.
5. Very pleased - primarily because the process made the congress
aware of arms sales and raised the hopes of more effective legis-
lative oversight. I think this has been the case. I was not aware of
the Conte-Long amendment. There was remarkably little communi-
cation between the relevant staffs. As I remember it the Symington
amendment did not go through much of a transaction. But you should
see Norville Jones and Pat Holt of the Committee Staff on this. It
would be a good idea to talk to Norville anyway. He now handles the
sales issue.













I have received your acknowledgment of my letter of October
h. Thank you for your invitation to send specific questions.
At present, in iny research, I an making an effort to identify
the congressional initiatives for reform of the U.S. Military
Assistance and Sales Program as it existed prior to the passage
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (together with its appro-
priating legislation) and the Export-Import Bank E-rbension Act
of the same year. It vould be of considerable help to me if you
might respop.d to the following questions,
1, On whose initiative was the staff study, "Arms Sales and
Foreign Policy" (published January 25, 1967), undertaken?
Could you identify staff m.embers, other than yourself, who
participated in writing the study? Was an effort made to
ensure that dissemination of the study included members of
both houses of Congress serving on comniittees whose juris-
diction covered foreign assistance and Ex-Im Bank legisla-
tion?
2, In regard to the administration's reaction to the study;
was it anticipated that Mr. KcN aughton would contest the
accuracy of the study and respond with a factual rebuttal?
Was the rebuttal letter given the same dissemination as
the study itself? During your interview vrith Mr. Kenr;^'
Kuss, incident to the preparation of the study, would you
describe him as cooperative and informative or as evasive
or reticent concerning his role in prumotixig arms sales.
3» In the spring and summer of 1967, the period during
which momentum grew within both houses of Congress for the
reform of existing systere of arms transfers, were members
of the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations in
active contact with members of the House and Senate Com-
mittees on Appropriations and Banking and Currency?
U. Would you comm.ent on the selection of Mr. bamuel
Cummings, the president of Interarmco, as a witness before
the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian affairs
(April 13, 1967)? Kis testimony ^despite his o».n efforts
to minirdse the role of private arms merchaxits) seemed




$, What was your own reaction to the legislation
passed that year and early in I968 which effected the
various restraints on arms transfers and military assis-
tance? \'.'ere you aware berorehand of Congressman Conte's
intention of writing legislation into the foreign assis-
tance appropriation bill (via the "Conte-Long smendment")?
Did the "Symington ainendnent" go through much transition
prior to its being introduced?
I hope that I am not presumptuous in putting these questions
to you. Dr. Bader. It is because you appear to have played a
rather central role in an effort to focus the attention of the
Congress on v;hat may have been clear excesses on the part of the
administration that I am. looking fon-rard with great interest to
whatever replies you may m.ake. Any peripheral advice or inform-
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Further to your questions :
1- Yes, vaguely. When I came to the Committee in June of 1966, Carl
Marcy asked me what subjects in the disarmament field I thought would
be important in next few years. I said the A.B.M issue, arms sales,
and CBW (the NPT was a given). With Marcy' s approval I begin to work
in the direction of hearing on all the subjects mentioned. The arms sales
study was part of that effort.
I never even thought of showing the study to ISA - if i had and they had
responded in the fashion you mentioned that effort you have only awakened
the interests of Senators^not changed the report. Facts I might have
checked with them - not conclusions.
2-7^ 1 has the answer.
3- I honestly don't think I can gracefully respond to this one.
4- No. Not to my knowledge.
5- The FA committee always spends a great deal of time on the Foreign
Assistance Act (critics might suggest : "What else do they have to do".
But, of course, that is not my opinion. I think the work of the FA committee
has been most useful \ Look at the record of how much time the Senate
Committee spent on Military Sales before 1967. In one sense, you could




they had given a great deal of attention to the issue (in comparison to
past efforts) and there wasiMch other business before the Committee
(take a look at the calendar)
.
6- No.
As for the "Vital statistics" on Bader try the NYT of March 22,1969 and
Anthony Austins' new book "The President's War".






Mr, li(illian B. Bader
Imter«atioajd Division





First, a 8ome*rhat belated "thanks" for your quick and
coiaplete response to my request for information. Your answers
provided me with valuable insight into the central issue of my
research — and thsy were much appreciated, as was your kind
isnritation to make further inquiries.
I m in the writing stage ncw^ and are busily tying up
loose ends. I was in Washington for a few days and had a
pleasant talk with Seth Tillman which helped in a general
way. Unfortunately, I missed Nox^ville Jones but will try to
see him when I return there again in the near future*
Pertiaps you will agree, in retrospect, that your stucfy
of arms sales, when coupled with the two subcommittee hearings
(DisarmauieTit and Near Sasten and South Asian Affairs) which
laanediately followed it, takes on aspects of a campaign. Your
presence at these hearings in the role of consultant to both
the subcomrrattees, your direct questioning of the witnesses,
and your frequent prompting of Senator Symington ^M tend to
identify you as a key actor in the proceedings. In an effort
to represent this phase of the congressional movwient to gain
some supervision of arms sales as accurately as possible, I
would like to take advantage of your invitation by asking the
foUx>%ring additional questions;
1« With regard to your study — did you prepare it with
the impending Disarmament Subcommittee hesrings in mind?
Mr, McNaughton was upset because you had not shown him
or Mr, Kuas a draft of the study and Mr. Marcy defended
the practice of not showing work in progress by the staff
to the executive bsanr^h, were you perhaps concerned that,
should ISA aee it before it was published, they might move
to prevent its publication or so water it down that it
would have little or no impact?
2, Mas the subject of arms sales originally included with
the topics (strategic deterrent and missile systens) which
were to be considered by Senator Gore's suteonmittee — or
was it added as a result of the intex^st in arms sales
stirred up by the study?
3. Even after the study had been published Senator Symington
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•eeaed (by his questions) slow to grasp all the lioplicatlons
of the administration* s arms sales program — he seemed, it
one point, to be marching toward the administration* s position
that if sales were going to be made anyway, the U.S. should
get in on the business, Would you care to comment on the
degree to which you were responsible in shaping his (and
possibly Senator McCarthy's) ultimate views of the program?
U« Senator Ellender, of the Appropriations Committee, was
extremely active during the same period — particularly in
regard to enployment of the Export-Import Bank in financing
arms sales. Do you recall whether you or other m«nbei*s of
the Foreign Relations Committee staff discussed the arms
•ales program with him or with his staff?
5« The House Foreign Affairs Coiranittee hearings on the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 lasted over two months and
received the testimony of numerous witnesses. Contrasted
with their handling of the bill the Foreign Relations
Committee hearings seem abrupt and almost perfunctory. One
covild draw the conclusion that, after the previous year's
bearings, your study, and the two subcommittee hearings,
the Senators had made up their minds and would have con*
•idered any teatimorry unmoving. Would this be a fair
conclusion? If so, was this mood of the Foreign Relations
Committee known to the administration by early summer?
6. Do you feel that Mr, McNaughton's untiftely death had any
effect on the administration's efforts in behalf of preserv*
Ing the arms sales program intact?
I hope that responding to these questions will not incon-
vwiience you *- you have already been most helpful, I have been
asked by my thesis adviser to includeda certain amount of bio-
graphical information on each of the primaay participants in
this issue; would you be kind enough to provide me with some










Hon. William S. Gaud,
Administrator, Agency for International Development,
Wn^hinglon, IJ.C.
.Deas Mil. GAPn: The; Snbcomrr.itteo on Diparmament is Sioldinc a series of
henririRS on nrmjiment and di.-^armanioiit problems. Anion;? rho subjocis under
ron.-idenvtiovi is the management of the I'nited States' couv< xitional arms .=ak's
profrranis. The ^^ubrommittee is particularly interested in dew^Tmining vhetticr
tbe pre.-~cnt system of intern i;cncy coordination is adec|uate to the task of super-
vising ciir burgeoniiii; arms ?.T,les.
'YUr. Subcommiltce woiikl tliereforn appreciate your cooprnation in providint;
information on your .Vgency's role in coordinating a n;-tiunal p'Viicy of .-irms sales.
In order to make this iti'iuirj- as spe<;ific as possible, would 5-ou picasc ])rovirle
answers to the questions below on voiir As'^ncv's role in the sale of (1) the F-4s to
Iran, (2) the 12 F-os to Morocco, (3) the F-1048 to Jordari, (4) the A-4s to
Arfientina.
ifn e-nch of the-e individual cases would you answer the foUtswitiy: <iM*--tions:
A. At what stay,e in the negotiations did your A^eiicy luuve,an op|iorliniity
to register an ciff;ci:d |)i>-ition ou tlx- s.ile?
15. Did your As<'ncy sit with the St;!te-D( fen -e l."oordisnati!i'.r Coniaiittee
when the sale was discus<e<r' Is your A^oncy a i)erniane!r't iJK-i;iber of tliat
Comniittee? If so, fur how long?
C. Did your Agency particip.-ite in a l^eiiior Ii'terdep:irtn!eMl.il Group
nteetini; where the final decision was m.-irie to .nppro'.e tfec sale'.'
D. \\'as your .Asc'icy proent at any high level meeting wher^ the credit
terms of tlie sale were discussed?
E. Did your Agency have any objections to the sale? If fcO, what were
the objections?
I would iiope to have your answers Ijy February itth. If a full reijort require.'
the answers be rlasslfied, that is acceptable.
Sincerely yours,
Albert Gore.
Agency for Intern \hon\l DEVi;LOP.MENT,
]Va«hinglon, Fe^ruanj H, lO'u'.
Hon. .Vi.nEiti' Gokk,
Vhaini'dn, Siibroiiimitlre on Disarmament,
U.S. Srnale, Wat^hiiigton, D.C.
De\i; SicxAToK Ci<iit!i; llneloseil herewith is the infornudion requested in your
letter of February S as to the part jjlayeri by this agency in rce sale of rJrcraft
to Iran, Morocco, .Jordan, and Argentina. If you wish any further information
I will be h.'ippy to supjily it.
Sincerely yours,
WiEJLiAU S. Gaud.
Sale of F-5's to Morocco
A
AID participated from their inception in the discussions iR'hich led 'O the
decision to furnish the»e aircraft to ^lorocco.
B
The Stato/I^efen.so Coordinating Committee did not meet oa this c;^,se. Ali^
was, however, fully familiar with the transaction and participated in many inter-
agency discussions relating to it.
C
The decision to provide tlio aircraft was made before the Senior Interdepart-
mental Group was estaljlished.
D
AID p.'irticipatcd actively in the discussions which led to the (decision to provide
these aircraft. The meetins; at wliich ihis was decified was an (interdepartmental
meeting chaired by the D<-puty Administrator of AID. AID was also an active
participant in the di.-cussions which led to developing the teruib upon which the
sale was made.
E




Salb or F—4*8 to Iran
A
Thcso iiircraft constitute part of a .<alc3 })rograni which was finally approved
i in May I'.t'itj.
; AID participated in many discussions relating to this proi)Osed sale. It not
only hud an oarly opj)ortunity to register a position on this matter, but did so.
i AID objected to the size and "timing of the j)roi)()<"d trans^iction. AID did not,
\ however, express an opinion as to the indi\ idual items lo be iiicluded, and therefore
expre.'^.'icd no view as to whether F-4 aircraft should be sold.
B
\ AID has hern a member of the State/ Defense Coordinatina: Committee since
j this Committee was set up in April li>64. This sale was considered by that Com-
\ mittee, and AID participated in llie discussion.
I
There was no meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group at which this
j transaction wa.s considered.
!
* AID n^presentativcs were present at a numi:>er of htu;h-level meetings at which
'i credit terms were discu.«»»c-d. AI D's view as to what these terms should be finally
I prevailed.
* E
AID did object to the proposal. AID's interest has been and crn:ti!.-..< t-> f*
that the primary call on th*- resources of Iran should be for economic devln; i... .'.
AID. therefore, recommended a one year agreement of a Icsm r amount.
These objections resulted in a modification of the sales projtosal.
Sale of F-104 to Jordan
A
AID was involved in this transaction from its inception and actively partici-
pated in the discussions relating to it.
B
There was no meetinc; of the State/Defense Coordinating Comniittcc at whi. a
this matter was discuss<(l. However, it was discussed extensively between t!ie
Department of Defense, State, and AID.
C
There was no meeting of the Senior Intcrdepartment.al Group at which thi-
transaction was con.^idered.
D
No credit was extended in connection with the sale of these aircraft. AID riid
participate in discussions wiien the possibility of extending credit was considered.
and was in agreement with the decision to extend none.
E
AID was concerned as to the possible economic impact of the .sale, but in tlie
last analysis did not object.
Sale of .\-4's to Augk.ntina
A
AID was informed from the outset of the negotiations which led to this sal.-,
and throughout had an opportunity to regist<T its position with respect to u.
B
There was no meeting of the State/Defense Coordinating Committee at whifl.
this sale was discussed. .VID did, however, participate in a number of ij.ter-
agency meetings at which this transaction was rliscussed.
C
The J^enior Interdepartmenlrl Group was not established until after tliis sale
had been completed.
PtafT "fficers representing this acencv participated in discussions at which tl..^
propo-e<I cre<lit (irms were diseus.-«d. "Those terms were subsequently appnne.l
by the .\dministr:.tor of the Agency.
AID did not object to this transaction in view of the limited effect it would iiav
on the Argentine <-conomy.




U.S. Arms Contkol and Disarmament Aoencv,
Washington, February 15, IC'iiT.
Hon. Ai.B-CKT Coke,
C'hninnau, S!ifiroinvi7(tte on Disnrnunnenf,
Senate Cofinutlce on Foreign Udatiovs, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Gore: In rcnponse to your Icttor of Febniary S, 1007, r<-.:,ir(l;! i«
the role of this ARrnry in fl<'ri>ion-ninkiiin willi n ^pect to iiiililtrv r'l- » 1 v. •
liKc to PKirvc sninc uriii-i:ii i-ominrnTs nr-ioro atuircsi-ir.L; your ipocilic qtiostions.
This A;;'-ncv h:is ;ilw:iy.s h:id ;in iiitonst in tlic rclalion^h jp of U.S. military
sitlcs poiicy to pnssii>ie iiiii^m.-itioiuil a!irt'<'mcnts iinpo.-in;z; limitations on arniu-
int'nl;;. Vvo hrivc devoted cnii-.ifjci;il)!f stmiy to this suhji'cl, and h.ivc ;ittcin|ited
to identify practical >ti-p> tli;;t nii'-jht \'C tnkoii to oncoiirage snch acn-iMncnts.
In p.'irlic.ilir. v.e forn>nl;ui"fi the propo.-al retloctcfl in point 7 of the i're.-ident's
mcpsaire to tlu' r.iiilili i-n Nation Disarniamcnt Confertncc on .January '27, 1!>GG
(a C(){)y of which i'^ i-ncioscd) : olahoratc-d that proposal at the ENDC anri at tiio
U.N. ;an<l have been pursuing every availal)le opporuiniiy to itnplenioiit that
proposal.
In \ iew of the liniitaiinn.-s initio.-erj by our small staff anil t!ic priorities necessarily
accorded to th;- strategic arms r?ce (uhie!; lias tieen th^; principal focus of atten-
tion in disarmament nei;otiatio!is at the J'A'DC an<l the U.N.), wc did not, prior
to ciiactniejit of the F"orei!;n As~i-laneo Act of liititi. Jilay a sii^niiicant- role in
doci.sion makiiiK witli respect to unilateral U.S. military' sales policy e.vcept wher?
questions involving; the limited test ban treaty or missile proliferation were
concerned.
Uoiio".' ioR eiuietmrnt of .>cctiou 154(a) of the Foreii^n Assistance Act of lOoG,
%vhich ])rovides that "proLrrams for the sale or exchare^c of defenpc article., shall
be a<inn"nisten"d bo as to encourage n tcional arms control and riif-.T.rmamcnt af;reo-
nients and ."=o as to fliscourasje arms races", the Director, as princip.-J advicftr to
the Pre>ifient and the Secretary of Staio oii arms control and disarmament mat-
ters, n'cog;d/ed the need to devote increased atlciiiion to this aspi'ct of his respon-
sibilities. Accordingly, he issued the enclosed Agency instruction, which is
currently Ixing vit;«5roulsy imjjlenicnted.
• We enclos<' a confuleati.d memorandum indicating the degree of our particip.i-
tion in docici^ions with respect to the particular military sales specified in your
letter.
Siaccrely yours,
Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Direc'.or.
(The ronfidontiiil nienionindura referred to Is on fde with the Senate
Foreign Rehitions Coniinitlee.)
ExECDTivE Office of the President,
Bireau of the Budget,
Washington, D.C, February 16, 1^*67.
Hon. Albert Gore,
Chuiriiirn, Suhrnmniitt-ee on Disarinainent,
Coininit/'c on Forngn Relations
U.S. Se/i(ile,
Wa^hin'jton., D.C.
Df, \R Mn. Chairman: I refer to yon.r letter of February 8, 1067, and your
questions on the Bireau of the Ihuiuct's role in ccn."iin aircraft s-alcs.
Before answerinu yoe,r iiiilivichial (|UOstions, I should liKC to discuss briefly the
general rcrlcs of iho priin-ipal Dt.-p.irtmerits and Bureau of trie Builgot hi the
])repandion of tl.e anntiul ir.iliti'ry assistance pro'.;nim, including credit sal<;^.
As you know, *iio Fon^ii: A>sistanco .\co rciuires that
—
" IJnfkr The dii'ection of the i'resident, the SeiTet.iry of Stale .shall he rc-ponsible
for tiie cfn:tJn!.oii< sn))er\ i>ioii and gencial diiection of tlie as-istanco pro^n.ms
authorized by .hi-; Act, i'.iclsu'ing but not liinitefl to deteiiniinng wlicther tiicre
sh;dl he .•[ iiiilifarv a>si.-t;.iice j>r;>j;ram .including any civic action ajid sales
program) for a country and tiie y;ilne tiiereof, to the end that sucii proL^rams are
cfFoctiwiy inteur:. i<;d botli at home and abioad and tiie foreign policy of tlio
Uniter! St:i',c.-> is :if.~t .served ;here!)y.''
The -Vet jd.-o stipulates th;it tin; .S/oretary of Defense "shall have primary
responsibiiiiv * )r
—
(D t!u; fimermin.'ilion of milit.ury end-item requirements;
{'!) the pror-urenient of military ec|uipnienl in a manner which permits
its int'-.;raiioii v.iiii service prf>L;r.uns;
(3) the sup-^rvi>ion of end-item use Ijy the recipient countries;
(4) the sujji-rvi^ion of tlie tr lining of fore:,",u i,-.ili(;.ry p'Tsnnnel;
(5) the rMovcrncnt a'Kl (U-livery of riuliiary <'nd-it<ans; atid
(C) wlihhi the Department of Defen.^'-, the p.-rformanco of any other
functions with re.-pect to ttio furnishing of military assistance."
With 1)1-!. •-.ary res;>on:~il^ility in State and Defense, the Burertu's involvement in
the miHtary credit siles iiroLirani at the pre.-ent time is focused around two speriric
points in the programniing-bufi-'etitHi: proces
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First, in the fall of eacli yoar :is .-i pjtrt of tl)'- kcii»t;»1 hiulijrt prorrsi>, tlip iiiilit:irv
aawisUiiice gnmt ami cr<'ilit salt-s progrnm for the oiirn-nt arui t)iuljii't vonrs (tliis
year, FY I1M".7 aiul FY lOiiS) i>; subniiitcd lo tlio rn'sidiMit. Tlic" piopn^nK
reprri^fiit tlic consi'lored judtrnuMi** of t\\<: Secretary of State and tlio Secretary
of Defense on a (•oiiiitry-l>y-'"oi!riiry ba>is. For credit sales, the |)rograin sub-
mitted sets forth for each prnpo-efl recipient, tlic major items and tin- terms of
credit. The Riireaii and National Security Council staff review tiiese programs
as to scope, content, and policy. The main issues idetitifto(i in (his review are
discussed with th«' Departm'iits prior to recommcndation.s to the President for
inclusion in the annual budget.
Second, after congressional actiofi on apf)ro])riations, the Tiureau acain reviews
the grant and credit sales program on a country i)asis jjrior to the npportiojniirnt
of funds. At that time, there is oyjportunity for discussion with representatives
of State and Defense to review the specific credit sales propo.sals as they relate
to the Administration's policy.
In response to the questions contained in your letter, I should like to make the
foliowini; observations:
State and Defense are responsible for the fornuilation and necrotiation of specific
credit, sales. However, Uureau staff folloiv on an informal basis major |>roposod
sales durinc negntiations and ran and do make recommendations to the agencies
or the President on sjiccilic sales, as appropriate.
The Bureau of the Budget does not sit on the "State and Defense Coordinating
Committee." Similarly, the Biiri-au is not a member of the S»^iiior Interdeparl-
mental Group. However, the results of the deliberations of these groups are
available when rcipiired.
In none of the s[jecific s.nlcs cases you cite was the Bure-iu of the Budget present
at "high level" meetings where the credit terrni? of the sales w<'re discussed.
Finally, the Buri-au of the Budget did not object to the aircraft sales to which
you refer in your letter.
I hope that these comments are lielpfiil.
Sincerely,
Philup S. IIoghes, Ading Dircdor.
The Secretary of the Treasury,




Dear SENATfiit (Iork: I am respoufliug to your letter of February S wlu'ch
rerpiested information concerning Treasury particii)ation in the interafrency co-
ordination of the U.S. militarv sales prouram, and particularly concerning the
'sale of (I) the F-4's to Iran."(_'i the 12 F-5's to Morocco, (ii) the F-104 s to
Jordan, (4) the A-4's to ,\r<;entin.-.
In ansv.er to your spf-cilic rpiestif'us:
A. .\t what statue ill the ncKotiati'^ns ilid the Treasiiry D«j»art!nent ha\-c an
Ol)portiMiil\' lo r<f;ist»-r an oliicial posiiiou on llie sale?
In I'Mcii of fh'- c.vsis meuti'MKil in yoiu' Icf^er, Ticjisury w;;-^ m;ide aware at an
early st:<jr" in Ihf n* ;;i»tiatinii ,•. "-itlier through the exchanti'' of messaees with
rur l';ml>assi(>s (.r i»y informal a<lv.ic(- from the Department f>f Defense, that sucli
sales w< r«' heinn considered. Through our recular liaison with DiTense and oilier
a^iencie'i we had oppiirtunities to in "sent our views thrnugh(>iit the proc<~-^s of all
r>f these liegot iat idlK.
B. I)ifl your Dey)artnient sit with the Sinre/Dcfens*- Cooifiinatiir.; Committee
when llie sn!(! wa^ <ii-c'i-:-ed? !s your r)e;artnient a pernniiicnt uienil'cr of tiiat
Omuuittec? If -•), for how long?
Treasury is rin' .-. j.urTnanent iiiend)er oi' tliat Committee. However, from time
to liuK; my As.-i^taiit for National Seeiiritv AiTairs has I'Ciiri -enlefi Treasury ;•'
moetin^;-^ of t}j(> Coniinittee, paniciilarty \\ !uni such subjects as creclii soi'.rces and
terms hav<- been di-cnsserl. lie v as not i:>ics(ut wIku the cases mentioned in your
letter w«-re rcjiisiilered.
(',. Did your l)ep-iitmeut participate in a Senior Inter('.rpar;ment;d Group
ineelinj: wiu.re the liiial dec! -ioti was luafle to apjirovi; the sale?
To our kno\\Iedi?e, there were no meetings of the Senior InterdepartnK^utal
Group on these sijecific sales.
D. Was your Dcp;;rlmeut present at any high-level meetings where the crcdii
terms of the sale were discussed?
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It was not neccssarj" for us to attend any hi?h-level mc<'tin!»s on those specific
cases. The focus- of any such iruM:"tinKs was not on crc<Iit terms. The sale to
Jordan was for ca^h. Tlic sales to Iran, M'^triieco, aacl Argentina iiivoKorl MAP
credit on' tiTiii.-^ wiiirli fell within the j;<'iier."i! ))aitern of MAI' credit terms that
had been iliseussed between af^encies on nuineroiis occasions.
E. l)i<! your Department have any objections to the sale? If so, what were
the objections?
Wo did not rai.se any oljjections to the specific sales from the Treasury point
of view. We felt tiiat no advcr.-e ba!ancc-oi-payments impact was involved,
nnd we did not i>l>ject to the credit terms.
In answer to yonr more (reneral question as to the role of the Treasury in
coordinating a nationrd ])oliey of arms s.Ues, Treasury has maintained close
contact with the Departments of Defense and State and other agencies on the
military sales proRram.
The .\ssi';taiit to the Secretary for National Security Affairs is in day-to-day
cof\tact with tin- Departments of 1')i fin.-c i'iid State and other agencies to efiecc
coordination. Tiiis olliee, through informal, regular contact, keeps other Treasury
ofKces informed of policy issues and negotiation.s in process, so t.hat Treasury is
in a pr)sition to expres-; its views on matters of concern to ns—especially bahmce-
of-payments imp;!L't aiifl credit terms,
Tre.-^sury also chairs tiie Natioiud Advisory Council on International Monerary
and P'inancial I'olicies (N.VC), which is compo>ed of the D(>partmcnts of Str.te,
Treasury and Comnierov ar.ri the Exjjoi t-Iniport Bank and th(^ Federal Rc-t^rve
Board. The !> [jartment of Defense and the .'Vcjoncy for International Develop-
ment are regular participants. We use the XAC procedures to facilitate coordi-
nation of military sales credit terms.
Sincerely yours,
Hbnbt H. Fowlkr.
Soforeex n»S« Congress, Senate, United States Urmatnent and Dlg<»
araaaent Froblema , Hearings BeXore the Subcomrairtee on
Disarmament or tne Coniniittce on Foreign Relations, 90th




Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washiugion, D.C., March 1, 1067.
Hon. Albert CJohe,
U.S. Scnn'-, Wnshi'i.jton, D.C.
Dear Senator Gouk: As I inomi^f^d at the time of my oarlior testimony on
FcbriKiry 7, I nm providini; hcif-with some siij.pl"Tai'nt;i-j' cominents on the
Study entitiod, "Arms y;!l."s and Forci'iiii Policy" i>rcp:trrd \,y iho St. iff of thn
Committee on Foi<'i?;n RoLition.-^ on J.muu.'-y 2.5. My comnunts ure grouped
under six mnjor Iie.-idiriKS \vliich seemed, on analysis, to represent the main
thrust of till" .<tiuly. Wo lind tiiat much of the dc.ciiment is faniujil and ^s'cll
presented; our disajireemciU- is eorifined to a fev/ errors of f.ict, to ni.iiters of
intcrpreti'.tion, and to certain of the Study's coneiiisions.
/. AUrgalion of a "Dramalic Shift" from Grant lo Soles Progrcms
The Study .'is.-icrts its position on this issue ns follows:
1. On paije 1, it states "This jjrowint: problem of iirms compeiitioa in the under-
developed world att<l tiu- diversion of .scarce re,~oiaccs is directly related to a
dramatic shift in the composition of U.S. tnilitJiry as.-istance and sales programs."
2. On page 12, it states th.at "Over thr past four years there ha,s been a b.asic
changi^ in the composition of American military assistance. The sale of arms has
now replaced the giving of arms as the predominant form of U.S. military
assistance."
•">. .\l-o on i).iL'>- 1", it tt:,(i~ ••It;i >-:•:.• ill'-." :•••• cI t:;- <• r.. * ' • . i'
:ippr«'ei;i'rd by t hi- lii<r;iri-hy of t h'' Airi. lii-Mi i^Mcu'r. • l!i .\:--': •; • .- ( r ,•• .. '
It is truf, :i.- I iii'iilioiicd in my c.irli'r t(--tiii!oiiy. th.U 'li.' t .\ • : \ .- :
grant aid ,um<I ci i(iir <:\\ih h.is ciiani;' d in rcccnl year-. W i;i t •.•r i ;;i • 1. - ~ i • .
tuted a dramatic shift is a m.tlter ol jud'^inent. In the rj.'^O's, th'- nr.in' j>-<-.-..-
;
far exceeded the salis program; at the present time the ratio is ') .1 in f.-.\..- of
sales. But since 1!IG1 tlie total of the two programs has been r<'maric:ibiy -• -• ! •,
hovering around i?o billion jut year; and it appears that the airgregate liuirr f..r
FY 1067 will be approximately •'52. .5 billion.
This shift is attrit)utablc almost entirely to natural economic developnv nts.
It has been oiir i)urpose for 20 years to strencthen our friend.> and aliie.s aca::.-t
serious military threats, both external and internal. Since the end of \\ orld W'.ar
II, we have provider! a nninlHT of countries vrith billions of dollars of grant
military assistance to meet important considerations of US national security. In
recent years the economic advance of these countries has enabled them to ass-uue
an increasiutjly larger resiionsibility for ihcir own defense costs. Tliis devcioi.-
ment is redected in t!ie d(;cliue of US military grants and the increase in US
military sales and is consistent with urgings bj- the Congress.
//. Alleged Inadequacy of the. Policy Review Machinery
The Study assei'ts its iio-^ltiou on this isstie ns follows:
1. On page 3, it raises tlie (|ue?tions "whether the; governmental machiiiery
designed for t]ie roanagenuMit of our military sales i)rogram is uieriuaie . . ."
2. On page S, it concludes that "In practice, the mechanism appears unequal
to the task."
?>. Also on pace S. it states that "the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
despite its charter, dne-s not sit at the Jiigli table when decisions o;i the sale of arms
are made."'
4. On i)age 11, it stat^-; that "there seems to be very little coordination betwc^cn
the right liaiid of military export credit i)olicy and the left hand of dev(>iopment
loans."
'y. On pac;e 12, it cr>;iclud;s that "it i, incumbent on tlie United States to re-
api)raise tiie adefpiacy of the pres.Mit machineiy of policy control and legishaivc
oversight governing tJic sale of arms."
As 1 said in uiy te^limolly of Feltruary 7, every military sale made is either
con;;onant with over-.'dl policy established by the Dejiartmeiit of State, or is
spf^eifically subjected to a car(-ful anrl thorough review within the I'S (love arnent
before negol i.ition is instituted. The re\ iew is concerned with the military
legitimacy of (he i<T|U'r"ments, the recipient's aliility to pay. the |)oteiiti.vl effect
on peace or stability in the area, aiifl other foreign |)olicy considerations. It
is conducted at very high levels of governuu-nt. and approval is not given until
a positive determin.'ition has been made that, bnlance-of-payments eousideratioiis
aside, thesali! is in our best n.'itional interests. Secretary McNaniara person.-dly
rc\'irws all inifiortant proposed sales, and the deei^ion frequently goes to the
Hi-'^sid<'nt.
The procops of jjolicy review always allows for the prrsmtation of views by
State, Defense, Treasury, ami AID. It may also invoht; the Anus Control and
Disarmament Aiz' my and the Unreau of the Buflget. Tl.' refore \silh res]iect to
rel itionsliip between mililaiy sales .and flevcloijment loans, State/AID is always
puscnt to bring tf> bear upon the reviTiV proei,'r,s the relevant eeotioniie facts .-ibout
the countiy in qu'siinn. The factors of ability to pay and the I'lfect of a military
sale on (he ..cr of local economic di'Vilopmeii t are serion-ly weiirhed. In con-
sequence, oilers of I'redit are frequently sealed down, nuich lo the di.-ai)poinimcnt




It is gcnor.illy tnif, as tlie stivly i)oints otit, that the Arms Control nnd Dis-
arr'inniont Ac-ncy h;»s not hfim a (najor pnrticip^nt in tho. rcvi<^v." urorcs.s ri'latini?
to -rpccilic a:il«-3 ol' ^oM^•l.li(i'Ml;ll ariiH. 'I'his rcllrcls anions otI\er tiling-; the tact
th:it'jO';o of sM'-h sales Iia\c bocH made for tlic purpose of nirolini; Aliiaiite rcqviirc-
nionts. ACI>A has concrntratod its attention on r>roblon\s of niuitilatoral control,
inchiding nurl. or nou-pruliferaii')!) and iii'iictal disartiuuuent nopoiiations.
In general, h'>\ve\-fr, I nur^t stale oniphaiically that, policy n>vie\v and policy
control aro t! '>rongh and clVoitix-'. Tiio present; milit;iry sales program is au
accurate rcUoction of considered US policy.
///. Allcgrd Lark ••>/ Comprehensive Reporting of Military Sales
The Study asserts its position on this issue as follows:
1. On pa^e 3, it states that "neither the Sides figures gi%'en by International
Logistics Negotiations—which do not include commercial military sales with the
o.\i'e|,'. 101! oi ti.o-,.; ;o v\ < -L 111 raiany
—
imr c\eii ea^iOiiis ^.all^llLs v.oui'j ne at .• 5 >
jjt\c the full -ilory of the extent of arms tratiic for which the United Stat>s is
r»-.spoii*il)|>."
_'. t^u p:it;c -"), it stales that "The prohli^rn of compilation of total sales is coiuiil".-
ra.ted, if not- ina'l'? imi)t).^-ible. l<y thi; a'lsenc:^ oi ;u-.y public or e'.en Government
sources that ivivc totals of ail US military exports to countries or regions."
3. On i>agf- S, ic states "the Oilioe of ISIunitious Coutroi, which should serve as a
general clearjiif? house, for all .arms sali'S, does not hav».> ri?sponsibiiity for handling,
or even c.ataIoi;iii!r, ,ui)veniiuent-to-j;overnment military sales . . ."
4. Also on pa;^e 8, it states "Since th.c Di i\!i.';e Department submits no com-
posite reports to tlie Cont;iess on what it sv.lU abroad or even how tho milirary
;ussistan'e. cn'flit accnunt is used, l(vi:islative oversight in the arms sales field is
Fiapiia/ard and <zeiier:dly inellcctual."
W'c bvlieix' th.it Coni;rc>s and t!io ^jner.al public h.ivo been extensively in-
formed on the scope, n.'-ull< ^md fut5;n.> pl.-uis of the military sales pro;:.\ni5.
Since the inc«'ption of milif.":v cash sa' 's in the early r.i.")!u. .ili such tr:.i;saei'o".s
have been r»p.irtetl aiauially by tlu^ DOlJ a.-< pan of the Military Assistance Pro-
gram presentation. In l'.t.">7, DOD informed Conirress of its intent to incre.i,~e
military sah''*, and asked Coi'i^rcss to est.il)lish a credit fund, on the grounds that;
prant recipirnts ^lioidd liet^jn paviiiji Th'-ir way as soon as their economic :ird
political sitiiiitions rnach; ihis le.i^iblo. Every year since 1061, representative.- of
the E\ecutiv<> Branch have testified before Congress on the details of the siih's
program. The 1)01) figures include commercial and customs statistics, .and
represent in «>ur judi;in'-nl aii;">ro\iiuat*'ly ".t>>^c of total I'.S in)lita.ry sales. They
are cninpiletl from a v.an'ety or sources includiiii; report-: from trie buying country,
US U!aba>sy rr'ports, foremn > nrDas-y re;)ort--. and speci.d reports covering cu.—
toni-^ still isiics for transactions over -Si!), (Kit). It is never.h.less true that no
.«in>;lc, comprehensive report on military sal's information (including munitions
licenses) i-^ prejiared within the ( !o\erunirnt. We believe the Study's recom-
niendal ion to provide one has considerable merit.
IV. Alleijrd "Dijnamic and Aqgressivc^' US Snles Approach
The Study asserts its po<itioii on this issuo as follows:
1. Oil pa-rc -i. it st.Ues t!i;it DOD "t!.;-o;:gh the .Military E.'^port Committee
of the J")t feiise Industry Advisoiy Council has soni;ht the coopei-aiion of industry
and the financial community in an elFort to furthcT ovei-s-.-as milirirj' sales."
2. On paue 4; it- stales ((luoting Mr. Kuss) tiiat other countties "may purch.'i?e a
minimum of Slll-1.'> billion of their requirements from the US" because US equip-
ment will U" '" O—lO'^o cheaper and . . . highh- corape:itive from a technical
point of view."
3. On pajzi; rt, it states ti.at "'neither Britain, France, nor any other of the in-
dustrial li.ations can compete with the United States in the 'Common Defciise
•M.-irket.' "
4. On paiie 8, it concludes that ".\meric.m sr.les efforts have iiecorne a source of
great iriiiati<>n in Euri.),)e, ]iarticiilarly in West, Germ.'uiy and Cre^'.t Britain. . ."
Most of these statements .an; factiialli' correct, l)ui che ini))l:cations are some-
what mi^le.-uHiur. \\'<' are of course ;iu indu.strial coimtry, in competition wiru
other natio'i-; and having or,r own ecciiomic goals. \\'<> are si-riously concerned
witii the m:UHtenaiie--- .ainl e\piii~iou of emiloyment levels, prcbictiou ana proliis
,ni tion,e. As till' Secretary of Defeu'-e citcfi al ;i jires.-- cor.feronc''' in I'.hj.", (1) niiii-
t.arj' sales will provide 1.2 million m m-ye.us of enipl'jynienc in the United .Stales
(2) they will result in nearly .si billion of j^rotiis to United Srates industry caci;
y<;ar; rnd (.'») tt.e bae-kloi; of orders for U..^. industry has grown by oOO'^/q, from
approximately S'.mII) million in Ivijl to nmn; t'.ian S3 billion in lilG.'i.
Til'; United Stiies ;dso has .a serious balance-of-payiiieni.; proijlem. Responsi-
ble U.S. ofhiials therefore cannot ignore t.he po-.~ii.le contriliutio;; of their j^rograms
to ihis probrm. Miliiary s.il s contribute direcily to our ba!.".nce-of-payu\eats
.•Nituation, but they do s-i wirliin tlie fr.irii ;\\-ork of iho rarli..;- slringent sales
criteria adopted by the Secret iry of Uefen'^e. His po.-ition is thar, witliOUt regard
to b.ilance-('i-p;i.yme its con-^ideraiions, (1) we will not sell milirary equinnieiit
to a forei;/!i couniry which we believe it cannot alford, (2) we w;:l not ask a loreis-u
country to buy a.ij-tlung which in its jufUment, or in ours, is not needed for i;s
armed forces. lu-.A (:',) we will not ask any foreiirn cou;try to purchase anything
from the United Ssaies whicii it can buy cheaper or l-ctcr els.-\'.-hi;re.
It is true th it l)Oi) has worked v.iih a number of <tefen.-e indust-ry groups t(*
further U.S. military sale.'?. We believe such coorfUutition with industry is in
keeping with the spirit of the Congressional mandate as set forth in Section
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G<ll (li.'i •"'' of »li'' J"<>ri ii;ii .\--i-i;in<-<' Act, wliii-Ii i trr(ii:r"," - ; In- Km ••'!;.. I;- •,••}
"to tin; in.i.xiiii'iiu cxti lit prni-iii .'.M'- to carry out |)rciu,r.i!:i- uf .---i-' vt.^ ; >.
*
private cliaiincl-."
Jt is aI-<) true, n.; I mvntiorn-d in mv <';irlicr t< -tiiuony, iIkiI ilc Ii.;-..! >! ..
h;is b'coiiii- tl)i; I'jwrsi i-i>,<t ai.cl ino>t circclivc iiio(liK-<"r of iitiiii.iry ••i|t|i[)tii' iii t;i
the world, which f.'ivc-< u" ;u\ uiidinnibli; coinpi ijiivc advaiitauc. V.-:])<>r;.!llv witli
respect to highly ^ophisticatod items. No doiiljt this jirodm-.'s irriMiion and
frustration in a. luiridjcr of other eoiiidrics, particidarly ia tlio<c which have a
well-o,stahli>Iifii industrial baso of (iirir own and a rffiuircincut for iiu'lcni uiili-
tury apiipment. Hut tiiis niatl'U- slionl I l)c ttMMi in true proportion: (.Mir Euro-
pean allies buy only 2'.'>',c of tlieir rnihtary eipiiptnent reeiuircnienls froiu the
• United tjliitcs; 77Vo is P'ipplied by their own industry. Moreover, ihi-y s;»ve
money and other risources dy buying; particular items in the Liiite<l suites.
V. Allcgationfi liegnrding the Financing of MililJinj Sales
The IStiidy asserts its position on this f)oitit as follows:
1. On piigc 0, it st:'.tes "The LxItnBank docs not know or \\;int to know where
this money goes. The Department of J)efen:^e {;iiarantees these fund.s through
the niilit.-^ry a-sistanec account. . . . The B.auk tiierefore avoi«is the jiroblem of
directly financing military sales to underdevi'lopcd countries."
2. Al-^o on i)age ti, it states "Tlie military .-i-sistance credit accounl is the most
useful io'^tniment at the disposal of the International Logistics Xv-ijotiations
(ILN) ollirn . . ."
3. On page 7, it states "The terms of such credit are at the discretion of the
Defense Department ..."
There is an iinplieation in the Sttidy tliat the ExImB.ink has b'^en acting
autonomouslj- in tiie financing of niilitary credit sales. Thi-^ i> nor tlie c;! -e.
Tie iniriative for the bank's role in milit.irv ^aa's was tak(Mi i>y the >"?'cretary of
the Treasury in lUO.T. At ;v meeting ,T.t tended by the AID Admini.-rrator. the
Budget r.ur''iiu Du<'ctor, and repr(?si'ntatives of the State unci Defeii-" Depart-
ments, and under the personal eh.-iirmatisliip of the Secretary of the Treasury, tlie
policies and pr(>cediires to l)e foi'.i.iwed by both the Uai.k and the Defen>e Depart-
nitnt in rcl-ition to military sales weie eslibli-ihed.
The Study also implies tliat Uii- milit:uy n>=-istance credit fund is solely at the
disposal of the Internatiti'ial Lo<;isties Negotiations oflice. In fact, tl;e manage-
ment of this fund is a matter of iiuero2:eney coordinatiou, and disbursements from
it are speeifieally controlled by the AID Administrator actiuii under the i)road
delcgatiou of authority fixnu the Secretary of State a.- set forth in th.e Foreign
Assist.incc Act. '1 he terms of credit for a given s.ale are also a matt»T of int<r-
agency discussion and coordination, in which the views of Treasury ;ind AiD are
given great weight.
VI. AlU'.jrd Prc-rmj^tire Selling and Intinsificalion of the Arms Race in Under-
developed \reas
The Study asserts its position on this is.-iio as follow.s:
1. On page 1, it states that "the pui'suit of 'illusory prestic;e' (rhrougii arms
acqeisitioii) ha.=: reeeiuly rii',ick'^ne''i throughout tlie developing nations of flie
world"; it then cites US sales of F—Is to Iran, F-5s to Libya. F-lOls to Jordan,
and A-4Bs to .\rgi-ntlna as pxamj'h-s of this development.
2. On p:ige .5, it slates tluvi. "l'rfv<>ntiug the iidlux of the military efnupment of
othe" nations, a sort of ;'re-e!ti])t:\e selliiig, has also been a sircuig I'S motive in
the underdevelopi'd pre.i« of tlie world. '
:}. On pau'-s 9 and 10, it cites '"increasmg arms competition between the United
Stales and the JMirope-,ns in the 'third' world . . .": it then Pt;Ues that Prance,
Sv,-e,ien, .•\nd Great IJriiain are pr'ssing tlie sale of supersonic aircraft in Latin
America.
It should be recognized as an historical fact that, until about lOGl, thc'under-
dev(-!oi>erl area- of the world were largely th(! e\clu'<ive pi«s(^rves of lirili-h.
i'ri'iii'h. tmfl (Jerman arms Hrms. Since then, >\ith rr<])( et to many iteui-.
European firms h.ave suliererl in underdeveloped mark' ts the sanu- compi'iiiv
disadv.Tntasies they do at 'lome: that i^^ to say, the T'S can often undi r^ell tli' in.
There has bi en some int'-n^-iticat ion of arms eom|)etiiion in yi.-.rl ieular uud'T-
fh.'veiiped areas'[delete'^l], but the f;,ets do not support .^uch a tindin!; -vii!; ri'-p'-c'
to Lntin .\inerica or Africa. P'orliiermore, in every case, the US his tri'-d i"
dit'iip 'iown tt'ii,-ious and slow dov. n the pace of .arms cxpe-miiiure.-. Th'- I >
iiioli%ation for each of the s^.Ies (iierl on page 1 of the Study wa.- to a^^ist in
deterring an external threat, or to help meet tli(^ internal security proiili m, or to
maintain TJS base richts. or to contribute to regional stability. In all of th' -*•
cases and in others, the US successfully reduced or postponed the supidy ol ariii-
de-irfil !>v thi' recipient or, as a comiitioa of tin- >ale, o':)tained aiireenients limiting
till' dive-r^-ion of national resources Lo military puri)o.s<-s. 'i'hat th(! pn'sent sUua-
ti<ui can be deseriiied as only an "arius w.dk" is allribulable to the extraordinary
elTorts madt^ by the U.S ( 'lovt-riiment to dis-uade developing nations froni ov< r-
speuding <m military items. Vou will recall that I provided, in my earlier te-ti-
mon}', specific examples of such US elTorts.
Fin.dly, as I also saiil previou-ly, tho^e cvnei-rned with guiding and directing
T^S foreign policy musl,, with respect to arms competition, dr iw u siiarp distinction
between oilier I'ree World competitors and tiio.sc from major Co:nmui'.i--t couiUrics.
In certain cases [deleted] the US sale was made lundamentally to avoid t ho
serious danger of a radi<-al shift in tlie orieut:ition of tlie reci[)ient country througii
the inlroductiiui of So\ ict arm?-, training missions, and other instruments of
influence-. And in another ease [deleted] our action was prompted by a heavy
infusion of Sox ' "t e<piipment into neighboring states.
Sincerely,
John T. McNavghton.




«Mrandu« of Senator Norse to the Gore Subcoanittee
March 2, 1907.
Senator Mouse
1. I have s'>i"^ over tiio ,McX;iiiu;hton letter which is a coinment on the staff
study on :irins s;ilo-:. My iiist roiiction is to c|U''-tiou --vhiil; iJo-.siljlt> reason thero
could bo for classifyii'.ir jt^ liiih-ss this is- anoUior cxiiianle of tin; oxocutivo br;iiich
cl;u':sifviii:C its (;n>b:irras<rnouts.
2. Wlniiior or not tiio Conimittt-o pursuc's this matter, I surely intend to.
Even if tliis let for riMnaius chissiticd, I sliall itcniize its points on tho S^oiiate Floor,
and respond to tln-iu. I hupc, liowcver, tiiis leiter wiil bo dcclas.-ifiod forthwith.
J. 1 find tlic spccilu's of rlie Di'[);irtuii;:it's n\~p in-c to be as 'ouch aa asrirniu-
tion of tho Coiuruiiiec study as a ri'ijuttal of ir. For example, Mr. .McN'au'^htoa
states that "Tlio jm-occss of policy review always allows for t!ic presentation of
vii^v.s by Stale, Drfen.-o, Treasiu'v, and AID."' liut, '.vhat, it "allows for" and
what it uets may be ipiite diiren-nt. I i!ii;>k Mr. .\|i'N'aUL;:;tou more or less,
contirms that the policy niacliinery is inadefj;;atc, and in my o;>iMion, that c.iis
for correction. .Moreover, the fact that uiilitary sah-s abroad provide i)rofits
—
not contracts, l)ut profits— lo Anu'rican biisinesd in the niar;nLtude of .'il biliion
a y(!ar is a statioiie to nuike us wonder whether profit.s iii llic arms traiFic are not
makim; us a [Mofiteer in blood money.
4. The statement by Mr. .McXau.'j^hton and tho fjuc-^tious we have for him
deserve to be considered in o[)en session. I find nothin.? in any of this matr;riul
that di;servcs to be secret. The subject should be pe.rsued by tho Subcomcniltee,
but in any c:'.se, it, .vill be pursued liy individe^d S^ieitors, iiuhidin'^ myself.
5. The Department's response doi-s not reb;.t tiie e^-eutiai p')it.ls of tho Com-
mittee .«T.udy. The alarms ix raises call for a complete, public rc-thinkiug of our
ann.s sales policy.
m"! •i°''^?"' ^*°***' United States Undent andgl3arma^.ent Problena. Hearings before the Subccamtitteeou bisaiT5iam«nii or the Conmittee on Foreign Relations.90th Congress, 1st session (Washington: U.S. Govern-




Oboanization or Intkrnationai. Looirtics Necotiattonr. OASD/ISA.
The Onire of Iiitrrnatioiml Logistics Ncscoliations is nn intejrral pnrt of the
Oflicc of iIi«-» A<5sistaiit i^wrotary of Defense for Iiitoniatioiial Socnrity Affairs
and is hoatlod by Dopiity Assistant Sptrctary Henry J. Kuss. Jr.
Under two dopiiti«'S to Mr. Kns^, ono primarily for Weapon SystiMns and one
for ]\IanaK<*ii)eat, there have been constituted six directorates each of wiiich is
<?harced with nctivifies for specific couutries and also with functional respon-
sibilities as p^t fortli below:
J. Air Wcaj*nn Sifstr^nn Directorate
Prinripnt \< i;otiutiii(j A'^.iiijtnnrnts: Federal llepublic of (Jeriiiany, Austria,
Belsium, Netherlands. I^uxeinbourg
Srconifnr^ Fiaictinnnl Aif-tii/iimcnt^: Coordination of ILN Air Weapon Systems
export i)lanuinp: and related reports; conduct multi-country Air Weapons nei:<>-
tiations; coordinate the weajwn systems management activities of the three
Weapon Systems Directorates.
2. ynr]f Wf^pon Sjixtrm Directorate
Principal Xrijof;;iti»rj Assigumrtits: United Kinfrdom, Canada. Sweden, Nor-
Wiiy, Denmark. Finland
Srconilnrjuf J'litu-tional Afxiqnmrntf: Coordination of ILN Navy Weapon Sys-
tems cxiMirt plaiinin^i and related rei)orts: c(Ui(luct nitiiti-counrry Navy Weapon
Systems phinnins ;ind re;;otiations ; conduct procurenieut planning and neso-
tintions, in<rludiuK common defense market planning.
5. Ground Weapon .S>//sfrm/» Directorate
Principal Net/olitrtintr Ansignmcnts: Italy, France, Spain, Switzerland, Tor-
ileal. Yii^je'Fiavia, NATO
Secondary Funeiinval Amtifjnmcnta: Coordination of ILN' Ground Weap-in
Systems esrport plans and related reports; conduct nuilti-country Ground Sys-
tems pHnnsnR and ncRotiatinns ; administration of non-rocurriui; cost recovery
policy; review of export ixdioy on advanced technology.
^. ifanarjcment Control Dircrtorntr
Principal! yriiotiatimj Ax^ifjiimcnta: Iran, Saudi Arabia, India. Pakistan
Seeoniiari/ Fimctinnal AU'dipuvntu: Desit^u, Installation and operation of a
management control system for foreicn military sales and related activities;
•stahlishm"!!* vt iutetrrated internal and external procedur'^s and Kchedulcs;
determinatiion of requirements for manaL'ctueiit iiiforuintion ; ucnnlsition, for-
mulation and presentation of such information for Management decisions.
5. Finnvcittl Mfinafjement Direetornte
Principal Ncrjotiatinfj A-'!sirjnvie>itf>: Australia, Japan. New Zealand, Taiwan,
Thailand, Malaysia. Rurtiia, I'hilippines, Korea. Vietnanj
Scondansi Functional A-'>''ifjntncnt.i: Maintain coordination with Treasury De-
partment, F'x-Im Kank and bankimr community for all ILN tinancine: develnp
credit finnncinK guidance and (Jovernment and commercial Military lixport Pro-
prams: manace credit program for all military exi>orts. inrludinir private and
Ex-Im Bank direct financing, Kuarantee financing, MAS njvolvin? fund financin::
and sale of notes to fmancinc institutions, includintr Talde TlTJ: provide ncirofi-
atinj: assisSance to all ILN Teams on credit financing; co<j»rdJnatc CINCl'AC
activities.
6. Economic} Manaffcment Directorate
Principal Xrgotintinrj A.tsifjnments: Latin America, Africa, Greece, Turkey.
Jordan, Israel. Lebanon, Iraq
Secondarjf Functional Aasifjnrncvts: Maintain coordination with AID and
Economic Officers at State on ILN economic matters; develop economic Kuidanc«
for ILN exi>ort programs for both Industrially developed ad developing coun-
tries; on the ba^is of economic analysis, develop new program tecbnitpics for
nianafreme-nt, neiroflations and implementatiou of Goverumeut and commercial
military export prograuis.
Soforctt U,S, Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1^68 , Hearings
before a Subcc^imittee of the CoCTsittee on~Jppropriations
,







Harold F. Linder o/ Xeir Ym-t President and Chairman. Walter C.
Saner of the District of Col^imbia First Vice President and Vice Chair-
man, Elizabeth S. May of Massachusetts, Hobart Taylor, Jr. of Michi-
^an and Tom Liller of \Vest Virginia.
Founded in 1?*34. t±ie Export-Iraix>rt Bank, more popularl.v known as Exin:-
banK^ is »n indepcndcirt corper^ia a«oncy o< the United States Govern wwt.lti
ifanction Is to assist in finanoinii the e.xport trade of the United .-^Jtates. 1 !,•
Bank serves thi> purpo.^e bv ui^ikin? loans directl.v to over.-^ea? buyers of A::i>'n-
'can goods and services; b.v tniarameeio? and insurin? short and mediuoi tiTn;
'export transactions: and by discounting export debt oblicrations hold by ri.m-
mercial banks. To enable Esinibank to conduct th^^se operations, the Act of •".ii
jrress Txhich constitutes the charter of the Bank, grants it broad bankin? powfr-.
including authority to borrow and lend, and to buy, sell, or guarantee <lr-b!
"obligations.
The direct lending operations of Eximbank are not unlike those of the spv.t.i!
'multi-national banks engagevl in international lending, altliouzh Eximban'i^ '•
activities are desioricd solely to serve the interests of the United States, wi;cr'':M
'the multi-national institutions serve the interests of all their member govern-
'nients. In its insurance and guarantee operations. Eximbank is the I'nited Srat">
"connterpart of those institutions of other indusrrial n.untries whiih i):.'M'i>-
guarantees and insurance to their exporters against the credit and poiUa-:i;
Vi.<:ks of overseas sales.
The charter of Eximhank lays down three basic principles: (^1) Exiuihank
'should supplement and encouni'ze—not compete with
—
private capital; '-
Eximbank loans should geuerall.v be for specific purposes and should "tT'
r
reasonable assurance of repayir.cnt: and <3) Eximbank foes and preuini-; '
charged for guanintees and insurance should be commensurate with the ri-i;«
covered.
Eximbank derives its funds from capital stock, from borrowing either from
fie United States Treasury or the private capital market, and from retained
^rnings. All of the Bank's .SI billion of captial stock is held by the Treasury
jnJ the Bank may Ixirrow f r-un the Treasury up to Si5 billion. The Bank has
^ised funds in the private market through the sale of particiijations in its
• |«aa portfolio and the Attorney General of the United States h;is ruled that
'-
"f-iiinbank .enarantee of such participations, as vrell as other undTtakings of
•Jie Bank, constitutes a general obligation of the United State.s Government
; backed by its full faith and credit. The retained earnings of the Bank, which
. .-oastitute a reserve for possible losses, are slii:inly in excess of :fl billion. This
r^.'ierve has been accumulated by the Bank after payment of all its operating
. ripsDses, including interest on funds borrowed, and payment of dividends over
ae years of some ?5(» million to the United States Treasury.
^^' VBANK







Eximbank is authorized to have outstanding loans, guarantees, and insurance
'jf up to S'J billion. Since it.s charter provicies that only 23 per cent of the face
amount of np to -i^'J billion of guaraiuees and insurance need be charged against
!bi.s ceiling, commitments outstanding man-y reach ."^lO.o billion. During its life,
Eiimbank's net authorization for loans, guarantees, and insurances have uggre-




ITie chief executive ofricer of the R;mk is a I're.-iJent who iil>o serves as Chair-
:»an of a bi-partisan I'.oaril of Directors whidi is the policy niakins bcly of the
^'>nk. The I'resideiit and Omirinan. aiifl the other four iiienilvM-.s of the Hoanl,
-iro appoiated )iy the President of the I'liited States with the advice and consent
''f tlie Senate. lOximhank's i>o!icies are coordinated wiih these of the (hnern-
j-"-Mit as a whole throii;,'!i the National Advisory Council on International ^foue-
.
'|ry iind l'"inaneial P'olicies, an inter-agency trroup composed of the Secretaries
; "•" State. Treasury, and Commerce, the (.'liairman of iIh' I'.cjard of (Wnernin's
'f the Federal Keserve Sy>teni. and tl'.e f.'hairnian of I\\-iudiank. An Advi:;()ry
'''Jiamittee of nine members, broaijly rei)resentativ(? of produerion, eommer( i>,
'"'lace, a.u'riculture, and labor, meets .several times a year to advise with the
,
'"Jiiik on its ptdicies.
I
i)n;Kt-r iovns
If a buyer abroad conieniiilates procnrin;,' C'lnipment from Tnited St;ile-« sup-
•
I'liors lor an industrial or other project and thc-e piirehases are of siillicient
i "'i>;,'nitude. direct contact with and a direct credit from Kxindjank will usually
i
'"' the most appropriate Kximbank assistance. Pnrebascrs eliirible to apply for
' " <Ureet credit are: .a foreisrn corporation, tho stoc'k" of which is ]iri\-ntely or
i'libliciy 1H..UJ ; a forei^^'u [larlnership or individual; a forei'-'ii ^'overnmcnt or Its
r '-'ciicie.s ; or a United States enterririse oiier.atini,' .abroad. (Generally s[>eakinir.
die credit will bo made available only to assist in tinancin?; capital giHuls and
''L'latiHl services of United States orisrin.
Tender a direct loan, Exiinbard; ne^'oliates a credit a^rpoment with the forel'i
purchaser who issues liis notes or promises to jiay to ICxiudiank Ujion iiTe.ti\,.
delivery of the equijiment, Die Bank concurr(Milly remitting dr>llars to the I'liji, •
States sujijdier. Here the exporter's role is secondary and he I'articip.'itcs jj, jj,,'
tinancinf^ only when asked to take some part of the hn.anced portion of the sn!.'
Itepayinent terms for direct credits vary with the project and the tspi- ',,'
equiiirnent, running' normally from" five to fifteen years. An initial waitiriL'pn i,, i
jirior to the lirst repayment of principal may he ^.Tanterl for installation and !•.
I)erinlt casli throw-off to develop. Tlie interest rale on direct credits is not sui!
.lect to fluctuations but, as it is i:overned in part by the cost of money to l^Ni.,,.
hank, may be adjusted ujiwards or downwards from time to time.
Exindjank must satisfy itself that the courjtry in which the loan is to be ina^ii-
can supply, in all probability, the dollar excbanL'e to service not only tlie V.Wv.,.
bank loan hut the coimtry"s total dollar detit as well. If exchange controls exj.t
or lire imuiinent. Kximhank will require assurance from appropriate L'overn
mental authorities that the necessary dollar exch,'in,c:e will lie forthcomiu'.:. !••
the country is limited in its ability to earn liard currency. Eximljank' may ^i\,- ij^
priority to loans w hich finance enterprise capable of thruwiuL' olT or savinir forei-n
exchange.
In loans to unseasoned ventures, or where the credit of the ohiirror falls slmf
,
of "reasonable assurance of repayment" criteria. Exiintiank requires an nnconrij.
<;,
tional endorsement from a (inancially resjionsilile .cMiarantor—a foreiL:n priv;iif.
V or f^overnmentJil hank, the government itself, a foreign or domestic coriioratlnu,
or on occasion an iniiividual. Kxinib.'.nk prefers not to accept UJort!.'a;;es, i)lfd;.'o-.
or other liens on assets as security for its loans.
Finally, the technical feasibility cf the project must he appraised. Thi<: ninv
Involve ent;ineerinir. market potential, raw material availability, and similar
studies. Since Fximhank operates within the frainework of (Jovcrnnjent jio'icy.
It also weic'hs the effect of the loan on the United States balance of paynicnix
nnd the ju-oject's economic and social impact in tlie host country.
Not all direct loans are for ca)iit;il eoods. Kximbank hat' been ji slL'-nillcnnt
factor in financinir acricultural cominodity exjiorts. princiii;illy cotton. I.(i:\ii'<
have also been made to linancial institutions abroad for relendinc: to buyers of
United States equipment. A number of sizeable credits have been extended to
foreign Kovernnients to tide thera over temporary periods of flollar shorta-".
thereby maint.nininc the flow of U.S. troods to the recipient counti,-y.
IXCREAStD LF.NniNG AUTItOlilTY .\XU EXTENSION OF LIfF,, rOii."
On Aucrust L'O. IfXiy, the Congress enacted I'.L. SS-.lOl (77 Srat. li'S) pursuant
'' which the len(lin.i: authority of the I'ank was increased from .s7 liillion to .sO
'•'lion; the agtrre-'ate amount of export credit in>uranc-e and guararuces whicii
'lie P.ank may h;ive outstanding, a.craiust fractional reserves, was increased from
>1 billion to ^2 billion : and the life of the Bank was extended frr.in June .'Id, l'.)i5;j
:'" June30, lt>C8.
Soureet U.S* Coiigr«88, House of RapresentatlTes, Bcport » ^y^*^
Bank and Cr»<ilt Sales of Defense Articles, Hering Beroro
the Conadttee on Banking and Carreney, 96th Congress, 1st
, session (Hashlngtons U^. Ooveroautt Printing Office, 1967 )•
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You inquired in your letter of March 18 as to the events
leading up to my writing the Chairman of the House Banking and Currency
Committee calling for a hearing on Export-Import Bank financing of arms
sales, including sales to underdeveloped countries.
In the fall of 1966, there was considerable comment in the
press as to the possibility of United States firms participating in
providing equipment for the proposed Fiat-Soviet automobile plane. In
December of 1966 several members of the International Trade Subcommittee
of the House Banking and Currency Committee made a trip to Italy and the
Soviet Union to acquaint themselves with the considerations involved
should there be United States participation in that plant. In the early
months of 1967 this group continued active in the further study of the
problems involved.
It was during this period that the minority staff of the
House Banking and Currency Committee, in discussing the Fiat problem with
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, became aware of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff study on armed sales and foreign policy
which had been released in January of 1967 followed by hearings before
that committee in March, April and June. At that time, the Export-Import
Bank had proposed legislation to extend the life of the Bank and increase
its basic lending authority. On July 17, 1967, the Banking and Currency
Committee held a supplemental hearing dealing with Export-Import Bank
financing sales of defense materials. This resulted in delay in enactment
of the basic legislation under consideration by the committee with the
result the bill extending the life of the Bank and increasing its lending
authority did not become law until March 13, 1968.
your thesis.
I hope this information will be helpful to you in preparing
Best wishes.
Commander James M. Patton
31 Needham Street







Kxpla:^ation of AME:^D^rE:>^Ts Proposfd by the Execcttti: Braxch to Part II
(Military Assistance Pbogeam) of the Fulcicn Assistance Act of 1961.
AS AilENDED
BEORGAXI2ATIO.V OF STATUTUEY PBOVISIOXS
Most of the aniendnients proposed by the Exe^utire Branch to part II of the
Alt are tt<Lii:i'.iil in nature and are de-iurieil t'j delineate more clearly those pro-
\isions v\"liit h app'y to the military as-istan'-e pro'^ram and those provisions
which api'iy to :he ujilitary sales prujrrain. They are intended as a forward step in
ilarifyin^ the -K.-i'pe of tho-e proirraius.
Circiiiii>;an<es <'f history, in jurtifular the clearly weakened economic con-
ditions of :a<'st countries followinsr World War H, f or< ed on the United States
the role oi nia.i'-r arnjameut >up]ilier to the free world. During: the decade of the
I'.'.-'Os. the United Slates iiioc the legitimate armament needs of its friends pri-
iiiaril.r thr"H;:ij a major :;raut aid iir'"::ram. Ily the latter |>art of the decade,
liowerer. maiiy of the.-e countries had l>econje pro-i>erous again, enabling them to
produce mi>re of their ov\u arms or buy them abri'ad.
In terms if t'lai vaiue. US miiitar.v exi)urts in the 10 year period. FY 10C2—
l!i71 are ii<-z e>;i>e-ie<l to he mea.-urably higher :han in the dc-i^-Kle. FY 11>."»2-1'h;1 ;
the b::r cban.::e will l>e in the .-hiit in the way these exjn^rts are financed—from
^'raur aid in liie 'Gos ro military sales in the •.<is. By FY 1!.h;i. grant aid had
<leeliiied from an ;i\enit'e annual level of .Sil biUi<!ii-pIus during the I'j-jOs to
abont >^1.". billii.n. since FY I'.^Jl this downwanl trend has continued as grant aid
-declined both aiisnUuei.v and relativei.v. Whereas in FY i;t01 there were s2 of
grant ai<l lor every dollar of military sales to foreign recipients, by FY IfXXJ the
ratio had b<-en reversed.
In view of this shift in emphasis from grant aid to sales—a shift called for by
the Congre<s ii; section TiChhci of the Act—it appt'^'ts desirable at this time to
recodify tiie statutory provisions applicable to the sran: aid and sales programs
si> as to d-iiiiv.ite th"-ie jirovisions applicable to both i^rocrrams and those pro-
visions applicable onl.v to crane aid or to sales. I nder the present Act. for ex-
aiiipie. iht- uenerai authority f'^r grant aid and for reimbursable transactions
• i.e..
--ales, exelianges. leases, and guaranties » are cominingle<l in one section
—
-ection Z'Xi. i.»:hHr provisions affecting these authorities are scattered through
the remainder of part II of the Act in various sections. Hence, the uninformed
reader of purt II can l>e led astray in seeking to ascertain the authority gcveming
l-artit;nlar kind:- of transactions. The guaranty authority is illustrative of this,
part of the authority being contained in section r.<i.'J(et of the .\ct and part in
-ei tiou r><*'.ifi, ( (,f the Act. Similarly, r-^stricti^ns on grant aid ro Latin America
are found not oulv in section oil of the Act Lut also in section Mo(b) of the
Act.
To reorganize the stattitory provisions into a clearer form is, accordingly,
the primary purr^'se of the technical amendments yiroposed by the Executive
I'«ranch. As a result of this reorganization, part II is divided into three chapters.
< hapter 1 sc-rs forth the policy governing military as<is,ance and saies and the
ii-rnis which giivern the utilization of defense articles and defense services
-ranted or soUl unoer part II. Chapter 2 consists of the substantive provisions of
!h,' u.iiirary assistance program. Chapter 3 sets forth the substantive provisions
f* the foreign military sales program, which comprises cash sales, credit sales,
-uaraiities. exchanges, and leases.
SUBBSTANTm: AME.SDMENTS
The remaiinng niiiendinorits proiK>s(Hl b.v the Executive Branch to part II of
the Act would .icciMiii'lish the following substantive changes.
1. Tiro Year Aiithorizntioii for Ai>i>rnprinli'»rx and "Ihatr-ilotcn" Authority
SiH-t ions 201 (c) and (j) of the bill auihorize .M.VP a I'propriations for the fiscal
years llics nnd I'.M'.il ;ind extends for tin- same |M'riod lln- aniiioiily lo draw-down
<lofenso slix'ks to meet oiiiergencirs. A two-yo.ir aullHoizat ion would evidence
Coiigri-ssioiial recomiition that miiitar.v assistance is in our national iiUeri'st, that
the program does iM-cup.v an e^iablished idace iu our overall foreign [M)licy, and
that (lu-re is a long-dTiu secnrit.v job to do.
(.'crlain i)arts of I In- .\I[> program -dcveloi.uient loans and the .\lliaiicp for
Prognvss—have traditioiiall.v been aiUlioriz(>d for more than one year. These
two proirranis are now authorized tliroui^h 1-"Y 1",h;;», and ^^^o-y(•a^ aiilliorizations
are also b»'ing re<)u<'sl«Ml for other AIL) piograms. A two-year authorisation fi>r
milil.ary assist.ance would bring it into line with the e<-ononiic assistance pro-
grams, and provide eac-li new Congress witli nn opiMirtunil.v to review militaiy
assist .•line in the light of changing world cireumstanc is. Apiiroprations. of course,
woiilil continue to bo made annuall.v, and the Kxeinitive l!ran<-h would pi'esent
the ofT-jear programs to the Cfimniiltoo on I'oreign Affairs iu whafe\cr form or
degree of detjiil the Committee desired.
2. Tranxfir of ^fAI' for Tmoh tiiid Tlxiilnnd, InfrnKtnirfurr, and It'tcrnntionnl
MUiiarii IlvadiiHitrttrx from I'ori iiin yl.f.v.-^/ajytc; Act to DOT) l,<i/t.'<!iitinn
Th«' ndiltary assb^tanct' program was not designed to support forcos aolually
engag'Ml iii combat operations, but i-atbcr to t<|iiip forios and pnnide storks of
CfUMb.'it eonsumablos essential to initial dofenso :i:;ainst oveit at:;-'r('ssioii. I'or this
reas/iti, it w.is proiMisi-d last voar to transfer tb" support of .South \'ii't Ttaircso and
other fno w<»rld forees en;:agi'd'in the defense o|' ilio U.piiblie of \'ii-tiiani friiiu
tlio miiitar.v assisljinoo prot;ram to the regubir Uofeiisc budgot. 'ITi-iL rhange.
whirli was aj'proved b.v tlie Congress, lias I'.'O-ilitaled ilio cflcitive niiinai,'oinent





Tills y<*ar, similar roiisidoratioiis iiiiilcrlic tho pr<»iH>s<-(l trnnsfcr in FY 1!»0,S of
tli« iniiltnry assistance siipixirt I'osts of the Lao and Thai forci-s f ri>iu the iniliNiry
assist,-I in<> pn>;:rani to the rcfinlar Dcfcnsi? hiulm-t. Laotian fon-vs aro in'avily
en^aj:c<l in foinhal; oiKniliuns (.Icsoly associated with tli<> fno world «>iToit in
Vif'tnain; and thoir n'liMirt'inoiits, (-siKK-ially for aniniiuntioi\ and ll'^lit. aircraft.
ar<' larju'ly «-ornl>al-rclal<'d and arc siiKjvvt to further chanco. I'nlt«-d States acc«>-;s
to Thai hasos is vital for l.iiitrd Stales aircraft operating apiinst Nurlh Viet-
nam, and tlie Thai Covernment will soon he sending some of lis Rroiind forces to
fichf: beside our own and other free world forces in South Vietnam.
Two other transfers from th»> military assistance jiroirram to tlie remilar l>e-
fens<> btid^et are also proposed in section 'J()l(li)(l!) and (.'?) of the hill. The
first involves tho NATO Infrastructure I'rouram whidi provides for the con-
struction and maintenance of facilities needed hy NATO forces in Kur>>jx\ in-
cliidinp those con.mitted to NATO hy the f-'iiited States and deployed throuKh-
ont the NATO area. The second involves tho International Military Ileadnuarters
Program which supports the integrated command stru<-tures of N.VTO, CKNTO
niul SKATO. These proijranis, which represent the United States' share of tho
total costs of tho two endeavors, are principally related to the support of our
own forcoH and should proiK?rly ho Unanced in the rO);nlar Defense budget.
S. Elimination of 40 Country Rcatrirtion nn MAP
Tho 40 country restriction which section TiOKa) of the .Vet lni]>oses ui>on M.W
is n^niovod by section 'JOl(c) of the bill in order to permit the President to
conduct U.S. foreipi policy with an adequate decree of flexibility. While it is
the goal ot the Executive liraiicli to reduce tlie number of rt-cipient countries as
rapidly as practicable without jeopardizinp our security, a fixed ceiling on the
number of countries which can be given military assistance is an arbitrary re-
striction on the President's ability to respond quickly to changing world re-
qxiirements.
Section 201<i) (4) (li) of the bill adds nil optional way of carryimr out b;irter
transactions, wliicb does not involve .M.\l' fundin};. L'mler sections r>n:{(:[) and
."(KMa) of the Act (which ari' conliniied in IxMDt; by section 201 (i> tl), (2),
(;j), and (4) (A) of the bill as new sections ."'J7(a) and (1«)), -'^lAl' funds may
be used to prctcure <leleiise articles !ind defense servics for barter with trier.dly
foreign couidries for el her def«'nse articles and defense servites. 'j'he defense
articles and delense servi<'es reecived in excliai!f;e may be used to carry out
part II or m:iv be tr:tnsfei red to any rnlled States Oovernment ageniy. In
some cases, barter tran^;o-|ions have been ciirricil out under this autlioi-i|.\ solely
in furtherance of part 11 of the Act. In other ea-es, barter traiwio tioiis under
this authority b.ave hail the dual purpose of further part 11 of the .\et ami also
of acquiring defense articles and defense servie<s from other countries to meet
the requiremei;ts of our own .armed forci's. In the latter kind ot t I'ans.iet ions,
the MAI' appropriation aecount is, under existing law, not reinibursed by tin?
applicable military fuii< tion appropriation until the items received :is exchange
are delivered to the Military Oepartments. The new authority jtropscd by sec-
tion 2(>1( i » (4 > ( 10 Would enable such transactions to be carried out without pre-
funding bj' M.M', .and this uoidd avoid tying up and tenqiorarily di\erling
MxVl' funds from other program uses.
J. Credit SalcH
Section i;<»l(p), which re enacts that part of s((tion ."^>.".(a) of the .Vcl re-
lating to gener.al authority for credit sales as snb>~ections (.a) aiul (b) of a new
Siection !>'J\, also adds a new credit sales authority as subsiition (b)('$) of se<'-
tion 5-1. This subsection, whiih would further the intent of Congress as ex-
pressed elsewhere in lb(^ .Net to utili/.e private chjiTinels. where possible, in carry-
ing out programs umler the A<'t, authorizes the purcha'-(>s of promissory notes
issue«l by u foreign country to a <-ommercial suiiplier \\hi<h has sold defense
articles and services direetly to the count ry.
J^n some eas(>s, friendly foreign governments m:iy. for (loiitical and/or <'i-onondc
reas<)ns. desire to deal directly wKh the U.S. pri\ate supplier or lending instilu-
tion rather than with U.S. <;overnment agencies. This new authority— like the
existing sales authorily^wmdd be used only when it is in the U.S. national in-
terest tlnit such sales lie madi;. Under this subse. tion. I>»»D would, with respect
to a]>proved sales, arrange in advance with U.S. sui)pliers to acquire from them
proniissf>ry iiot«'s issued by foreign countries and either hold these or dispose
of them, in whole or in part, to appropriate linancial institutions. It should
be noted that enactment of this subsection would n()t have the elTe<t of in-
creasing tlie fuiuls uvall.able for financing crotlit sales or the total volume of
sales which could legally be (iiumced by such fiinds; it woidd only provide an
additional oj>tionul means of utilizing available funds to carry out approved
programs for tlie assumption by friendly countries of a larger sliare of tho burden
of their own defense.
Source:







O -H +i TJ
T3 -^ -fJ -C I-
:5 3 > ? i
p- ro ;* o C
^ T^ 'U u o
o d5
0| '-I > ~«l














-1 tr\ CO ID r- VO -a- ^ m W CM CM (\j OJ CM rH Cj

















H J- c^ ^c UN VD J- m m C\j OJ C\J OJ C\J C\J r^ (M
.H ON J~»
\0 u^ CJm Q or
iH m M











OJ ro m C\J CVI OJ OJ OJ ^ iH ^ r-t ^ '^ t-i Cd
CO

















H O o CJ r-t CO t~ \o UN -3- m -3- -3- -J tn m cn











-t J- c- vo l/\ ^O J m m CM CM CM CM OJ CJ .-«











H U" vO -T UN (O -H CM ^ '-< -I ^ rH -H "1 -^ -1













on § ,9, & g 3
-« UN ^ ^ m ^ " "1 r-< ^ -^ ^ -^ ^ ^ -^ ^ o u^m
S ^'
^ irt
•n TT 'fl -Jl t^
w^































tJ a J =
t-
-r x: c
tc J -*-> -J
r- 3 s
>»-< < o
"H >. -4 t.
^ c- 5 E?
^-.? u O - V *i} ''.—t '
H " :: ;- - i^ jj (-4 c ->,*e- --1 ^ 1 0! •»
; c -< :->A - •»• -. £- -< -l'. O O
3> 3 •:;:'!"
w jj ^ « V : a*




.\i^^;i,'i ,= ; ^',
•
'; s s ::; Ml •" --.
hx---y- s,. .-..., ..,..
o o nj
Source: U^, Department of Defense, Military Agaistanee Facts » 1967







Commander James M. Pat ton, USN
31 Needham Street
N. Chelmsford, Massachusetts 01863
Dear Commander Patton:
We have discussed within our Bureau the
possibility of declassifying the documents you
indicated would be useful to you. Our conclusion
is that to declassify these documents would require
a substantial effort, that probably not all could
be declassified, and that, since yours is the only
request for these documents , such an effort is not
warranted at this time. We are also reluctant to
let this material out of our files, i.e., mail it
to Tufts for you, because some of it appears to be
irreplaceable. Nevertheless, we shall keep your
request in mind, and we shall do what we can to help
you.
You are, of course, welcome at any time to use
our Conte-Long files here in the office, or for that
matter any other files pertaining to your research.



































Commander James M. Patton, U.S.N.
31 Needham Street
North Chelmsford, Massachusetts 01863
Dear Commander Patton:
in further response to your recent letter concerning
your Ph.D.
dissertation on congressional influence on foreign policy
exercised
U.S. Military Assistanc
This includes my pressthrough
restraint on the nce Program, I have
enclosed the material available from my files.
releases from November, 1967, which pertain to that
subject and, also,
the texts of my radio shows from that month.
AS you may know, the Conte-Long amendment is no
longer in force, since
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Amended
(in 1967
and 1969) covers basically the same ground. It was
knocked out on the
floor by Representative Clement J. Zablocki(D-Wis.) m 1970 on a
point
of order that it was legislation on an appropriations
bill.
J^lJ^l'l
argu;nent used was that provisions of the Conte-Long
amendment are now
contained in the authorization legislation and, therefore,
are no longer
needed .
concerning the background of this measure, I ^^/^^°^f^^Jflt^i^r
""^
restriction on assistance to underdeveloped countries
for some t me.
in fact I filed a minority view with the Report of ^^^^-^^^^^J-^.^^.^r
subcommittee in 1966 expressing my beliefs ^^"^^"^"^r 'n^'^^^^^f^"^^^"''^
in this area. So, as you can see, the concept was
not a new one to me.
concerning Dr. Bader's study, "Arms Sales and ^y^^^" f^^^g^/ Vneter^
I first learned of it when it was mentioned in
tne mass media ^^^^^^
i-;,lked to Dr Bader, but I and mu legislative assistant at
the time,
Mr Frer^er^hei^er: did draw much valuable information
from the document.
The final wording of the amendments was the result
of many discussions
,
drafting, refinements. I was mainly upset with the ^-^^
-^^%,:^,,^
arms going to underdeveloped Latin American
countries. Peru, for example,
h^one of the lowest literacy rates in the world and economically,
many of the people there were destitute, vn^lejer^^^^^^^^








the -Met set" originally, my amendments only dealt uith
Latin America
2d Africl HoZel, I clanVed that in my ..Sco^ittee .he. --"-*««
^ntioned that the a^ndr^ents might be interpreted « ,^-=""-^°^^,
treatment against latin America and Africa. In




Commander James M. Patton, U.S.S,
Page 2 4/27/72
wording of the amendments, I was assisted by Mr. Wertheimer and the clerk
of mg committee.
As far as the actual procedure , however, I had not been planning this
"unorthodox" move for any great length of time in advance. It was simply
the approach that seemed to be the best one at the tdme. The authorization
bill itself seemed hopelessly deadlocked over this Issue, so we decided to
bring the appropriations bill to the floor without it. Yet, I felt even this
would not have succeeded without a provision limiting arms sales to under-
developed countries.
With regard to Congressman Long's contribution, his co-sponsorship of the
amendments was necessary to give them the bipartisan flavor so crucial to
sharply contested measures . He was also a firm believer in this sort of
limitation and a member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
In retrospect, I believe that these amendments were not only appropriate, but
necessary to our entire foreign assistance program. It is highly improper for
the United States to encourage these underdeveloped nations to waste funds on
unnecessary military purchases. True stability and an improved economy can
only result from a victory over hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy. These
are the areas to which our economic aid should be directed.
Despite the amendments, the countries affected of course could still go ahead
and purchase the armaments -Elsewhere . For example, when American jet planes
were not for sale, some bought from the French and the English. This occurred
despite the fact that those countries who purchased such weapons had their
economic aid from the United States decreased by the amount they spent for the
arms. But the amendments did succeed to a large degree in getting the United
States out of the business of supplying sophisticated weapons to these under-
developed nations.
I believe the Executive Branch acted well in response to the legislation. Many
times after the Conte-Long Amendments were enacted the Executive Branch came to
me for an interpretation of the exact intent of the legislation. One example I
recall had to do with certain electronic equipment needed for a radar system.
The legislation was written so tight that this equipment also was covered and
the Administration wanted to find out from me if this was by intent or whether
sale of the equipment could be allowed. I believe, on the whole, the Executive
Branch leveled with me on its actions.
I hope that I have been of some assistance to you on this matter. If you have
any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Also, I would
appreciate it if you could send me a copy of your paper when it is completed.
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